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Update on the Law of Discrimination
I. Introduction
• Arbitration Decisions
See materials on "Arbitration Provisions: The Aftermath of Circuit City
Stores. Inc. v. Adams and EEOC v. Waffle House" prepared for the 8th
Biennial Employment Law Institute by Hon. Robert D. Hudson, Greenebaum
Doll & McDonald, Covington, Kentucky.
• Harassment Decisions
See materials on "Workplace Harassment: A Critical Update" prepared for the
8th Biennial Employment Law Institute by Hon Winifred L. Bryant,
Greenebaum, Doll, & McDonald, Lexington, Kentucky and Hon. Julie K.
Hackworth, Ashland, Inc., Covington, Kentucky.
• Disability Discrimination Decisions [ADA]
See materials on "The Americans with Disabilities Act; An Analysis of Recent
Decisions" prepared for the 8th Biennial Employment Law Institute by Hon.
Raymond C. Haley, III and Hon. Kathryn A. Quackenbush, Woodward,
Hobson & Fulton, Louisville, Kentucky.
• Religious Discrimination Decisions
See materials on "Losing My Religion: The Employer's Duty to
Accommodate an Employee's Religious Beliefs" prepared for the 8th Biennial
Employment Law Institute by Hon. Debra H. Dawahare, Wyatt, Tarrant &
Combs, Lexington, Kentucky.
II. U.S. Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit Decisions
A. Disparate Treatment Discrimination - Establishing the Prima Facie Case
1. Background
a. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (19730,
established the basic evidentiary framework for Title VII
(42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.) disparate treatment claim. See
also, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981). The plaintiff must show:
i. membership in a protected group;
ii. qualified for the position;
iii. rejection or other adverse employment action; and
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iv. circumstances supporting an inference of
discrimination. 1
Burden of going forward then shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action;2 and
Then the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the reason
articulated by the employer was a pretext for
discrimination. That is, the plaintiff must meet the ultimate
burden of persuading the court that the plaintiff was the
victim of intentional discrimination.
This burden can be met either by directly persuading the
Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248,256 (1981).
b. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)
held that rejection by the fact finder of the employer's
asserted reason does not entitle the plaintiff to a judgment
as a matter of law. It still remains for the factfinder to
determine whether the plaintiff's proffered reason
(intentional discrimination) is correct. The factfinder's
disbelief of the reason put forward by the employer
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima
facie case be enough to show intentional discrimination.
2. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc.! 530 U.S. 133
(2000).3 The Court:
a. Rejected the "pretext plus" theory that some courts thought
was required by St. Mary's Honor Center decision;
1 In Clayton v. Meijer. Incorporated, 281 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2002) the Court held that an employee
can satisfy this element of the McDonnell Douglas test by proving that the employee was replace
by a person not within the protected class or by showing that similarly situated, non-protected
employees were treated more favorably. See also, Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff's
Department, 227 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2000)(as female former deputy sheriff was not similarly
situated to male deputies who were accommodated by county, she failed to establish a prima
facie Title VII case).
2 In Smith v. Leggett Wire Company, 220 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000) the Court held that an
employee's threat to "kill a bunch" of people unless his pay dispute was resolved constituted a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination.
3 In accord, Braithwaite v Timken Com.pany, 258 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2001).
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b. Made it clear that a plaintiff can prevail merely by making
out a prima facie case and presenting enough evidence
that the employer's reason was pretextual without
additional, independent evidence of discrimination; and
c. Reasoned that "in appropriate circumstances, the trier of
fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation
that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose."
3. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
a. The McDonnell Douglas framework is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement. The framework
does not apply where a plaintiff is able to produce direct
evidence of discrimination. See Trans World Airlines. Inc.
v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985). Because, the precise
requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on
the context, the framework was "never intended to be rigid,
mechanized, or ritualistic." Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
b. A Title VII or Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29
U.S.C. §623 [ADEA]) complaint alleging disparate
treatment discrimination is sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss if it satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) that a complaint must include only "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." The statement must merely give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. Thus, complaints in
employment discrimination cases must satisfy only the
requirements of Rule 8(a).
c. NB: Abrogates the 6th Circuit's decision Jackson v.
Columbus, 194 F.3d 737 (1999) which held that the
complaint must contain factual allegations that support
each element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.
B. Disparate Impact Discrimination - Establishing a Prima Facie Case
1. Background
a. Under Title VII, impermissible disparate impact
discrimination arises from employment practices that are
"fair in form but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Disparate impact
does not require a showing of discriminatory intent.
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b. As a general rule, the plaintiff must identify a particular
employment practice and offer statistical evidence
demonstrating that the employment practice has a
significant adverse effect on a protected group. Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
c. Once the plaintiff establishes the adverse effect, the
burden shifts to the employer to produce evidence that the
challenged practice is a business necessity.
2. Adams v. Florida Power Corp., _ U.S. _, 122 S.Ct. 1290
(2002); 255 F.3d 1322(11 th Cir. 2001).
a. The Court granted cert to resolve a Circuit split whether the
disparate impact theory of discrimination is available to
plaintiffs under the ADEA.
b. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), a
case involving liquidated damages under the ADEA, the
Court expressly left open the question of "whether a
disparate impact theory of liability is available under the
ADEA."
c. The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits subsequently held
that disparate impact claims are actionable under the
ADEA. See CrUey v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102
(2d Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union,
114 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 1997); and Frankv. United Airlines,
Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
d. In contrast, the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth
Circuits have questioned the viability of disparate impact
claims under the ADEA post-Hazen. See Mullin v.
Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696 (1 st Cir.) cert. denied, 528
U.S. 811 (1999); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41
F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73
F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 1995); and Lyon v. Ohio Educ.
Ass'n and Prof'I Staff Union, 53 F3d 135 (6th Cir. 1995).
e. Writ of certioriari was dismissed as improvidently granted.
3. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
a. §601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in
covered programs and activities. 42 USC §2000d.
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b. Pursuant to §602 of Title VI (42 USC §2000d-1) which
authorizes federal agencies to effectuate §601 by issuing
regulations, the Department of Justice promulgated a
regulation forbidding funding recipients from using criteria
or administrative methods that had the "effect" of
subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the
prohibited grounds (disparate impact).
c. Reaffirmed that there is a private right of action to enforce
the text of §601 (See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979» which prohibits intentional discrimination.
d. However, the Court held that there is no private right of
action to enforce the DOJ's disparate impact regulation it
promulgated pursuant to §602.
C. Damages
1. Caps
a. 42 U.S.C. §1981(a) provides that: "The sum of the amount
of compensatory damages awarded . .. for future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages
awarded ... shall not exceed..." various amounts based
on the number of employees the employer has.
b. Pollard v. E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843
(2001 ).
i. The Court held that an award of front pay to
compensate a successful plaintiff for lost pay
between the time of judgment and reinstatement
was not subject to the damage caps in 1991 Civil
Rights Act for "compensatory damages."
ii. NB: Abrogates the 6th Circuit's decision in Hudson
v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir. 1997), which held
that the statutory damage caps under §1981
applied to all compensatory and punitive damages
in the entire lawsuit including front pay.
2. Punitive Damages
a. Definition
42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(1) provides that: "A complaining
party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent (other than a government,
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government agency or political subdivision) if the
complaining party demonstrates that the respondent
engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory
practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."
b. Cooper Industries. Inc. 'v. Leatherman Tool Group. Inc.,
532 U.S. 424 (2001).
i. This was an unfair competition and false
advertising case under the Lanham Act4 , not a Title
VII case.
ii. The due process clause of the U.S. Constitution
prohibits the award of excessive punitive damages.
See BMW of North America. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559 (1996),
iii. When a Court of Appeals reviews a District Court
determination of the constitutionality of a punitive
damage award, it should apply a de novo standard
and not the less demanding abuse-of-discretion
standard.
3. Back Pay Awards - Taxes
a. United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.
200 (2001).
This was not a Title VII case. However, the Court found
that payroll taxes imposed on back wages should be
computed using the rate and wage base applicable in the
year in which the back wages were actually paid, not the
year in which they should have been paid.
b. NB: Abrogates the 6th Circuit's decision in Bowman v.
United States, 824 F.2d 528 (1987) that held that back
wages were subject to taxation in the years to which back
pay related.
D. Sovereign Immunity
1. Background
a. U.S. Const. Amend. 11 provides that:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
4 The Lanham Act is the popular name for the Trademark Act of 1946.
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commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."
b. Since 1996, the Supreme Court has held that the 11 th
Amendment shields unconsenting states from private
lawsuits seeking damages for alleged violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (Kimel v. Florida, 528
U.S. 62 (2000»; the False Claims Act (Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. U.S. ex reI. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765
(2000»; the Lanham Act (College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Brd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999», the Patent Act (Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. V. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999», the Fair Labor Standards Act (Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999» and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996».
c. There is no Eleventh Amendment bar to private lawsuits
seeking damage remedies against a state in three
instances:
i. when the state has consented to suit;
ii. when Ex Parte Young exception applies;5 or
iii. when Congress has properly abrogated states'
immunity.
d. Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
under its Section 5 power to enforce the 14th Amendment if
(Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996):
i. Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity; and
ii. Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of its
Section 5 power as determined by the requirement
that there be:
1) congruence; and
2) proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means
5 A plaintiff may sue a named state officials in their "individual and official capacity" for alleged
violations of federal laws or the Constitution if they are seeking prospective relief such as an
injunction to prevent a· continuing violation of federal law, but not for relief designed to remedy
past behavior such as damages.
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adopted to that end. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
,t
2. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001).
a. Adds the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to the list of
federal statutes that can't be enforced against the states
by private lawsuits seeking damages.
b. To abrogate the states' 11 th Amendment immunity from
suit by an individual in federal court, two factors must be
met:
i. Congress must make its intention to do so
unmistakably clear; and
ii. The congressional enactment must be a proper
exercise of Congress' constitutional authority.
c. ADA was an invalid exercise of Congress' 14th
Amendment, Section 5 power against the states because
Congress failed to establish a pattern of irrational state
discrimination in employment against the disabled.
Moreover, the rights and remedies created by the law were
not "congruent and proportional" to targeted violations.
3. Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533
(2002).
a. State university employees brought an action in federal
district court alleging a federal cause of action under the
ADEA against their employer and coupled it with a state
age discrimination action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367, a
federal supplemental jurisdiction statute. The federal
statute purports to toll the statute of limitations period for
state supplemental claims while the state and federal
claims are pending in federal court and for 30 days after
they are dismissed.
b. The plaintiffs' ADEA claims were dismissed because they
were barred by the 11 th Amendment. Thereafter, Plaintiffs
refiled their state law claims in state court beyond the state
statute of limitations for such claims, but within the 30 day
tolling period under 28 U.S.C. §1387.
c. The Court held that the state law claims should have been
dismissed as time-barred because, as a matter of statutory
construction, the tolling provision does not apply to state
A- 8
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law claims asserted against nonconsenting states that are
subsequently dismissed on 11 th Amendment grounds.
d. Expressly refused to address whether federal tolling of a
state statute of limitations constitutes an abrogation of
state sovereign immunity with respect to claims against
state defendants. "[W]e can say that the notion at least
raises a serious constitutional doubt."
e. See, Jinks v. Richland County. S.C., 2002 W.l. 654174
(4/2/02). The South Carolina Supreme Court answered
the question left open in 2002 W.l. 654174 (4/2/02). The
South Carolina Supreme Court answered the question left
open by the U.S. Supreme Court in Raygor. It held that
the tolling provision in § 1367(d) vio'lates the Tenth
Amendment6 because it interferes with the state's
sovereign power to set conditions for the waiver of its
subdivisions' immunity from tort actions.
4. Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2000).
a. A terminated vice president sued the university under Title
VII for race and national origin discrimination and
retaliatory discrimination.
b. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445. 456. 96 S.Ct. 2666. 49 l.Ed.2d 614
(1976) that Congress had abrogated the states' sovereign
immunity by enacting Title VII under §...§ of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the 6th Circuit found that the 11 th Amendment
conferred no immunity upon the university from the Title VII
claims.
5. Kovacevich v. Kent State University, 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000).
a. A faculty member sued the university for sex and age
discrimintion under the Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. §206(d)
[EPA]); Title VII and the ADEA.
b. On appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the
university raised, for the first time, an Eleventh Amendment
defense.
c. In Wisconsiv Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381
(1998) the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the Eleventh
6 The Tenth Amendment provides "the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the
people." U.S.Const. amend. X. "
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Amendment is not jurisdictional, and is not akin to the
complete diversity requirement. A court is not required to
raise the defect on its own. Unless the state raises the
matter, a court can ignore it.7
d. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit held that the Eleventh
Amendment defense '''sufficiently partakes of the nature of
a jurisdictional bar that it may be raised at any point of the
proceedings," including appeal.
e. Because the university was an "arm of the state" it was
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the ADEA
claim. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000).
f. However, the Court found that the Equal Pay Act
constituted a proper abrogation by Congress of the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity. It reaffirmed the
continuing validity of Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of
Commerce, 104 F.3d 8333 (6th Cir. 1997).
6. An Aside: Fisher v. Peters, 249 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2001).
a. An employee with the dual status as both a civilian and
National Guard technician brought a Title VII suit against
the acting secretary of the U.S. Air Force claiming sex
discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment.
b. Relying on Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983)(Congress has exercised its plenary authority over
the military by establishing statutes regulating military life
and providing for a comprehensive internal system of
justice), the Sixth Circuit reiterated its refusal to extend to
uniform members of the armed forces the statutory
remedies (e.g., Title VII) available to civilians absent a
clear direction from Congress to do so. See Coffman v.
States of Michican, 120 F.3d 57 (6th Gir. 1997).
. b. The Court held that National Guard technicians occupy
military positions despite their hybrid employment status.
Therefore, they had no remedy under Title VII.8
7 This decision abrogated the- Sixth Circuit's decision in Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203
(1996) .that held "state immunity is jurisdictional in the same sense as the complete diversity
requiremenf' and that "neither the litigants' consent, nor oversight, nor convenience can justify a
court's exercise of illegal power."
8 See, also Kentucky Department of Military Affairs v. Hon. Robert L. Crittenden, 2001 WL
958909 (KyApp Aug. 24, 2001). Discrimination and retaliation claims brought under KCRA for
discrimination and retaliation by current and former members of the Kentucky National Guard
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a. Buckhannon Board & Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia
Dep't. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598
(2001 )
i. Involved only the fee-shifting provisions in the 1988
Fair Housing Amendments Act and the 1990 ADA,
but the Court noted that the same language
appears in other statutes, including the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. §1988, authorizing the
award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party".
ii. Court held that a "prevailing party" entitled to an
award of attorney's fees is one who has been
awarded some relief by the court.
iii. An enforceable judgment on the merits and court-
ordered consent decrees create the "material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties"
sufficient to permit an award of attorney's fees.
iVa Rejected the "catalyst theory" which would have
permitted the award of attorney's fees when the
plaintiff's lawsuit brings about the desired change in
the defendant's conduct without a final judgment or
court-ordered consent decree.
b. Adcock-Ladd v. Secretary of Treasurey, 227 F.3d 343 (6th
Cir.2000).
i. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k) & 2000e-16(d) authorize,
in employment discrimination lawsuits, the
discretionary court-awarded allowance of a
reasonable attorney fee, as a recoverable litigation-
cost, in favor of the prevailing parties, other than
the United States.
ii. Plaintiff, a former Secret Service agent, filed her
employment discrimination lawsuit in Tennessee.
She retained a Washington, D.C. lawyer to depose
a key witness in that city. The Plaintiff ultimately
prevailed.
against the Kentucky Department of Military Affairs and Kentucky National Guard were impliedly
preempted by federal law.
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The Sixth Circuit found that the District Court
abused its discretion because it applied the
reasonable hourly rate that prevailed in Knoxville,
the situs of the court of record, to out-of-town
counsel's services rather than the proven
reasonable hourly charge the out-of-town attorney
billed for legal work performed in Washington, D.C..
The Sixth Circuit distinguished its decision in
Hudson v. Reno, 133 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir. 1997),
cerl. Denied, 525 U.S. 822 (1998) which deemed
the legal community within the court's territorial
jurisdiction as the relevant community for
determining the reasonable hourly rate. It held that
Hudson governs fee awards to out-of-town counsel
who volitionally elect to represent a party in a
lawsuit to be litigated in the jurisdiction of a court in
which the case is filed instead of using the judicial
venue of the lawyer's professional residence. In
the Adcock-Ladd case, the Plaintiff retained out-of-
town counsel because she was required to depose
a witness in Washington, D.C. and out-of-town
counsel transacted all his professional duties for
the plaintiff within the District of Columbia.
2. Statute of Limitations
a. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, _ U.S. _, 122 S.Ct.
1145 (2002).
i. Title VII §706(e)(1) requires that an employee
alleging employment discrimination to file a
"charge" with the EEOC within a certain time after
the conduct alleged (USC §2000e-5(e)(1) and
§706(b) requires the employee to affirm or swear
that the allegations are true (USC §2000e- 5(b)).
ii. The Court found that a letter faxed by an employee
to an EEOC field office within the required statutory
time period claiming "gender-based employment
discrimination, exacerbated by discrimination on
the basis of . . . national origin and religion"
constituted a "charge" within the meaning of
§706(e)(1) even though neither the complainant
nor the EEOC had treated it as one.
iii. The Court sustained the validity of an EEOC
regulation that permits an otherwise timely filer to
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verify a charge after the time for filing has expired.
See 29 CFR §11601.12(b)(1997).
b. Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2001).
i. ADEA contains no statute of limitations for a federal
employee who pursues administrative remedies
before going to court.9
ii. The Court held that Title VII's 90-day limitations
period for filing a civil action applies to ADEA
claims brought by federal employees who pursued
administrative remedies before going to court. In
accord, Rawlette v. Runyon, 104 F.3d 359 (4th Cir.
1996)(unpublished decision); Edwards v. Shalala,
64 F.3d 601 (11 th Cir. 1995); and Lavery v. Marsh,
918 F.2d 1022 (1 st Cir. 1990). Contra, Lubniewski
v. Lehman, 891 F. 2d 216 (9th Cir. 1989)(six year
statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. §2401 (a)
applies).
c. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001).
i. Plaintiff's application for a tenure-track faculty
position was rejected. He did not file his race,
religion, national origin and age discrimination
charges with the EEOC until more than 300 days10
elapsed after receipt of the college's written
notification that he was not going to be hired.
However, his charges were filed within 300 days of
when he learned that the college hired a white male
under the age of 40 for the position who did not
subscribe to the same religious beliefs as the
plaintiff.
ii. The court held that the starting date for the 300-day
limitations period is when the plaintiff learns of the
employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff
learns that the employment decision may have
been discriminatorily motivated. See also, EEOC
v. United Parcel Service, 249 F.3d 557 (6th Cir.
2001 ).
~ Federal employees alleging age discrimination do not have to seek relief from their employing
agency or the EEOC. They can opt to file suit in federal court in the first instance. However, they
can elect to pursue administrative remedies first. 29 U.S.C. §633a(d).
10 Because the alleged unlawful practice occurred in a "deferral state," the plaintiff had 300,
instead of 180, days in which to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
5(e).
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The Supreme Court has held that the 300-day
period of limitations for filing a charge with the
EEOC is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling (Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385
(1982).
However, the Sixth Circuit held that equitable tolling
of the EEOC filing period in this case did not satisfy
its five-factor test (Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148
F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1998):
1) lack of notice of the filing requirement;
2) lack of constructive of constructive
knowledge of the filing requirement;
3) diligence in pursuing one's rights;
4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and
5) the plaintiff's reasonableness in remaining
ignorant of the particular legal requirement
for filing his claim.
d. Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Board, 259 F.3d 452 (6th Cir.
2001).
i. Employee sued for race discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII and the Tennessee
Human Rights Act (THRA).
ii. Plaintiff argued that the time for filing suit after
receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue letter should be
tolled because of his lack of mental competency
pursuant to TN Code §28-1-106 which provides
that: "If the person entitled to commence an action
is, at the time the cause of action accrued . . . of
unsound mind, such person ... may commence
the action, after the removal of such disability,
within the time of limitation for the particular cause
of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in
that case within three (3) years from the removal of
such disability."
iii. Consistent with its previous decision in Johnson v.
Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 489 F.2d 525 6th Cir.
1973), the Court of Appeals held that state law
tolling or savings provisions do not apply to the
limitations periods expressly set forth in Title VII.
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e. COX v. City of Memphis, 230 F.3d 199 (6th Cir. 2000).
i. White police lieutenants alleged that the city
engaged in racially discriminatory failure to promote
because of the use of an allegedly tainted eligibility
list. The plaintiffs were on the eligibility list despite
their allegations that management had coached
black police lieutenants for the test that determined
inclusion and ranking on the list. The plaintiffs did
not file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of
the promulgation of the eligibility roster. However,
they did file their charges within 300 days after the
eligibility list expired two years later and they had
not been selected for promotion.
ii. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the use
of the tainted eligibility list constituted "continuing
acts" of discrimination thereby excepting them from
the usual timing rules for filing a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC.
iii. The Court held that the promulgation of the tainted
promotion roster triggers the time for filing an
EEOC charge. Subsequent promotions or hiring
decisions based on such a list are not continuing
acts, but are merely the effect of previous
discrimination. In accord, Bronze Shields. Inc. v.
New Jersey Dept. of Civil Service, 667 F.2d 1074
(3d Cir. 1981). Contra, Guardians Ass'n of New
York City Police. Dept. v. Civil Service Comm'n of
City of New York, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. Standing
a. Cleveland Branch. National Association for the
Advancement of Collored People v. City of Parma. Ohio,
263 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2001). The NAACP, an advocacy
association, sued the city alleging race discrimination in
the recruitment, selection, and hiring of municipal
employees.
b. The Court held that an association may obtain standing to
bring suit on behalf of its members when its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right,
the interests at stake are germane to the organizations'
prupose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members
in the lawsuit. Citing Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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c. Court also held that "associational standing" is determined
at the time the complaint is filed.
4. Scope of EEOC Investigation
a. EEOC v. Roadway Express, 261 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2001).
i. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(a) provides that:
"In connection with any investigation of a charge
filed under section 2000e-5 of this title, the
Commission or its designated representative shall
at all reasonable times have access to, for the
purposes of examination, and the right to copy any
evidence of any person being investigated or
proceeded against that relates to unlawful
employment practices covered by this subchapter
and is relevant to the charge under investigation."
ii. The employer, charged with failure to hire women
as operators/laborers and failure to promote black$
to sales/management positions, refused to provide
information regarding the promotion of women to
sales/management positions and the hiring of
blacks as operators/ laborers as not relevant to the
charge.
The Court held that the statutory relevancy
requirement should be generously construed and
that evidence of employer discrimination in one
situation or employment position is relevant to a
determination of whether the employer
discriminated in other circumstances. See Blue
Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir.
1969).
iii. The employer also refused to turn over evidence
that did not fall within the time-frame of the EEOC
charge (e.g., post-charge information).
The Court held that the temporal scope of an
EEOC request for information was not so limited.
Compare, EEOC v. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. 54 (1984).
III. Kentucky Cases
A. Sovereign Immunity
1. Background
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a. Ky.Const. §231 provides: "The General Assembly may, by
law, direct in what manner and in what courts suits may be
brought against the Commonwealth."
b. School districts, as agencies of state government, are
entitled to sovereign immunity. Clevinger v. Board of
Eduction, 789 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1990).
c. While the defense of sovereign immunity usually arises
from tort claims, it applies as well to contract claims.
University of Louisville v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 676 (Ky.App.
1978).
2. Ammerman v. Board of Education of Nicholas County, 30 S.W.3d
793 (Ky. 2000).
a. Teachers sued their school board alleging breach of
contract, various tort claims, violation of certain statutes
protecting teachers and sexual harassment in violation of
Kentucky Civil rights Act. KRS §344.010 et seq.
b. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that all of the plaintiffs'
claims except the one based upon the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act were barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
c. Reaffirmed the continuing viability of its decision in
Department of Corrections v. Furr, 23 S.W.3d 615 (Ky.
2000) that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not
prevent suits based on the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
against the Commonwealth or its agencies because the
state had specifically waived it.
3. Tiller v. University of Kentucky, 55 S.W.3d 846 (Ky.App. 2001).
a. Community college employee sued the university for sex
discrimination in compensation.
b. The university argued that the plaintiff's claims were, in
essence, wage discrimination claims under KRS Chapter
337 which contains no waiver of sovereign immunity for
wage discrimination claims brought against the
Commonwealth.
c. While agreeing that sovereign immunity would bar a wage
claim based on KRS Chapter 337, the Court concluded
that the plaintiff brought her claims under the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act, for which sovereign immunity is expressly
waived.
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a. KRS §344.040(1) provides in pertinent part that it is an
unlawful employment practice for an employer: "otherwise
to discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of the individual's sex."
b. KRS §344.030(8) defines the term, "discrimination on the
basis of sex" to include pregnancy, childbirth, and other
related conditions.
c. In Tiller v. University of KentuckyTilier v. University of
Kentucky, 55 SW3d 846 (Ky.App. 2001) the Court held
that discrimination against a female employee on the basis
of her status as an unwed mother was sufficiently within
the statutory definition of "discrimination on the basis of
sex" to allow her to bring a sex discrimination suit against
her college assuming the requisite burden of proof is met.
2. Definition of "Employee"
a. KRS §344.030(5) defines "employee" for purposes of
Kentucky Civil Rights Act as "an individual employed by an
employer .... "
b. In Steward v. University of Louisville, 65 S.W.3d 536
(Ky.App. 2002) the Court held that a graduate student
receiving a fellowship from the university that provided full
tuition remission and a renewable taxable yearly monetary
stipend was not an "employee" and could not bring sex
and age discrimination lawsuit under KCRA.
3. Definition of "Retaliation"
a. KRS §344.280 makes it an unfair employment practice for
an employer to "retaliate or discriminate in any manner
against a person because he has opposed a practice
declared unlawful by this chapter, or because he has made
a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in any investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter ...."
b. In Bank One, Kentucky v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540 (2001),
a former employee, who had brought suit against her
employer for sexual harassment, alleged that the employer
violated KRS §344.280 because it filed a declaratory
action (during on going settlement negotiations) in the U.S.
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District Court seeking a determination that it was entitled to
prevail on its affirmative defenses under the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998).
T~e Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that filing a suit
while settlement negotiations were on-going was retaliatory
in nature. "While it may amount to bad manners or may
appear to some to be unprofessional, such conduct does
not constitute a violation of the statue nor is it tortuous."
4. Election of Remedies
a. Doctrine of "election of remedies" means that if a person
has two modes of legal redress for an injury suffered which
are contradictory and inconsistent with each other, the
deliberate and settled pursuit of one will preclude a later
choice to pursue the other.
b. KRS §342.690(1) provides that a claim for workers'
compensation benefits is "exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee ...."
Subsection (4) creates an exception to this "exclusive
remedy" rule if the employee is injured through the
deliberate intention of the employer.
c. In American General Life & Accident Insurance Company
v. Hall, 2002 WL 442044 (Ky. March 21, 2002) an
employee sued her employer for damages for mental and
emotional injuries inflicted by the employer's sexually
discriminatory practices. The employee accepted workers'
compensation benefits for "psychological problems
resulting from sexual harassment" by her immediate
supervisor. The Court concluded that because the
Plaintiff's workers' compensation claim and her civil rights
claim were premised upon the same injury (harassment by
her supervisor) and the same resulting damages, she was
only entitled to only one remedy (workers' compensation
award she had previously accepted).
d. In Wilson v. Lowe's Home Center, 2001 WL 1658212
(Ky.App. Dec. 28, 2001) the Court held that an employee
who initially opted to use the administrative process
provided under KCRA for redress of his charge of race
discrimination and hostile work could withdraw his
complaint before the Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights prior to a final determination on the merits and to
subsequently file a discrimination complaint in circuit court.
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5. Extraterritorial and Intraterritorial Application of Civil Rights
Statutes
a. In Union Underwear Company, Inc. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d
188 (Ky. 2001), the Kentucky Supreme Court was asked
the question whether a Georgia employee of a New York
corporation that had its headquarters in Kentucky could
bring suit under KCRA for age discrimination when all acts
of alleged discrimination occurred outside of Kentucky and
the employee never lived and worked in Kentucky.
i. There is a well-established presumption against
extraterritorial operation of statutes. Thus, unless
a contrary intent appears within the language of the
statute, courts presume that the statute is meant to
apply only within the territorial boundaries of the
Commonwealth.
ii. KCRA does not contain any express provision for
the extraterritorial application of KCRA. Nothing in
the act implies that it was intended to operate
beyond Kentucky's borders. There is express
language to the contrary. The purpose of KCRA is
described as one to "safeguard all individuals within
the state from discrimination ...."
iii. KCRA has no extraterritorial application. In accord,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991 )(Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to
regulate employment practices of United States
employers who employ United States citizens
abroad.)
b. In Rogers v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 48 S.W.3d
28 (Ky.App. 2001), the Court was faced with the question
whether the Jefferson County ordinance prohibiting sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination in
employment, public accommodations and housing could
be enforce in the City of Louisville which had adopted an
ordinance that prohibited sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination in just employment.
i. K.R.S.§67.083(7) provides that "County
ordinances which prescribe penalties for their
violation shall be enforced throughout the entire
area of the county unless: (a) Otherwise provided
by statute; or (b) The legislative body of an city
within the county has adopted an ordinance
pertaining to the same subject matter which is the
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same as or more stringent than the standards that
are set forth in the county ordinance.
ii. Because of the express statutory command and the
lack of appl.icability of the exemptions contained
within the statute, the Court held that the more
expansive county civil rights statute was
enforceable within the City of Louisville.
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I. INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY
• Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. _, 122
S.Ct. 681 (January 8, 2002).
The United States Supreme Court recently overturned the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision and held that in order for an individual to be substantially limited in the major life
activity of performing manual tasks, she "must have an impairment that prevents or severely
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily
lives." The court noted that these activities would include attending to one's personal hygiene
and performing various household chores. Contrary to plaintiffs position, it did not include an
individual's ability to perform "repetitive work with [her] hands and arms extended at or above
shoulder levels for extended periods of time," since these duties were not central to most
people's daily lives. The United States Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's finding that a
worker will be considered disabled if an impairment substantially limits her ability to perform a
class of job-related manual tasks. The Supreme Court holding restricts the application of the
ADA; whether it will limit disability discrimination litigation in the future remains to be seen.
Plaintiff was hired by defendant Toyota Motor Manufacturing Company in 1990 to work
in the paint department. She was later assigned to a position on the engine fabrication assembly
line which required her to use pneumatic tools. Plaintiffwas subsequently diagnosed with carpal
tunnel syndrome. To accommodate plaintiffs medical restrictions she was assigned a variety of
modified-duty jobs over the course of a two year period.
Plaintiff was eventually placed in a quality-control position, which duties included
visually inspecting painted cars moving down the assembly line for imperfections. In 1996, the
Company decided that all quality-control employees must· rotate through a variety of tasks such
as wiping oil on the cars' hood, fenders and doors. These duties required plaintiff to hold her
hands and arms around shoulder height for several hours at a time.
Plaintiff began experiencing pain in her neck and shoulders and requested to be excused
from having to perform these functions and return to the paint inspection job full-time. The
Company rejected plaintiffs request because these duties were determined to be within her
restrictions. Plaintiff contends that she was forced to perform the wiping duties that aggravated
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her condition, which subsequently led to her doctor directing' her to avoid all work-related
activities for a period of time. Soon thereafter, plaintiff was terminated based on her poor
attendance record.
Plaintiff filed a disability discrimination action alleging that the Company violated the
ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate her and terminating her employment. The district
court granted summary judgment in the Company's favor finding that plaintiff was not disabled
because she was not substantially limited in the major life activities of lifting, performing manual
tasks or working. In reaching this conclusion, the lower court judge noted that plaintiff was able
to engage in "personal hygiene activities" and carry out household chores despite her alleged
condition.
The case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which disagreed with the
lower court's findings and reversed the summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Williams' condition prevented her from doing the tasks associated with "certain types
of manual assembly line jobs, manual product handling jobs, and manual building trade jobs
(painting, plumbing, roofing, etc.) that required the gripping of tools and repetitive work with
hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time." The United
States Supreme Court accepted this case to decide the proper standard for determining whether
an individual is substantially limited in performing manual tasks.
The high court held that an individual seeking to prove that she is substantially limited in
the major life activity of performing manual tasks must first demonstrate that the manual tasks
involved are "of central importance to people's daily lives." Additionally, the court held that
"the impairment's impact must be permanent or long term." Because most people are not
required to be able to "perform repetitive work with [their] hands and arms extended at or above
shoulder levels for extended periods of time," the inability to do so in and of itself is insufficient
to constitute a substantial limitation on a major life activity ofperforming manual tasks. Further,
the court emphasized that these standards must be applied on a case-by-case basis.
Of significant importance, the Supreme Court highlighted the Sixth Circuit's failure to
focus upon Plaintiffs ability to perform personal hygiene and household chores. The court
noted that activities such as bathing and brushing one's teeth are "the types of manual tasks of
central importance to people's daily lives." Since plaintiff admittedly could perform these tasks,
her limited impairment in other areas of her life were not sufficiently severe to establish a
manual task disability. By requiring plaintiffs to prove that the manual task in which they are
limited is "central to most people's daily lives" it may create more difficult standard for a
plaintiff to prove that they are disabled under the ADA.
• Swanson v. University of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit held that an employee was not substantially limited in a major life
activity when the duration of his depression was short. Plaintiff began his surgical residency at
the University of Cincinnati ("UC") on July 1, 1995. During his residency his perfonnance
began to decline and in May, 1996 he was placed on academic probation until September, 1996.
In May and June his performance continued to drop. Based on the recommendation of another
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physician plaintiff had seen, plaintiff sought psychiatric treatment in July, 1996. He was
diagnosed with major depression and began taking medication. Plaintiffs performance began to
improve, however, one of plaintiffs evaluators suggested he transfer to another residency
besides surgery.
On October 31, 1996 Plaintiff was terminated from his residency position. He requested
to be reinstated, receive a leave.oi.absence and/or ,some accommodation, but each request was
denied. Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging disability discrimination against his
employer, VC.
The employer argued that plaintiffs major life activities were not substantially limited by
his condition because his restrictions were short term and improved with medication. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the employer's position that although plaintiffs depression
affected his ability to concentrate, it did not significantly restrict it. Nor was plaintiffs sleep or
communication significantly restricted since with medication he continued to have future
success. Plaintiffs impairment was short-term because with medication he improved
significantly. Thus, the court noted, that an employer must consider the duration of an otherwise
substantially limiting impairment when they are determining whether an individual is disabled
under the ADA.
• Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d 1328 (11 th Cir. 2001).
The Eleventh Circuit held that an inability to drive to work for six months does not
qualify as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. After the employee was
diagnosed with focal onset epilepsy, her doctor advised her not to drive until she had gone six
months without experiencing a seizure. Employee's position as a nurse involved driving
between different sites where she carried out file reviews. The employee asked to work at home
and for a variable schedule to accommodate her transportation needs. The employer eliminated
the requirement that she drive between work sites, but denied the other requests. The Eleventh
Circuit held that the ability to drive to work is not a major life activity, noting that it requires a
license from the State that can be revoked for a number of reasons, such as failure to insure, and
that millions of individuals are not self-driven to work. Further, the court concluded that there
was no evidence in the record that the employee's inability to drive substantially limited her
ability to work.
• Contreras v. Sun Coast Corp., 237 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit held that a forklift operator's inability to lift more than 45 pounds for
a long period of time, to engage in strenuous work, or to drive a forklift for more than four hours
per day did not constitute a substantial limitation on his ability to work, absent a showing that he
was precluded from a broad class of jobs. The Court also concluded that the employee's
inability to engage in sexual intercourse more than twice per month due to his back injury did not
substantially limit the major life activities of reproduction or engaging in sexual relations.
Although the employee claimed that he was able to have intercourse 20 times per month prior to
his injury, he failed to present any evidence regarding the condition, manner or duration of his
inability to reproduce as compared to the average person in the general population.
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• EEOC v. United Parcel Service Inc., 249 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit held that a delivery driver who suffered a severe reaction to an allergen
(pollen of a Mountain Cedar plant) specific to Central Texas had made a prima facie showing
that he was disabled. The driver resigned his employment after the employer denied his request
for a transfer to Ohio. Although ·.the employee could still perform the essential functions of his
job at the time that he requested the transfer and his reaction to the allergen cleared up after he
moved, his reactions to the allergen were steadily worsening at the time ofhis transfer request.
The plaintiff employee rarely left home during his non-working hours, his wife took care
of his household duties, and the employee suffered from severe nasal and bronchial congestion,
swollen eyes and nose, rashes, fever blisters, fatigue, fever and depression. His physician stated
that effective allergy medication would threaten the employee's safe operation of a truck. The
court therefore concluded that a reasonable jury could find. that the employee was disabled
because his allergies substantially limited his ability to do his job while in Texas. The court also
held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the employee's resignation was not voluntary, but
an involuntary loss of his job due to the employer's failure to reasonably accommodate his
disability.
• Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd 230
F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff's asthma was found not substantially limiting because it was correctable by
medication, even though the plaintiff refused to take the medication. Plaintiff's doctor testified
that her asthma was slow to clear because she refused to comply with his recommendations and
was reluctant to take steroid drugs. The court concluded that because Plaintiff's asthma was
correctible by medication and she voluntarily refused the medication, she was not substantially
limited in a major life activity.
II. "REGARDED AS" DISABLED
• EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the EEOC failed to prove that the
defendant Company discriminated against prospective employees in failing to hire them based
solely on the results of a nerve conduction test that identified people susceptible to neuropathy.
While the applicants did not presently have an impairment at the time the Company failed to hire
them, the EEOC argued that the defendant regarded them as disabled. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed, holding that the Company regarded the applicants as unable to perform only four
specific jobs in the workplace and that the record contained no evidence that the applicant's
perceived inability to perform jobs requiring frequent repetition or use of vibratory power tools
precludes them from any other jobs in the geographic area.
Moreover, the court rejected the Company's argument that in the context of proving a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must always present
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quantitative ievidence of the characteristics of the local job market, and number and types 'ofjobs
from which he or she is precluded. The court noted that in some rare cases the impairments are
so severe that substantial foreclosure from the job markets is obvious. In other cases, however, a
plaintiff must present some evidence of the number and types of jobs for which he or she is
precluded because of a disability (or perceived impairment), and/or demographics of the .relevant
labor market.
• Henderson v. Ardco Inc., 247 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff employee brought an action against her former employer alleging disability
discrimination among other claims because the employer's policy prohibited her from working
unless she was "100% healed." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the employer's
"100% healed" policy was evidence that she was "regarded as" disabled.
Plaintiff employee was on a medical leave for seven months recuperating from an injury.
When the employee returned to work she had several physical restrictions. The Company's
manager refused to allow the employee to return to work stating that the Company had a policy
that she must be "100% healed." The Company's policy was well known and consistently
applied.
The employee requested the Company accommodate her restrictions and was informed
that the Company had no light duty work that she could perform with her current medical
restrictions. The Court of Appeals allowed the employee to proceed with her claim of disability
discrimination based upon the Company's statement that "there is not a job in this plant that
[plaintiffs] restrictions would not bump into." The court believed this statement could be
interpreted as indicating that the Company believed the employee was unable to do any factory
work and such broad scope of an employee's perceived disability could constitute disability
discrimination, ifproven.
• Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff employee presented sufficient evidence to create
a factual dispute as to whether the defendant employer regarded him as being disabled. The
evidence presented included: (1) Comments in a memo regarding whether the employee should
be given a bonus which referred to the employee as a "problem person" and which had a post-
script stating "back case"; (2) supervisor's remark to employee that "we can't have any more of
this back thing"; (3) supervisor's completing a "Job Accommodation Request Analysis" despite
the fact the employee did not request an accommodation and indication on such form that the
supervisor consulted with the medical department to determine the employee's condition was a
disability rather than a temporary impairment; and (4) supervisor's testimony regarding the
plaintiff employee's back trouble that stated "there are certain things that will raise red flags to
you that require a person be given, maybe, a little extra benefit of a doubt."
B- 5
III. QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY
• Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a truck driver was not a "qualified
individual" under the ADA when he did not possess the certification required by the Department
of Transportation (DOT). DOT regulations. prohibited an employer from permitting a driver to
resume driving until he produced a doctor's certification indicating that he was physically
qualified to drive. The Seventh Circuit indicated that it would not examine the medical basis for
the physician's refusal to provide the certification absent evidence that the employer attempted to
prevent the employee from being recertified, acting in bad faith, or unreasonably relied on the
physician's medical determination. The Seventh Circuit further indicated that a court may
examine the underlying medical basis when the decision is based on a condition not covered by
DOT regulations, the driver's lack of certification is a pretext for discrimination or if an
employer is working in collusion with a medical professional to deny certification.
• Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's finding that being a fully rotational
team member of an automotive assembly team was not an essential function of the team
member's job. Some job announcements did not list the ability to rotate fully as a necessary
qualification and there was evidence that the only time the employer fully implemented the job
rotation requirement was when it placed employees with job restrictions.
• Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 1919 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit held that delivering and stocking of medications were essential
functions of a pharmacy technician's job in a county hospital. In coming to this conclusion, the
Seventh Circuit held that a court may consider, but is not limited to, evidence regarding an
employer's judgment of the position, written job descriptions prepared for advertising or
interviewing applicants, and the work experience of past and current employees in that position.
Moreover, the Court held that one must determine whether an employer actually requires all
employees in a particular position to perform the allegedly essentially job functions, but should
not otherwise second-guess the employer's judgment. For an employee to overcome deference
to the employer's judgment, the employee must offer sufficient evidence that the employer's
understanding of the essential job functions is incorrect. Further, while the amount of time the
function encompasses is evidence whether the function is essential, the function need not
encompass a significant amount of time in order to be essential. The mere fact that other
employees are available to perform the function also does not render the function non-essential.
In this case, while the technician's delivery of medications only took 45 minutes of an
eight hour day and other employees could have delivered the medication, delivery of medication
is essential to the pharmacy's functions and the employer detennined that the technician position
was the best position to fulfill this vital duty. In determining that the functions were essential,
the court relied upon the employer's "Essential Job Function Fonn," which predated the
employee's injury, was completed by six other pharmacy employees, and listed the work
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experience of current and past employees in the technician position. Additionally, the court
noted that the fact the employer had gone beyond the requirements of the ADA and created a
special assignment for the technician which did not require delivery of medication was not proof
that delivery of medication was non-essential, absent other independent evidence. The court
deemed that holding otherwise would have punished the employer for going beyond the
requirements of the ADA.
IV. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
• U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, __ U.S. _, No. 00-1250 (decided April 29,
2002); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 228 F.3d 1105, vacated and remanded.
The United States Supreme Court held that an employer's showing that a requested
accommodation conflicts with seniority rules is ordinarily sufficient to show, as a matter of law,
that an "accommodation" is not "reasonable." However, the employee remains free to present
evidence of special circumstances that makes a seniority rule exception reasonable in the
particular case.
Plaintiff employee injured his back while working for U.S. Airways, Inc. as a cargo
handler. After his injury, he transferred to a less physically demanding mailroom position. The
mailroom position later became available to seniority-based employees bidding under the
employer's seniority system. Employees senior to plaintiff planned to bid on the mailroom job.
Plaintiff requested to remain in the mailroom position as a reasonable accommodation to his
disability, however the employer refused and plaintiff lost his job. Plaintiff filed suit under the
ADA alleging that his former employer discriminated against him by not providing him a
reasonable accommodation of the job transfer.
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against "an individual with a
disability" who with "reasonable accommodation" can perform ajob's essential functions, unless
the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of [its] operation of business." See 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) and (b) and §1211(b)(5)(A).
The district court held that altering a seniority system would result in an "undue hardship" to the
employer and its non-disabled employees and therefore granted the Company summary
judgment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's holding that "the
seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that case-by-case, fact
intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an
undue hardship." Due to conflicting holdings between the circuits, the United States Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case.
The U.S. Supreme Court's plurality opinion held that generally an employer's proof that
a requested accommodation conflicts with seniority rules is ordinarily sufficient to show that an
"accommodation" is not "reasonable." However, the plaintiff employee may present evidence of
special circumstances that makes a seniority rule exception reasonable in the particular case and
therefore overcome summary judgment. Id. at p. 4-15.
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Justice O'Connor's concurrence opinion would IiInit the seniority system defense to only
those cases involving "enforceable" seniority rights. In O'Connor's view, the plurality opinion
will be interpreted by the lower courts to require a showing of enforceability as a prerequisite to
successful defense that seniority rules render a requested transferred as "unreasonable."
• Bums v. Coca Cola - Enterprises, Inc., 222 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals held that an employee was disabled under the ADA in
part because his "personal education and prior work experience" limited his ability to pursue
employment in other sectors of the economy. The Sixth Circuit believes that an individual may
be deemed disabled within the meaning of the ADA merely because he has a physical or mental
impairment that becomes substantially limiting when considered with factors such as work
experience and education.
Additionally, this case is important because the employer had a documented policy
requiring all employees seeking transfers to file a written "Request for Transfer" form. The
plaintiff employee did not follow Company policy in completing the form. Therefore, the
employee was not transferred into a position notwithstanding his contention that jobs were
available for which he was qualified and that he should have been allowed to transfer into one of
those positions. Due to the plaintiffs failure to comply with Company policy, the court held he
could not claim that the employer failed to accommodate him under the ADA.
• Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriffs Department, 227 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reinforced the well-settled law that an employer does
not have to create a new job as a reasonable accommodation for an employee. Plaintiff was a
sheriffs deputy who could not perform the duties involved in her position because of her alleged
disability. Therefore, plaintiff requested a transfer to a position in the jail's control booth. A
control booth operator's primary duties include -allowing other officers. to enter and leave the
cellblocks. Historically, the position of the control booth operator was delegated to each of the
deputy sheriffs on a rotating basis to allow them a break from their more stressful and physically
demanding sheriffs deputy job duties. The court held that plaintiffs requested accommodation
to a permanent position of a control booth operator was unreasonable under the ADA since it
would essentially create a new job.
• Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2000).
The First Circuit held that the lower district court erred when it concluded that an
additional five-months of unpaid leave beyond the one-year leave.provided under the employer's
leave policies was not a reasonable accommodation, based on its conclusion that the district
court failed to perform an individualized inquiry and seemed to be fashioning a per se rule. The
First Circuit noted that in some circumstances such a lengthy leave may be unreasonable,
however the facts in this particular case did not warrant such a finding.
In this case, during the plaintiffs absence, her employer filled her secretarial position
with individuals hired from temporary agencies. Plaintiff did not request pay beyond the
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disability benefits provided by the employer alld there was no evidence in the record to suggest
that the temporary employees were being paid more than the plaintiff or were less effective in the
job than plaintiff had been. Therefore, the court concluded that there appeared to be no business
pressure to fill the secretarial position with another permanent employee, and in fact, the
employer never did so. Thus, under these particular circumstances, the additional leave request
was reasonable.
• Walsh v. United Parcel Service, 201 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Sixth Circuit held that an employer did not violate the ADA in denying an
employee's request for additional leave in order to obtain a medical diagnosis. The employee
had sufficient time to obtain a medical diagnosis and provide the employer information
concerning his condition when he received a year's paid leave following an accident-related
disability, and six months of unpaid leave following the expiration of is paid leave. When the
employee failed to provide the information requested, the Company terminated the employee.
v. DIRECT THREAT DE,FENSE
• Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 213 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2000), amended 226
F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted October 29, 2001.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ADA's "direct threat" defense is
permissible only when an employer denies employment when an employee's condition threatens
the health or safety of others in the workplace. In 1972, plaintiff was employed by maintenance
contractors who performed work at Chevron's Oil Refinery. Plaintiff was exposed to solvents
and chemicals in that position. In 1992, he applied to work directly for Chevron. While the
Company determined he was qualified for the job, a pre-employment physical revealed his liver
was releasing certain enzymes at a larger than normal level. Due to the physical examination
results, Chevron determined that plaintiffs liver may become damaged if he continued to work
in the coker unit where he was exposed to harmful solvents and chemicals. Chevron withdrew
its offer of employment to plaintiff.
Plaintiff continued to work for the independent maintenance contractor in the same
position in the coker unit and Chevron made no attempts to remove him from that position. In
1995, plaintiff applied to Chevron for a position in the coker unit. Again, Chevron made a job
offer to plaintiff contingent upon passing a physical examination. Chevron withdrew its job
offer following plaintiffs physical examination when it revealed that his liver may be damaged
if he worked in the coker unit. Unlike in 1992, Chevron wrote plaintiffs employer and
requested that he immediately be removed from the position to eliminate his exposure to the
chemicals. The independent contractor removed the plaintiff from his position at Chevron.
Plaintiff soon thereafter filed a lawsuit against Chevron and his previous employer claiming they
discriminated against him on the basis of a disability in violation of the ADA, among other
claims.
Chevron argued that it was not required to hire plaintiff and was permitted to request his
removal from the refinery in his independent contractor's position since his continued presence
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would pose a direct threat to his own health. "Direct threat" is defined in the ADA as a
"significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation." Therefore, the Court rejected Chevron's argument. The Court further stated
in its Opinion that the ADA's legislative intent reflects that "employers may not deny a person
unemployment opportunity based on paternalistic concerns regarding the person's health." Thus,
an employer may not lawfully deny an individual employment when the job duties or work
environment pose a risk .of injury or illness. to the individual. Due to conflicting opinions in
other federal appellate courts, the United States Supreme Court granted review of this decision.
VI. CAUSAL CONNECTION REQUIRED IN ADA CASES
• Parker v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 260 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2001).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that when an employee with a disability is
injured by the employer's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, no additional showing
of animus against persons with disabilities is required to establish ADA liability. However, in
order to find an employer liable under the ADA, there must be a connection between the
employer's failure to accommodate a disability, the employee's performance deficiencies and the
adverse employment action. The employee plaintiff must further prove that protected
characteristics "played a motivating role in, or contributed to, the. employer's decisions." The
"motivating factor" requirement would be satisfied when: (1) both the lack of an accommodation
and some other factor plays a role in the employee's failure to return to work or (2) when both
the failure to return to work and some other factor played a role in the employer's termination
decision.
In Parker, plaintiff employee sued his employer after being fired when he did not return
from a six month medical leave of absence. The employer argued that it believed the former
employee was not able to return to work and that he never requested an accommodation. The
employer based its belief upon the employee's submission of several medical reports for their
long-term disability benefits and Social Security Disability Insurance in which the employee
claimed he was unable to work and was completely incapacitated. Despite those reports, the
employee claimed that he told the employer that he would be able to return to work if they
accommodated him with a modified schedule. Subsequent medical reports indicated that the
former employee's condition was unchanged and therefore they did not suggest whether he could
return to work and did not mention any work restrictions.
While the employee asserted that the employer violated the ADA by failing to provide a
reasonable accommodation, which he needed in order to return to work, the jury found the
employee failed to show a causal connection between his disability and his termination. While
the jury found that the employee had a disability, could not perform the essential functions of his
job without a reasonable accommodation, could perform the essential duties with a reasonable
accommodation, requested a reasonable accommodation and such accommodation would not
have imposed an undue hardship on the Company, the jury concluded that the employer did not
know that the employee could perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable
accommodation. Therefore, the employee's disability was not a motivating factor in the
employer's decision to discharge him.
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I. INTRODUCTION.
This outline addresses two of the most crucial tactics the Plaintiffs employment litigator
should employ for ultimate success:
1. A well devised strategy and story plan;
2. Evaluating, engaging, and endearing the jury.
II. DEVISING THE STRATEGY AND DEVELOPING YOUR STORY PLAN
THROUGH DISCOVERY.
A. DEVELOP THEORY OF THE CASE AND CASE PLAN.
Establish the legal objectives of your case.
Before you take the first step into the discovery realm ofyour case, you must outline your
legal goals - how will you "prove-up" your case for the jury? The most fatal mistake for
a beginning practitioner in a discrimination case is to jump into the discovery process
without such defined legal objectives, allowing the defendant corporation to lead the
plaintiffs attorney on a lengthy and expensive fishing expedition, which neither the
plaintiffnor her attorney can afford.
1. Identify the elements of proof required to support each legal claim.
Start by reviewing each of the legal claims set out in your Plaintiffs Complaint.
Reviewing the individual legal elements of these claims, draft a proposed jury
instruction for each. These jury instructions will be the basis for the liability
aspect ofyour case objectives, which will represent the first half ofyour
discovery plan.
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2. Identify the elements of proof required to support your damages.
The second portion ofyour legal objectives is based on the damages aspect of
your claim. Many litigants fail to recognize the importance of damages proof
until just before trial. This can be quite tragic to your case if a component of
damages requires some element ofproof from defendants, such as payroll records
or benefit plan descriptions.
Outline each ofyour damage claims, specifically identifying the elements ofproof
for each. This plan, combined with the legal elements plan, completes the legal
objectives portion ofyour entire case plan.
Outline the factual theories to support each legal objective.
1. Create your factual plan.
After combining the damages and liability portion ofyour legal objectives, it is
time to determine the facts you will need to support these claims.
The very basic difference between a winning discrimination claim and a failed
one is the strength of the factual support for the discriminatory animus. This
support can only be assimilated through discovery of the defendant employer and
its agents and managers.
Thus, you should build your factual support by formulating a detailed outline
within each ofyour legal objectives. An example ofhow you would build your
claim ofquid pro quo sex discrimination follows:
B. PRACTICE SAMPLE: LEGAL OBJECTIVES AND FACTUAL THEORIES
Goal ofProof: Quid pro quo sex discrimination by a supervisor.
First: Set out elements of proof for your legal claim:
1. Proofof a sexual advance.
2. Bya supervisor.
3. Promise ofjob security, advancement, or other benefit.
4. Employer's knowledge.
5. Employer's failure to act.
6. Damages to Plaintiff.
Second: Set out factual requirements to meet the legal proof:
1. Proofof a sexual advance.
Plaintiffs testimony.
Witness A's testimony ofharasser's advance to her.
Employer's record of investigation ofwitness A's complaint.
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Harasser's testimony.
2. "By a supervisor."
Plaintiffs testimony that she understood harasser to be her boss.
Personnel file ofharasser.
Other witnesses to establish supervisor duties ofharasser.
3. Promise ofjob security, advancement, or other benefit.
Plaintiffs testimony.
Witness B's testimony.
Plaintiffs personnel file.
Job postings.
Policies and procedures manual.
4. Employer's knowledge.
Plaintiffs testimony.
Employer's records of investigations.
Personnel file ofharasser.
EEO Charges.
Testimony ofwitnesses A and B.
Policies and procedures.
5. Employer's failure to act.
Plaintiffs testimony.
Policies and procedures.
Records of this complaint and others.
Testimony ofwitnesses A and B.
6. Damages to Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs testimony.
Employer's benefit plan packages.
Plaintiffs personnel file.
Testimony ofHR manager (wage and benefit loss).
Testimony of"before and after" witnesses (emotional distress).
Gather all the information in Plaintiff's possession, and any other available to
Plaintiff.
Obtain and compile every bit of information which your plaintiffhas in her
possession, or that which is immediately available to her. Make sure you
specifically review with her your factual needs, e.g. the employer's policies and
procedures (does she have a copy of the policy handbook?; can she easily obtain a
copy from another former employee, or from a box in her own garage?).
Next, discuss her ideas for some good sources for other factual needs, specifically
the identity ofwitnesses. Determine the best approach for contacting non-
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employer witnesses, and to what extent plaintiff should be involved. As a general
rule, if the plaintiff is willing and able to make the first contact with a lay witness,
the witness is generally more cooperative and can become a strong ally in the
development of the case. Potential witnesses who are initially approached by an
attorney in these highly sensitive situations are sometimes "gun shy" about
testifying. The plaintiff can thus play an important role in merely "introducing"
the lay witness to the background of the case and to the attorney.
Finalize your "plan" by determining what other information is still
outstanding.
Discovery is the process by which you fill the open spots on your case·plan that
have not been filled by information your plaintiffhas provided.
Begin with the information you can acquire from other witnesses not associated
with the employer - friends, relatives and acquaintances ofplaintiffwho can
informally provide you with both substantiating and new information about your
client's case.
Once you have the entire plan together, identify which information you will
require from employer, and move to the "tools of discovery" to obtain it.
C. CONTROL DEFENDANT'S "BLANKET" ACCESS TO YOUR CLIENT'S
RECORDS.
1. Access to your Plaintiff's medical/mental records.
When it appears that an FRCP 35 motion for the plaintiffs medical/mental
records will be requested by defendant, plaintiff should always consider moving
the court to limit such motion to the proper scope. The proper scope of such a
motion is largely dictated by the type of discrimination the plaintiff suffered, and
her theory for damages.
If the plaintiffwas discriminated against due to a disability, the scope ofrelevant
medical records is likely to be much more broad. The defendant usually has the
right, at a minimum, to look as far back as the disability goes.
Scope truly comes into play, however, when the plaintiff is claiming damages due
to emotional distress. Frequently, no medical records will exist for proofof such
emotional distress, and it must be proved through other factual means. As the
claim for emotional distress is alleging the distress as a result of the plaintiffs
employment, the plaintiff should attempt to limit scope for mental records to the
duration of employment.
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2. Access to a medical/mental examinations on Plaintiff.
Medical and mental examinations may be introduced only upon order of the court,
and can only compel a party to the action. FRCP 35 provides that the physical or
mental condition to be examined must not only be relevant to the action, but also
in controversy. A court will consider a number of factors in determining good
cause for an order for a medical or mental exam.
Plaintiffs attorney should pay particular attention to motions for medical and
mental exams as they hold great potential for revealing circumstances which, even
if irrelevant to the case at hand, could nonetheless negatively affect the outcome
ofplaintiffs case.
Motions for medical and mental examinations are frequently made in employment
discrimination cases, as very often the plaintiffs medical or mental condition is at
issue. Review any such motion for adherence with the "in controversy" and
"good cause" elements described in FRCP 35, and formulate any available
argument in opposition to the motion.
Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). (This is a case of long-standing
importance, stressing the focus of the "in controversy" and "good cause" factors.)
III. VOIR DIRE: IMPLEMENTING YOUR STRATEGY AND SERVING THE
TRUTH AT TRIAL.
A. MAKE YOUR BESTEFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE JURY.
Once the Plaintiffs employment attorney gets to trial, the most important litigation tactic,
other than the presentation ofyour Plaintiffs "story" in direct examination, is voir dire. Since
the jurors "are the law" for the purposes ofyour trial, you need to know how your jurors "tick"
before you approach and convince them ofyour client's story.
The first idea you must solidify in the minds ofthe jurors is that this is the most important
day in your client's life. Further, they are the most important people to help him/her.
What is it that you really need to know to understand where each ofyour jurors stand,
and how to make them focus on your client? As Phillip C. McGraw, Ph.D. wrote in his #1 New
York Times Bestseller, "Life Strategies: Doing What Works, Doing What Matters", "[I]fyou
want to genuinely know what someone or some group is really all about", you ask the following
questions:
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1 - What do they value most in their lives: Are ethics a big deal? Do money and
success define them? Do they value strength, or compassion? What really
matters in their outlook on life?
2 - What are their expectancies and beliefs about how life does and should work?
3 - What resistances or predispositions - fears, biases, prejudices - do they have?
4 - What positions or approaches or philosophies are they most likely to reject or
accept?
5 - What do they need to hear from a person in order to conclude that that person
is fundamentally 'okay' and to be trusted?
6 - What sorts of things do they consider relevant?
7 - How do they feel about themselves?
8 - What do they want most in their lives?
These are the exact questions you need to formulate to approach a jury. Rewrite these
questions, ofcourse, to match the specific facts ofyour case, the peculiarities ofyour client, and
the issues that relate to her story. The answers can be used to cement your previously established
strategy and help you present your client in the most compelling but favorable light.
B. COMBATING JUROR BIAS: BE VIGILANT TO THE SKEPTICISM.
What constitutes an "impartial jury" and a "fair trial"? The ultimate hope is that jurors
come to the Court with a clean slate to be filled with only that information entered into
evidence.1 But ifwe stop for a moment to think about the extensive prejudices each ofus has
developed just in the last six (6) months due to changes occurring in our society as a whole, is
there any doubt that similar prejudices have occurred within the personal lives of every person
who sits on a jury? If each ofus, as an advocate, trained under the notion that ''justice is blind"
is subject to such bias, how could we expect any juror to enter the courtroom with a "clean
slate"? Add to these prejudices the saturation ofnews influencing our society, the talking heads
on the various legal dramas broadcast everyday, and the increasing skepticism toward the legal
1 Steven I. Friedland, Legal Institutions: The Competency and Responsibility ofJurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw.
V.L.Rev. 190, 1990.
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process, and we must know the real truth - every jury room in this country is "full up" with
prejudice and bias.
c. PUT YOUR KNOWLEDGE TO WORK: ENDEAR THE JURORS.
The task of addressing juror biases is two-fold. First, there is the classic challenge of
eliminating the most biased jurors during voir dire. Although it does not clean the slate, it
hopefully creates more of a balance among.those to be selected. Second, is the task of adjusting
the trial approach toward the prejudices of the jurors finally seated, and win them over!
In an employment discrimination case, this second stage of"transforming" the jurors'
attitudes to a client's advantage is paramount but can be quite a delicate process. In essence,
while the advocate screams the horrors ofdefendant's discrimination, he must massage the
jurors' known prejudices with kid gloves.
1. Prejudice #1: "Finding Fault with the Plaintiff"
This is the most classic bias found in every civil case, but imperative to be "rooted out" in
an employment discrimination trial. Sometimes referred to as the "anti-plaintiffbias," it stems
from our society's belief that there are just too many frivolous lawsuits; that people are too
"sensitive", and that some people will quickly sue for little or no reason. The plaintiff is thus
"guilty until proven innocent" before the trial even begins.
It can sometimes be worse. A particularly defensive juror may be inclined to blame the
plaintiff so as to avoid thinking that he himselfmight suffer a similar fate. Thus, even where a
juror can identify with the Plaintiff, he may be subconsciously thinking, "This can't/won't
happen to me", or "I would have complained to my supervisor much earlier if I were the
plaintiff:"
Trial Tactic: Find each juror's "norm" or "routine", and describe defendant's
conduct as vividly inconsistent with such norms.
Jurors who are made to feel empathetic toward plaintiff are less likely to think the
plaintiff could have prevented the occurrence, and more likely to recognize that someone else
(defendant) may be to blame. Each juror has pre-determined thoughts ofhow one should act in
specific situations, such as a nonnal and routine process. For instance, a juror who has been in a
supervisory job will have a well-developed thought process about the interrelating roles of a
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supervisor, employee, and top manager. During the trial, a juror is more likely to recall evidence
that confinns his or her pre-existing routine process. Therefore, a goal often suggested for the
plaintiffs attorney is to discover how to describe the defendant's conduct in a manner that is
inconsistent with the juror's routine process.2 The trial must make the defendant's conduct vivid
so it is memorable during deliberation.
2. Prejudice #2: The Personal Responsibility Bias
The "personal responsibility" factor has become a part ofpopular culture in our world.3
Translated to the juror's prejudice, this "matter ofchoice" can be a problem for the
plaintiff in a discrimination case. "Ifonly the plaintiffhad acted responsibly, he would not have
to be asking for a handout from someone who has been virtuous in supplying him with a job and
supporting his needs." "Why didn't he/she just leave and go somewhere else?" In other words,
is plaintiff/employee unjustly trying to take advantage ofothers who have achieved success
through hard work? After all, people should get only what they deserve.
Trial Tactic: Shift the idea ofResponsibility
Confronting this attitude and making it work to the plaintiffs advantage during case
preparation can restore the plaintiffs moral authority in the eyes of the jury. By making
personal responsibility the central theme and using it against the defendants, moral high ground
can be recovered.
The goal is to show that plaintiff is being personally responsible in family, work,
community, and even in the wake of adversity at his employment. Concentrate on the strength
and character of the client. Characterize the plaintiff as a fighter with a positive attitude who can
and will live a productive life ifgiven the right opportunity.
Then illustrate the defendant's irresponsibility and lack ofwillingness to be accountable
in contrast to the plaintiffs attitude and actions.
2Id.
3 Stephen Covey, author of the best seller "7 Habits ofHighly Effective People" claims personal responsibility as
the foundation of this theory. Covey argues that we have the responsibility to make things happen and to control
our response, a product of our conscious choice.
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3. Prejudice #3: The Party with The More Limited Options Wins
In the employment setting, there is one bias which works to the plaintiffs advantage: the
predisposed perception that an employee confronting his employer has narrow and limited
options, since he does not have the controlling hand. This same bias can be made to work
directly against defendant, i.e., the perception that the employer has many options available to
address his employee's issue. Thus, the greater number ofoptions that plaintiffpresents as
available to the defendant/employer, the more likely jurors will find liability.
To enhance this bias, the plaintiffs attorney should emphasize the vast availability of
options, given that the employer has the total ability to change the situation according to its
wanted outcome. For instance, "ifonly the Defendant had done 'X' or 'Y' or 'Z', this would
have changed the Plaintiffs life."
Combined with the strategy found in the previous bias, plaintiff should portray
defendant's conduct as unusual and different from the norm, but then reframe defendant's
conduct as an action that was controllable and clear. The jury should then see that the injury was
a result of the defendant clearly and controllably making a bad choice - ofwhich plaintiff -
despite his exhaustive measures to correct it - became the victim.
For the employment discrimination case, strategies to combat juror bias must remain in
full force long after voir dire is ended. While there are no stock strategies that will work for each
case, many common themes can be learned and perfected. Voir dire should be perceived as an
opportunity to learn of a juror's specific experiences and the impact each had on him or her.
Eliminate as much bias as possible before you seat your jury, but know that your primary
challenge is to manage those prejudices once your jury is seated. Use the biases to perfect your
case plan and client's story, and you are well on your way.
IV. CONCLUSION
A Plaintiffs attorney's greatest challenge is to present the client's story in a compelling,
and compassionate manner, considering all the inherent prejudices and expectations of the jury.
Such story, however, must be created by a strategic plan using sound legal objectives, or all the
compassion in the world will not yield a verdict.
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Overview: Seek to win at your earliest opportunity. Employment litigation from a
defendant's perspective is about prevention, surrnnary judgment and settlement. While case
preparation and even legal advice centers around presenting a case before a jury, few cases are
tried to a jury verdict. Most are either dismissed on a pre-trial motion or settled through the
efforts of counselor with the assistance of a mediator. The cases tried to a defense verdict will
still be analyzed by most clients in tenns ofwhether the litigation could have been avoided in the
first instance. Prudent counsel, therefore, prepares his or her clients before the litigation has been
initiated to help the client avoid the risk that is ever present for employers-an adverse verdict.
The earliest opportunity to win litigation is before it is filed. Fortunately, the same
practices that avoid litigation are the same ones that win litigation. One of the special qualities
of employment litigation is the counselor's ability to prepare the "troops" to avoid the legal
battle.
I. LITIGATION TACTICS 101: WINNING WITH EARLY INTERVENTION.
Why is employment litigation flIed? It is sometimes more than a legal violation.
Understanding why employment litigation results is the first step to avoiding it~ A lawsuit may
be filed for a number ofreasons unrelated to a legal violation. The fonnula for employment
litigation is as follows:
Employee motivated to sue + actual or perceived illegality/unfairness + attorney
motivated to sue = Employment Litigation.
Because the flame of employment litigation is usually the spark of three distinct elements,
the defense counsel is well-advised to focus on not only legalities, but also reducing the risks of
motivating an employee to sue by communicating well, reducing the risks ofmotivating an
attorney to take the case by proper documentation, and reducing the perception ofunfairness to
avoid an employee's need to find counsel.
Prepare your managers/witnesses to document properly to avoid/win litigation.
There are few litigators who can prepare their witnesses in advance of litigation to avoid it.
Front-line supervisors and managers are, however, the future witnesses of defense counsel. They
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should be trained to document well. Excellent documentation that clearly communicates and
focuses on performance will deter many plaintiffs attorneys from pursuing litigation. Poorly
documenting, however, is often worse than no documents at all and may be the very reason for
litigation.
Documentation should focus on the facts of the situation and not the opinions of the
manager writing it. It should clearly state the performance or conduct that is expected. If
possible, the manager and the documentation should work on possible solutions to the
performance issues provided those solutions are directed at the work and not the employee's
personal affairs. Finally, the documentation should state the consequences of the future failure to
abide by the rules or performance requirements.
An employer should train its supervisors to provide clear, factually-based, documentation
for inadequate performance. The amount or level of documentation should stay consistent and
should only focus on the performance issue at hand.
Effective documentation not only provides solid evidence of the basis for the discharge
decision, it also discourages an employee from seeking legal representation and discourages an
attorney from bringing suit. A well-written disciplinary memorandum may become the only
reason a suit is not brought. It is the employer's opportunity to communicate with Plaintiff's
counsel before the suit is filed.
A sample form disciplinary notice is attached as Appendix A.
The winning jury theme. The end of employment litigation is presenting the
employer's case before a jury. So what is it that a jury wants from an employer in litigation?
The answer to this question will help the employer organize its employee relations and its
approach to individual employees. Defense counsel should instruct their clients on these themes
so they may be used in an employer's decision-making process.
At least one jury consultant who studied employment litigation and effective themes to
win employment cases before a jury, argues that an employer must focus on providing every
employee a "safe" workplace. But "safety" is defined more broadly here than simply avoiding
workplace injuries. "Safety" in the sense jury consultants mean it is freedom from both physical
and psychological harm.
An employer should constantly and consistently seek to provide a workplace that is safe
in the sense that it is fair, in the sense that employees understand what is expected of them, in the
sense that the rules are evenly applied but employees are given individual treatment. This does
not mean that an employee is not subject to termination or that discipline does not take place.
Instead, it means that management decisions have reasons and that employees will not be
subjected to random or inexplicable exercises of authority.
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Have simple, well-written policies. Employment policies should be clear and concise
and written to be read and understood by the average employee. Every employee handbook
should have a statement that employment is at-will unless there is written employment
agreement. In addition, every employee handbook should have a policy against discrimination
and harassment that defines clear reporting channels and opportunity to report around the alleged
harasser.
Policies should be reviewed carefully to avoid promises to an employee that an employer
may not keep. For example, a promise that "Employees will be reviewed twice annually"
should only be made if it is true. If an employer sometimes misses employee reviews because of
the press of the business this policy may be rewritten to state, "Every effort will be made to
review employees twice annually. Ifyour review is late, you may request it at the appropriate
time."
Like a well-written disciplinary memorandum, a well-written and well-conceived
handbook may be an employer's first (and last) communication with plaintifPs counsel. It will
then serve the dual role of communicating with the company employees and educating a potential
plaintifPs counsel on the professionalism of the organization.
Be honest concerning shortcomings/avoid a hidden agenda. Employment litigation
may be avoided by maintaining open, honest and clear communication with employees
concerning matters pertaining to an employee's performance.
Many employers face difficulties today and tomorrow when they refuse to directly
address the real reasons for employee termination or adverse employment actions and instead try
to force the employee to resign. The basis for most claims of discrimination is that an employer
had a hidden discriminatory reason for a discharge and the stated reason was merely a pretext.
Often employers will find that they have a hidden non-discriminatory reason for a discharge but
didn't have the courage to address it directly with the employee. This hidden agenda will suggest
that the employer has something to hide which, in the employee's eyes, will suggest illegal
discriminatory animus-a violation of the law. Notwithstanding the law, it is better to be honest
and direct than to save an employee's feelings and hide the real reasons for employment actions.
To work from a hidden agenda may suggest that an employer is hiding not a legal reason for its
actions, but instead, an illegal reason.
Persuade your employer/clients to give an employee an opportunity to tell his or her
story. Employer's should be trained that, ifpossible, they should allow an employee to tell his or
her side of an event before termination. It may seem absurd or a waste oftime, but be assured
that a decision will seem unfair unless an employee is given a chance to explain him or herself
This form of "due process" is not required in employment law but it is still well-advised in all but
rare occasIons.
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Encourage your employer/clients to follow standard procedures and use routines.
Normally evidence requires personal knowledge or recollection of the witness. What happens if
you interview 300 applicants and have no recollection of the interview with an employee
claiming discrimination in your interview?
Rule 406 of the Federal Rules ofEvidence provides that evidence of a routine or practice
is relevant to prove conduct in conformity with the routine or practice. So ifyou have a standard
or routine in interviewing you would be able to testify to that standard or routine. In the end, the
use of a standard routine or procedure in repetitive human resources actions such as interviewing
not only presents the organization in a professional light but also provides the organization a
vehicle to defend itself in litigation. Why shouldn't your front-line managers and human
resources representatives be armed with this information before the litigation is filed?
It might provide an additional reason for them to use this prudent business practice.
Periodically train supervisors/ periodically certify compliance with key policies.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that good faith efforts on the part of an employer
to train its employees may be used as an affirmative defense to a claim ofpunitive damages in
employment litigation. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass., 527 U.S. 526 (1999). Training not only
provides a defense, but also connnunicates why a particular program is important and why
management wants the employees to understand the policy.
Many employers will train employees on the company's sexual harassment policy, on the
warning signs ofworkplace violence, on effective and legal interviewing and a myriad of other
topics. Likewise, supervisor training on effective documentation and compliance with
employment laws is another excellent investment of an employer's resources.
As an additional defense to litigation and an additional compliance step, some employers
are now requiring periodic certification by employees that the employee has complied with
important policies such as the harassment policy or other ethics policies. These written
certifications will provide proof of the reasonable steps an employer is making to comply with its
legal obligations.
Train your clients to know when to ask for help. According to a jury verdict reporting
publication, the median award in 1997 for wrongful termination/discrimination lawsuits was
$162,500 with the probability range from $50,000 to $407,689. These numbers will be less for
Kentucky since these averages include venues that traditionally return higher verdicts.
Nevertheless, the point is well made that employment litigation is expensive. Even successfully
defending employment litigation is expensive.
Clients, therefore, are well-advised to seek out expert advice. It is often an excellent
investment of time and/or money if faced with a tricky human resources issue or matter. Some
litigation cannot be avoided but the organization's position may be strengthened with early
intervention.
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Attached as Appendix B is a discharge checklist that counsel may use in assisting clients
with a termination decision.
II. LITIGATION TACTICS 201: WORKING TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT/AVOIDING COSTLY MISTAKES.
The complaint is fIled. Now what? There are a series of issues to face immediately
upon the filing of employment litigation. Failure to address any of these issues may jeopardize
the chances of the case presenting for summary judgment or increase the risk and expense to the
client.
Before the formal step ofresponding to the Complaint, defense counsel should determine,
the employer's response to the allegations, the legal defenses, the witnesses, the discoverable
documents, whether the case may be removed, whether there is insurance coverage and how the
employer should be prepared to respond ifplaintiff's counsel calls its supervisor or non-
supervisory employees.
What is the employer's story? The first order ofbusiness is to determine what the
employer's response is to the allegations of the Complaint. Often there has already been a
demand letter by Plaintiff's counsel so this aspect of a case's development has already begun.
From the very beginning, the defense counsel should develop themes and theories that
will support the story it presents. One commentator suggests that counsel capsulate the case into
a few sentences and use that capsule at the beginning of every court motion or response as a way
to persuade the Court to your theory. For example, "This is a sexual harassment case where the
employee never reported harassment until after her resignation." Another commentator suggests
that counsel immediately begin to develop the opening argument to the jury from the start of the
case. In either event, careful planning should be used to prepare the employer's response.
Defense counsel should also consider interviewing key witnesses at an early stage in the
litigation. A firsthand rendering of the actual testimony by the live witnesses is more valuable
than a secondhand delivery by a management employee involved.
Witness statements. Care should be taken to properly interview internal witnesses and
to preserve attorney-client privilege. Defense counsel should consider a standard set of
introductory statements to witnesses interviewed and should have a company representative
present during the interview. For example, you might state,
My name is Tom Williams. I am an attorney with Ogden Newell & Welch and
represent the company in litigation that has been filed by employee X. Your name
has been raised by employee X as a potential witness and I want to interview you
for purposes of the defense. You have the right to talk with me or not to talk to
me. Whether you talk to me or refuse to talk with me will have nothing to do with
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your employment. You will be neither rewarded nor penalized; your participation
is voluntary. Do you understand your rights? Do you wish to speak further?
This sort of introduction will help avoid claims that you pressured an employee or that the
employee was under some other form ofundue influence.
In addition, a witness should' be given an opportunity to read and make changes to any
witness statement. Instead of reprinting these changes, it is better to simply allow the witness to
write in the changes. This demonstrates that the witness was given the opportunity to correct the
written statement and that makes it easier to assume the remaining parts of the statement are truly
reflective of the witnesses own words.
What are the legal defenses? Defense counsel are presented with a number of legal
defenses in almost every piece of employment litigation. Employment litigation touches upon
discrimination law, benefits law, bankruptcy law, contract law, administrative law and any
federal, state or local law that touches an employee. Defense counsel may win a case on grounds
ofpreemption, exemptions, failure to exhaust administrative remedies or a host ofother technical
employment-related law that are too numerous to list.
The time to learn about these defenses is before a responsive pleading has been filed.
Acc'ordingly, every case deserves its own legal research to detennine if there are new or
additional defenses not previously available. Defense counsel, likewise, should been keenly
aware of avoiding the wavier of a defense by failing to plead it in the answer or the first
responsive pleading. See CR 12.08.
Who are the witnesses? What are the discoverable documents? ,How are they
secured? One sure way to lose employment litigation is to destroy documents, alienate witnesses
or tamper with evidence. Early preparation of the client can avoid these disasters.
Like other states, Kentucky recognizes that a court may addresses spoliation of evidence
with a wide variety ofremedies ranging from a jury instruction to dismissal of a claim or defense.
Any potentially relevant documents or computer files should be preserved throughout the course
of the litigation. No documents or evidence that may even remotely touch upon the litigation
should be destroyed without consultation with counsel. This prohibition includes electronic
mail and electronic documents.
In addition, defense counsel should be notified before an employer tenninates any witness
to pending litigation. The testimony of that witness may be preserved through a transcribed
interview or a witness statement. Employees who have been discharged may not be willing to
cooperate.
Is there insurance coverage? Defense counsel are well-advised to review any and all
sources ofinsurance coverage with his or her client at the earliest indication that there may be
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employment litigation. Even sophisticated clients may not be sufficiently aware of their existing
coverage without a complete review of existing policies. Failure to timely notify the carrier of
coverage may result, in some circumstances, with the denial or loss of coverage.
Is there grounds to remove the case to federal court? One of the most important
defense moves in employment litigation in Kentucky is the defendant's step of removing the case
to federal court if there is a federal question or diversity jurisdiction.
The summary judgment standard in federal courts is expressly more conducive to the
award of summary judgment for the employer. In addition, federal judges are often more
familiar with some ofthe complex defenses presented by employers than state judges and, on the
whole, otherwise more sympathetic to the notion of dismissing employment cases.
Attached as Appendix C is a sample notice ofremoval based upon diversity jurisdiction.
Are the employees/management prepared for a call from plaintiff's attorney?
Management employees or employees who can bind the organization with their word cannot be
contacted directly by the plaintiff's counsel during litigation or upon learning that the company is
being represented.
Every employer is well-advised to have a coordinated strategy and approach in handling
connnunications by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's counsel. For management employees and
employees that can bind the organization, the answer is simple: contact our counsel. For
employees who may be contacted by Plaintiff's counsel, it is not improper to tell the employee
that they have no obligation to speak with Plaintiff's counsel and that the employer would like to
have its lawyer present when the employee speaks. Most employees want to stay out of the
middle of the dispute.
The defendant's response to the complaint. Many employment claims are brought by
inexperienced employment practitioners who are not sufficiently familiar with the elements of
their claims. The temptation for defense counsel in these situations is to file a motion to dismiss
under CR 12 or a motion for summary judgment under CR 56 right out of the gate. While in
some cases this approach is warranted, in many cases the defense counsel should resist the
temptation to move too quickly. A premature motion to dismiss may simply give a plaintiff and
his counsel an opportunity to educate themselves to shape facts that support a viable claim. For
example, an African-American employee who is discharged brings litigation for "negligence" in
conducting an investigation that led to the employee's discharge and for "defamation" in
reviewing his case with other members ofmanagement. Arguably, this plaintiffhas not pled a
cause of action under Kentucky law. Still, a motion to dismiss would likely result in the claims
being recast as a race discrimination claim that might be viable.
Instead of educating plaintiff's counsel and his client on the weaknesses of their claims,
the defense counsel should prepare himself as completely as possible to have his opportunity for
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direct contact with the Plaintiff through the deposition. Before the deposition, defense counsel
should completely review the files, the applicable policies, the necessary company witnesses and
should obtain certain background information from the Plaintiffwithout asking the key
questions.
Written discovery before the plaintiff's deposition. As indicated, defense counsel
should generally work toward that immediate, 'unfiltered access to the Plaintiff that comes in the
form of a deposition. To make that contact more meaningful, it is wise to find'out certain
background information before the deposition through interrogatories and document requests.
Defense counsel should avoid asking the ultimate questions through written discovery and should
reserve those questions to the plaintiff during the deposition. So, for example, the defense
counsel should not ask in interrogatories each way in which the plaintiff claims she was
discriminated because this will simply educate the plaintiff's counsel and give the plaintiff an
inordinate amount of time to craft the perfect answer. Instead, the written discovery ofplaintiff
before the deposition should focus on background information such as previous employment,
previous medical treatment, or previous involvement in criminal, civil or administrative
proceedings. AImed with this information, the defense counsel will be prepared to take the
plaintiff's deposition.
The plaintiff's deposition. The primary uses of the plaintiff's deposition are to secure
admissions that will narrow the issues, set up inconsistencies for impeachment and establish facts
that ultimately support defendant's motion for summary judgment. Certain key questions should
be written in advance of the deposition so they will be asked accurately during the deposition.
Defense counsel should list the elements ofplaintiff's case and the employer's defenses before
the deposition and direct questions to defeat the prima facie case and support the defenses.
Demeanor and approach to use during a deposition will depend upon the witness. My
preference is to be cordial or neutral during the questioning unless the witness is obstructing the
examination or refusing to answer straightforward questions. The examiner should'maintain
control of the deposition and obtain the information he or she requires. Keeping focused on the
information required helps one to maintain control of the deposition. Several attempts to secure
the information by your own means should be used before any resort to seeking the assistance of
the court is taken.
Typically, the defense counsel must resist the temptation to "overask" key questions by
continuing to probe even when the plaintiffhas provided an answer that supports the defendant's
position. Valuable admissions may be secured without the plaintiff realizing they are admissions
that hurt his or her case.
Additionally, defense counsel must use judgment in determining whether to lead the
witness with documents and other information that support summary judgment or use the same
information for impeachment purposes to present at trial. For example, an e-mail may contain an
admission of a critical meeting and the discussions of the meeting that the plaintiff does not
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recall exists. Do you provide the e-mail to the witness early on so the testimony is consistent
with the e-mail or do you hold back the e-mail and allow the witness the opportunity to speak
inconsistently with what was stated in the e-mail? The answer will depend upon the objectives
of the deposition and whether your client's interests are better served with consistent or
inconsistent testimony.
The Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment. Once the plaintiff's
deposition is in hand, the defense counsel may prepare the motion for summary judgment. All of
the tools of effective advocacy should be used including brevity and clarity. I prefer to capsulate
the entire case in an opening paragraph to give the court a roadmap of the argument. Then, I will
provide background facts to show the court that the result we want reached is not inconsistent
with what is ''just'' or "right." Next, I will provide a list of "material facts" that are undisputed
or undisputable. The material facts should be few and should be clearly stated. The "Argument"
section will contain headings ofthe major points with exposition of important statutes and cases.
The "Conclusion" will summarize the arguments and state the requested relief
ill. LITIGATION TACTICS 301: EVALUATING SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES.
Assess the case. Winning employment litigation is really about meeting your client's
realistic objectives. The realistic objectives will depend upon the strength of the employer's
legal position, the perception of fairness of the decision made, the clarity of the written
documentation, the number and credibility ofpotential witnesses, the credibility of the plaintiff
and the experience and reputation ofhis or her counsel. Any number of these factors can and
will change during the course of litigation, but a surprising number ofcases can be accurately
assessed early on even before any documents have been exchanged or witnesses examined.
Moreover, a surprising number of cases can be evaluated early for the likelihood that
sunnnary judgment will be granted. If the client faces a jury trial on a given case, an early
assessment of settlement is warranted.
Defme your objectives. Some employers will fight every litigation through to a
dismissal or jury verdict. Like a government who will not negotiate with terrorists, these
employers send a clear message that litigating with them will be time-consuming and costly.
Other employers seek early settlement of employment litigation as an insurance policy against:
(1) future litigation expenses, (2) a large judgment, (3) lost employee time in litigation, and (4) a
potential public relations fall-out for losing:
Most employers will fall somewhere between the two extremes of fighting everything and
settling everything. In any event, it is appropriate to have a litigation budget and an
understanding ofwhat time and expense this litigation will cause versus the potential cost to
conclude the case with settlement. Many employers faced with an additional $30,000 in expense
for a chance to win a case will quickly accept paying $10,000 to secure a confidential settlement
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to end the litigation. Understanding these economics up front will allow the employer to meet
its objectives and secure a "win" in litigation.
A Litigation Budget. Employment litigation is expensive. An employer not familiar
with the process may be awakened to benefits of settlement by the presentation of a litigation
budget. Any budget, of course, will be subject to events outside of the control of defense
counsel. Still,a budget that presents a range ofnumbers for various stages in litigation will be
instructive to a client and may educate the client to the benefits of early mediation or any early
solicitation of a settlement demand.
Mediation. There are many alternative routes and means to settle a dispute early on
before costs begin to soar. Mediation is an informal, non-binding, settlement conference
conducted by a third party who is independent of the court and the parties. It is a quick and cost-
effective means to learn whether a dispute is going to be resolved. Any party who seriously
considers settlement should seriously consider mediation as a way to bring the matter to a close.
Offer of Judgment. CR 68(1) provides that "any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow
judgment to be taken against him for the money or property, or to the effect specified in his offer,
with costs then accrued." CR 68(3) provides "[i]fthe judgment finally obtained by the offerre is
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the cots incurred after making the offer."
In addition, the offeree will not recover his or her attorney's fees from the point of the offer if the
judgment is not greater than the offer.
Thus, defense counsel may use an offer ofjudgment as a way to encourage settlement by
putting the recovery of costs and attorney's fees at risk. An offer ofjudgment should be reserved
for special occasions when it appears the plaintiff's counsel has overvalued his or her claims.
Attached as Appendix D is a sample offer ofjudgment.
Learn from litigation. Employers will usually benefit from a discussion with their
counsel on lessons learned from the pending or recently concluded litigation. Management may
freely discuss these lessons with their counsel under the protection of attorney-client privilege. If
your client does what· it can to make sure that any mistakes are not repeated, it will have surely
claimed a "victory" in the pending litigation.
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Note: This paper and the appendixes are not presented as legal advice.
About the presenter: Thomas M. Williams is partner in the Louisville law firm of Ogden
Newell & Welch, PLLC. A graduate of the College of William and Mary and the University·of
Cincinnati School of Law, Mr. Williams specializes in employment litigation and litigation
avoidance for employers. He is past Chairman of the Labor and Employment Section of the
Louisville Bar Association and current Labor and Employee Relations Chair of the Louisville
Society for Human Resources Management. In addition to being licenced to practice in
Kentucky and Indiana, he is a past contract mediator for the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and a certified Senior Professional in Human Resources Management. Mr.
Williams is a frequent writer, speaker and trainer on human resources and employment law
topics. For more information, please visit .1Y)~:1Y.~Qg{-1~JJlf!1~:;.~~~!.t!J.
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APPENDIX A: DISCIPLINARY NOTICE
Employee: _ Department: _
Oral Warning D Written Warning D Other D
1. Statement of the problem: (violation ofrules, policies, standards, practices or
unsatisfactory performance.)
2. Statement of the facts:
3. Prior disciplinary discussions or warnings: (oral, written, dates.)
4. Statement ofobjectives or company policy on this subject:
5. Solutions or corrective actions for improvement:
6. Employee cormnents:
Employee Signature Date Supervisor's Signature Date
Written Warning Distribution: One copy to Employee, one copy to Supervisor and original copy
to Personnel File.
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Appendix B: Discharge Checklist
Discharge. Tennination of employment is the most serious action an employer can take
against an employee. The decision should be made after careful consideration and with a full
analysis of the existing situation, its effect on the organization, and with a clear understanding that
the decision is fair and defendable. Ask yourself these questions:
o What are the reasons for the discharge decision?
o How serious was the misconduct?
o Are there mitigating or aggravating factors?
o Who is the employee involved and what is his or her employment record?
o Is the employee a member of a union or seeking to organize a union?
o Have you reviewed the union contract or handbook for applicable policies and rules?
o What other written or unwritten company policies are implicated?
o Have you reviewed those policies again?
o Was the standard of. conduct or performance at issue known and understood by the
employee?
o Was the discharge decision properly documented?
o Will the discharge come as a surprise to the employee?
o Was the employee given an oral and written warning concerning the discharge issue?
o Ifno warnings, why is this a serious enough matter to warrant innnediate dismissal?
o Is there any less serious discipline that should be considered such as a written warning or
suspension?
o Is the employee in a protected classification ofemployee, e.g., over 40, female or a minority?
o How have similar matters been handled in the past?
o How have similar matters been handled with employees in and outside of protected
classifications?
o If this matter is handled differently than another similar matter--why?
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o Has this employee recently sought rights under any laws such as worker's compensation,
FMLA, OSHA, harassment, wage and hour or any other federal, state or local laws?
o How important is this employee to the Company? How easy or difficult will it be to replace
him or her?
o Would the decision seem fair to someone outside of the organization?
o Is there anyone else who should be part of the discharge decision review?
o Does the employee record generally support the decision e.g. performance evaluations and
other employee records?
o Has the employee had an opportunity to explain himself or herself? Should the matter be
investigated further?
o Does the employee have legal counselor has the employee threatened litigation?
o Is there any other reason you are aware of that may cause the employee to legitimately
challenge the decision?
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Appendix C: Notice of Removal to Federal CourtlDiversity
Federal Court Case Style
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant hereby removes the above-entitled action from
the Commonwealth ofKentucky Jefferson Circuit Court, to the United States District Court for the
Western District ofKentucky, Louisville Division, on the basis of diversity of citizenship, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(a).
In support of the removal action, Defendant alleges as follows:
1. On or about January 30, 2002, a civil action was filed against Defendant by Plaintiff in
the Commonwealth of Kentucky Jefferson Circuit Court entitled Plaintiffv. Defendant, Inc., Case
No. 02CI00781 ("Action"). A true and correct copy of the original Complaint ("Complaint") filed
in the Action, along with summons thereon, is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated
herein by reference.
2. Defendant was served with summons and a copy ofthe Complaint on January 31, 2002.
3. Exhibit A constitutes all ofthe pleadings and paper in the Action ofwhich Defendant is
aware.
4. This action is removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) and 28 U.S.C. §1332 because
the citizenship of the parties is diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
requirement. First, it is a civil action between citizens of different states. Plaintiff is a citizen and
resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and is domiciled in the Commonwealth. Defendant's
state ofincorporation is Nevada with its principal place ofbusiness in San Antonio, Texas. Second,
Plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages, including lost salary, lost employment benefits,
emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, as well as punitive damages. Based upon
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Defendant's good faith belief and the pleadings and attachments thereto, the amount in controversy
exceeds the sumof$75,000, exclusive ofinterest and costs. This Court has originaljurisdiction over
the Action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
5. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1441(a), this Action is removable to this Court.
6. This Notice of Removal is timely filed with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1446(b),
as it is being filed within 30 days after receipt by Defendant of the initial pleading in this Action.
7. The adverse party has been given prompt written notice of removal by service of this
Petition.
WHEREFORE, Defendant hereby removes the Action to this Court.
Dated: February 28, 2002.
Thomas M. Williams
Craig C. Dilger
OGDEN, NEWELL & WELCH PLLC
1700 PNC Plaza
Louisville, KY 40202
(502) 582-1601
Attorney for Defendant,
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Appendix C: Notice of Removal to State Court
State Court Case Style
NOTICE OF REMOVAL TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
To: Plaintiff's counsel
239 South Fifth Street, Suite 1700
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3268
Counsel for Plaintiff
Please take Notice that Defendant in the above-entitled action, filed a Notice of
Removal, a copy ofwhich is attached hereto, on February 28, 2002, in the office ofthe Clerk ofthe
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Louisville Division.
DATED: February 28, 2002.
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Appendix D: Sample Offer of Judgment
Counsel
11420 Bluegrass Parkway
Louisville, Kentucky 40299
RE: Employee v. Company; Jefferson Circuit Court, Division Eleven (11);
Civil Action No. 01CI-05565
Dear Counsel:
As oftoday's date, Defendants collectively offer to allow judgment to be taken against them
in the amount of$10,000.00, inclusive of costs and fees.
This offer is governed by CR 68. Under CR 68(1), your client has ten (10) days to accept this
offer. Under CR 68(3), "[a]n offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof
is not admissible except in proceedings to detennine costs."
I will address discovery matters in a separate letter to follow.
Sincerely,
Thomas M. Williams
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I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in the workplace based
upon employees' sincerely held religious beliefs. In 1972 Congress amended Title VII ofthe Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to add as a distinct obligation ofemployers the duty to reasonably accommodate
the religious practices of employees to the extent that they can do so without undue hardship. In
imposing upon employers the duty to reasonably accommodate the religious practices and
observances of employees if they can do so without undue hardship, Congress did not define the
terms "reasonable accommodation" or "undue hardship." Congress never amended the definition of
"religion" in which such terms are used, or otherwise given substantive guidance as to the meaning
of such terms since 1972.
Religious discrimination in employment has been the subject of state as well as federal
legislation, and the courts have been called upon to define the circumstances under which particular
circumstances have resulted in an employer's failure to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs
of the employee. As the courts have grappled with interpreting these terms in a variety of factual
contexts, some general principles have emerged. Viewing the cases generally, the courts have taken
seriously Congress's attempt to impose upon employers an affirmative duty to accommodate the
religious practices of employees which is in addition to, and distinct from, the obligation to not
discriminate against an employee on the basis of religion. However, it is also clear that if an
employer makes a good faith effort to accommodate the religious practices ofthe employee, it will
generally have no major difficulty in establishing either that it has reasonably accommodated the
employee or that to do so would impose undue hardship. At a minimum, the employer must
negotiate with the employee in an effort to reasonably accommodate the employee's religious beliefs
and then the employee has a duty to make a good faith effort to attempt to accommodate his or her
religious needs through means offered by the employer.
Acknowledging the above facts, this article will attempt to address: (a) recent cases
discussing the requirements for religious accommodations; (b) the state of the law in Kentucky
surrounding an employer's obligation to reasonably accommodate; and (c) religious accommoda-
tions that directly conflict with other workplace policies.
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II. WHAT IS RELIGION FOR PURPOSES OF TITLE VII
Title VII defmes "religion" to include all aspects ofreligious observance, practice, and belief. 1
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). One purpose of defming "religion" so broadly is to minimize the need for
judicial decisions in which particular beliefs and practices qualify as a "religion" in order to avoid the
excessive entanglement ofchurch and state prohibitedby the FirstAmendment. On occasion, however,
courts have had to decide what "religion" is. "Religion," within the meaning of Title VII, has also
been found to include: the Black Muslim faith, the "Old Catholic" religion, and atheism. "Religion,"
within the meaning ofTitle VII, has been found to include the Wicca religion or "The Old Religion."
In Van Koten v. Family Health Management, Inc.,2 the court held that" a religious belief does not
have to be espoused by or accepted by any religious group to fall within the definition of
'religion' under Title VII." Applying the Redmond test, the court held that Wicca may be considered
a belief which is sincerely held in the plaintiffs "own scheme of things." But since the court found
that the plaintiffhad failed to satisfy the notice requirement ofhis prima facie case, they affirmed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment.
Courts have also been called upon to determine whether a certain practice or belief is
"religious" for purposes ofTitle VII. Notwithstanding Title VII's broad defInition of religion, there
are limitations on what constitutes a legitimate "religion" or a "religious practice or belief'. The
discussion which follows will outline the general principals all courts follow in analyzing these issues.
In the landmark case ofRedmond v. GAF Corporation3, the court set forth the proper test for
determining what is a protected "religious practice or belief." Redmond was a Jehovah's Witness.
Church elders appointed him to be in charge ofa Bible study class. All went well so long as the class
met on Tuesday nights. When the elders changedthe meeting time to Saturday mornings, the schedule
conflicted with GAF's required Saturday overtime. Redmond claimed that even though his employer
was aware that he could not work on Saturday because of his "religious obligation," his supervisor
told him that either he agreed to work or he would lose his job. When he told them he would not be
able to work the scheduled overtime on the coming Saturday, he was terminated. The district court
found that the discharge discriminated against the employee in exercise of his religion and the
employer appealed.
The Court ofAppeals held that the employee's participation in Saturday bible class activities
constituted a statutorilyprotected "religious obligation." GAF argued on appeal that, because Saturday
work per se was not prohibited by the plaintiffs religion, the practices in question were outside Title
VII's. The court disagreed. It relied principally on the statute's explicit language in support of its
conclusion. "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
2 Van Koten v. Family Health Management, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (emphasis added).
3 Redmond v. GAF Corporation, 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1978).
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as belief ..." 4 The court held that these words leave little room for the limited interpretation that Title
VII protection is found only in situations where either "Sabbatarianism" or a practice specifically
mandated or prohibited be a tenet of the plaintiffs religion is involved. Second, the court noted that:
...to restrict the act to those practices which are mandated or prohibited by a tenet of
the religion, would involve the court in determining not only what are the tenets of a
particular religion, which by itself perhaps would not be beyond the province of the
court, but would frequently require the courts to decide whether a particular practice
is or is not required by the tenets ofthe·religion.s
The court found that suchjudicial determination would be "irreconcilable" with the Supreme
Court's holding in Fowler v. Rhode Island:6 "it is no business of courts to say ... what is a religious
practice or activity...." The court found that the proper test to determine what is "religious" under Title
VII is whether (1) the "belief' for which protection is sought religious in person's own scheme of
things, and (2) is it "sincerely held."
The evidence established that Redmond was sincere in his religious beliefs, having been a
member in his church for over 16 years. It further established that he was appointed to be a lifetime
leader of the Bible study class and had done so for many years. Redmond testified that.he felt his
participation in the Saturday activities was at the dictate ofthe elders therefore a "religious obligation."
Thus, applying the above test with these facts, the court concluded that the practice in question was
within Title VII's protection.
The Sixth Circuit adopted the test set forth in Redmond to be applied in determining what is
"religious" in Dorr v. First Kentucky National Corp'. In this case, Dorr appealed the lower court's
dismissal ofhis Title VII employment discrimination suit. He alleged that actions directed against his
religious activities forced him to resign from the defendant bank. Dorr was a member and president
ofIntegrity, an organization that is affiliated with the Episcopal Church and that advocates equal rights
for homosexual men and women within the church and society as a whole. Dorr claimed that after he
was appointed president of a local chapter of Integrity, he was forced to resign.
The district court found that Dorr did not sincerely believe that his religion "required" him to
serve as president of Integrity, and therefore those activities were not motivated by sincere religious
beliefs. The court of appeals reversed. It concluded that although the district court recited the
applicable standards, it erred in applying them. The court stated that the "concept ofreligion embraced
by the statute, is not, we think, one of an external set of forces and rules that compel~ individual to
act one way or another... The question is not one of compulsion, but one ofmotivation." Therefore,
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)(emphasis added).
5 Redmond at---
6 Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70, 73 S.Ct. 526, 527 (1953).
, Dorr v. First Kentucky National Cor., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 421 (1986)
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the court found that in applying the Redmond test, courts must not stop at a fmding that one does not
sincerely believe that he is required by his religion to perform a certain practice or "obligation;" they
must also fmd whether participation or performance was motivated by religious beliefs. The court
stated "his sincerely held religious beliefs may motivate his activity even though they do not require
it. ,,8
The First Circuit recently explained the phrase "sincerely held belief' for purposes of Title
VII protection in E.E.O.C. v. Union Independiente De La Autoridad de Acueductos.9 This case
involved David Cruz-Carillo, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church who claimed that the
tenets ofhis religion prohibit him from joining a labor organization. Cruz alleged that the defendant
mandated that he join in order to keep his job.
The union argued that the district court erred in granting summaryjudgment due to the fact that
there remained disputed issues offact with respect to the question ofwhether Cruz's objection to union
membership was the product of a "bona fide religious belief." In support of its argument, the
defendant relied on the evidence tending to show that Cruz had on several occasions taken actions that
were at odds with his professed faith. The Court of Appeals agreed. It began by stating, "while the
'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question ofwhether it is truly
held." The court found that the element ofsincerity is fundamental, since without sincerity, there can
be no showing of a religious observance or practice that conflicts with an employment requirement.
The court reasoned that findings on this issue will necessarily depend on the factfinder's assessment
of the employee's credibility. These issues are fact questions and should not ordinarily be disposed
of by summary judgment. The court continued that the evidence tending. to show that an employee
acted in a manner inconsistent with his professed religious belief is relevant to the evaluation of
sincerity. The court found that there was evidence establishing that Cruz only objected to certain
membership requirements and he showed opposition to any form ofunion membership only after the
union agreed to accommodate him with respect to each practice he had identified earlier. Such
evidence, the court stated, "ifcredited by the factfinder, could bear on the sincerity ofCruz's belief."
The court cautioned other courts to "be careful in separating the verity and sincerity ofan employee's
beliefs in order to prevent the verdict from turning on the factfmder's own idea of what a religion
should resemble."lo
Title VII does not protect an employee's "personal preferences." In Vetter v. Farm/and
Industries, Inc., II Dean Vetter suedhis employer, Farmland Industries, for terminating him for refusing
to move to his trade territory. Vetter argued that his religious beliefs required him to live in a city with
an active Jewish community and synagogue and that Farmland had discriminated against him on the
basis ofhis religion by enforcing its residence requirement and not accommodating his beliefs. Ajury
8 Idat421.
9 E.E.O.C.. v. Union Independiente De La Autoridad de Acueductos, 279 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2002).
10 Id. at 54, quoting Phi/brook v. Ansonia Bd. OfEd., 757 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 1985).
11 Vetter v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 120 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1997).
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returned a verdict for Fannland, but the district court granted Vetter's motion fot judgment as a matter
of law. Farmland appealed and the court of appeals reversed.
Fannland argued that the district court erred by overturning the jury verdict. It believed that
the desire to live near others of the same religion was not an "observance or practice" that must be
accommodated. The court stated that under the jury instructions Vetter had to show that he had a
sincere belief that compliance with. Farmland's residence requirement conflicted with his religious
observance or practice and that his decision to live in Ames did not reflect a purely personal
preference." Since the evidence was in conflict on this point, and the court held that it was a matter
for the jury to resolve. The evidence showed that Vetter chose to live in Ames as a matter ofpersonal
preference, and not because living in the Webster City area would have conflicted with an observance
or practice of his religion. Fannland witnesses testified that Vetter agreed in his interview to live in
the Webster City area and living there was required. Vetter testified that he had looked for a home in
the Webster City area but was unable to fmd rental housing. He further acknowledged that he wanted
to live in Ames in part because he had found suitable housing there and the schools had a good
reputation. Furthermore, the evidence showed that before Vetter accepted the job he lived in a city
which did not have a synagogue and from where he commuted 45 miles to religious services. Had he
moved to Webster City, he would have been approximately the same distance from a synagogue as he
was previously. Thus, the court concluded "the reasonable inference that could be drawn from it was
sufficient to support the jury verdict in Fannland's favor."
The federal courts have been consistently adopted and applied the Redmond test. Courts will
not evaluate the "truth" of one's belief; however, they will allow evidence which tends to prove or
disprove whether the belief is in fact sincerely held. Evidence establishing that the belief is not
sincerely held leads to a possible finding that the belief is not motivated by religion, but rather by
personal preference. Although case law provides the above basic principles, each case must be
evaluated separately based on its own specific facts.
III. RECENT CASES DISCUSSING RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
A. M. Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services, Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th eire 2001).
The Plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a counselor in its Employee Assistance
Program (EAP). Early in 1996, Bruffbegan counseling a woman identified only as Jane Doe. After
several'months, Doe informed Plaintiffofher homosexuality and asked for help in improving her
relationship with her female partner. Bruff declined to counsel her on that subject, advising that
homosexual behavior conflicted with her religious beliefs, but offered to continue counseling her on
another matter. Doe complained to her employer, who in turned complained to the medical center.
Bruffs supervising counselor arranged a meeting to explore the matter, at which Bruffwas asked,
per company policy, to put in writing exactly what aspect of her counseling responsibilities she
wanted to be excused from. Bruff wrote a letter generally asking to be excused from providing
assistance in improving homosexual or extramarital relationships. In response to this letter,
management met several times to determine ifplaintiffs request could be accommodated by shifting
responsibility among the three EAP counselors. Eventually it was determined that accommodation
would not be feasible. Management then denied Bruffs request stating that, "Our EAP contract
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obligates us to treat a wide variety ofpsychiatric services and clinical issues" and does not exclude
certain categories of issues for individuals with certain types of issues. When the possibility of
transferring from EAP to a section specifically performing pastoral or Christian counseling was
discussed, Bruffdeclined. The vice president then offered three options: (1) reconsider her request
for accommodation; (2) request a transfer to another position or department in which conflicts were
less likely to occur; or (3) resign her position. If she decided to request a transfer, she would be
given 30 days to secure another position,.before she would be terminated. During this 30-day period,
Bruffapplied for one other position which was given to anotherapplicant with superior credentials.
Although there was another counseling position available, she did not apply and at the end ofthe 30-
day period Broffs employment was terminated.
The district court magistrate dismissed the state law claims on a motion for directed verdict.
However, he did enter a judgment on the jury finding that the employer had violated Title VII. The
jury found that the Medical Center had discriminated against Bruffbecause ofher religious beliefs,
that it had not made a reasonable accommodation for those beliefs, and that it acted with malice or
reckless indifference to Bruffs sincere beliefs. The defendant appealed.
The issue in this case was to what extent Title VII required the Medical Center to
accommodate Bruffs religious beliefs. The Court ofAppeals held that the hospital was not required
under Title VII to accommodate the plaintiffby excusing her from a counseling on a subject which
conflicted with her religious beliefs, as such accommodation would have constituted an undue
burden as a matter of law. The court also concluded that the hospital offered reasonable
accommodations to the plaintiff as a matter of law when the hospital offered to give her 30 days to
find another position at the hospital where the likelihood ofencountering further conflicts with her
religious beliefs would be reduced, and the court finally concluded that the plaintiffs tennination
was not wrongful under the Mississippi public policy exception to the employee at will doctrine.
The court began its analysis by looking at the Medical Center's motion for judgment as a
matter of law. The court noted that after Bruff established her prima facie case of religious
discrimination under Title VII, the burden shifts to the employer to show why accommodating her
religious beliefs as requested would cause them an undue hardship or that they have offered an
reasonable alternative accommodation to resolve the conflict. The court stated that accommodation
can take place in two ways: (1) an employee can b"e accommodated by his/her current position by
changing the working condition or (2) the employer can offer to let the employee transfer to another
reasonably comparable position where conflicts are less likely to arise.
In relation to the first method ofaccommodation, the Medical Center argued that retaining
Bruff in her position would cause an undue hardship, relying on the Supreme Court's holding in
TransWorld Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977), holding that
an undue hardship exists as a matter oflaw when an employer incurs anything more than a minimal
cost to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs. Bruffdetermined that she would
not perform some aspects of the position itself: The court found this to be an inflexible position.
Relying on Weberv. Roadway Express, 199 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2000), the court stated that Title VII
does not require an employer to accommodate inflexible religious accommodations affecting other
employees. The Defendant contended, and the court found the record supported, that given the size
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of the EAP staff, the area covered by the program and travel involved, and ·the nature of
psychological counseling incorporating trust relationships developed overtime, any accommodation
of Bruff in an EAP counseling position would involve more than a minimal cost to the Medical
Center. The court found that requiring one or both counselors to assume a disproportionate
workload, or to travel involuntarily with Bruffto sessions to be available on a case by case basis in
case a problematic subject matter came up, is an undue hardship as a matter of law.
In relation to the second way to accommodate by transferring an employee to another
counseling position, the court found that Title VII does not restrict an employer to only those means
ofaccommodation that are preferred by the employee. Thus, once the medical center established
that it offered Bruff a reasonable accommodation even ifnot her preference they have, as a matter
oflaw, set aside their obligations under Title VII. The court rejected the plaintiffs reliance on ADA
claims handling reasonable accommodations and undue hardship, stating that there was a distinction
in the definition ofreasonable accommodation and undue hardship from ADA claims and Title VII
claims. The court found that when the medical center gave her 30 days to find another position, it
also alerted in-house counsel to the situation and directed that Bruffbe given assistance in finding
other employment at the medical center. The court concluded that an employee has the duty to
cooperate in achieving accommodations ofhislher religious beliefs and thus be flexible in achieving
that end. The court found that Bruffdisplayed almost no such cooperation or flexibility in that she
refused to be tested for other positions, declined to even consider a pastoral position, and refused to
even apply for a second counseling position.
B. Ali v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, 8 Fed. Appox. 156 (4th Cir. 2001).
An Islamic employee brought action against her employer under Title VII for refusing to
allow her to wear a head scarf at work that was mandated by her religion. Alamo hired Ali as a
management trainee. While on the job, she wore a head scarfalong with her company unifonn. A
new supervisor told Ali .that she would have stop wearing the head scarf or be transferred to a
position in which she would not be in frequent contact with customers. Ali refused to stop wearing
the scarf and thereafter she was transferred. After the transfer, Ali filed suit. The district court
granted the employer's motion to dismiss for failure to allege an adverse employment action. The
court gave her 11 days to amend the complaint alleging such action. Plaintiff concluded that she
would not meet the standard, therefore she filed a motion to amend arguing that Title vn religious
discrimination did not require such adverse employment action. The trial court denied the
employee's motion to amend its judgment. The employee appealed and the Court ofAppeals found
that the employee was required to allege adverse employment action to survive the employer's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The issue in this case was whether Title VII religious discrimination claims require a
showing of adverse employment action. Ali claimed that the accommodation provision in the
statutory definition of "religion" dictates that religion should be treated differently, unlike other
bases for discrimination, religion does not require ashowing ofadverse employment.
The court began its analysis by setting forth the definition ofreligion. "Religion" is defined
. as including "all aspects ofreligious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
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demonstrates that he is unable'to reasonably accommodate an employee...religious observance or
practice without undue hardship in the conduct ofthe employer's business." 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)(j).
The court noted that Congress inserted this provision in the definition in the wake of Dewey v.
Reynolds Metal Company, 429 F.2d 324,330 (6th Cir. 1970), affinned by an equally divided court
at 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 276 (1971). In Dewey, the circuit court held that an
employer· does not discriminate on the basis of religion simply by failing to accommodate
employees' religious practices. The court concluded in light ofDewey the accommodationprovision
.is a clarification that an employer does discriminate on the basis ofreligion ifit cannotaccommodate
a religious practice without undue hardship. However, relying on the explicit language in the statute,
the court concluded that the accommodation provision does not affect the underlying requirement
that the employer's discriminatory practice relate to "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment" or that the practice "deprives any individual or employment opportunity or
otherwise adversely affect the status of an employee." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). Therefore, the court
found that Ali's reliance upon the accommodation provision in the definition of religion was
misplaced.
Ali also relied upon the legislative history accompanying the adoption ofthe accommodation
provision to support her argument that religious discrimination claims do not require a showing of
adverse employment action. Ali cited the history in which Congress expressed concern with the
Dewey decision. However, the court concluded that Congress' concern about said decision was not
inconsistent with Title VII's requirement for adverse employment action. Likewise, the court
rejected Ali's reliance on the EEOC regulations implementihg Title VII with respect to religious
accommodations. The court concluded that the regulations merely track the language ofthe statute
and do not address the issues in this case. Finally, the court rejected Ali's claim that case law
supported her argument stating that "none of the cases she cites stand for, or even suggest, such a
proposition."
IV. THE "RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION" EXEMPTION
Hall v. Memorial Health Care Com., 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
A tenninated college employee brought a religious discrimination claim under Title VII.
The District Court for the Western District ofTennessee entered summaryjudgment for the college.
The employee appealed. The Court ofAppeals held that (1) the college ofhealth sciences qualified
as a religious educational institution entitled to Title VII exemption from religious discrimination
claims based on this direct relationship with the Baptist church; (2) the religious exemption was not
waivable, and (3) the employee did not state a prima facie case ofreligious discrimination and the
college's proffered nondiscriminatory reason was not pretextual.
Plaintiff Glynda L. Hall sued her fonner employer, Baptist Memorial College of Health
Sciences, alleging that the College unlawfully tenninated her employment based on her religion.
The Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation (Corporation) is a non-profit corporation established
with the purpose of"carrying out a health care mission consistent with the traditional and ongoing
health care missions of the Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee Baptist Conventions and their
affiliates." The Corporation is the parent ofBaptist Memorial Hospital which, in tum , is the parent
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ofBaptist Memorial College ofHealth Sciences. The Hospital's charter states that it is a non-profit
corporation organized for "charitable, educational, religious and scientific" purposes and that its
purposes include "hospital and health care and education ... in line with the traditional and ongoing
mission of the Baptist churches affiliated through their State Baptist Conventions in Arkansas,
Mississippi and Tennessee with the Southern Baptist Convention as now known and practiced
among Baptists." Id.
On August 7, 1995, the College hired the plaintiffas a Student Services Specialist. In that
position, Hall worked with students and the administration in organizing and planning activities of
various campus student organizations. Hall was responsible for interpreting school policies and
ensuring that all student activities were consistent with the mission of the College. Hall was later
ordained as a minister at Holy Trinity, a church which teaches that there is nothing inherently
inconsistent between the homosexual lifestyle and Christianity. The Southern Baptist Convention
is outspoken against homosexual lifestyles. Hall's position at the College was perceived as being
one of considerable influence over students and since the Holy Trinity's views on homosexuality
were inconsistent with those ofthe College, Hall was asked to resign. The College did offer to help
her obtain another position at the College for which she was qualified. Hall refused and the College
tenninated her for a "conflict of interest." Id.
Hall raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in finding that the
College was a religious institution entitled to an exemption from Title VII's prohibition against
religious discrimination; (2) whether the district court erred in finding that the statutory Title VII
exemption was not waivable; and (3) whether the district court erred in finding that Hall did not state
a prima facie case of religious discrimination, and in finding that the College's proffered
nondiscriminatory reason was not pretextual.
The court began its analysis by recognizing that Title VII has expressly exempted religious
organizations from the prohibition against discrimination on the basis ofreligion. The court stated
that "the decision to employ individuals ofa particular religion has been interpreted to include the
decision to tenninate an employee whose conduct or religious beliefs are inconsistent with those of
its employer." See, Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3rd Cir. 1991). The court reasoned that the
College qualifies for the exemption under the plain language of § 2000e-2(e)(2) because it is a
"school, college, university, or other education institution or institution of learning ... that ... is, in
whole, or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a ... religious
corporation." The court further found that the College was founded by three sectarian organizations
and that the atmosphere was permeated with religious overtones.
Additionally, the court rejected Hall's contention that even if the College was a religious
educational institution, it waived the Title VII exemption for such institutions because it represented
itself as being an equal opportunity employer and because it received federal funds. Relying on
previous decisions addressing this issue, the court found that the statutory exemptions from religious
discrimination claims under Title VII could not be waived. See, Little, supra; Siegal v. Truett-
McConnell College, Inc., 13 F. Supp.2d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
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Finally, Hall argued that the district court erred in finding that she failed to establish her
prima facie case or that she failed to prove that the College's articulated reason for firing her was
pretextual. Under this analysis, the court focused on whether Hall had shown that she was treated
less favorably than similarly-situated persons not a member ofthe protected class. The court relied
heavily on the district court's finding and held that Hall failed to establish that "a similarly-situated
co-worker received more favorable treatment than she." The court found that an ordained minister
in the Methodist Church and two employees who were committing an adulterous relationship were
not similarly situated co-workers in that neither assumed a leadership position in an organization that
publicly supported homosexual lifestyles. Similarly, the court found that Hall failed to show that the
reason for her tennination was a pretext for discrimination based on her religion. The court stated
that" to show that tennination was based on her religion, Hall must show that it was the religious
aspect ofher leadership position that motivated her employer's actions. Id. at 626.
In this case, the employee tried to analyze this case as a reasonable accommodation claim,
arguing that the employer must reasonably accommodate her religious beliefs. The court rejected
the employee's reasonable accommodation claim stating,
In reasonable accommodation religious discrimination cases, a plaintiff must
establish that it holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment
requirement, that it inform the employer of the conflict, and that it was discharged
or dismissed for failure to comply with the conflicting requirement.
The court stated that this analysis was not relevant to this case since Hall's employers did not direct
her to do anything that conflicted with her religious beliefs, and Hall was not tenninated over a
failure to perfonn any duties which conflicted with her religious beliefs. It further found, "even if
this case could be so characterized, the evidence shows that the college president had a list of
available positions she offered to help Hall obtain ifHall would have agreed to resign her position
as a student services specialist. Hall declined this reasonable accommodation and was tenninated."
Id.
v. THE STATE OF LAW OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN KENTUCKY
A. State Cases
Kentucky Revised Statute § 344.040 prohibits religious discrimination in employment and
requires employers to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs ofemployees. The
discussion that follows briefly summarizes the state of the law on religious accommodations in
Kentucky in relation to Title VII.
In Human Rights v. Commonwealth, Department for Human Resources, Hazlewood
Hospital, 564 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. App. 1978), the court decided that a hospital's effort at accommodat-
ing a nurse aide trainee's religious belief was inadequate to satisfy the rule of reasonable
accommodation for purposes ofKentucky Revised Statute § 344.030(5) and 344.040. The record
revealed that the nurse's aid trainee was a member ofthe Worldwide Church ofGod, which required
that members in good standing abstain from gainful employment from sunset Friday to sunset
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Saturday and on seven (7) holy days. After accepting ajob at the hospital, she infonned the nursing
supervisor that she could not work on these days, but she offered to work on other days, including
Sunday. The supervisor infonned her that no accommodation could be made for her religious
observance, and she was reported as having declined the position for refusal to work the scheduled
hours. The record showed, however, that the hospital later offered her an open exam booklet that
listed classifications currently being tested by the Commonwealth.
The court stated that the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of federal statutes and
regulations as set forth in TransWorld Airlines v. Hardison 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d
113 (1977) was persuasive, ifnot controlling, in interpreting the similar requirements ofstate law,
namely that employers must make reasonable accommodations tothe religious needs ofpresent and
prospective employees where such accommodation can be made without undue hardship. In the
court's view, the standard for demonstrating undue hardship had shifted from a "dire effect" standard
to a new rule, set forth in the TransWorld Airlines case, that more thana "de minimus cost" in the
fonn of either loss efficiency or premium wages would constitute undue hardship. The court
observed that even though the nurse aide trainee had made a genuine attempt at a solution by
offering to work any days other than her Sabbath and special religious holidays, the employer had
offered only to try and find a position other than that ofnurse aide for which she applied. The court
concluded that the employer's efforts were not reasonable attempts at accommodation, since an
additional effort to investigate the possibility of swapping time with other employees could have
been made without causing undue hardship.
Likewise, in Kentucky Commonwealth on Human Rights v. Kerns Bakery, Inc., 644 S.W.2d
350 (Ky. App. 1982), the court found that a bakery illegally discriminated against an oven operator
who did not work on his Sabbath because it did not comply with the reasonable accommodation
provisions of Kentucky Revised Statute § 344.030(5) which provides that otherwise unlawful
discrimination because of religion was lawful if the employer demonstrated an inability to
reasonably accommodate employees' religious observance or practice without undue hardship.
The case involved a roll oven operator who became a member of the East Eighty Free
Pentecostal Holiness Church. When he advised the supervisor ofhis religious beliefagainst Sunday
work and sought accommodation by way ofa transfer to an available non-Sunday job or by being
excused from Sunday work, the bakery made no effort to accommodate him and when he failed to
report for work for three Sundays, he was fired. The court approved the state Human Rights
Commission's fmdings that the bakery had failed a statutorily required duty ofmaking efforts to
reasonably accommodate the oven operator's religiously based refusal to work on Sunday, and its
findings that the bakery could have easily accommodated the oven operator without undue hardship
to its business by either transferring him to an available non-Sunday job or simply excusing him
from Sunday work. The court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint
on constitutional grounds and reinstating the state Human Rights Commission's order finding a
violation of the state anti-discrimination law.
However, a tire company did not violate the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Kentucky Revised
Statute § 344.040, which outlawed discharge because ofreligion, when it fired a lab technician for
refusal to work on his Sabbath, because the company's efforts to accommodate the lab technician
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were found to be reasonable. Evans v. General Tire & Rubber Co., Mayfield Division, 662 S.W.2d
843 (Ky. App. 1983). The company's lab employees, who were not unionized, were required to
work occasional overtime during the week and on Saturdays, and they worked out a voluntary
rotational system to equalize the number ofSaturdays worked by each, subject to individual trade-
offs to accommodate conflicts of a personal nature. The lab technician then became a member of
the Worldwide Church of God, whose Sabbath e~tended from sundown Friday to sundown on
Saturday, and based on his religious beliefs he advised his supervisor that he would no longer work
any Saturdays. He was successful in getting voluntary replacements for about five months, butwhen
he could not get a replacement and refused to work on four Saturdays, he was fired. The court noted
that § 344.040 outlawed discharge because of religion unless the employer cannot reasonably
accommodate an employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship..The court
disapproved the findings of the state Commission on Human Rights in this case, which found that
the company could have reasonably accommodated the lab technician's need not to work on
Saturdays without undue hardship, saying that the state's Commission wrongfully believed that
undue hardship could only result legally where there is a collective bargaining agreement or
contractual right to shift a job preference. Rather, said the court, undue hardship could also result
ifaccommodation would lead to preferential treatment ofsome employees on the basis ofreligion.
The court found that all the lab technician's fellow employees obviously objected, as the lab
technician could find no one to substitute for him on the Saturdays in question, and it pointed to
undisputed testimony of morale problems on account of attempts to accommodate the lab
technician's religious practices. The loss of efficiency and the resulting cost to the company as a
result of forcing others to work for the lab technician on Saturdays, continued the court, would
obviously be more than de minimus. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order setting
aside the state Commission's findings ofreligious discrimination by the company.
The Sixth Circuit, in the following cases, has held that under the circumstances presented,
that proposed accommodation of the employee's religious practice imposes an undue hardship on
the employer for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court in Reed v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975) held that the
employment of a copy reader who refused to work Saturdays for religious reasons would have
caused undue hardship to the employer for purposes ofregulations issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission pursuant to Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 because (1) it would
require the employer to assign involuntarily other employees to take the employee's place on
Saturdays, resulting in a daily overtime expense of $77; (2) the employer in the long run would
probably have to hire another copy reader because continuing to assign involuntary overtime for a
long period of time was not desirable; and (3) the involuntary assignment ofother copy readers to
work on Saturday to substitute for the employee when they had seniority over the employee would
cause serious morale problems among the copy readers.
However, in Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975), the
court held that an employer who had fired an employee because he would not work on Saturdays
violated Section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court rejected the argument of the
employer that it had made a reasonable accommodation of the employee's religious practices by
offering to facilitate the transfer ofthe employee, an electrician, to a projection job, and stated that
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while in certain circumstances such a transfer might be an adequate accommodation, in the instant
case the transfer would have meant a substantial reduction in pay, would have wasted the skills of
the employee and there still would have been no assurance that Saturday work would not be
required; therefore, the employer had to first attempt to accommodate the employee within his then
current job classification.
The court stated that a shift exchange would have eliminated the problems. It found that shift
exchanges could have been done without increasing labor costs and the company had a right to make
shift assignments under the collective bargaining agreement. The court further noted that the
employee could have made up the lost work at another time which would have left the maintenance
department shorthanded for part of Saturday, but the record indicated that the department often
operated with less than 15 electricians. The court therefore concluded that a reasonable
accommodation ofDraper's religion was possible.
Additionally, the court in Draper stated it was somewhat skeptical ofhypothetical hardship
that an employer thinks might be caused by an accommodation that has never been put into practice
and that the record did not establish that accommodating the employee's religious practice would
have caused chaotic personnel problems since ideally the substitution could be done on a voluntary
basis or the Saturday work could have been rotated among all the other employees. The court
rejected the argument that accommodationwould cause safetyproblems by making electricians work
more than 8 hours a day, though conceding that those safety considerations were highly relevant in
determining whether a proposed accommodation would produce an undue hardship on the
employer's business, since Title VII does not require that safety be subordinated to the religious
practices ofemployees. But the court stated that the company had not sustained its burden ofproving
that the employee could not have been accommodated without jeopardizing safety as the record
indicated that for a variety ofreasons maintenance employees often work more than 8 hours per day.
The court stated that it was also not convinced by the argument that to accommodate the employee
would be to prefer him in violation ofthe overtime allocation provisions or the collective bargaining
agreement because the employer had the right to direct the work force and to assign employees to
shifts without regard to seniority and a partial shift exchange would not have resulted in a
disproportionate assignment ofovertime to the employee ora reduction in the amount ofovertime
available to the other employees and there was no indication that the union would object to the shift
change assignment as long as 16-hour days were not scheduled on a regular basis. However, one
should note that the authority ofthe United States Pipe case as a precedent would seem to be limited
in view of the fact that it was decided prior to the.decision of the Supreme Court in TransWorld
Airlines v. Hardison, supra.
Recently, the court in Cowan v. Gilless, 81 F.3d 160 (6th Cir. 1996) held that an employer
had reasonably accommodated the desires of an ~mployee not to work on her Sabbath by (1)
permitting her to secure a substitute for her shift any time she was scheduled to work on her Sabbath
and to use the employee bulletin board to notify co-workers ofher interest in swapping shifts when
necessary. In the face of this evidence, the court stated that the employer was required, yet failed,
to submit significant probative evidence in support ofher claims in order to defeat the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. The court found she could not defeat the employer's motion for
summary judgment by challenging the policy as unreasonable merely because her private religious
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belief had to be made public since Title VII does not require employer's to accommodate the
religious practice ofemployees in exactly the way employees would like to be accommodated.
VI. WHEN RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS CONFLICT WITH OTHERPOLICIES
The local governments ofKentucky's two largest cities have enacted "fairness ordinances"
which prohibit discrimination on the.basisofsexual orientation. The City ofLouisville first enacted
such an ordinance in 1999 and the Lexington-Fayette County combined government, which includes
the city ofLexington, has followed suit. These ordinances have been interpreted as broadening the
scope of existing state an~ federal civil rights law. There is no federal or statewide legislation in
Kentucky or Tennessee that presently prohibits discrimination against gays and lesbians. However,
employers should be aware that such legislation exists on the local level. There are now statewide
laws in 10 states12 and over one hundred local ordinances in twenty-seven states13 prohibiting the
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
As the result of such legislation, prudent employers may find themselves stuck between a
rock and a hard place. Employers seeking to comply with the requirements of the fairness
ordinances may face opposition from other employees who argue that such prohibitions
unconstitutionally infringe on their right to freedom ofreligion. For example, some employees may
object on religious grounds to diversity and/or sensitivity training that includes a discussion ofthe
homosexual lifestyle or other measures employers take to comply with "fairness ordinances."
In Altman v. Minnesota Department of Corrections, 251 F.3d 1199 (8th Cir. 2001),
employees ofthe MinnesotaDepartment ofCorrections silently read their Bibles during a mandatory
seventy-five minute training program entitled "Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace." The
employees received written reprimands, which made two ofthe employees ineligible for promotions
then in progress. Said employees then filed this action against the Department alleging that the
reprimands violated their federal and state constitutional rights of free speech, free exercise of
religion, and freedom ofconscience, their right to equal protection, and Title VII.
The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the employees' free speech, equal
protection and Title VII claims. The employees appeal those rulings. The court upheld their free
exercise and freedom ofconscience claims and granted the employers qualified immunity on those
damage claims and ordered them in their official capacities to withdraw the written reprimands. The
employees appealed the grant ofqualified immunity. The employer cross-appealed the grant ofany
. reliefon the free exercise and freedom ofconscience claims. The Court ofAppeals for the Eighth
12 These include: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia.
13 States with local ordinances include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia.
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, Circuit found that the employees raised triable free speech, equal protection, and Title VII issues and
accordingly reversed the ruling of the district court.
The court began its analysis by discussing the employees free speech, equal protection, and
Title vn claims. The court stated that to prevail on a First Amendment claim, the employees would
have to prove they were punished for conduct that "fairly characterizes as constituting speech on a
matter of public concern," Id. quoting-Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75
L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), and that their interest in speaking out on that matter of public concern
"outweighs the public employer's interest in promoting its efficiency by prohibiting the conduct."
Id. quoting Dunn v. Caroll, 40 F.3d 287,291 (8th Cir. 1994). The employees argued that their right
to equal protection of the law was violated because the defendants had not disciplined similarly
situated employees who had been inattentive for other reasons during previous training sessions.
In their Title VII claim, they alleged they were impennissibly disciplined on the basis of their
religious beliefs. The court found that these claims raised "genuine, interrelated issues ofmaterial
fact." Id. at 1202.
The court disagreed with the district court's ruling that the employees did not engage in
speech on a matter ofpublic interest and concern because they were "concerned only with internal
policies or practices which are ofrelevance only to the employees ofthat institution." Finding that
although the issue is inherently "internal," the court concluded that the way in which the Department
deals with issues ofgays and lesbians in the workplace affects the perfonnance oftheir public duties
and is a matter ofgeneral public concern. Additionally, the court found that summaryjudgment was
inappropriate because a trial might establish that the reason for the discipline was the employees'
"nondisruptive speech, or their religion, or the fact that they expressed opposition through religious
activity, and that other employees went unpunished who showed equally insubordinate but less
constitutionally protected disregard for training." Id.
In discussing the employees' free exercise ofreligion and freedom ofconscience claims, the
court stated that to prevail on t~s claim, they must show first "that the governmental action
complained ofsubstantially burdened their religious activities." Id. at 1204 quoting Brown v. Polk
County, -61 F.3d 650,658 (8th Cir. 1995) (en bane). The court found that neither the employees nor
the district court identified a significant burden on their religion in this case. The employees did not
suggest that their religion requires them to read the Bible while working. The court found that the
only burden placed on the employees was a requirement that they attend a seventy-five minute
training program and concluded this was not a substantial burden on their free exercise ofreligion.
Thus, the Court ofAppeals held that: (1) employees' conduct constituted speech on a matter
ofpublic interest; (2) fact issues remained as to state's motive in reprimanding employees; and (3)
the state did not impose significant burden on employees' exercise ofreligion.
Altman operates as red flag that employers must be sensitive to their employees' religious
rights. An employer must do so but still comply with the requirements of local ordinances
mandating fairness in disregard to sexual orientation and gender identity through appropriate
measures. An employer who fails to reasonably accommodate an employee who raises objection
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tb such measures in light ofAltman may be subject to p6tentialliability under Title VII, the First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the above summary of recent court decisions regarding reasonable accommoda-
tions, the state of·the law appears to .·adhere to the general principles that employers have an
affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate unless it imposes an undue hardship and employees
have a good faith duty to accommodate his or her needs to the means offered by the employer. As
oftoday, the courts have r~fused to require an employer to "reasonably accommodate" beyond the
traditional two ways: (1) changing the working condition or (2) transferring the employee to a
comparable position. Additionally, the courts have rejected arguments that there is no need to show
an adverse employment action to establish a religious discrimination claim under Title VII. Finally,
courts have refused to apply the reasonable accommodation test beyond its traditional scope inwhich
an employer is only required to accommodate when the performance ofjob duties directly conflict
with an employee's sincere religious beliefs.
Kentucky's state courts use the traditional tests for detennining what is a "reasonable
accommodation" but appear to set a higher bar for "undue hardship" than do the federal courts.
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CASE STUDY
CONVICTION VS COMMERCE
Your company is large enough to be covered by both Title VII and the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act. One ofyour employees advises you that he has recently converted to a
religion that observes a Saturday sabbath; therefore, he will no longer work on Saturdays,
in conformity with his new faith's tenets.
Ifyou allow this employee to have every Saturday oft: the other members ofhis work
crew will have to work additional Saturdays, or someone else will have to be called in to
work overtime, at additional expense to the company.
What should you do?
ANALYSIS
1. Recognize that the courts will not inquire too deeply into what constitutes a
sincerely held religious belief, and that the employee's religion need not be
mainstream to qualify him for an accommodation.
2. Evaluate the situation using an "undue hardship" analysis.
3. Remember that the courts favor the flexible party.
Title VII and the Courts Define "Religion" Broadly
• "Religion" includes all aspects ofreligious observance, practice, and belief.
• Courts have recognized "Old Catholicism", the Black Muslim faith, Wicca, and
atheism as "religions."
• A broad definition of "religion" minimizes the need for judicial decisions about
whether particular beliefs or practices qualify as "religion" in order to avoid
excessive entanglement ofchurch and state as prohibited by the First Amendment.
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FOWLER Jt: RHODE ISLAND, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953)
flit is no business ofthe courts to say...what is a religious practice or activity. "
The test for Determining What is "Religious" Under Title VII
1. The belief for which protection is sought must be "religious" in the person's own
scheme of things.
2. The beliefmust be sincerely held.
E.g. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1969)
CASE STUDY
Redmond v GAF Corporation, 574 F. 2d 897 (1978)
Facts
Redmond began working for GAF in 1953 and joined the Jehovah's Witnesses in 1958.
In 1959, the church elders appointed him head of the Tuesday evening bible study class.
In 1974, the elders told Redmond the Tuesday evening class would meet on Saturday
morning. Redmond took this to be a dictate of the elders.
Redmond told his supervisors he could not work on Saturday mornings, they responded
that he would have to. When he did not report, they fired him.
Result:
II The court rejected GAF's argument that no accommodation was necessary
because Redmond's religion did not forbid all work on Saturday.
II The court concluded that GAF was on adequate notice of Redmond's
conflict, but made no effort to accommodate him.
II The court concluded that GAF had not shown that scheduling Redmond off
on Saturdays would have caused it to underman its crew, expend additional
money by hiring a replacement, or contravene a collective bargaining
agreement; thus, there was no undue hardship.
The Employee's Credibility is Key
II EEOC v Union Independiente De La Autoridad de Acueductos, 279 F. 3d 49
(1st eire 2002)
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[E Employee Cruz, a Seventh Day Adventist, says his religion prevents him
from joining the union. It's a closed shop.
[E The union doubts Cruz's sincerity, since he objects only to certain
membership requirements, and refuses any form ofunion membership
only after the·union offers to accommodate his original objections.
Result:
Cruz loses. The court cautions care "in separating the verity and sincerity ofan
employee's beliefs in order to prevent the verdict from turning on the factfinder's own
ideas ofwhat a religion should resemble," but concluded that while the "truth" of a belief
is not open to question, whether the employee sincerely holds the belief is a fair subject
for inquiry.
Cruz's Spectacular List of Noted Inconsistencies with his Professed Piety:
II Lying on his job application
II Divorcing his wife
II Taking an oath before a notary upon becoming a public employee, contrary to
Adventist doctrine
II Working only five days a week instead of the six, contrary to Adventist doctrine
Personal Preferences Aren't Protected
(Not a promising issue for Summary Judgment)
II Vetter v Farmland Industries, Inc., 120 F. 3d 749 (8th eire 1997)
[E Vetter sues when Farmland fires him for refusing to move his trade
territory, claiming he must live in Ames, which has a synagogue and an
active Jewish community, rather than Webster City, which doesn't.
[E However, Vetter had agreed' at interview to move to Webster City, had
previously lived in a city with no synagogue, and preferred housing and
schools in Ames.
CAVEAT:
The court upheld a jury verdict, noting that the evidence was conflicting. Defendant was
able to get an instruction saying that Vetter had to demonstrate a sincere religious belief
rather than a purely personal preference.
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The Employee's Responsibilities
1. The employee must notify the employer that she needs an accommodation for a
sincerely held religious belief:
2. The employee must be flexible in working toward a suitable accommodation.
Case Study
Bruff v North Mississippi Health Service, Inc., 244 F. 3d 495 (5th eire 2001)
Facts
• Bruffworked as a counselor for Health Service's EAP program.
• Brufrs client Jane Doe asks for Brufrs advice on issues with Doe's lesbian
partner.
• Bruffdeclines. Doe complains.
• Bruff explains to Health Services that the subject offends her religious beliefs.
Outcome
o Health Services offers accommodations: accept Christian counselor position; or
request transfer and obtain other position w/in 30 days.
o Bruff refuses, insists on having backup counselor for issues that offend her, is
fired and sues.
o Jury awards Bruffcompensatory and punitive damages.
o Appellate court reverses, finding Bruffwas inflexible in her demand for
accommodations, and that providing the backup counselor would be undue
hardship.
What's an "undue hardship" in this context?
Transworld Airlines v Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)
II An undue hardship exists as a matter of law when an employer incurs more than a
minimal cost to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs.
II The accommodation given does not have to be the one the employee prefers.
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CASE STUDY
ON THE ROAD AGAIN
A male truck driver learns that some ofthe drivers to be assigned for overnight hauls with
him are female. He objects on religious grounds. His supervisor says ''too bad." The
trucker protests· that other drivers are sometimes allowed to decline assignments in case
of emergencies; therefore, he should be allowed to decline assignments with female truck
drivers. Should this request be accommodated?
ANSWER
No. In Weber v Roadway Express. 199 F. 3d 370 (5th eire 2000), the court concluded
that Weber's standing request was inflexible, that it was different from the occasional
requests ofother drivers with emergencies, and that accommodating Weber would
inconvenience other drivers, which was itselfan undue hardship. The court also rejected
Weber's attempt to impose the ADA's higher standardfor proving Hundue hardship"
upon employers in the context ofdisputes about accommodating religious beliefs.
CASE STUDY
HAVE A BLESSED DAY!
..4.nderson v U.S.F. L02istics, 274 F. 3d 470 (7th eire 2001)
Anderson ends her business conversations and letters with "have a blessed day." U.S.F. 's
biggest customer, Microsoft, complains. Anderson is warned not to use this phrase with
customers. An article appears in the newspaper in which Microsoft denies that it had any
problenl with Anderson's business blessings, so Anderson deliberately resumes using the
phrase in her business conversations and letters. U.S. F. fires her.
HOlV will this come out?
• The court concluded that U.S. F. reasonably accommodated Anderson because:
[E She was allowed to say "Have a blessed day" to everyone except
customers.
[E U.S.F. did not object to Anderson's other religious practices.
CASE STUDY
George v Home Depot. Inc•• 82 EPD 40881 (E.D. La. 2002)
Home Depot hires George as a greeter, expecting her to work peak weekend hours.
George refuses to work on Sundays, saying her religion (Catholic) requires her to rest
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mind and body on Sundays. She offers to work on Saturday instead. Home Depot
refuses to give her every Sunday off, but agrees to arrange her weekend schedule so that
she could attend Mass. George refuses and gets fired.
Did Home Depot offer a reasonable accommodation?
ANSWER
Yes. The court concluded tllat George was infle.'tible in refusing any accommodation
other than one on the exact terms she demanded. Home Depot delnonstrated that it
would have suffered undue hardship in givilzgher every SU11day offbecause designers
would have had to perfomz George's job duties, thus reducing her department's
efficiency; and other employees' schedules would suffer. (N.B. Compare Redmond,
where the employer failed to make this vital showing).
IV/tat is all "adverse employmellt action" that will support a failure toacCOI',I"odate claim?
Ali v Alanzo Rent-a-Car
Ali, a management trainee and a Muslim, works at Alamo's front desk. Her supervisor
tells her she must remove her hejab or transfer away from public view. She refuses to
remove the scarf and gets transferred. The Fourth Circuit concludes that the transfer did
not affect compensation, tenns, conditions, or privileges ofemployment.
The "Religious Institution" Exception
• Title VII exempts bona fide religious institutions from claims ofdiscrimination
based upon religion
• The "religious institution" exception is not waivable
CASE STUDY
Hall v Menlorial Health Care Corp., 215 F. 3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000)
Memorial Healthcare is affiliated lvith the Southern Baptist Convention, which has been
outspoken in its views against homosexuality. Hall, a student services specialist, becalne
an ordained minister in a church that tall.ght that homosexuality does not conflict with
Christian principles.
What happened next....
• Memorial asked Hall to resign or look for ajob that involved less contact with
students.
• Hall refused.
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• Memorial fired Hall~ claiming conflict of interest.
Then came the lawsuit.•••
• The court concluded that Memorial was a bona fide religious institution.
• The court rejected Hall's argument that Memorial had waived its religious
institution exemption by claiming to be an equal opportunity employer, or by
receiving f~deral funds.
• The court rejected Hall's attempt to spin the case as one of"reasonable
accommodation" as opposed to what it was: a disparate treatment case.
• The court pointed out that the employer never asked Hall to do anything that
conflicted with her religious beliefs, and in any event, offered reasonable
accomnlodation.
Kentllcky Decisions
Hazlewood: Hospital failed to acconunodate nursing aid trainee who accepted job then
told employee she could not work on Sundays. Court acknowledges U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Hardison, but says it is not controlling. Concludes that hospital should have
looked into letting plaintiff switch times with other employees in addition to letting her
apply for other jobs.
Kentucky Decisions (cont)
Kerns Bakery: court sides with a baker who refuses to bake on Sunday, saying the
employer should have offered him another job or just let him skip Sundays.
Evans: emergency room did not violate KRS Chapter 344 when it fired an employee who
refused to work on Saturdays (his Sabbath) when he could no longer find a replacement.
Irvin: (not final) public employer not required to accommodate employee who is also a
minister when employee applies for a job that requires Sunday work, then refuses Sunday
work.
Final Query: What if one person's idea of fairness is another person's idea of oppression?
II Ten states and a hundred local jurisdictions (including Lexington-Fayette County)
have laws or ordinances forbidding employment discrimination based upon sexual
orientation.
II What if an employer wants to condllct sellsitivity trailling ahollt this sllbject, but
some employees protest that attending would violate their religious beliefs?
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I. Introduction
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court issued three ground-breaking decisions in the field
ofworkplace harassment.: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1989); Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragherv. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998).
Oncale made clear that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Faragher and Ellerth established the circumstances under which employers will be
liable for harassment committed by supervisors and managers.
This trio ofcases has resulted in an avalanche of federal district and circuit court decisions
further defining and refining the parameters ofsexual and other types ofharassment. Although the
United States Supreme Court has continued to speak in the harassment area, its more recent cases
have had more limited application. In Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 532 U.S. 843 (2001), for
example, the Supreme Court held in a hostile environment sexual harassment case that front pay was
not an element of compensatory damages within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and
therefore not subject to the Act's statutory damage caps. In Clark County School District v. Breeden,
532 U.S. 268 (2001), the Supreme Court held that no reasonable person could have believed that a
single relatively mild incident of alleged sexual harassment violated Title Vll, thus precluding a
retaliation claim based on the employee's internal complaint.
Although the overwhelming majority of workplace harassment cases continue to allege
sexual and racial harassment, courts have more recently begun to recognize national origin and
religious-based harassment .(under Title VII) and age and disability-based harassment (under the
ADEA and ADA, respectively).
Kentucky state courts continue to consider and follow federal court decisions under Title vn
when interpreting and applying the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Kentucky Supreme Court has
shown its willingness to adapt the Faragher and Ellerth supervisor liability standards and has recently
issued an important case demonstrating a broad interpretation of the employer's duty to promptly
correct harassing behavior.
As the following outline will show, workplace harassment remains a heavily litigated and
constantly evolving area of employment law.
II. The Statutory Basis for the Prohibition of Harassment
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (as amended)
1. Prohibited Conduct
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., ("Title Vll") provides
that it is unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges ofemployment, because ofsuch individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I). In holding that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
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proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive working environment, the
United States Supreme Court, in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66, suggested that harassment based on race,
color, religion and national origin might likewise be actionable.
Two types ofsexual harassment have been recognized by the Courts: (1) harassment which
creates a hostile work environment, and (2) quid pro quo harassment, where an employee's
supervisor makes the receipt of tangible job benefits contingent upon submission to unwelcome
sexual advances. The distinctions between hostile environment and quidpro quo sexual harassment,
while still recognized, do not have the same significance as they did before Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998).
2. Remedies
Remedies available in Title VII cases are provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and § 2000e-
5(g)(k). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) provides:
Ifthe court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged
in ... [a discriminatory] employment practice, ... the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to reinstatement, ... back pay, .
. . or any other equitable relief the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides for the recovery ofattorneys' fees by the prevailing party.
Section 1981a provides for the recovery ofcompensatory damages not otherwise available, and for
the recovery of punitive damages. However, the amount of punitive and actual damages that are
recoverable under §1981a is capped depending upon the defendant's total number of employees,
with a maximum amount of $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. The Sixth
Circuit has ruled that this cap does not apply to each separate claim made by an individual, but
represents the total aggregate amount which can be recovered, regardless ofthe amounts awarded for
each individual claim, and regardless of the number of claims on which the plaintiff prevailed.
Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir. 1997) abrogated on other grounds by Pollard, 532 U.S.
843. Attorneys' fees, back pay and front pay awards are not subject to the caps.
3. Punitive Damages
The U.S. Supreme Court clarified the standard for recovery ofpunitive damages in Title VII
cases, in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n., 527 U.S. 526 (1999). In this case, Kolstad challenged
her employer's decision to promote a male to a position she also sought. She claimed that the
selection process was a sham, and that the reason offered by the employer for its decision to promote
the male was a pretext for gender discrimination. At trial, the judge refused to allow a jury
instruction on punitive damages. After the jury returned a verdict in Kolstad's favor, she appealed
the trial court's denial ofher request for a punitive damages instruction. The appellate court upheld
the trial court's decision, finding that punitive damages were only warranted in cases where the
plaintiff could demonstrate that the employer engaged in "egregious" misconduct.
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The Supreme Court rejected this standard, and provided a two-part test for awarding punitive
damages. First, punitive damages can only be recovered if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
employer or its agent engaged in "intentional discrimination." Intentional discrimination occurs
when the employer or its agent knowingly bases an employment decision on the individual's
membership in a protected class. Although a plaintiffmay recover actual or compensatory damages
in cases ofboth intentional and unintentional discrimination (such as claims that a policy or practice
has a disparate impact on a particular class, and is not justified by business necessity), a plaintiffcan
only proceed to the next level of analysis if he or she can show that the employer or agent
consciously made a decision based on prohibited considerations.
Next, the plaintiff must show that the employer or its agent acted with malice or reckless
indifference to the fact that the discrimination might violate the plaintiff's rights under federal law.
The Court explained that this is a separate analysis from detennining whether the decision-maker
was consciously influenced by the employee's protected status. The requirement of "malice" or
"reckless indifference" relates to the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation oflaw,
not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination. This second prong focuses on the mental state
ofthe individual making the discriminatory decision. The Court noted that there will not always be
an overlap between the employer's awareness that it is engaging in discrimination, and the awareness
that the discrimination may violate federal law. The Court recognized that there maybe cases where
the employer is unaware of a relevant federal prohibition, where the employer or its agent may, in
good faith, believe that making a decision based on a disability or other protected characteristic is not
unlawful, or cases where the theory. of discrimination advanced by the plaintiff is novel or not
generally accepted. However, the Court cautioned against reliance on deliberate ignorance ofthe law
as a defense to punitive damages.
In order to encourage employers to adopt policies and practices designed to end unlawful
discrimination, the Court created a safe harbor that may allow an employer to limit or even
completely avoid liability for punitive damages based on intentional discrimination by a managerial
agent. The Court recognized that an employer will not be vicariously liable for punitive damages
due to the acts of its managerial agents where the employer has made a good faith effort·to prevent
discrimination in the workplace. The examples ofgood faith efforts specifically mentioned by the
Court include the existence ofa written policy prohibiting discrimination that has been instituted in
good faith and the implementation of programs or other policies to prevent discrimination in the
workplace.
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (as amended).
1. Prohibited Conduct
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, was enacted to provide all persons within
the jurisdiction ofthe United States with the same rights to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be a
party to a lawsuit, to testify in a legal proceeding, and have the full and equal benefit of all laws
protecting their person and property regardless oftheir race. Prior to its 1991 amendment, the United
States Supreme Court interpreted § 1981 in an employment context as only providing a remedy for
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hiring decisions, sometimes referred to as "pre-formation" conduct, based on race. As a result, it
provided no remedy for race discrimination, such as racial harassment, which occurred during the
course of the employment relationship. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
In 1991, Congress amended § 1981 to provide that the power to "make and enforce contracts"
includes "the making, performance, modification, and termination ofcontracts, and the enjoyment of
all benefits, privileges, tenns, and condition of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
This statute is now construed broadly by the courts to prohibit discrimination in any ofthetenns and
conditions of employment on the basis of race, at all stages of the employment relationship.
Williams v. Carrier Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1528 (M.D.Ga. 199.5); Allen v. City of Chicago, 828 F.
Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
2. Remedies
Although § 1981 does not contain specific remedies provisions, both compensatory and
punitive damages have been awarded under § 1981. There are no damages caps for claims brought
under § 1981. Accordingly, most claims for racial harassment are often pled as both Title VII and §
1981 causes of action.
C. The Kentucky Civil Rights Act
1. Prohibited Conduct.
The Kentucky Civil Rights Act ("KCRA"), KRS § 344.010 et seq., was enacted to provide
for execution within Kentucky of the policies embodied in federal anti-discrimination statutes.
"Kentucky's Civil Rights Act was enacted to in a measure enforce policy established in federal civil
rights law." McNeal v. Annour & Co., 660 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Ky. App. 1983) (citing KRS
§ 344.020). The KCRA incorporates the policies of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended (78 Stat. 241), Title vm of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1968 (82 Stat. 81), the Fair
Housing Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 360), the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (81 Stat. 602), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-336). See KRS
344.020(1)(a).
Because the KCRA is modeled on federal legislation, decisions interpreting these federal
statutes are considered highly persuasive by the Kentucky courts. Mountain Clay, Inc. v.
Commonwealth Commission on Human Rights, 830 S.W.2d 395,396 (Ky. App. 1992); Kentucky
Commission on Human Rights v. City of Owensboro, 750 S.W.2d 422,423 (Ky. 1988); White v.
Rainbo Baking Co.. 765 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Ky. App. 1988); McNeal v. Annour and Co., 660 S.W.2d
957 (Ky. App. 1983); Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Commonwealth, Dept. ofJustice,
586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ky. App. 1979).
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2. Remedies
The KCRA provides for recovery ofactual damages sustained by the plaintiff, together with
the costs of the lawsuit, including a reasonable attorney's fee for the plaintiffs attorney of record.
KRS § 344.450.
In Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Ky. 1992), the Kentucky Supreme
Court recognized that while the KCRA incorporates the anti-discrimination policies embodied in
Title VII, it also contains further protections not specified in Title VII, including "protect[ing] ...
personal dignity and freedom from humiliation." Accordingly, the courts have allowed successful
plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages under this statute, including damages for
"embarrassment and humiliation."
The KCRA does not contain a damages cap.
3. Punitive Damages.
At the time this publication is going to press, the question ofwhether punitive damages may
be awarded under the KC'RA is unresolved. In an opinion since ordered depublished, the Kentucky
Court ofAppeals, in Union Underwear Co., Inc. d/b/a Fruit ofthe Loom v. Barnhart, upheld the trial
Court's instruction to the jury on the issue ofpunitive damages in an age discrimination case. The
case was reversed on other grounds in Union Underwear v. Barnhart, 50 S.W. 3d 188 (Ky. 2001),
reh 'g denied (2001), with no mention ofthe punitive damage issue. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky, in Timmons v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 33 F.Supp. 2d 577
(W.O. Ky. 1999), found that the KCRA permits punitive damages, while the United States District
Court for the Eastern District ofKentucky and the Sixth Circuit have found that punitive damages
are not authorized by the act. Messick v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 578 (E.D. Ky.
1999); Lewis v. Quaker Chemical Corp., 229 F.3d 1152, (6th Cir. 2000). The Kentucky Court of
Appeals, in Kentucky Dept. ofCorrection v. McCullough, 2000 WL 707953 (Ky. App. 2000), disc.
review granted Feb. 14, 2001 (unpublished opinion) agreed with Timmons, supra, that punitive
damages are recoverable under the KCRA. This question will presumably soon be put to rest by the
Kentucky Supreme Court, as it has granted discretionary review in McCullough.
III. Sexual Harassment
A. Hostile Work Environment Harassment.
The most recognized type ofunlawful harassment is "hostile work environment harassment."
This type of harassment does not directly affect an economic aspect of the victim's employment,
such as promotion, discharge or salary, but rather deprives an employee of the right to work in an
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult.
E· 5
1. Required Elements of the Plaintiffs Claim.
A cause of action charging a sexually hostile work environment is evaluated in the Sixth
Circuit using the five part test set forth in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., Div. ofTexas American
Petrochemicals, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) abrogated on other grounds by Harris, 510 U.S. 17.
Generally, to prevail in a Title VII hostile work environment sexual harassment action, an employee
must assert and prove that:
(1) the employee is a member of a protected class;
(2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment;
(3) the harassment complained ofwas "based on sex";
(4) the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiffs work
perfonnance and creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment (or
alternatively was "sufficiently severe or pervasive" so as to create a hostile or abusive
work environment);
(5) the existence ofemployer liability.
Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996); Harris, 510 U.S. 17.
a. The PlaintiffMust Be A Member ofa Protected Class.
Although the plaintiffs work environment may be affected due to sexual harassment directed
at others (see next section), the plaintiffgenerally will not be pennitted to recover under the hostile
environment theory unless that plaintiffand the targets ofharassment are members ofthe same class.
Accordingly, a male employee cannot recover under the hostile environment theory based on a claim
that his work environment has been affected due to his distress over the pervasive harassment of
females in his department. See, e.g., Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 252 F.3d 179
(2nd Cir. 2001); Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998).
b. The Plaintiff Was "Subjected to" the Conduct.
In Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (loth Cir. 1987), the court examined whether
sexual harassment directed at employees other than the plaintiff can be used as proof of the
plaintiffs claim of a hostile work environment, and stated: "The answer seems clear: one of the
critical inquiries in a hostile environment claim must be the environment. Evidence of a general
work atmosphere therefore - - as well as evidence ofspecific hostility directed toward the plaintiff- -
is an important factor in evaluating the claim." Id. at 1415, citing Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141
(D.C. Cir. 1985), ajJ'd in part and reversed in part, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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The Hicks opinion suggests that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that any sexual
harassment was directed specifically toward her in order to state a cognizable hostile environment
claim under Title VII. "Even a woman who was never herselfthe object ofharassment might have a
Title VII claim ifshe were forced to work in an atmosphere where such harassmentwas pervasive."
Id. at 1416. See also Sims v. Montgomery County Commission, 766 F. Supp. 1052 at 1074 (M.D.
Ala. 1990) (in refusing to limit the remedy for harassment to only the persons at whom it was
directed, the court explained that under Title Vll, a person may be a victim of sexual harassment
without being its intended victim; the challenged conduct need not be directed at the complaining
individual); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 at 1277-78 (D.D.C. 1988) (women forced to
work in an atmosphere pervaded by harassment may have a Title VII action even ifthey suffered no
harassment themselves).
Note that, under a hostile work environment theory, actionable harassment may be committed
by supervisors, co-workers or other individuals present in the workplace, such as customers.
c. The Conduct Was Unwelcome
The most fundamental aspect ofactionable sexual harassment is that the sexual conduct was
unwelcome. An employee must show that he or she did not solicit or invite the conduct, regarded the
conduct as undesirable or offensive, and also that the harasser knew or should have realized that the
conduct was unwelcome. This notice may be actual or constructive. Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
143 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 1998). The fact that the employee may have freely consented to, or
participated in such conduct in the past will not necessarily defeat the employee's claim, if the
employee can show that he or she later made it clear to the alleged harasser that the conduct was no
longer welcome. Bums v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993) (The
fact that the plaintiffposed for a pornographic magazine did not mean that she "welcomed" repeated
sexual advances and vulgar comments about pictures in the magazine while she was at work.)
Further, a plaintiffs voluntary submission to sexual conduct will not necessarily defeat a
claim ofharassment. The crux ofa sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
"unwelcome" not that the complainant was forced to participate against her will. Mentor, 477 U.S.
at 68.
. d. The Conduct Was "Based on Sex"
Conduct that is "based on sex" may be sexual in nature, such as requests for sexual favors
and comments about sexual activity. However, the key issue is not whether the conduct was about
sex, but rather, whether the conduct would not have occurred but for the employee's sex. Williams
v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999). Unless the victim is able to show that a
supervisor, co-worker, etc. mistreated one sex but not the other, or directed the complained of
behavior at the victim because ofhis or her gender, then the harassment has not occurred "because of
sex," and he or she should not be able to prevail on the claim. EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin. 266 F.3d
498 (6th Cir. 2001) (Where only three of 292 employees were women, and none of the women
worked in the field with the male plaintiffs, court could not conclude that "gross, vulgar, male
horseplay" was directed at plaintiffbecause ofhis sex).
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The gender and the sexual orientation ofthe harasser are not relevant to the claim. Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see also Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.
App. 1999) (applying Oncale to hold that same sex harassment is actionable under the KCRA). See §
[7.50], infra, for a discussion ofgender based harassment arising from conduct that has no sexual
content.
e. The Harassment Was Severe or Pervasive
Hostile environments may be created by very different combinations and frequencies of
hostile sexual conduct. However, the plaintiff generally has the burden of demonstrating that the
hostile environment resulted not from a single isolated or offensive incident, comment or action, but
from incidents, comments or conduct that occurred with some frequency. The allegedly harassing
incidents must be "more than episodic"; they must, under the totality of the circumstances, be
"sufficiently continuous and concerted" in order to be deemed pervasive. Harris. 510 U.S. at 21.
Single incidents ofharassment will rarely be sufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment.
See § [7.25], infra.
1. Conduct Held Insufficiently Severe or Pervasive to Create
Hostile Environment
The Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Stacyv. Shoney's, 955 F. Supp.751 (E.D. Ky.
1997) ajf'd by 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision), upheld the District Court's
grant ofsummaryjudgment in favor ofShoney's, finding that the conduct alleged failed to rise to the
level required to support a finding that a hostile environment existed in violation of the KCRA.
In this case, Stacy alleged that over the course of her two months of employment with
Shoney's, her supervisor, Mr. Kimbrell, "created a hostile and abusive work environment" for her.
Specifically, Stacy alleged that Mr. Kimbrell made the following "sexual" remarks to her: (1) he
told her that her "hair looks better down"; (2) he said that her "tan looks good" and told her that he
wished he "could see more ofit"; (3) he told a dishwasher at Shoney's that he never had a sister who
looked like Stacy; (4) he made a comment to Stacy about working on the night shift with him; (5) he
told her that he would move in with her and take care ofher "in a heartbeat"; 6) he called Stacy at
work on his days offand told her that he missed her; 7) he told her that she could have anything she
wanted when she asked him for a cigarette; and 8) he told Stacy that ifhe had someone who looked
as good as her, he would not let her out of the house. Stacy also alleged that on one occasion Mr.
Kimbrell took a pen out ofher shirt pocket and touched her breast with his fist. Other than this one
incident of "physical contact," Mr. Kimbrell never touched her.
Quoting from Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1045,1051 (S.D. Ohio
1995), eerl. denied, 522 U. S. 1110 (1998) the District Court wrote:
The concept ofsexual harassment is designed to protect women from
the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for
women .... It is not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity.
E-g
Drawing the line is not always easy. On one side lies sexual assaults;
other physical contact whether amorous or hostile, for which there is
no consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations;
intimidating words or acts; obscene language or gestures;
pornographic pictures. On the other side lies the occasional vulgar
banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of course or boorish workers.
Stacy, 955 F. Supp. at 755; see also, Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822 (6th Cir. 1997)
(Comments including "Nothing I like more in the morning than sticky buns, " and "Say, weren't you
there [at the biker bar] Saturday night dancing on the tables?" and references to "Hootersville" and
"Twin Peaks" held not actionable); Koelsch v. Beltone Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 1995)
(supervisor who stroked plaintiffs leg on one occasion, grabbed her buttocks, told her he found her
attractive, and twice asked her out on a date, did not commit acts rising to the level of hostile
environment sexual harassment); Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir.
2000) (construing KCRA) (several dirty jokes told in plaintiffs presence, an alleged verbal sexual
advance, one-time reference to plaintiffas "Hot Lips" and isolated comments about plaintiffs state
ofdress held insufficient to create hostile work environment); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980
(6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 928 (2000) (single battery coupled with two offensive remarks
over six months does not create a factual issue).
In EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, 266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit, in a same sex
harassment case, ruled that a supervisor's having grabbed the plaintiffin his genital area on a couple
ofoccasions, and stalked the plaintiffby hanging around him and looking at him from a distance was
"gross, vulgar, male horseplay." However, it was not sufficient to create liability under Title Vll. Id.
at 522-523.
11. Conduct Held Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive to Create
Hostile Work Environment
When reviewing the evidence ofharassment, the courts generally apply a sliding scale, e.g.,
the more severe the conduct, the less frequently it must occur before becoming actionable.
Conversely, the more frequent the conduct, the less severe it must be in order to be deemed as having
altered the work environment. In Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1997), a jury found
that the evidence was sufficient to establish a hostile work environment where a co-worker touched
the plaintiffonly two times in a sexually suggestive manner, but after her rejection ofhis advances,
he laughed and made suggestive noises to plaintiff for a period of eight month~ and repeatedly
blocked her exit from their narrow workroom.
f: The Conduct Was Objectively and Subjectively Hostile or Abusive
In Harris, the United States Supreme Court held that in order for conduct to be found
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working environment, there must be
both an objective and subjective component." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.Conduct that is not severe or
pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive is
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beyond Title VII's reach. Similarly, the victim must subjectively perceive the environment to be
hostile or abusive if a violation of Title VII is to be found. Id.
g. The Conduct Had the Effect ofAltering the Work Environment
In addition to holding that there must be both an objective and subjective component to the
existence of a hostile or abusive working environment, the Supreme Court in Harris refused to
require that the plaintiffshow an environment that seriously affected herpsychological well-being.
The Court instead reaffinnedthe standard set forth in Meritor, requiring the plaintiffto show that the
workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions ofthe victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23.
h. Employer Liability
1. Liability for a Hostile Environment Created by Co-Workers
or Third Parties
An employer will be liable for harassment by non-supervisory employees and for harassment
committed by third parties such as customers or vendors where the employer or its agents or
supervisory employees knew or should have known ofthe conduct, and failed to take action to end
the harassment.
Since 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has stated in its
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex that employers may be held responsible for sexual
harassment by non-employees "where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows
or should have known ofthe conduct and fails to take immediate action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e), as
amended.
In Lockard v. Pizza Hut, 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998), the Tenth Circuit rejected an
employer's argument that it could not be held liable for harassing conduct by its customers. In this
case,. two male customers were well known in the restaurant, and the plaintiff, a waitress, had
previously told her supervisor that she did not like to wait on them. On the day in question, the
waitress was propositioned by one of the customers, and rebuffed· his advance. He responded by
grabbing her hair. She then went to her manager and asked that she not be required to continue to
wait on their table. The manager refused her request. When she returned to their table, she was
physically assaulted by one of the men. The court ruled that the employer was liable for the
harassment, because it had notice ofthe problem and had the ability to control the waitress's working
environment, but failed to do so. The court also recognized that the manager's actions violated a
specific company policy that provided instructions on how to deal with harassing customers.
Similarly, the employer was held liable for harassment by a customer in Menchaca v. Rose
Records, 1995 WL 151847, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1334 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 1995). In this
case, a female employee of a record store was repeatedly harassed by one of the store's regular
customers. The customer regularly made sexual comments to the employee, asked her out on dates
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and to sleep with him, and he attempted to grab the employee from behind several times. Although
the employee complained to the store manager about the customer's behavior, the manager still took
no action. On one occasion the manager was present when the customer grabbed the employee and
dangled her by her ankles, injuring her arm and tailbone. However, the manager took no action to
either halt or discourage the customer's conduct. Applying the rationale found in the EEOC
guidance, the district court denied the defendant's summary judgment motion, stating that "a
harasser's status as a non-employee does not as a matter of law shield the employer from liability
under TitleVll, ifthe employer knew or should have known ofthe harassment." Id. at 1336-37. See
also, Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848 (1 st Cir. 1998) (employer liable for
harassment offemale employee by an important client when, after complaint was made by employee,
her supervisor told her to respond "as a woman" and then fired her when she refused the client's
advances); Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (employer liable for
harassment by customer where employer responded to female employee's complaint that the
customer made unwanted sexual advances to employee, by stating that "the customer is always
right").
11. Knowledge Imputed to Employer
One of the questions that will be relevant to the liability of an employer for a hostile work
environment caused by a co-employee or third party is whether the employer knew or should have
known of the alleged harassment. Actual notice may be found if the employee complained of the
harassment to the company's personnel office or other management personnel. Knowledge may be
imputed to the employer ifthe harassment is so severe or pervasive that the employer was negligent
in failing to discover and prevent it. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir.
1995).
In Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429 (1 st Cir. 1997), the employer was
charged with constructive knowledge ofa hostile environment, despite the plaintiffs failure to use
official procedures to complain because other women had made complaints against the same alleged
harasser and the layout of the mill was such that higher management "could not have missed the
discriminatory atmosphere that permeated the department." Id. at 437- 438.
Ill. Failure to Act to Remedy Harassment
Generally, an employer will have no liability for harassment by non-supervisory co-workers
or third parties ifit responded promptly after receiving notice of the harassment, and the response
was adequate. Adequacy is usually found where the response was reasonably calculated to, or did in
fact, cause the harassment to stop. However, if the harasser has already stopped all objectionable
conduct voluntarily, the employer may still be liable to an employee who has reported harassment,
unless the employer takes some additional action to address the past problem, and demonstrate to the
harasser and the victim that the employer will not tolerate harassment in the workplace. Fuller v. City
of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995).
In Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997) the Sixth Circuit found that
the employer was not liable for sexual harassment under either Title VII or the KCRA, where (1) the
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employer had a written policy that explicitly prohibited sexual harassment, (2) immediately upon
learning of the harassment the employer terminated one co-worker, severely reprimanded another,
and required that public apologies be made to the victim, and (3) as a result of the employer's
actions, all harassment stopped.
In Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996), the employer was not held liable
for hostile environment sexual harassment where the harassment by the plaintiffs co-worker was not
known to the employer prior to the plaintiffs report, and immediately thereafter the employer
reprimanded the co-worker and the objectionable conduct stopped. The Sixth Circuit stated that
since the harassment stopped after the employer took action, the requirement that the employer's
remedial action be reasonably calculated to end the harassment was satisfied. See also, Wilson.v.
Southern National Bank ofNorth Carolina, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 803 (W.D. N.C. 1995) in which the
employer was excused from liability for a hostile work environment where it had no knowledge of
the harassment until the complaint was made, and it took prompt remedial action after the complaint.
Actions taken by the employer to remedy the hostile environment included a departmental meeting, a
memo issued to employees, and transferring the plaintiff to a new department with a raise.
In Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2nd Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit reaffirmed that an
employer's written policy outlawing sexual harassment coupled with prompt action to remedy an
employee's claim would, except in unusual cases, defeat a hostile work environment claim on
summary judgment. The Torres court also found that an employer may be relieved from its
responsibility to take prompt remedial action to remedy a hostile work environment, ifthe employee
making the report has requested that the employer not investigate the claim, keep the claim
confidential, and take no action. The court suggested that the only time such a request must be
dishonored is when the reported harassment involves a severe fonn ofsexual harassment that might
pose a threat of serious physical or psychological harm. However, the recent EEOC Guidance on
Vicarious Liability for Harassment by Supervisors, and the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in
Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. v.Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540 (Ky. 2001) discussed more fully in § [7.46]
infra, provide strong support for adopting a practice that requires supervisors and managers to report
and/or respond to a complaint of harassment, regardless of the circumstances under which they
become aware of the allegations.
B. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998), courts drew a sharp distinction between hostile environment cases (in which employer
liability usually turned on whether the employer knew or should have known ofthe harassment and
where the plaintiffhad to establish severe or pervasive conduct) and quidpro quo cases (in which
employers faced strict liability and where a single request for sexual favors was generally sufficient
to establish liability). In a quid pro quo case, the plaintiff complained that her supervisor or
manager conditioned the receipt ofjob benefits on the acceptance ofunwelcome sexual advances,
thus ordinarily resulting in the loss of those job benefits. Such cases usually differed from hostile
environment cases, in which plaintiffs often suffered no tangible job detriment. In Ellerth, the Court
was presented with a claim framed in terms ofquidpro quo harassment. However, the case more
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closely resembled a hostile environment case, since the plaintiffhad never submitted to the alleged
harasser's demands, and therefore suffered no tangible job detriment.
Kimberly Ellerth alleged that a vice president of sales and marketing for Burlington
Industries sexually harassed her throughout her employment by asking inappropriate questions,
making lewd comments and sometimes touching her offensively. For example, he allegedly asked
her whether she and her husband were practicing having a family while staring conspicuously at her
breasts and legs, regaled her with off-colorjokes; rubbed her leg under the table at a luncheon, made
provocative comments about her breasts and legs·and once suggested she perform fellatio. Ellerth
also claims that her harasser reminded her that he could make her job "very hard or very easy at
Burlington." She subsequently applied for and received a promotion, but claimed that the promotion
decision was delayed by the harasser. Although Ellerth complained to various co-workers and
various lower-level managers around her, she did not use Burlington's grievance procedure, or
complain to her direct. supervisor about the harassment.
The district court granted summaryjudgment to Burlington on Ellerth's quidpro quo claim
on the grounds that Ellerth failed to demonstrate that she suffered any adverse employment action
after rejecting her supervisor's advances. The Seventh Circuit reversed in a severely divided
decision, which held that Burlington could be held liable· for quidpro quo sexual harassment even
though Ellerth could not show that she suffered any adverse job consequences. The court's decision
ended with a plea to the Supreme Court to resolve "the chaotic case law in this important field of
practice."
In its opinion, the Supreme Court downplayed the importance ofthe quidpro quo and hostile
environment labels. Stating that it was not suggesting that the terms quidpro quo and hostile work
environment are irrelevant to Title VII litigation, the court nevertheless made it clear in Ellerth that
the quid pro quo label did not have any meaning in a case in which a harasser's threats of job
detriment are not carried out. Where the harasser's threats are unfulfilled, the case should be
analyzed under the hostile work environment paradigm, requiring a showing ofsevere or pervasive
conduct. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.
1. Required Elements of a Quid Pro Quo Claim
The traditional elements of a quidpro quo claim are as follows:
(1) the employee is a member of a protected class;
(2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment by supervisory or
higher level personnel, in the form ofsexual advances or requests for sexual favors;
(3) the harassment complained ofwas based on sex;
(4) the employee's submission to the unwelcome advances was made an express or
implied condition for receivingjob benefits or the employee's refusal to submit to a
supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment;
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(5) the existence ofrespondeat superior liability.
Highlander v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986).
As noted above, due to recent changes in the law ofharassment, unfulfilled threats ofadverse
employment action must be analyzed under the hostile work environment "severe or pervasive
conduct" paradigm, and additionally, employers are now vicariously liable for harassment committed
by supervisors and managers. Accordingly, the authors will suggest that thisprimafacie model may
no longer be accurate post-Ellerth. Based on the holding in Ellerth, in order to state a quidpro quo
claim where the supervisor's threats were unfulfilled, the fourth element might more appropriately
read:
(4) The employee's submission to the unwelcome advances was made an express or
implied condition for receivingjob benefits and the employee's refusal to submit to a
supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment.
The fifth element should probably be deleted entirely in such situations, since under Ellerth,
employers are vicariously liable for harassment committed by supervisors and managers and,if
tangible job detriment results, the affirmative defense is not available. Thus, where an employee's
refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands results in a tangible job detriment, the traditional
strict liability standard for employers remains intact.
What is unclear, following Ellerth, is the effect ofthe court's decision on the traditional quid
pro quo claim where the supervisor'sthreat is not carried out because the employee has submitted to
the supervisor's unwelcome advances. As the Ellerth court noted, with reference to its earlier '
decision in Meritor:
We assumed, and with adequate reason, that if an employer
demanded sexual favors from an employee in return for a job benefit,
discrimination with respect to terms or conditions ofemployment was
explicit. . . . We distinguished between quid pro quo claims and
hostile environment claims, and said both were cognizable under
Title VII, though the latter requires harassment that is severe or
pervasive. The principal significance of the distinction is to instruct
that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive alterations
in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter
must be severe or pervasive.
Ellerth, 524 U.S..at 752 (citations omitted), citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
This suggests, at least, that the traditional quidpro quo paradigm may still be available to a
plaintiff who has submitted to a supervisor's unwanted advances, because her submission to the
employer's demands in exchange for ajob benefit, or in order to keep ajob benefit, constitutes an
explicit alteration in the terms and conditions ofher employment. If this is the case, then the only
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effect ofEllerth on this type ofquidpro quo claim may be to require reading the fifth prong of the
Highlander test to provide for the availability ofthe affirmative defense in cases where the alteration
ofthe victim's terms and conditions ofemployment fell short ofconstituting a "tangible employment
action." For a discussion ofwhat constitutes a "tangible employment action" see § [7.44], infra.
a. A Request for Sexual Favors Was Made
The request for sexual favors in exchange for a tangible job benefit must be either overt, or of
such·a nature that the sexual overture is clear. For example, in Perkovich v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997), the court found that quid pro quo conduct was not actionable where
there was no overt request for sexual favors, and the plaintiff could only argue that the ordinary
language used by the supervisor had a hidden sexual meaning. In addition, the court stated that a
plaintiff's super-sensitivity was not sufficient to create a prima facie case.
The courts will not generally find sexual favoritism to be actionable unless the plaintiffcan
show: (1) that she was approached and rejected sexual advances, and then others who were receptive .
to sexual advances were given advantages she did not receive, or (2) favoritism toward sexual
partners was so pervasive in the workplace that it became an implicit condition for receiving benefits
or advancement. Isolated instances where sexual partners are favored do not give rise to actionable
claims for quid pro quo sexual harassment, because both male and female employees who are not
involved with the supervisor are at an equal disadvantage.
In Karibian v. Columbia University, 930 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), a romantic
relationship between a plaintiff and her supervisor soured. The plaintiff later sued her employer,
claiming it had failed to take appropriate actions to deal with the supervisor's continued attraction to
her after she made a complaint regarding his attentions. The court rejected her quidpro quo claims,
finding that the earlier relationship was consensual, and no requests for sexual favors in exchange for
a job benefit occurred after it ended. In this case, the evidence suggested only that there was a
relationship that the plaintiffdid not want any more. Accordingly, the court found that the employer
had done enough when it transferred the plaintiff to another supervisor.
In Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ill. 1994), the court ruled that the
mere showing of preferential treatment and promotion given to female co-worker who was
romantically involved with her supervisor would not be sufficient to state a cause of action for
discrimination "based on sex," because all other eligible employees, male and female, who were not
sexually involved with the supervisor did not receive a promotion. However, allegations that it was
generally necessary for women to grant sexual favors to the employer's decision makers in order to
obtain professional advancement, and that she was not extended certain employment benefits
including promotion because unlike favored co-employees, she did not grant sexual favors, would be
sufficient to state a cause of action for quidpro quo sexual harassment under Title VII.
b. The Request for Sexual Favors Was Unwelcome
The existence ofa prior sexual relationship between a supervisor and an employee does not
mean that later requests for sexual favors by the supervisor will be considered welcome. In Babcock
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v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the plaintiffestablished a prima facie case ofquidpro
quo harassment where she demonstrated that although she had a prior consensual relationship with
the supervisor, she later objected to his advances, and was then told by her supervisor she would be
fired if she continued to refuse to sleep with him. Under these circumstances, the court found that
the later advances could not be considered "welcome."
c. The Request Was Coupled with a Threat
Where the employee rejects the sexual advances and has been threatened with an adverse
employment consequence, the content of the threat must be sufficiently severe to affect the
employee's "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Robinson v. City of
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1298 (3rd Cir. 1997). Thus, "[f]onnal reprimands that result in a notation
in an employee's personnel file could be sufficiently concrete, but harsh words that lack real
consequences are not." Id. In addition to tennination, under prior law, the following actions were
sufficient to be considered "adverse employment actions":
(1) ,denial ofpromotion; Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1298-99; Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 894
F.2d 651 at 659 (4th Cir. 1990).
(2) decrease in pay; Spencer, 894 F.2d at 659.
(3) denial ofparticipation in training program; Henson v. City ofDundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11 th Cir. 1982).
(4) reprimands; Hom v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985).
(5) transfers; Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n.6 (4th Cir. 1983).
(6) loss ofjob title; Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
(7) more rigid enforcement ofleave policy. Gallagherv. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338 (2nd Cir.
1998).
2. Employer Liability for Supervisor Harassment
In Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the United States Supreme Court
was invited to consider whether the City ofBoca Raton could be held strictly liable for hostile work
environment sexual harassment by a supervisor. The.plaintiff, Beth Anne Faragher, worked as a
lifeguard for the City ofBoca Raton. She alleged that between 1990 and 1995, two male supervisors
touched and/or patted her thighs and buttocks on approximately 15-30 occasions and subjected her to
a large number ofextraordinarily offensive comments and gestures, including requests for oral sex
and demands to join her in the lifeguard shower room.
Although Faragher did not fonnally report this conduct to the city during her employment,
she did informally consult with Robert Gordon, whom she regarded as her friend and who also
happened to supervise one of the harassers. Gordon did not speak to either man about the
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harassment, or inform higher management ofhis discussion with Faragher. She later resigned as a
lifeguard in order'to attend law school, and then filed suit for sexual harassment.
The district court entered judgment for Faragher on her Title VII claim against the city, and
awarded her $1 in nominal damages. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the city could not
be held liable because the supervisors did not act within the scope of their employment when they
harassed Faragher, and there was no evidence that the supervisors were aided in the perpetration of
their sexual harassment .by any relationship with the city, since they did not make any adverse
employment decisions based on Faragher's response to their sexual overtures.
In her petition for certiorari, Faragher argued that constructive knowledge should be imputed
to an employer any time harassment is reported to an employee ''whosejob it reasonably should be to
report the harassment up the line." In its amicus brief, the EEOC urged that the'court should find
that a harasser has been "aided in his harassment due to the existence of the agency relationship,"
whenever the victim reasonably fears adverse employment consequences ifshe resists the harasser's
overtures or complains.
The Supreme Court detennined that employers should be held vicariously liable for hostile
work environment harassment carried out by supervisory employees, regardless of whether the
employer had any actual or constructive notice ofthe harassment. However, as explained in § [7.41]
below, where no tangible employment action has been taken against the plaintiff, employers may be
able to take advantage of an affinnative defense to liability.
Faragher arose in the context ofa hostile work environment case. As stated above, prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Ellerth, the distinction between hostile environment and quidpro
quo sexual harassment was fundamentally important to the issue ofemployer liability. Employers
had generally been held to be "strictly liable" for quid pro quo harassment on the part of their
supervisors and managers. In Ellerth, the Supreme Court essentially recognized that the real
distinction for employer liability purposes should not be between quid pro quo and hostile
environment cases, but rather between cases in which the plaintiff suffered tangible job detriment
and those in which she did not. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753. This distinction has since been recognized
in the Sixth Circuit. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus,where
the threat ofadverse job consequences in a traditional quidpro quo case goes unfulfilled (because
the plaintiff called the supervisor's bluff, for example), the case will be analyzed as a hostile work
environment case, requiring a showing ofsevere or pervasive conduct. On the other hand, where the
threat has been fulfilled, resulting in "tangible" employment action such as discharge, demotion,
decreased pay, etc. the employee will continue to be "strictly" liable and unable to utilize the
affirmative defense discussed below.
E· 17
3. Affirmative Defense Created Where Supervisor's Actions Did Not Result in
Adverse Employment Action
The Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth also chose to create an affirmative defense that
may relieve an employer from liability for a supervisor's actions. The availability of this defense
depends upon whether the supervisor has taken some "tangible employment action" with respect to
the employee during the course of the harassment. The affirmative defense requires that the
employer show: .
1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior; and
2) that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided or to avoid hann otherwise.
However, as emphasized by the court, the affirmative defense is not available when the
supervisor's harassment has culminated in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment. Id. at 2293.
4. Issues Raised by the Affirmative Defense
Federal Circuit and District courts, and state courts throughout the countryhave embraced the
Faragher and Ellerth affirmative defense and tackled some of the lingering questions left by the
Supreme Court as to its interpretation. In addition, on June 18, 1999, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission issued EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability of
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors ("Enforcement Guidance"). Some of the provisions of the
Enforcement Guidance, and some cases construing the affinnative defense, are set forth below.
a. Who is a "Supervisor"?
Both Ellerth and Faragher announced that an employer may be vicariously liable for
harassment by "a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over an employee."
Under the Enforcement Guidance, an individual will qualify as an employee's "supervisor" ifat least
one of the following conditions is met:
(1) the individual has the authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment
actions affecting the employee;
(2) the individual has the ability to direct the daily work activities of the employee; or
(3) the employee reasonably believes the individual has supervisory power.
The ability to undertake or recommend tangible employment actions does not need to be
absolute. The individual can be a supervisor even if he or she lacks the final say concerning
employment decisions, or ifthe individual's decision is subject to approval by a higher authority. An
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individual's ability to recommend tangible employment actions is sufficient ifthe recommendation
"is given substantial weight by the final decision maker(s)."
With regard to the second condition, the EEOC states that it is recognized because "an
individual's ability to commit harassment is enhanced by his or her authority to increase the
employee's workload or assign undesirable tasks." This will apply even in cases where the
authorization is only for a temporary or short-tenn basis. However, it will not apply when the
individual directing work is in fact only relaying the work assignments determined by another
employee, or where the individual has only limited authority to assign a small number of minor
tasks.
Finally, an employee may reasonably believe an individual has actual supervisory authority in
situations where the chain ofcommand is unclear. This beliefmay also arise in situations where the
employee knows the individual is outside the employee's chain ofcommand, but has such a broad
grant ofauthority over other matters, that the employee reasonably believes this authority provides
the ability to influence the employee's working conditions.
b. What is a "Tangible Employment Action"?
Under the Enforcement Guidance, a "tangible employment action" has the following
characteristics:
(1) it requires an official act of the enterprise;
(2) it usually is documented in official company records;
(3) it may be subject to review by higher level supervisors; and
(4) it often requires the formal approval ofthe enterprise and use ofits internal processes.
Additionally, a tangible employment action usually results in economic hann to the
employee, and is an act that could only be carried out by an individual who has the power to act with
the authority of the company.
Examples of tangible employment actions include:
(1) hiring and firing;
(2) promotion and failure to promote;
(3) demotion;
(4) undesirable reassignment;
(5) a decision resulting in a significant change in benefits;
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(6) compensation decisions; and
(7) work assignment.
An employment decision is not "tangible" if it only results in an insignificant change in the
employee's status. For example, transferring an employee to a new job with only slightly different
responsibilities, with no change in payor benefits would generally not qualify. However, ifthe new
job constitutes a demotion, or places the employee in a position with reduced promotional
opportunities, a tangible employment action may be found.
An employee must always demonstrate that any "tangible employment action" imposed by
the supervisor was causally connected to the harassment carried out by the supervisor, i.e., a
subsequent demotion occurred because the employee rejected the employer's sexual advances.
However, the EEOC takes the position that "[a] strong inference of discrimination will arise
whenever a harassing supervisor undertakes or has significant input into a tangible employment
action affecting the victim, because it can be assumed that the harasser could not act as an objective,
non-discriminatory decision maker with respect to the [employee]." If the employer provides a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employmentaction, then the employee must show that
the offered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Unless the employee meets this burden, the
affinnative defense is still available to the employer.
c. What if Only One Prong of the Affirmative Defense Can Be Met?
Where a supervisory employee has created a hostile work environment, or has engaged in
quidpro quo harassment, but no "tangible employment action" has yet occurred, the employer has
the ability to avoid vicarious liability by showing:
(1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any harassment; and
(2) the employ~e unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid hann otherwise.
The Enforcement Guidance notes that this standard will only operate to relieve the employer
ofliability ifboth ofthe above requirements are met. "Ifan employer cannot prove that it discharged
its duty of reasonable care and that the employee unreasonably failed to avoid hann, the employer
will be liable." However the Enforcement Guidance expresses the opinion that in most hostile work
environment cases, ifboth ofthese events occur, harassing conduct can be stopped before it rises to
the level ofactionable harassment, which would also allow the employer to escape any liability for
the supervisor's conduct. 'An effective complaint procedure "encourages employees to report
harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive" and ifan employee promptly utilizes that
procedure, the employer can usually stop the harassmentbefore actionable hann occurs.' This would
only fail to provide reliefifthe conduct that created the hostile work environment was so severe that
it rose to the level of actionable harassment almost immediately.
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d. The Employer's Duty ofReasonable Care
The employer's duty ofcare will be satisfied where it establishes, disseminates and enforces
an anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure, and takes other reasonable steps to prevent and
correct harassment. Although noting that they are not mandatory, the Enforcement Guidance
recommends that an anti-harassment policy contain the following provisions:
(1) prohibition of harassment;
(2) protection against retaliation;
(3) a clearly described complaint process, with more than one avenue for making
complaints;
(4) an assurance that any report will be treated confidentially to the extent possible;
(5) a complaint process that provides for prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation
of complaints; and
(6) an assurance that immediate and appropriate action will be take:Q if the employer
detennines that harassment has occurred.
In this regard, practitioners in Kentucky should be aware ofthe Kentucky Supreme Court's
decision in Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540 (Ky. 2001). In this case, the
plaintiff, Ms. Murphy, apparently endured a series of sexually harassing acts by her supervisor,
Grant. She reported this to her previous (female) supervisor, Korphage, who told Murphy she too
had experienced harassment from the same individual. Murphy reported the harassment to Bank
One's HR Department, which conducted an apparently thorough investigation, resulting in the
supervisor's resignation. Nevertheless, Murphy sued, alleging sexual harassment. The Bank
defended on the basis of the Faragher/Ellerth affinnative defense. Murphy contended that the
"reasonable care" prong ofthe affinnative defense could not be met,however. Despite the fact that
the Bank apparently had a sufficient sexual harassment policy and had promptly taken steps to
correct the harassment alleged by Murphy, Murphy ~ook the position that the Bank had failed to take
appropriate action when Korphage had previously reported Grant's actions. Even though the facts
show that Korphage had refused to file a formal complaint, stating that she wished to remain
anonymous, and refused to cooperate in an investigation, the Court noted that Grant's deposition
testimony revealed that he had never been confronted with the facts of the Korphage incident by
name. Because it was unclear from the record whether the investigation into the Korphage incident
was complete, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial court for a factual determination.
This case demonstrates that Kentucky courts have embraced the concept ofthe affinnative defense
set forth in Faragher and Ellerth. However it also shows that Kentucky employers must be certain
that every complaint ofharassment is carefully investigated, even though the complainant may wish
to remain anonymous or refuse to participate. Failure to do so may negatively affect the employer's
ability to use the affirmative defense in future cases unrelated to the one at issue.
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e. The Employee's Obligation to Avoid Hann
The Enforcement Guidance provides that "an employer who has exercised reasonable care...
is not liable for unlawful harassment if the aggrieved employee could have avoided all of the
actionable hann." Likewise, "[i]f some but not all of the harm could have been avoided, then an
award ofdamages will be mitigated accordingly."
This generally means that the employee must use the employer's complaint procedure to try
to resolve the harassment. Further, the employee should use the procedure in good faith, byproviding
complete information to the employer, and cooperating with the employer's investigation.
Additionally, the employee should make a complaint as soon as possible after objectionable conduct
has occurred. If the employee fails to take these steps, the employer will have the opportunity to
argue that the employee failed to take reasonable steps to avoid hann.
However, the Enforcement Guidance recognizes that in some cases, the employee will be
relieved ofthe obligation to make a complaint ofharassment. These may exist where the employee
had reason to believe that:
(1) making a complaint would result in retaliation;
(2) there were obstacles in the procedure that actually discouraged complaints, such a
burdensome or intimidating reporting requirements;
(3) the complaint mechanism was ineffective.
The Enforcement Guidance also provides that even ifthe employee "unreasonably failed" to
use the employer's complaint procedure, the employer may not be able to satisfy the second prong of
the affinnative defense ifthe employee took "other efforts to avoid harm." Interestingly, one ofthe
examples of other efforts to avoid harm includes making a complaint to the EEOC or its state
equivalent. The other examples provided are filing a union grievance, or, in the case ofan employee
who was engaged through a temporary agency, making a complaint to the temporary agency.
However, the guidance notes that the timing ofthe complaint to such a third party may affect liability
or damages. For example, if the employee could have avoided some of the hann by making the
complaint to the employer at an earlier time, then the damages that employee can recover will be
limited accordingly.
Regardless of whether the courts would view a complaint to an outside agency as an
acceptable alternative to using an employer's reasonable complaint procedure, employers who
receive their first notice of a complaint when served with a charge of discrimination, or by some
other outside source, should respond to the notification by immediately conducting a thorough
investigation and taking any appropriate corrective action thereafter.
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5. Vicarious Liability for the Actions ofHigh Level Employees
Finally, the guidance provides that harassment by certain high level employees is the
equivalent of harassment by the "employer." Because these individuals are a "proxy" for the
organization, their acts are imputed to the employer automatically, precluding the employer from
raising the affinnative defense. Examples of those individuals include:
(1) a president of a corporation;
(2) the owner of a company;
(3) a partner;
(4) a corporate officer.
In October of 1999 the EEOC also revised its previously issued Sex Discrimination
Guidelines and National Origin Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,333 (1999), amending 29 CFR Parts
1604 and 1606, to revise its earlier statements on vicarious liability for harassment by a supervisor,
in order to comply with Ellerth and Faragher.
: IV. Harassment on the Basis of Other Protected Classifications
A. Additional Causes ofAction for Harassment under Title vn
While causes ofaction for sexual, racial and gender based harassment are well known, it is
important for employers to recognize that the hostile environment cause ofaction applies to all types
of discrimination prohibited under Title Vil. In light of the events of September 11, 2001, it is
particularly timely to remember that employees are protected from harassment and discrimination on
the basis oftheir religion and national origin. On September 14, 2001, Cari M. Dominguez, Chair of
the EEOC, issued a press release urging employers and employees across the country to "promote
tolerance and guard against unlawful workplace discrimination based on national origin or religion."
1. National Origin Harassment
An employer has an affinnative duty to maintain a working environment free ofharassment
on the basis ofnational origin. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(a); see Appendix, Section [4.2], for the complete
text of§ 1606.8. National origin discrimination is not defined under Title VII; however, the EEOC
has defined national origin discrimination as "including, but not limited to, the denial of equal
employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or
because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
group." 29 C.F.R. §1606.1.
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Under the regulation:
Ethnic slurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to an
individual's national origin constitute harassment when this conduct:
(1) has the purpose or effect ofcreating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment,
(2) has the purpose or effect ofunreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance, or
(3) otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment
opportunities.
29 C.F.R. §1606.8(b).
In Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Authority, 997 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1993), the Sixth
Circuit held that to establish aprimafacie case ofa hostile work environment due to national origin
under Title VII or Section 1983, a plaintiffmust show the following:
(1) he was a member of a protected class;
(2) he was subjected to harassment based upon national origin;
(3) the harassment unreasonably interfered with his work performance and
created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and
(4) the existence of respondeat superior liability.
Id. at 203 (as modified by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (offensive
conduct does not need to be psychologically injurious).
The plaintiff in this case presented evidence that throughout his employment he was
subjected to numerous disparaging ethnic stereotypical epithets, such as "camel jockey" or "camel
rider" made in demeaning reference to his Arab ancestry, either by or with the knowledge of his
supervisors. Overturning the lower court's grant of directed verdict for the employer, the Court
found that this evidence was sufficient to send his claim for hostile environment harassment to a
jury. See also Miller'v. Kenworth ofDothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2002) (Allegations that
hispanic employee was subjected to ethnic slurs and derogatory nicknames on a daily basis over a
one-month period and that his co-workers used these slurs and derogatory names in an intimidating
manner to berate and taunt employee demonstrated conduct that rose above the level ofoff-handed
comments or casual conversation. Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff: these allegations
were sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that the employee was subjected to severe and
pervasive harassment that was sufficient to alter the tenns or conditions ofhis employment.); Erebia
v. Chrysler Plastics Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (In a Section 1981 action against
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employer for maintaining hostile work environment, evidence that plaintiffwas subjected to racial
slurs by hourly employees and that he reported slurs regularly to three different managers who at best
did nothing in response or at worst threatened him economic harm was sufficient to support jury's
verdict for plaintiff.); but see Flores v. I.C.Penny Co., Inc., 2002 WL 397669 (D. Kan. Mar. 8,2002)
(Summaryjudgment for employer upheld. In order to show harassment based on national origin, the
plaintiffmust present more thanjust a subjective beliefthat the harsh comments made repeatedly to
her by her supervisor which did not mention or refer to her ethnicity were actually motivated by her
national origin.).
2. Religious Harassment
Title VII's treatment of religion is somewhat unique. This is based in part on the
constitutional requirements ofseparation ofchurch and state. Title VII prohibits discrimination on
the basis ofreligion, but it provides an exemption for religious institutions that discriminate on the
basis ofreligious affiliation. Also, under Title VII, religious discrimination can take two seemingly
opposite forms: (1) discrimination that arises when an employee is treat differently because ofhis or
her religious faith or affiliation, and (2) discrimination that occurs when an employer fails to
reasonably accommodate an employee's religious observances and practices.
There is no bright-line test available to determine what qualifies as a "religion" or "religious
belief," and what does not. "Religion" is defined by the EEOC at 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1, which
provides in part:
[T]he Commission will define religious practices to include moral or
ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held
with the strength of traditional religious views. . .. The fact that no
religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious
group to which the individual professes to belong may not accept
such beliefwill not determine whether the belief is a religious belief
of the employee or prospective employee. The phrase "religious
practice" as used in these Guidelines includes both religious
observances and practices, as stated in Section 7010), 42 U.S.C.
2000eO)·
Courts have relied on similar definitions ofreligion that have evolved in First Amendment
litigation. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't ofEmployment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). A "religion" does not
require a God or deity or even a written theology, but to be a "religion" the ideology must be more
than a political, economic or social philosophy. In Frazee, the Supreme Court explained:
There is no doubt that "only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by
the Free Exercise Clause." Purely secular views do not suffice. Nor
do we underestimate the difficulty ofdistinguishing between religious
and secular convictions and in determining whether a professed belief
is sincerely held.
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Id. at 833.
Title VII prohibits harassment on the basis ofreligion, using the same framework for proving
harassment on the basis ofsex, race, or national origin. To prevail on a religious harassment claim,
the plaintiff must show that the conduct was pervasive, that it was unwelcome and offensive, and
that it was directed at the plaintiff due to his or her religious beliefs or practices. For example, in
Weiss v. U.S., 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984), the court found that an occasional offensive
religious epithet by a co-worker does not necessarily give rise to a Title vn claim against an
employer. However, when an employee is repeatedly subjected to demeaning and offensive religious
slurs over a two year period by a co-worker and by his supervisor, including such taunts as "resident
Jew," "Jew faggot," "rich Jew," "Christ killer," "nail him to the cross," and "you killed Christ,
Wally, so you'll have to hang from the cross." it would have the effect ofaltering the conditions of
his employment within the meaning ofTitle VII. Id. at 1056 (citing Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424
F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (when a person vested with managerial responsibilities
embarks upon a course ofconduct ca1culated to demean an employee before his fellows because of
the employee's professed religious views, such activity will necessarily have the effect ofaltering the
conditions ofhis employment)).
The harassment is not required to be religious in content, only motivated by the plaintiffs
religion. In Turner v. Barr, 811 F..Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), the plaintiff alleged both racial and
religious harassment. He was able to show that he was subjected to jokes about the Holocaust by
one ofhis supervisors and that he and other white and Jewish employees were placed in segregated
seating areas, not pennitted to work overtime in amounts comparable to other non-white and non-
Jewish employees, and a poster referring to the plaintiffwith a derogatory nickname, although non-
racial and non-religious, was placed in the workplace. The defendant claimed that the case for
religious harassment was insufficient because only a few incidents of alleged harassment had any
religious content. Relying on its prior opinion in McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C.Cir.
1985), the court found the evidence was sufficient to sustain the plaintiffs claim, as "evidence of
harassment need not have explicitly racial or religious overtones. The Plaintiffneed only show that
the harassment would not have occurred but for the Plaintiffs race or religion." Turner, 811 F. Supp.
at 4. The court found that when viewing the "totality ofthe circumstances," both the frequency of
the events and their severity justified a finding that the plaintiff was subject to harassment on the
basis ofhis race and religion. Id. at 5.
However, the courts have recognized that unlike an employee's race, gender, or national
origin, an employee's religious .beliefs may conflict with legitimatejob-related demands made by the
employer. When this happens, the employer's demands should not be confused with religious
harassment. In Beasley v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 940 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1991), the court clarified
the level of personal commitment to work that a company can expect from employees without
creating religious harassment. In this case, the employer did not engage in religious harassment
when the employer told its employees during a training session that their jobs should be the "first
priority" in their lives. The plaintiffin this case stated that since, according to her religious beliefs,
God was her first priority, having this type of requirement for employees constituted religious
harassment. The court found that, in the absence of any actual impact this expectation had on her
practice ofreligion, the company could continue to use such language and request that its employees
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make their jobs top priority in their lives. This demonstrates the additional twist to analyzing
harassment claims that is created by the requirement that an employer make a reasonable
accommodation for an employee's religious beliefs.
Similarly, in Hoffman v. Lincoln Life and Annuity Distributors, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D.
Md. 2001), the employee's religious harassment claim failed, as she presented no evidence that she
ever infonned her employer that any employment requirements of her job conflicted with her
religious beliefs. Although she .stated that she objected to the sexual jokes she had viewed while
screening her supervisor's e-mail, she did not infonn her supervisor that this objection was based on
religious grounds. There was only one occasion when she was asked to perfonn a task to which she
raised a religious objection (mailing a flier to an organization of gay and lesbian professionals, to
which the company had marketed itself and received business), and after she explained that this
offended her religious beliefs, she was not required to assist any further with this mailing.
v. The Emergence of Causes ofAction for Harassment Under Other Anti-Discrimination
Laws:
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq., prohibits
discrimination in the compensation, tenns and conditions of employment on the basis of age. 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(I). It protects individuals who are age 40 and over. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Remedies
available under the ADEA are similar to those provided by Title Vll, and include backpay, front pay,
and attorney fees. Although compensatory and punitive damages are not available under the ADEA,
the courts may elect to provide liquidated damages in an amount not to exceed backpay for willful
violations of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). In addition, the courts have the ability to provide
equitable reliefand may order that the plaintiffbe hired, promoted, transferred, or receive some other
job benefit that was unlawfully denied on the basis of age. The ADEA contains enforcement
provisions similar to those found in Title Vll, and it requires the filing ofan administrative charge
with the EEOC or a state or local human right agency prior to the filing of a state or federal court
action. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b).
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Title I ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et. seq., prohibits
employers from discriminating against "qualified individuals with disabilities" in the tenns,
conditions and privileges of employment, including their job application procedures and hiring,
advancement and discharge practices. 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). In addition to prohibiting discrimination,
the ADA also places an affirmative burden on employers to provide a reasonable accommodation to
an individual with a disability, ifsuch accommodation will allow the individual to: (1) perfonn the
essential functions of his or her position, or (2) otherwise participate in a process designed to
evaluate applicants for employment or evaluate current employees for compensation and
advancement purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
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The ADA's enforcement provisions are similar to those found in Title VII, and they require
an individual to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC prior to filing a lawsuit in state or
federal court. The remedies provided under the ADA are basically the same as those provided under
Title VII, with one exception. A successful ADA plaintiff may receive back pay, front pay,
injunctive relief, attorney fees, and compensatory and punitive damages. However, in cases where
the violation complained of is the employer's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, the
employer can avoid liability for compensatory and punitive damages if it demonstrates that it made
good faith efforts to provide such an accommodation.
C. Employer Liability for Age and Disability Based Harassment
Because these two anti-discrimination laws are so similar to Title VII, it is not s~rising that
the courts have now begun to recognize that the ADEA and ADA also provide causes ofaction for
harassment on the basis of age and disability.
1. Cases Discussing Age-Based Harassment
The Sixth Circuit, in Crawford v. Medina General Hospital, 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996), held
that this similarity required the recognition of a cause of action under the ADEA for age-based
harassment. The court held that a claim for hostile work environment under the ADEA could be
established by showing that:
(1) the plaintiffwas at least forty years old;
(2) the plaintiffwas harassed based on his or her age;
(3) the harassment had the effect ofunreasonably interfering with the plaintiffs
work, by creating an environment that was both objectively and subjectively
hostile or offensive; and
(4) the plaintiffhas some basis for imputing liability to the employer.
Id. at 834-35.
In Crawford, the plaintiff alleged that her co-workers mistreated her and were rude to her
because ofher age. She presented evidence that she was excluded from parties outside the office,
that a supervisor commented that she did not think ''women over 55 should be working," and that
"old people should be seen and not heard." Using the above standard, the court found that although
age-based hara~sment was actionable under the ADEA, the plaintiffhad failed to establish a prima
facie case:
Unquestionably, there was hostility and abusiveness in this working
environment, but the evidence suggests that the atmosphere stemmed
from a simple clash ofpersonalities. In any event, there is an absence
ofevidence that it stemmed from a dislike ofpeople over a particular
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age. . .. [I]mportantly, it is Crawford who simply assumes, without
objectively articulable support, that when she was insulted with age-
neutral insults, it was because ofher age.
Along those same lines, we think it is patent that we must entirely
discount the plaintiffs complaints insofar as they focus on coworkers
having parties without inviting her, or coworkers being surly or
impolite. Even ifcoworkers failed to invite her to parties because she
was over 55, it seems obvious that the ADEA was not intended to
remedy minor social slights and the resulting hurt feelings. Pizza
parties are simply not a term, condition, or privilege of employment
of which Congress has taken cognizance. . .. Similarly, while a
supervisor's opinion that women should retire at age 55 may be
unenlightened and logically indefensible, and might be circumstantial
evidence of age discrimination if the supervisor were later to have
fired Crawford, it hardly rises even to the level of an "offensive
utterance," as it is simply one person's opinion, susceptible to retort
and dispute. . .. Crawford has not produced any evidence tending to
show that the harassment interfered with her work performance
and/or created an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment, within the meaning of[Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
510 U.S. 17 (1993)]. We note there is absolutely no suggestion that
the environment impeded Crawford's work performance; indeed, she
herself·claims to like her job, despite [her supervisor's] asserted
abusiveness.
Id. at 836; see also Brennan v. Metropolitan QperaAss'n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing
Crawford) (summary judgment in favor of the employer on age-based harassment claim upheld
where there was no evidence that the alleged harasser knew plaintiffs age and the three instances of
hostility recounted by plaintiffhad nothing to do with age, and even if they had been motivated by
age, they would be insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate a hostile work environment);
Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 1998) (Federal district court properly dismissed claims of
racial and age-based harassment by fonner city employee who alleged that supervisor interfered with
his ability to complete projects, limited his access to supervisor, withheld infonnation, refused to
allow him to attend some job-related seminars on job time, imposed unreasonable deadlines,
reassigned tasks to subordinates, ignored his advice, and chastised him, despite former employee's
conclusory statements that supervisor treated him less favorably than younger black and white
employees ofsimilar rank, since he presented no evidence suggesting that supervisor's conduct was
motivated by his age or race, supervisor never made any derogatory comments about his race or age,
and nothing about supervisor's conduct suggests that it was based on these factors.); but see
Woodford v. Community Action Agency, 239 F.3d 517 (2nd Cir. 2001) (Plaintiffoffered sufficient
evidence in her complaint of harassment on basis of her age to overcome employer's motion to
dismiss where she attached exhibit stating her birth date to show that she was ofprotected age and
she alleged that supervisor repeatedly and explicitly stated that she was too old to remain in her
position, that he harassed her in attempt to force her to resign, that she filed internal grievances
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complaining of his conduct, and that he retaliated against her by, among other things, discharging
her.).
2. Cases Discussing.Disability-Based Harassment
In 2001, the Fifth Circuit became the first United States Court of Appeals to recognize a
cause of action under the ADA for hostile work environment harassment. In Flowers v. Southern
Regional Physician Services, Inc., 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff, a medical assistant,
filed a complaint of harassment and unlawful termination by her supervisors based on her HIV-
positive status. She alleged that after learning ofher disability, her immediate supervisor engaged in
conduct such as intercepting her telephone calls, eavesdropping on her conversations, and hovering
around her desk. Despite paying more attention to her on the job, he also stopped socializing with
her outside the workplace. Other supervisory employees also avoided contact with her and refused to
shake hands with her. In addition, she was selected for four "random" drug tests within a one-week
period and was written up for poor performance and placed on probation twice, despite receiving
high performance appraisals by her supervisors before they knew ofher HIV-positive status.
The trial court allowed the plaintiffs harassment claim to proceed to a jury, where she
received a favorable verdict. The employer then appealed the jury's verdict for the plaintiff, asking
the appellate court to reject this theory of liability under the ADA. The Fifth Circuit rejected the
employer's argument, finding that the ADA's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
disability in the terms and conditions of employment must be read to provide the same causes of
action the Supreme Court has recognized as existing under Title VII:
We conclude that the language of Title vn and the ADA dictates a
consistent reading of the two statutes. Therefore, following the
Supreme Court's interpretation ofthe language contained in Title Vll,
we interpret the phrase "tenns, conditions, and privileges of
employment," as it is used in the ADA, to "strike at" harassment in
the workplace.
Id. at 233 (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,64 (1986)). In further support ofits
position, the Fifth Circuit also acknowledged that the Sixth Circuit, in Keever v. Middletown, 145
F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1998), had previously recognized that the ADA would support a cause of
action for hostile work environment, although the Keever court had provided no analysis in support
of this position.
Less than two weeks later, the Fourth Circuit, in Fox v. General Motors, 247 F.3d 169 (4th
Cir. 2001), used identical logic to recognize that a cause of action for disability-based harassment
exists under the ADA. In this case, the plaintiffalleged that after returning to work following a back
injury, his supervisors and co-workers regularly insulted him, made fun ofhis disability, withheld
work-related materials from him, instructed other employees to avoid him, and gave him work
assignments beyond his limitations that aggravated his back injury. As in Flowers, the employer in
this case was also unsuccessfully appealing a jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor.
E·30
VI. ~ndividual Liability For Workplace Harassment
A. Liability Under Title VII
Title VII imposes liability upon "employers," employment agencies, labor organizations and
joint labor-management committees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(d). An employer is defined as:
[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees and any agent of such a person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Prior to 1993, most courts interpreted this definition to impose individual
liability on supervisors for their harassing conduct where they were acting as "agents of an
employer" or "within the scope of their employment." The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to
reject individual liability under Title VII, in Miller v. Maxwell's International, 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.
1993). The Miller court considered the legislative intent expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and noted that Congress had limited liability under Title VII to employers with 15 or more
employees in order to spare smaller employers the cost oflitigating discrimination claims. Because
Congress decided to protect small entities with limited resources from liability, the Ninth·Circuit
court found that it was inconceivable that it intended to allow civil liability to run against individual
employees. Id. at 587.
The United States District Courts ofboth the Eastern and Western Districts ofKentucky as
well as the Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals have ruled there is no individual liability under Title VII.
In Lowry v. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Ky. 1994), the Eastern District ofKentucky expanded
Miller's reasoning by taking into consideration the changes to Title vn embodied in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. Noting that the 1991 Act imposed damage caps upon employers based on the number
of persons they employ, it reasoned that Congress did not intend to pennit recovery against
individual employees for these damages. The Western District ofKentucky followed suit shortly
thereafter in Winston v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (W.O. Ky. 1995).
In 1997, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed the position of the Miller court and
Kentucky's federal district courts by holding that individual employees and supervisors, who do not
otherwise qualify as "employers," can not be held personally liable under Title VII. Wathen v.
General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997).
Nearly all federal courts that have considered the issue ofwhether individual liability exists
under Title VII have now ruled that it does not. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100
F.3d 1061 (3rd Cir. 1996), eert. denied, 521 U.S. 1129 (1997); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295
(2nd Cir. 1995); Garyv. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir.), eerl. denied, 516 U.S. 1011 (1995); EEOC
v. AlC Security Investigations Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995), reh. en bane denied (1995) (ADA
case); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir.) (construing state law), reh. en bane
denied (1995); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649
(5th Cir.), eerl. denied, 513 U.S. 1015 (1994).
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B. Individual Liability for Harassment Under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
The Sixth Circuit has also interpreted the KCRA's provisions prohibiting discrimination by
"employers" to preclude the imposition of individual liability on harassers. Wathen v. General
Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) (interpreting KRS 344.040).
C. Individual Liability for Retaliation Under the KCRA
However, in Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2000), the
Sixth Circuit held that individuals may be held liable under KRS Chapter 344 for retaliation. The
Court explained that KRS Chapter 344 generally mirrors Title vn but that the two acts have very
different retaliation provisions. Title VII forbids retaliation by "an employer," whereas KRS Chapter
344 forbids retaliation by "a person." Id.; see also Stacy v. Shoney's Inc., 142 F.3d. 436 1998 WL
165139 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished decision).
VB. Developments in the Procedural and Evidentiary Areas of Harassment Law
A. Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies and the Timely Filing Requirement
A civil complaint alleging violation ofTitle VII, the ADA, or the ADEA must be preceded by
the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Title vn further requires that the
charge "be in writing under oath or affinnation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (§ 706(b) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964). If these and other procedural requirements that exist in the administrative
framework used to pursue TitleVll, ADA, and ADEA claims are not met, both the prosecution of
the charge and any civil litigation thereafter may be foreclosed.
1. Use ofthe Continuing Violation Rule to Expand the Time Period for Filing a
Charge ofHarassment.
To be timely, the EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days of an act of discrimination,
unless the charge is filed in a timely manner with a state or local human rights agency. In such cases,
the time to file the EEOC charge is generally expanded to 300 days from the time the discrimination
occurred.
Because ofthis relatively short filing period, it is frequently the case that while one or more
of a plaintiffs alleged incidents ofharassment took place within the 180/300 day period, there are
also other alleged acts that occurred prior to this time period. In order to bring claims based, at least
in part, on acts occurring outside the 180/300 day window, the plaintiffmay claim that the prior acts
of harassment are part of a continuing violation by the employer and attempt to invoke the
"continuing violation" rule. The plaintiffmay do this in an attempt to seek recovery for all alleged
acts ofwrongdoing, or at a minimum, to allow for the introduction ofevidence ofthe less recent acts
in the hope that this will bolster the validity ofthe timely claims. These same considerations apply
to plaintiffs filing under Kentucky law. However, because ofthe longer filing period, the situation is
less common.
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The Sixth Circuit has applied the continuing violation rule to allow the introduction of
evidence about, and recovery for acts occurring, outside the 180/300 day limitations period in two
narrowly limited instances. Bell v. Ohio State University, 2002 WL 193694 (S.D. Ohio, Feb 5,
2002). The first situation is where there are past violations plus current discriminatory activity ofthe
same type, such as ''where an employer continues to presently impose disparate work assignments or
pay rates between similarly situated employee groups." EEOC v. Penton Industrial Pub., 851 F.2d
835, 838 (6th Cir. 1988). This category requires a current and a continuing discriminatory act and
cannot be based merely on the continuing ill-effects of a past violation. Tolbert v. State of Ohio
Dep't ofTransportation, 172 F.3d 934, 940 (6th Cir. 1999); Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 216
(6th Cir. 1991).
The second instance requires "a longstanding and demonstrable po/icy of discrimination."
Dixon, 928 F.2d at 216 (emphasis added). In general, repeated requests for further relieffrom a prior
act of discrimination is insufficient; rather, there must be a continuing "overarching policy of
discrimination." Janikowski v. Bendix Corp., 823 F.2d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 1987). "Repeated
requests for further relief from a prior act ofdiscrimination will not set the time limitations running
anew." Id. at 949. However, where there has been a long-standing policyofdiscrimination, repeated
attempts to gain employment or promotions may each trigger the running ofa new limitations period.
Roberts v. North American Rockwell Corp., 650 F.2d 823, 827 (6th Cir. 1981).
Other circuits have also applied the continuing violation rule narrowly when considering
whether to allow the introduction ofevidence ofevents occurring outside the administrative filing
period. For example, in Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708 (2nd Cir. 1996), the
plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint on August 4, 1992. However the majority of incidents about
which the plaintiff complained occurred prior to September 5, 1991 (more than 300 days earlier).
The court observed that the continuing violation theory would apply in only two instances: (i) where
there is evidence ofan ongoing discriminatory policy or practice, such as the use ofdiscriminatory
seniority lists or employment tests, and (ii) where specific and related instances ofdiscrimination are
pennitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory
policy or practice. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to invoke the continuing violation rule
because the plaintiffs evidence showed neither a connection between KLM's treatment ofher and
any company policy or practice. Further, the evidence did not show that KLM allowed related
incidents ofdiscrimination to go unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or
practice.
In West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744 (3rd Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit held that, in
order to establish that a claim falls within the continuing violation rule, the plaintiff must first
demonstrate that at least one act occurred within the filing period and then establish that the
harassment complained of is "more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional
discrimination." Thereafter, the court explained, if the continuing violation theory applies to the
plaintiffs claims, this causes the statute of limitations issue to drop out of a case, and the plaintiff
may introduce evidence ofevents outside the statute oflimitations. The plaintiffmay offer evidence
of, and recover for, the entire continuing violation.
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In Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corp., 46 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit
found that, in order for the continuing violation rule to apply, the event(s) occurring within the 300
day period must be closely related to acts falling outside this window. In this case, the plaintiff first
filed a charge ofdiscrimination in April 1992, primarilybased on incidents ofsexual harassment that
she claimed occurred in 1988 and 1990. In an attempt to maintain these older claims, she tried to
link the prior acts to other alleged acts of harassment occurring within the statutory filing period.
However, when the 'court examined the timely claims, it found that they were isolated and unrelated
to the incidents that may have occurred in 1988 and 1990. Therefore, the court detennined that the
earlier incidents ofharassment were time-barred.
However in Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir.
1996), the Seventh Circuit did allow a plaintiff to bring a sexual harassment lawsuit based on
conduct which occurred both within the 300 day filing period and prior thereto. In Galloway, the
court found that the pre-filing period conduct the plaintiffalleged was not the sort ofconduct which
would reasonably cause an employee to file suit (constituting, as the court found, single, isolated
comments). The court opined that a plaintiff may base his or her suit on conduct that occurred
outside the statute of limitations if it would have been unreasonable to expect him or her to sue
before the statute ran on that conduct. This would be true in a case in which the conduct could be
recognized as actionable harassment only in the light of events that occurred within the statute of
limitations.
2. Additional Time for Verification of a Charge
The United States Supreme Court, in Edelman v. Lynchburg College,__U.S. __, 122 S.
Ct. 1145 (2002) recently resolved the controversy over the validity of an EEOC regulation
interpreting Section 706(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that permits an otherwise timely but
unverified charge to be verified after the time for filing a charge ofdiscrimination has expired. The
Supreme Court found that that this regulation was a permissible interpretation of Section' 706(b)
because:
[W]hile the verification process is meant to provide some degree of
insurance against catchpenny claims of disgruntled, but not
necessarily aggrieved, employees ... Congress presumably did not
mean to affect the nature ofTitle VII as a remedial scheme in which
laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process.
122 S. Ct. at 1150 (citations omitted).
B. Election ofRemedies Under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
Many state civil rights statutes, including the KCRA, provide both administrative and judicial
avenues for relief. In Kentucky an individual may elect to pursue claims for discrimination under
state law by filing a charge with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights ("KCHR"), or with a
local human rights commission, prior to filing a lawsuit under the KCRA. However, unlike claims
brought pursuant to Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA, an individual bringing claims under the
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KCRA may elect to forego the administrative process entirely, and immediately file a civil action in
state or federal court. In recent years, there has been considerable debate in Kentucky over whether
an individual's decision to initially proceed through the administrative process constitutes a binding
election of remedies that would either prevent any future action in state or federal court under the
KCRA or would at a minimum require exhaustion ofthe administrative process prior to the filing of
a lawsuit.
The controversy over the effect ofan initial election to pursue administrative relief is based
on KRS 344.270 of the KCRA, which provides as follows:
A state court shall not take jurisdiction over any claim ofan unlawful
practice under this chapter while a claim of the same person seeking
relief for the same grievance is pending before the commission. A
final determination by a state court or a final order ofthe commission
of a claim alleging an unlawful practice under KRS 344.450 shall
exclude any other administrative action or proceeding brought in
accordance with KRS Chapter 13B by the same person based on the
same grievance.
The Kentucky Court ofAppeals, in Founder v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 23 S.W.3d 221
(Ky. Ct. App. 1999), held that under this provision, if the complainant chooses to make an
administrative fjling, he has elected his remedy and may not thereafter proceed with a lawsuit under
the KCRA in state or federal court. The Founder decision is based on the holding in Vaezkoroni v.
Domino's Pizza, 914 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1995), an earlier Kentucky Supreme Court decision
construing KRS 344.270. These two decisions interpreted this section of the KCRA as providing
that the filing ofa complaint with the state or local commission is subject matter jurisdictional, i.e.,
once such a complaint has been filed, the circuit courts lose subject matter jurisdiction over the
matter.
The Kentucky Supr~meCourt has not yet ruled on this issue; however, recent rulings by the
Federal District Court in the Western District of Kentucky and a subsequent unpublished opinion
issued by the Kentucky Court ofAppeals appear to hold that where an individual has initially elected
to use the administrative process, KRS 344.270 will only bar a subsequent action in state or federal
court in two situations:
(1) where the administrative agency has made a final determination that the
charge has no merit, and has refused to provide the charging party with a
Notice ofRight to Sue following this detennination; or
(2) where the administrative proceeding is still pending before the administrative
agency at the time the charging party files the lawsuit in state or federal court.
In Grego v. Meijer, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Ky. 2001), the plaintiff filed a sex
discrimination complaint with the KCRR in May 1998. She subsequently requested to withdraw her
complaint. After the KeRR withdrew the complaint without prejudice, she filed a civil complaint in
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the Jefferson Circuit Court, which the defendant employer then removed to federal district court on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Grego court denied the employer's subsequent motion to
dismiss based on the doctrine ofelection ofremedies. After examining the Vaezkoroni and Founder
cases, the court declined to adopt their reasoning, based on its prediction that the Kentucky Supreme
Court would not follow their holdings. Grego, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 693; see also Thomas v. Forest
City Entemrises, Inc., 2001 WL 1772018 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 17, 2001).
Shortly thereafter, in Wilson v. Lowe's Home Center, 2001 WL 1658212 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec.
28, 2001), the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected as dicta those portions of Vaezkoroni and
Founder that would have prevented a charging party from filing suit in state or federal court after
filing an administrative charge:
As we have noted, in the Vaezkoroni case the Kentucky Supreme
Court stated that "[0]nce any avenue of relief is chosen, the
complainant must follow that avenue through to its final conclusion."
Since the Vaezkoroni case involved an employee who had
prosecuted his claims to the administrative body to a final
determination, that language is clearly dicta.
Similarly, in the Founder case a panel ofthis court stated that "[f]rom
our reading of the language in KRS 344.270 and Vaezkoroni once a
complaint is filed with the Commission, a subsequent action in circuit
court based on the same civil rights violation[s] is barred." Since the
employee's circuit court complaint in Founder was barred by KRS
344.270 for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint was still
pending with an administrative body, this language in the Founder
case is also dicta.
Wilson, 2001 WL 1658212 at *7 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, it does not appear that the charging party, once having elected to proceed
through the administrative process, is required to exhaust the administrative process prior to bringing
a lawsuit under the KCRA. The charging party has the option ofrequesting to withdraw the charge
ofdiscrimination at any time during the administrative proceedings prior to a final determination on
the merits by the administrative agency and then filing an action in state or federal court.
C. Admissibility ofEvidence ofPrior Sexual Conduct
1. Admissibility of Evidence ofPrior Sexual Conduct of the Plaintiff
Federal Rule ofEvidence (FRE) 412 as amended in December 1994, prohibits the admission
of evidence offered to prove "other" sexual behavior (i.e., behavior not intrinsic to the alleged
misconduct) or the sexual predisposition of any alleged victim of sexual misconduct (including
plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases) unless (a) the evidence is otherwise admissible under the
federal rules and (b) its probative value substantially outweighs the danger ofharm to any victim and
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of unfair prejudice to any party. The Rule further prohibits evidence of an alleged victim's
reputation unless it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
The Advisory Committee Notes make clear that the procedures set forth in FRE 412 do not
apply to discovery of a victim's past sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases, which will
continue to be governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Advisory Committee Notes at
Subsection (c). However, the Advisory Committee Notes go on to provide:
In order not to undermine the rationale ofRule 412, however, courts
should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to
protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure
confidentiality. Courts should presumptively issue protective orders
barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing
that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the
facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be obtained
except through discovery. In an action for sexual harassment, for
instance, while some evidence ofthe alleged victim's sexual behavior
and/or predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be relevant, non-
workplace conduct will usually be irrelevant. Cf Bums v. McGregor
Electronic Industries, Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1993)
(posing for a nude magazine outside work hours is irrelevant to issue
of unwelcomeness of sexual advances at work). Confidentiality
orders should be presumptively granted as well.
Recent cases construing amended FRE 412 in the context of admissibility at trial make it
clear that the courts will apply it strictly according to its terms, and will also follow the Advisory
Committee's guidance concerning the distinction between the admissibility ofevidence concerning
sexual conduct within the workplace and behavior outside work. For instance, in Dufresne v. J.D.
Fields & Co., 2001 WL 30671, 85 Fair Empl. Proc. Cas (BNA) 25 (E.D. La. Jan. 12,2001), the court
found evidence that a female employee downloaded Internet sex scenes from her office computer and
e-mailed a copy to her manager on at least one occasion was relevant and probative both as to issue
of whether the presence of pornography in the workplace was offensive to her and also to the
appropriate measure of damages she could recover on her claim.
This case can be compared with Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157 (2nd Cir. 2000), in which the
plaintiffs hostile environment claim also relied on evidence that male co-workers placed
pornographic magazines in areas where she would discover them. The Wolak court refused to allow
the defendants to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had viewed pornographic movies outside
work, finding that ''whether an alleged victim in fact perceived her work environment to be sexually
offensive does not tum on the private sexual behavior of the alleged victim, because a woman's
expectations about her work environment cannot be said to change depending upon her sexual
sophistication." Id. at 160. The evidence was not even considered to be probative as to the degree of
distress the plaintiff might have suffered as a result of the pornography placed in the workplace,
because:
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Even ifa woman's out-of-work sexual experiences were such that she
could perhaps be expected to suffer less harm from viewing run-of-
the-mill pornographic images displayed in the office, pornography
might still alter her status in the workplace, causing injury, regardless
of the trauma inflicted by the pornographic images alone.
Id. at 160-161.
However, the courts have shown a willingness to allow admission ofevidence ofconduct that
occurred outside the workplace ifthe plaintiffdiscussed the conduct in the workplace. This was the
case in Fedio v. Circuit City Stores, Inc, 1998 WL 966000 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1998), where the court
held that because the plaintiffhad discussed her sexual proclivities in the workplace, allowing her to
invoke FRE 412 to prevent the admission ofmatters she had previously flaunted in public would be
tantamount to a complete disregard of the rule's purpose.
In Chamblee v. Harris & Harris, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), the plaintiff
brought sexual harassment claims against her supervisor and employer, a McDonald's franchisee.
The defendants sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiffhad worked as a call girl prior to her
employment with McDonald's, that she frequently made sexual statements at work, and that she told
other employees that she was planning to open her own escort service in the future. Relying on
Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157 (2nd Cir. 2000) and the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1994
amendments to FRE 412, the court granted the plaintiffs motion to exclude evidence that she had
previously worked as a call girl/escort prior to her employment with McDonald's. The court found
that this evidence would only be relevant to prove her sexual disposition, a use plainly forbidden by
Rule 412. However the court stated that the plaintiffs discussions with co-workers about her plans
to start an escort service and her other sexual comments made at work were on a "different footing"
than conduct that occurred outside work and might be admissible to refute her hostile work
environment claims. Id. at 680.
Similarly, in Woodard v. Metro, I.P.C.T., 2000 WL 684101 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2000), the
court held that evidence of the plaintiffs own sexual conduct in the workplace, including her
workplace discussions of off-duty conduct, was relevant to show that the she did not subjectively
consider her work environment hostile and was also relevant for the purpose ofevaluating whether
her employer had responded reasonably to her complaint or whether the employer should have
discovered the alleged harassment and responded earlier. The court found the probative value ofthe
evidence that the plaintiffworked at a lingerie shop that she advertised and marketed while at Metro,
that she wore provocative clothing, passed around photographs at work in which she was modeling
lingerie and participated in sexual banter and horseplay while working at Metro, substantially
outweighed its potential to unfairly prejudice her claims. Id. at *7.
2. Admissibility ofPrior Acts ofAlleged Harasser
Plaintiffs in harassment cases often attempt to bolster their claims by introducing evidence
that the alleged harasser has engaged in acts ofharassment or discrimination against others. Such
attempts raise potential challenges under FRE 403 (relevance) and 404(b) (providing that evidence of
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other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith, but may be admissible to prove motive, identity or absence of
mistake or accident). Sometimes, such evidence is admitted for the purpose of showing that the
employer had actual or constructive notice of the harasser's propensity for wrongdoing.
In Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. v. Murphy, 52 S.W.3d 540 (Ky. 2001), which is also discussed
in Section [1.44], supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment granted in
favor ofthe employer on plaintiffs sexual harassment claim on the grounds that the plaintiffshould
have been pennitted to present evidence concerning other prior acts of harassment by her alleged
harasser. The court found that the employer's attempt to rely on the affirmative defense provided by
Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742 (1998), made evidence concerning prior harassment ofa different employee by the same alleged
harasser relevant. Evidence ofthe prior harassment, and the insufficiency ofthe employer's response
to the harassment complaint that was made as a result ofthe priorharassment, could be used to refute
the employer's assertion that it took reasonable efforts to prevent harassment in the workplace.
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I BACKGROUND.
A. 17% of cases brought in federal court allege civil rights violations. The number of
wrongful employment practices charges received by EEOC increased from 59,000
in 1989 to nearly 90,000 in 1995. The number ofemployment discrimination cases
increased by 47% from 1989 to 1995.
B. Costly to employers.
1. Legal fees.
2. Disruption in business.
3. Adverse media attention.
4. Judgment.
C. Liability of attorney for failing to advise of possible insurance coverage. Jordache
Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 661 (1996) (rev'd);
Darby & Darby, P.C. v. VSI International, Inc., 678 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1998) (rev'd).
II INSURANCE LINGO
A. ISO.
B. Hammer clause.
C. Claims made policy.
D. Reservation of rights. Eskridge v. Educator and Executive Insurers, Inc., Ky., 677
S.W.2d 887 (1984).
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III RULES FOR INTERPRETING INSURANCE POLICIES.
A. Terms of insurance contracts have no technical meaning in law and are to be
interpreted according to the usage ofthe average man and as they would be read and
understood by him in the light of the prevailing rule that uncertainties and ambigu-
ities must be resolved in favor of the insured. Fryman v. Pilot Life Insurance
Company, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 205 (1986).
B. An ambiguous policy is to be construed to effectuate the purpose of indemnity.
James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
Ky., 814 S.W.2d 273 (1991); Wolfordv. Wolford, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 835 (1984).
C. Insurer has duty to defend if there is any allegation which potentially, possibly or
might come within the coverage of the policy, and the insurance company must
defend any suit in which the language of the complaint would bring it within the
policy coverage regardless ofthe merits ofthe action. 0 'Bannon v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Company, Ky., 678 S.W.2d 390 (1984); Wolford, supra.
D. The determination ofwhether a defense is required must be made at the outset ofthe
litigation. Knapp v. Chevron USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir.. 1986); but see
Transamerica Insurance Company v. KMS Patriots, L.P., 752 N.E.2d 777 (Mass.
App.2001).
E. Duty to defend continues to the point of establishing that liability upon which
plaintiff was relying was in fact not covered by the policy and not merely that it
might not be.' 7C Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4683.01 (Berdal Ed.
1979).
F. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. Wolford, supra. If some
claims are covered and others are not, the insurer has a duty· imposed by law to
defend the action in its entirety because to defend meaningfully, the insurer must
defend immediately, and to defend immediately it must defend entirely.
IV TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT RELATED CLAIMS.
A. Wrongful termination.
B. Defamation.
C. ERISA.
D. FMLA.
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E. Discrimination based on protected class.
F. Disability claims.
G. Fraud.
H. Contract.
I. Harassment.
J. Intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. Wilson v. Lowe's Home Center,
Ky. App., 2001 WL 1658212 (2001).
K. Violations ofEmployee Polygraph Protection Act.
L. Whistle blower claims.
M. Retaliation, workers' compensation.
N. Public policy.
O. Invasion of privacy.
P. Negligent supervision, hiring, etc.
Q. Dangerous workplace.
-R. Due process.
S. Wage and hour.
V POSSIBILITIES OF INSURANCE COVERAGE.
A. Workers' Compensation.
1. Excludes intentional acts.
2. Certificates for self-insureds.
3. Employment liability section (sometimes called "B" coverage).
4. Endorsements.
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B. Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL").
1. Coverage A for bodily injury (does not include emotional damages), coverage
B for advertising injury, and coverage C for medical expenses. Some also
cover "personal injury" which is defined as injury other than bodily injury.
a. Smith v. Animal Urgent Care, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 827 (W.Va. 2000).
Fonner employee alleged sexual harassment, wrongful discharge, and
,.intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. The policy
provided coverage for bodily injury. The Court held that purely
mental and emotional harm that arises from a claim of sexual
harassment and lacks physical manifestation does not fall within the
definition of bodily injury. (Policy also provided coverage for
"personal injury" but the Court failed to address coverage for claim
under that provision.)
2. Must be a result of an "occurrence" (an accident).
a. Smith, supra. Court held that it strains the imagination to speculate
how a pattern of sexual overtones and touching can be accidental.
See also Thompson v. West American Insurance Company, Ky. App.,
839 S.W.2d 579 (1992), where the Court commented: "We believe
that sexual molestation is so inherently injurious, or substantially
certain to result in some injury, that the intent to injure, or the
expectation that injury will result, can be inferred as a matter oflaw."
3. Employment related practices exclusion (Insurance Services Offices 1993)
typically excludes injuries to employees "arising in and out of the course of
employment.
a. Agricultural Insurance Co. v. Focus Homes, Inc., 212 F.3d 407 (8th
Cir. 2000). Insurers provided CGL coverage, PL (professional
liability) coverage, and CD (commercial umbrella) coverage to
employer. Three women asserted a cause of action for sexual
harassment, based on an allegation that they were sexually assaulted
by a retarded male in the employer's treatment facility. The Court
concluded that the conduct came within the definition of bodily
injury, but held that the CGL coverage did not apply based on an
employer's liability exclusion, which excluded coverage for bodily
injury ofan employee arising out ofand in the course ofemployment.
See also Smith, supra.
b. Golden Eagle Insurance Corp. v. Rocky Cola Cafe, Inc., 94 Cal.
App.4th 120, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 (2001). CGL insurer sought
declaration that it had no duty to defend its insureds (employer and
several employees) against an action brought by a former waitress
who alleged sexual harassment, defamation, retaliation, intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress, wrongful termination and
negligent hiring and supervision. The defamation claim was based on
the assertion that a superior of the waitress communicated to others
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that she was "sexually promiscuous and a calculating bitch who had,
by use of sexually aggressive tactics, maneuvered him into an
unwanted sexual relationship in order to obtain on-the-job favors."
The complaint also alleged that his statements were republished by
other named defendants. The insurer admitted that certain aspects of
the defamation claim fell within the definition of "personal injury"
contained in the policy, but asserted that coverage was not provided
based on an exclusion for injuries arising out of any employment
related practices, policies, acts or omissions. The Court held that the
exclusion did not apply because it was difficult to conclude that the
comments in issue were employment related.
4. Intentional Acts Exclusion.
a. Smith, supra. Court held that acts of sexual misconduct constitute
intentional acts. It further held that employer's attempt to obtain
coverage by contending that some of the claims were based on
negligence (negligent supervision of the harasser) was a transparent
attempt to trigger insurance coverage. (Note that some courts have
reached the opposite conclusion.)
C. Directors and Officers Liability ("D & 0").
1. Usually no coverage for company or others.
2. Employment practices liability coverage endorsement ("EPL") broadens
coverage for all employees and deletes exclusions for bodily injury and
emotional distress.
3. Usually contains exclusion for claims based on bodily injury, or any claim for
emotional distress or mental anguish.
a. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Maryland Yacht Club, Inc.,
742 A.2d 79 (Md. App. 1999). Former employee alleged that his
discharge was an act ofretaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim. Insurer had issued a D & 0 policy, which contained an
exclusion for bodily injury. The Court held that the former em-
ployee's claim was not within the scope ofthe exclusion, even though
the Court recognized that Maryland does not follow the majority rule
that an insurance policy is to be construed strongly against the insurer.
D. Errors and Omissions, Professional Liability, and Malpractice Coverages.
1. Normally economic and emotional distress covered.
a. Agricultural Insurance Co., supra. PL policy covered those sums
which the insured becomes obligated to pay because of professional
error or mistake made arising out of the performance or failure to
perform any professional service for others. The Court held that the
policy did not provide coverage for two reasons. First, the complaint
did not allege injuries arising out of professional malpractice.
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Second, coverage was barred by an exclusion ofinjuries occurring in
the course of employment.
E. Employment Practices Liability Insurance ("EPLI").
1. Sold by approximately 75 carriers as stand alone policies or endorsements to
D & 0 coverage.
2. Standardized policy available in 1998, but few insurers adopted.
3. Claims made coverage.
4. Covers company, officers, directors and employees (be careful regarding
definitions of employee that do not include leased or seasonal employees).
5. Covers "claims," which may include arbitration and administrative proceed-
ings.
6. Issue if just covers claims by employees, or includes claims brought on
employee's behalf; also be wary that the definition of employee may not
cover applicants for job (claim based on failure to hire).
7. Focus on what acts covered (wrongful dismissal; discharge; termination;
wrongful failure or refusal to hire or promote; wrongful discipline or
demotion; failure to grant tenure; negligent evaluation; sexual harassment;
other types ofharassment; hostile work environment; employment discrimi-
nation; invasion of privacy; defamation; wrongful infliction of severe
emotional distress; failure to provide for or enforce adequate or consistent
employment policies or procedures; retaliation; and violations of FMLA.
8. Typical exclusions:
a. Cost of reasonable accoinmodations.
b. Claims based on Fair Labor Standards Act.
c. Claims based on National Labor Relations Act.
d. Claims based on violations ofthe Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Act.
e. Claims based on violations of COBRA.
f. Claims based on violations of OSHA.
g. Claims based on violations of ERISA.
h. Costs associated with non-monetary and injunctive relief.
i. Claims arising from downsizing, layoffs, plant closures and strikes.
j. Punitive damages.
9. Other considerations.
a. Notice obligations.
b. Duty to defend.
c. Choice of counsel.
d. Settlement authority and hammer clause.
10. Note that in the Smith opinion the ,Court commented in its decision finding
against the insured on CGL policy that EPLI policies were created specifi-
cally for employment related actions.
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F. Commercial Umbrella Coverage
1. Employment practices exclusion ("arising out ofrefusal to employ, termina-
tion ofemployment, coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline,
humiliation, discrimination, or other employment related practices, policies,
acts or omissions).
a. SCI Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Insurance Co., 526 S.E.2d 555
(Ga. 2000). Three former employees obtained a judgement against
SCI for sexual harassment. SCI filed suit against Hartford Fire, its
COL insurer, and Hartford Casualty, its umbrella carrier, seeking to
recover the amount of the judgment. The Eleventh Circuit deter-
mined that the umbrella policy's bodily injury provision did not
provide coverage to ·SCI for .the sexual harassment, but that the
employees' allegations of discrimination appeared to be covered by
the umbrella's definition ofpersonal injury. The Court noted that the
policy had an exclusion for claims made by employees for personal
injury arising out of and in the course of employment. It certified to
the Supreme Court of Georgia the issue of whether the conduct in
issue could be construed to have arisen in and out of the course of
employment. The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the injuries did
not arise in and out of the course of the employment and, therefore,
the exclusion did not apply. The opinion noted that the Eleventh
Circuit had determined that the CGL policy did-not provide coverage,
but did not give an explanation.
b. Agricultural Insurance Co., supra. Court held that conduct fell
within definition ofbodily injury, but that the employment practices
provision excluded coverage.
VI OTHER COVERAGE ISSUES.
A. Public Policy Violations.
1. Doe v. Shaffer, 738 N.E.2d 1243 (Ohio 2000). Ohio Supreme Court held that
it would violate public policy for a liability insurance carrier to provide
coverage to diocese and bishop for their ne-gligence related to sexual abuse
committed by others. This appears to be a minority view.
VII CONSIDERATIONS FOR COVERAGE AND PREMIUMS.
A. Workplace composition.
B. Counsel advice.
C. Claim experience.
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D. Handbook (including counsel's endorsement).
E. Training.
F. Evaluations.
G. Written grievance procedure.
H. Human resource manual.
I. Established termination procedure.
J. Employee assistance program.
K. Policy for handling complaints of harassment.
VIII ETHICAL CONCERNS WHEN REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYEE
THROUGH INSURANCE CARRIER: E-416; E-410; E-409; E-404; E-378; E-368; E-359;
E-340; E-331.
A. Control of defense by insurer.
B. Settlement.
C. Certain claims covered, others not.
D. Audits.
E. Billing procedures.
F. Representation ofnumerous defendants, and control by employer or insurer.
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Answer:
KBAE-416
Question 1: In general, may an insurance defense lawyer agree to abide by
insurer-prescribed
case handling guidelines in representing the insured?
A lawyer may not agree to abide by .such guidelines unless:
a) the lawyer determines that the guidelines will not interfere with the lawyer's
independent professional judgment and other duties owed to the insured under the
Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct; and
b) the lawyer discloses the guidelines' existence to the insured, and provides a
practical explanation of their import, at the outset of the representation and as may
become necessary in specific situations thereafter, and the insured consents after
consultation to any guideline that materially limits the representation; and
c) the lawyer, upon undertaking the representation, perfonns all duties imposed by
the Rules, regardless of compensation under the guidelines, so long as the
representation continues.
Every lawyer is strongly cautioned that the insured is entitled to adequate
representation despite limitations prescribed by the insurer. A lawyer who is
unable or unwilling to accept the potential burden of this responsibility must
decline the representation at the outset.
Question 2: More particularly, may the lawyer accept representation under
guidelines that:
a. Require approval by the insurer before the lawyer undertakes any
discovery, conducts any legal research, or files any motion?
Answer: No. The lawyer may agree, however, to guidelines setting a reasonable,
tentative budget and providing a process for ongoing consultation.
b. Require all investigative work or all records review to be performed only
by the insurer's employees or, if performed by the lawyer's firm, to be billed only
at a paralegal rate?
Answer: No. The lawyer may agree, however, to guidelines establishing an
appropriate allocation of lawyer and nonlawyer/paralegal tasks, or setting a
reasonable tentative budget for investigative work or document review, and
providing a process for ongoing consultation.
c. Require prior approval of compensation for additional lawyers or experts
with whom the principal lawyer may wish to confer, or for a lawyer's trial
preparation exceeding a specified pretrial period (e.g., thirty days)?
Answer: Yes, if (and only if) such limitations are reasonable in relation to
the issues in the case and the guidelines provide a process for ongoing
consultation.
d. Prescribe detailed billing and reporting procedures, with deadlines for
certain submissions?
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Answer: Yes, if (and only if) such procedures and deadlines do not create
material disincentives to adequate representation of the insured and do not abridge
the insured's right to confidentiality.
Even when a lawyer is permitted ethically to accept representation under an insurer's
guidelines, he or she may choose not to do so. The lawyer is free to decline the
representation, just as the insurer is free to offer the work to other counsel. The lawyer
must decline, however~ if he or she is unable or unwilling to provide adequate
representation to the insured regardless of limitations prescribed by the insurer.
Principal References:
KBA Ethics Opinions E-331, 340,359,368,378,404,409,410.
ABA Formal Opinion 96-403
S.C.R. 3.130 [Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct], Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.6, I.7(b), 1.8(t),
1.16, 5.4.
American Insurance Association v. Kentucky Bar Association, 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996).
In the Matter ofthe Rules ofProfessional Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and
Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000)
2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS (2000) §§ 121, 122, 134.
1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (3d ed. 2000) §§ 12.13, 12.14.
Additional references, including ethics opinions from other states, appear throughout the text.
Opinion:
Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we place the insurance guidelines issue in context by recalling
previous opinions of this Committee and by noting the polarized contentions ofpartisans in the current
nationwide debate over guidelines. Next, we examine professional responsibility in an insurance
defense context, focusing on the key principles of informed consent by clients and independent .
professional judgment by lawyers. Then, we apply these principles to the general issue of
insurer-prescribed case handling guidelines. Finally, we comment on particular limitations contained in
some guidelines.
A. History and Current Controversy
A purchaser of a liability insurance policy acquires two things ofvalue: an indemnity fund to pay claims
covered by the policy, and an insurer-provided legal defense against the claims. E.g., Wolford v.
Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1984). For insurers, the cost of providing the legal defense has become a
major concern. Defense costs are significant components of total litigation expenses, which were
reported recently to consume "nearly 55 cents ofevery claim dollar" in property-casualty insurance.
Sullivan & Muldowney, "Changing Times in the Insurance Industry," For the Defense (Defense
Research Institute, Feb. 1998), Supp. p. 2, quoted in Indiana State Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Committee,
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Ope 3 (1998). Cost containment, vi wed by insurers as an urgent imperative, has generated ethical
concerns that have found their way 0 our Committee.
In Opinion KBA E-331, issued in 1 88, the Committee considered a broad inquiry as to whether any
ethical problems could arise ifalia ility insurer "instruct[ed] defense counsel to conduct or limit a
defense so as to minimize the insur r's costs," even though the claim was within coverage limits. The
Committee answered "yes," but dis vowed "any generalization" on the question. The tone was
cautionary, not prescriptive:
We issue this opinion only t advise of ethical considerations that may arise in this context. We
are not suggesting that coun el has carte blanche to needlessly run up a bill. Such conduct would
be just as reprehensible as y elding professional control ofhis or her work to an adjuster or
claims manager. Nor are w suggesting that costs and expenses are not a legitimate concern of
the insurer. Conflicts are n t inevitable, or irreconcilable. Presumably these matters can be
resolved amicably and resp nsibly in the great majority of cases. We only wish to emphasize
that the insured is defense c unsel's client, and that counsel owes professional obligations to his
or her client that flow from e attorney-client relationship and are not bounded by the
"hardboiled commercial" reationship between the insured and the insurer.
Five years later, the Committee ap roved, with some caveats, an attorney fee arrangement creating an
incentive (Le., a "reverse" canting nt fee) for insurance defense counsel to achieve the best outcome on
the claim. See Opinion KBA E-35 (1993). Such an arrangement was not perceived to create a conflict
between the lawyer and the insure client. The following year, however, when the Committee returned
to the subject of litigation costs -- s opposed to indemnity payments -- it encountered a "hardboiled
commercial" approach to cost cont inment. The question was whether a lawyer could contract with an
insurance carrier to do all defense ork for a set fee, or could agree to take such work while foregoing
reimbursement ofall litigation cos (experts, court reporters, etc.). Answering both questions "no," the
Committee noted that such arrang ments would interpose the lawyer's economic interests directly
against those of the insured client. The Committee acknowledged that such an economic tension "is
inherent in other lawyer-client arr gements; but here the insured client ... [would] have no control over
the choices that will be made." Se Opinion KBA E-368 (1994). As explained more fully below, the
Committee's opinion was later en orsed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in American Insurance
Association v. Kentucky Bar Asso iation, 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996) (hereinafter AlA).
Today, upon inquiry from an org ization of Kentucky defense lawyers, the Committee must examine
the ethical dimensions of a more c mplex and nuanced form of cost containment: insurer-prescribed
case handling guidelines. Such g idelines vary widely from insurer to insurer, and their actual
administration may vary from cas to case, but they have certain core characteristics. As suggested by
the term "guidelines," they often ntain disclaimers of any intent by the insurer to override a lawyer's
ethical duties; nonetheless, the gu·delines usually are expressed as conditions of a lawyer's engagement
to represent the insured client. Th y mandate the form and timing ofa law firm's billings and reports, .
and they warn that no payment wi 1be made for unauthorized expenses or for services that are outside
the guidelines and not otherwise a proved. They usually limit (absent prior approval) the number and
identity of lawyers working on a ase at any particular stage, the extent ofmotion practice or discovery
to be conducted, and the amount r manner of legal research to be undertaken, on the client's behalf.
These guidelines have generated ational controversy in academic, professional, and judicial venues. In
several respects, unfortunately, th controversy has come to resemble a minefield of false dichotomies.
Guideline opponents contend that the controversy is about ethics; proponents argue that it is only about
economics. Opponents decry a loss of the lawyer's independent professional judgment under the Rules
of Professional Conduct; propone ts declare that the insurer has a contractual right to control the
defense of claims covered by the nsurance policy. Opponents maintain that the lawyer has but one
client, the insured; proponents as ert the lawyer has obligations to the insurer regardless ofwhether the
insurer is deemed a co-client or erely a third-party payer. Opponents complain that the guidelines
reduce defense practice and the n eds of each client to a formulaic regime, often administered on behalf
of insurers by poorly trained and verworked nonlawyer case managers. Proponents respond that the
guidelines allow for exceptions hen justified and provide a framework for dialogue between counsel
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and insurers. The Committee finds, for reasons appearing below, that that each of these contentions has
some merit, and some limitation. Distilling the truth of both sides is essential to making sense of the
guidelines controversy.
.B. Professional Responsibility and Insurance Defense
Insurance has been described as "a regulated industry clothed with a substantial public interest." 7C J.
A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (W. F. Berdal ed. 1979). Subject to
legislative and administrative oversight (which varies considerably in quality and intensity from state to
state), liability insurance companies collect premiums, invest funds, and pay claims. To secure
protection against unwarranted or excessive claims, insurers generally are authorized to contract with
policyholders for control and settlement oflitigation. Id. at 2-4. Most insurance policies contain such
provisions; moreover, they treat an insurer-provided defense as an obligation. Thus, the insurer's right
of control is linked to fulfillment, in good faith, of the insurer's duty to defend. R. E. KEETON & A. I.
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES,
AND COMMON PRACTICES (1988) § 7.6(b). Conversely, the insured has a contractual duty to
cooperate in the defense and, absent conflicting interests, is deemed to have consented to the role of the
insurer in designating defense counsel. Id.
Juxtaposed against this regulatory and contractual authority of the insurer are the case law and Rules of
Professional Conduct regulating the relationship between a lawyer and client. In Kentucky (as noted in
Opinions E-331 and E-368 cited above), when an insurance company engages a lawyer to defend an
insured against a claim, the insured -' not the insurer - is the lawyer's client. The one-client doctrine also
has been articulated in this Committee's Opinion KBA E-410 (1999) (stating, inter alia, that absent
informed consent by the insured, defense counsel may not reveal to the insurer confidential information
obtained from the insured that could adversely affect coverage); in Opinions KBA E-409 (1999) and
E-404 (1998) (both stating that insurance defense counsel must obtain the insured client's full and
informed consent before submitting billing information to the insurer's outside auditor); in Opinion
KBA E-378 (1995) (counsel engaged to represent the insured may not also defend the insurer against an
unfair settlement practices claim arising from same action); and in Opinion KBA E-340 (1990)
(insurance defense counsel may not permit the insurer's represen~ativetosit in on the lawyer's
conferences with the insured without the insured's informed consent).
Kentucky's one-client view differs from the position taken in some states, and expressed by some
commentators, that the tripartite relationship (or "eternal triangle") of insured, insurer, and defense
counsel actually entails two clients: the insured and the insurer. See, e.g., Maryland State Bar Ass'n
Comm. On Ethics, Ope 00-23 (2000); State Bar of Wisconsin Ethics Opinions, Ope E-99-1 (1999); E.
Cothran, Can Carriers Legitimately Evaluate Independent Counsel Fees without Impeding Counsel's
Independent Judgment? Vol. 29, No.3, THE BRIEF (ABA Tort & Insurance Practice Section, Spring
2000), at 38-46; K. Syverud, The Ethics ofInsurer Litigation Management Guidelines and Legal Audits,
INS. LITIG. REP. (May 1, 1999), at 180-94; D. Richmond, The Business and Ethics ofLiability
Insurers' Efforts to Manage Legal Care, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 57 (1997). Kentucky's view, however, is
shared by many other states. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Insurer
Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Montana 2000) (hereinafter Montana Rules); Rhode
Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No. 99-18 (1999); Alabama Ethics Opinions, Ope
RO-98-02 (1998). See generally J. Pitulla, Three-Way Street: Discord between Insurers and Insureds
Puts Defense Lawyers on Perilous Path, 81 A.B.A.J. 102 (August, 1995) (characterizing single-client
view as the majority approach); D. Q'Roark, In Kentucky the Insured is Your Client - Not the Insurer!
KY. BENCH & BAR, vol. 60, no. 1 (Winter 1996),49-52 (observing that Kentucky's one-client view is
"with the national trend"). The one-client view also has received favorable scholarly commentary. E.g.,
1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (3d ed. 2000) .(hereinafter Hazard &
Hodes), at §12.14; S. Pepper, Applying the Funda~entals ofLawyers' Ethics to Insurance Defense
Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 27 (1997).
Under the one-client view, the insurer is a third-party payer, not a client. Third-party payment is a
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phenomenon seen not only in insurance defense cases, but also in litigation involving persons
represented by lawyers in public legal aid programs or private pre-paid legal service plans; cases
involving officers of corporations, or members of organizations, who are represented by entity-hired
attorneys; and litigation in which lawyers have been engaged by the parties' friends or families. See
generally, Hazard & Hodes §12.13. Among third-party arrangements, however, the
insured-insurer-defense counsel relationship may be unique because it is rooted in an underlying contract
and involves "primarily standardized protection afforded by a regulated entity in recurring situations." 2
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW ,GOVERNING
LAWYERS (2000) (hereinafter Third Restatement), at §134, comment! As noted above, the insurer has
contracted to provide a defense and it possesses a correlative right to control the defense. This right of
control, however, is limited by another source of law: the cases and ethical rules governing lawyer-client
relations.
In case law, it appears well settled as a general proposition that a lawyer may accept direction from a
person other than the client if, but only if, (a) the direction does not interfere with the lawyer's
independence ofprofessional judgment; (b) the direction is reasonable in scope and character, e.g.,
reflecting obligations borne by the person directing the lawyer; and (c) the client gives informed consent
to the direction. See, Third Restatement § 134 (2) (cross-referencing §§ 121, 122). This three-part test
applies regardless of whether the person giving the direction is a third-party payer or another client. See
comment/to Third Restatement § 134; see generally, ABA Formal Opinion 96-403 (1996) (hereinafter
ABA Opinion) (upholding insurer's right to give direction regarding settlement within policy limits,
while noting that insured who objects can assume responsibility for his or her own defense, and
declaring that "[f]or the purposes of this opinion, nothing fundamental turns on whether the lawyer
represents the insured alone or both the insurer and the insured"). Generally speaking, when the
three-part test is fully satisfied, the client is deemed to have conferred the power of directing the defense
to the insurer. Third Restatement § 134, comment d.
If this three-part test were applied to an insurance company directive to defense counsel on the conduct
of litigation, element (b) -- the requirement of reasonableness -- might be satisfied simply by the
insurer's obligation to pay for the defense. But element (c), the requirement ofinfonned consent by the
insured, would require more than the bare language of the insurance contract; and element (a), the
requirement of noninterference with the lawyer's independent professional judgme~t, would be even
more problematic. As this Committee noted in Opinion E-331, and as our Supreme Court later
recognized in AIA, the interests of insurers and insureds are subject to wide divergence, even in cases
where claims appear to fall within the subject-matter coverage and dollar limits of the insurance policy.
An insured may have a reputational stake in the case, or may have another legitimate personal interest,
that could be affected adversely by the insurer's direction to counsel concerning discovery, settlement,
trial or appeal. In such a situation, counsel's candid advice to the client might be contrary to the
insurer's strategy. Moreover, the perceived interests of the insured and insurer can evolve - just as
coverage issues and claim values can evolve - while litigation progresses. Accordingly, in the insurance
defense context, an insured's acts of conferring the power ofdirection upon the insurer (signing the
insurance contract and giving informed consent at the outset of the representation) are subject to change
if substantial risks to the insured's interests become apparent during the representation. Third
Restatement § 134, comment!
The requirements of infonned consent and independent professional judgment, and the necessity of
satisfying those requirements throughout the litigation, also emerge when the question of insurance
company directives is examined in light of the Kentucky Rules ofProfessional Conduct (S.C.R. 3.130).
Under Rule 1.2 (c) and coniment 4 to the rule, an insurer's directive requires the insured's informed
consent - i.e., a consent "after consultation" (not merely a consent implied by the insurance contract) --
if the directive limits the objectives of the representation. Similarly, counsel's right to accept direction
from a person other than the client is recognized, but limited, by Rule 1.7 (b), which provides in
pertinent part as follows:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless:
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(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation ....
Thus, Rule 1.7 (b) echoes the necessity of consultation with the insured and also requires that counsel
determine independently that the representation - shaped by the objectives established under Rule 1.2
(c) - will not be adversely affected. As mentioned in Comment 4 to Rule 1.7, the reasonableness of the
lawyer's belief that the representation will not be adversely affected must be measured by the standard
of a disinterested lawyer. Moreover, the adequacy of consultation must 'be considered in·light of Rule
1.4, which requires a lawyer to keep the client "reasonably informed" and to "explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." See also Opinion KBA 410 (1999). The disclosure should occur at the outset of the
representation and periodically thereafter when specific circumstances so require. It must be "sufficient
to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question," and it may take the form of
a "short letter clearly stating that the lawyer intends to proceed at the direction of the insurer in
accordance with the terms of the insurance contact and what this means to the insured." ABA Opinion at
2. See generally, Third Restatement § 134, commentf.
Rule I.8(t) repeats the reference to consultation and makes explicit the protection of independent
professional judg~ent in a third-party payment situation: .
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the
client unless:
(1) Such compensation is in accordance with an agreement between the client
and the third party or the client consents after consultation;
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence ofprofessional
judgment or with the client?lawyer relationship; and
(3) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by
Rule 1.6.
Although the wording of Rule 1.8 (t) differs somewhat from that of Rule 1.7 (b) above, the two rules are
intended to provide the same protection for counsel's independence ofprofessional judgment. Hazard
& Hodes § 12.13. Rule 5.4(c) further reinforces that protection, as follows:
A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal
services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such
legal services.
I
Indeed, the thrust of Rule 5.4 in its entirety is to safeguard the professional independence ofa lawyer.
The importance ofprofessional independence is underscored by Rule 5.4 (d) (2), which prohibits a
lawyer from practicing with a for-profit entity in which a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the
lawyer's professional judgment. Although Rule 5.4 (d) (2) does not apply by its literal tenns to
insurance defense retainers, it highlights the general need under Rule 5.4 (c) and the other rules cited
above to scrutinize arrangements in which a lawyer regularly receives direction from a nonlawyer, such
as an insurance company's claims manager.
The rules -- with their thematic emphasis upon ongoing informed consent by clients and upon the
exercise of independent professional judgment by lawyers -- are part of a comprehensive ethical
framework that shapes all lawyer-client relationships. Within this framework, the requirements of
informed consent and independent professional judgment secure the insured client's entitlement to
competent legal services (Rule 1.1) and the right to understand any material limitations upon the scope
and objectives of the insurer-supplied representation (Rule 1.2). The lawyer is expected to act with
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reasonable diligence and promptness (Rule 1.3), keeping the insured informed (Rule 1.4), protecting the
insured's confidences (Rule 1.6), and rendering candid advice (Rule 2.1 and comments to Rule 1.7).
Counsel must perform these duties without charging the insurer more than a reasonable fee (Rule 1.5).
These duties comprise a professional mandate that continues until the relationship concludes or is
terminated in a manner permitted by Rule 1.16. A lawyer may not narrow his or her duties, by accepting
direction that limits the objectives of the representation, unless the client consents after consultation and
the lawyer concurs, exercising independent professional judgment. In any event, the representation may
not be so limited as to impair the competence of legal services as required by Rule 1.1. (See Comment 5
to Rule 1.2.)
C. Informed Consent, Independent Professional Judgment, and Case Handling Guidelines
The principles of informed consent and independent professional judgment are foundations of insurance
defense, although their importance has not always been recognized. During much of the twentieth
century, the insurer's contractual right to control the litigation, subject to an implied covenant of good
faith, was considered the dominant force in the insurer/insured/defense lawyer relationship. E.g.,
Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones & Associates v. Agrippina Versicherunges A. G., 476 P.2d 406 (Cal. 1970)
(upholding policy provision that forbade incurring defense costs without the insurer's prior consent, and
holding that the provision could be ignored only if the insured had requested and had been denied a
defense by the insurer). More recent decisions, however - such as the Kentucky Supreme Court's
opinion in AIA -- have made it clear that insurance defense lawyers must follow the case law and rules of
professional responsibility that define and safeguard the lawyer-client relationship. This does not mean,
however, that insurers' contractual rights have disappeared or that lawyers today may simply disregard
all efforts by insurance companies to control litigation costs. Rather, the issue has become whether, and
to what extent, such cost controls intrude upon informed consent and independent professional
judgment.
The potential variety of insurer-prescribed case handling guidelines makes it impossible to eschew or
embrace all of them categorically. Our Committee recognized in Opinion E-331 that guidelines must be .
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Referring to fees and expenses incurred by defense counsel, the
Committee said:
[T]he insurer has a legitimate interest in keeping such costs down.... At some point [however],
carrier imposed restrictions may threaten counsel's ability to provide [zealous and competent]
representation and impact on the lawyer's ability to bring to bear his independent professional
judgment on behalfof the insured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Later, when our Supreme Court inAIA upheld this committee's Opinion E-368, the Court similarly
stopped short ofdeclaring all insurer-imposed guidelines invalid. In fact, the Court declared that "the
ethics opinions and case law cited in E-368 are on point...." 917 S.W.2d at 573. As noted above,
Opinion E-368 cited Opinion E-331, in which this Committee sounded a warning about insurer-imposed
budget limitations but was careful not to lay down a categorical prohibition.
Our long-standing view, that insurer-prescribed guidelines must be examined in each case to determine
their impact upon informed consent and independ~ntprofessional judgment, is also expressed in the
ethics opinions ofmany other states. Indeed, the case-by-case approach appears to be nearly universal,
so far as our research discloses. See, e.g., Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Commission Opinion No.
RQ-98-02 (1998); Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee Formal Opinion No. 107 (1999); Florida
Bar Association Ethics Committee Opinion No. 97-1 and Staff Opinion 20591 (1997); Hawaii Supreme
Court Disciplinary Board Opinion 37 (1999); Idaho State Bar Committee on Ethics Opinion No. 136
(1999); Indiana State Bar Association Legal Ethics Committee Opinion No.3 (1998); Iowa Supreme
Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct, Opinion No. 99-01 (1999); Mississippi Bar Ethics
Committee Opinion No. 246 (1999); New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion 721 (1999); Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No. 99-18 (1999);
Tennessee Supreme Court Board of Professional Responsibility Formal Ethics Opinion 2000-F-145
(2000); Wisconsin State Ethics Opinion E-99-1 (1999). These opinions, as we read them, do not
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categorically preclude all insurer-prescribed guidelines, but allow defense counsel to accept them to the
extent they do not significantly encroach upon the principles governing the attorney-client relationship.
Accord, Third Restatement, at § 134, commentJ: particularly Illustration 5, at p. 409.
Some states, such as Missowi and Virginia, also utilize the case-by-case approach and have stated that
insurer-prescribed guidelines may be permissible, even if they materially limit the scope of
representation, so long as the insured consents after consultation. See Missouri Office of Chief
Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Opinion No. 980188 (1998); Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion
No. 1723 (1998). The Tennessee opinion cited above also contains language to this effect.
Two other states, Ohio and Texas, arguably follow the case-by-case approach as well, but they have
condemned certain offending guidelines in emphatic terms. The Ohio Supreme Court Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, in Opinion No. 2000-3 (2000) has disallowed guidelines
that provide for "demeaning" motion-by-motion evaluation of the lawyer's work. The Board observed
that "[i]fan insurer is unsatisfied with the overall legal se~ices performed, the insurer has the
opportunity in the future to retain different counsel." The.Board concluded in a more conciliatory tone,
however, saying that it "encourag[ed] attorneys to cooperate with insurers, but [they] must not abdicate
control of their professional judgment to non-attorneys." The Texas Professional Ethics Committee also
sounded contrasting themes - or, at least, different emphases -- in its Opinion No. 533 (2000). It began
with a conventional statement that "[a]lthough the lawyer is free to enter into an agreement with the
insurer regarding his fee and services to be rendered to the insured/client, such agreement cannot
override the ethical responsibilities of the lawyer ...." But the Committee may have implied a narrow
scope ofpermissible guidelines when it went on to say that procedures for billing and payment could be
followed if they did "not [affect] the actual representation of the client."
Finally, the Montana Supreme Court, in the previously cited Montana Rules case, has undertaken the
sharpest critique to date of insurer-prescribed guidelines, taking particular exception to any guideline
requiring "prior approval" by the insurer ofcertain defense services and costs. The Court held:
"[D]efense counsel in Montana who submit to the requirement ofprior approval violate their duties
under the Rules of Professional Conduct to exercise their independent professional judgment and to give
their undivided loyalty to insllreds..".2 P.3d at ~17 (fjJ 51). Ifby this holding the Montana Court meant
that a lawyer could not agree to guidelines materially affecting the scope and quality of the insured's
representation - which would implicate the client's right of informed consent and would intrude upon
the lawyer's duty to exercise independent professional judgment -- then the Court's decision is broadly
consistent with our Committee's prior opinions and with the general pattern of opinions in other states.
In fact, this reading of the Montana decision draws support from the fact that the Montana Court cited
extensively the Kentucky AIA decision which, as mentioned earlier, approved this Committee's Opinion
£-368 (and the authorities it had cited, including Opinion £-331).
In other passages ofits opinion, however, the Montana Court may have created some confusion about
the dimensions of its ethical guidance to the lawyers of that state. On one hand, the Court said that its
decision, adopting the one-client view ofthe insured/insurer/defense lawyer relationship, "should not be
construed to mean that defense counsel have a 'blank check' to escalate litigation costs nor that defense
counsel need not ever consult with insurers." 2 P.3d at 814 (~39). On the other hand, the Court also
said, "Without reaching the issue here, we caution further that a mere requirement of consultation [with
the insurer] may be indistinguishable, in its interference with a defense counsel's exercise of
independent judgment and ability to provide competent representation, from a requirement ofprior
approval." 2 P.3d at 814-15 (, 44) (emphasis original). The Court later added that "prior approval
creates a substantial appearance of impropriety in its suggestion that it is insurers rather than defense
counsel who control the day to day details of a defense." 2 P.3d at 815 (~47). Ifby these dicta the
Court was attempting to create an ethical preclusion against any requirement of prior "approval"
regardless of the process connected with it, or against even a simple requirement ofprior "consultation"
with an insurer, then (and to that extent) we believe the Court's language was overbroad and - we
respectfully observe -- contrary to the better reasoned authorities.
Evidently, we are not alone in refraining from reading too much into the Montana decision. On
September 8, 2000, approximately four months after the Montana Court rendered its opinion, the the
F- 16
Board of Professional Responsibility of the Tennessee Supreme Court, writing en bane in Opinion
2000-F-145 (cited above), undertook to synthesize the ethical requirements for insurance defense
lawyers. The Board, citing In Re Petition o/Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322, 328 (Tenn. 1995) -- a
decision quoted with approval by the Montana Court -- provided the following guidance:
The [insurer] cannot control the details of the attorney's performance, dictate the strategy or
tactics employed, or limit the attorney's professional discretion with regard to the representation
[quoting Youngblood] .... Counsel receiving a retention purporting to require undeviating
compliance should inform the insurer that such compliance cannot be assured, but that counsel
will comply to the extent permitted by counsel's duties to the insured.
It is not proper to call upon the insured to make a decision about the directives in question....
Rather, the insured should be informed at the outset that the insurer ordinarily issues such
directions. Counsel may further explain that, in light of the insurance policy and the insured's
tender of defense, counsel assumes that such directions should be followed unless counsel
identifies some reasonable probability that following the directive might differ from an interest
of the insured.... But if counsel identifies a reasonable possibility of an interest being advanced
that differs from that of the insured, counsel will consult with the insured about the decision at
the time it is to be made and in light of all the circumstances then prevailing.
If this explanation is acceptable to the insured, counsel may proceed with the representation
unless and until it appears that one of the directives will (or is likely to) become operative and
that compliance presents a reasonable possibility of advancing an interest that differs from that
of the insured.
When and if a reasonable probability becomes apparent of an interest being advanced by one of
the directives that differs from that of the insured, counsel should first point this out to the
insurer and inquire whether it will vary its procedure to avoid that probability. If the insurer will
do so, the problem is solved and the insured protected.
If the insurer will not vary its directive, counsel must then consult with the insured.... If the
insured objects to the insurer's directive, counsel must advise the insurer that counsel cannot
comply. The insurer then has a choice of accepting the insured's position, by withdrawing the
objected-to directive (perhaps reserving its own right to assert that the insured has breached the
policy); seeking to persuade the insured to withdraw the objection; or discharging counsel.
In no event may counsel permit the insurer's directive to cause counsel to take action - without
the insured['s] informed consent - if counsel believes that action has a reasonable possibility of
advancing an interest that would differ from that of the insured.
Like the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, our Committee adheres to the widely accepted
view that some insurer guidelines may be acceptable. There is no ethical (as opposed to economic)
reason to condemn guidelines that standardize insurance billing practices, enhance lawyer accountability
without eliminating professional judgment, require a legitimate sharing ofnonconfidential information,
or provide a framework for communication about the cost (and cost-effectiveness) of legal services --
not unlike the dialogue a lawyer would expect to have with a sophisticated client paying for services
with first-party money. Such guidelines serve salutary purposes without infringing materially upon the
attorney-client relationship. They are permissible under the case law and rules governing professional
responsibility.
The guidance offered by the Tennessee Board comports well with our Committee's prior opinions, and it
is broadly consistent with the Kentucky AIA decision mentioned above. As noted, our Supreme Court in
AlA held that lawyers could not agree to take all of an insurance company's defense work at a fixed fee,
nor could they accept such work on condition that litigation expenses would not be reimbursed. In
rejecting such arrangements -- and, in a separate part ofthe opinion, by disallowing insurance companies
to engage in the unauthorized practice of law through in-house defense counsel -- the Kentucky Court
recognized that such extreme cost· containment measures, to which no client had given informed consent,
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nakedly pitted the economic interests of the lawyer against the insured's interest in adequate
representation. Such measures purposely created a material disincentive to the exercise by counsel of
independent professional judgment on behalf of clients, and AIA condemned them. AIA does not
preclude less intrusive, more ethically sensitive, case handling guidelines.
An effort to develop ethically sound guidelines has been undertaken recently by the Defense Research
Institute. Without pronouncing or implying any judgment on particular provisions ofDRI's
recommended guidelines (which can be found at the organization's Web site), our Committee notes that
the proposed guidelines represent a two-year, and ongoing, collaborative project of national defense bar
leaders and major insurance company representatives. Implicitly; such an effort demonstrates the view
of its participants that guidelines can be crafted within ethical boundaries, and it confirms our
Committee's observation in KBA Ethics Opinion E-331, quoted earlier: "Conflicts are not inevitable.
Presumably these matters can be r~solved amicably and responsibly in the great majority ofcases."
D. Illustrative Situations
The Kentucky lawyers who requested today's opinion from our Committee have not tendered a
particular set ofguidelines for review, but they have raised many specific questions in addition to the
broad inquiry about guidelines in general. We will consolidate and address some of those questions
here. In doing so, we re-invite attention to the comments of the Tennessee Board of Professional
Responsibility, quoted above, and we note the following observation of the Indiana State Bar
Association Ethics Committee:
There can be no bright-line test as to the kinds of controls to which insurance defense counsel
may agree. Because of the breadth of activities which a given insurer may seek to manage, the
ethical propriety of a given set of guidelines is necessarily somewhat subjective. There are no
better standards than those provided by Rules 5.4(c) incorporated in I.8(t) and 1.7 (b). When
confronted by proposed guidelines which cannot be followed ethically, the lawyer is
well-advised to seek an acceptable modification. If such modification cannot be agreed upon, the
representation must be declined. [Indiana State Bar Ethics Committee Opinion No.3 (1998).]
We recognize that when guidelines are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, many questions will arise, not
at the outset of representation -- when counsel presumably has made a threshold determination that the
guidelines will be acceptable and the client has been generally informed about them -- but rather during
the course of litigation. In most instances, such questions will be resolved amicably because the insurer
usually shares the insured's interest in the lawyer's preparation ofan effective defense.
In some circumstances, however, a disagreement may arise regarding the necessity of certain legal
services as the representation unfolds. In such a situation, the lawyer may act at his or her own expense
as a matter ofprofessional duty (perhaps reserving a right on behalf of the client to seek subsequent
judicial review of the insurer's decision). With the informed consent of the client, the lawyer also may
perform the service in question at the client's expense or may dispense with the service if the lawyer's
judgment is that the client's representation would still satisfy the basic requirement of competence under
Rule 1.1. The lawyer cannot acquiesce, however, in an insurer-imposed limitation if it endangers
professional competence or places other client interests significantly at risk.
A lawyer must understand that the client comes first. The lawyer prudently should decline a proffered
insurance defense if it is freighted with potentially troublesome guidelines. If the lawyer agrees to
guidelines that initially seem acceptable but later collide with the lawyer's independent professional
judgment, and if the client does not -- and, upon consultation, should not - consent to the limited
representation, then the lawyer must protect the client by providing adequate representation regardless of
the guidelines. Bearing in mind this caveat, we now turn to questions regarding particular kinds of
guidelines:
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1. May a lawyer accept representation under guidelines requiring approval by the insurer (i. e.,
by an insurance claims adjuster) before undertaking any discovery, conducting any legal
research, orfiling any motion? The question implies that the insurer would be in the position of
reviewing and approving a lawyer's choice of the methods and content ofdiscovery, or the topics
and time invested in the lawyer's legal research, or the lawyer's decisions to seek rulings or relief
from the court. Because each of these functions falls within the lawyer's independent
professional judgment, the answer to the question is no. A lawyer cannot agree to representation
of the insured client under guidelines that shift the exercise ofprofessional judgment to the
insurer. The lawyer could agree, however, to guidelines setting a reasonable tentative budget for
these functions and providing a process for ongoing consultation if the client's interests require a
budget exception.
2. Maya lawyer agree to guidelines requiring that all investigative work or all documentary
review be performed only by the' insurer's employees or that it be billed only at paralegal rates if
performed by the lawyer's firm? The answer is no. With respect to investigative work, the
determination as to whether a lawyer should gain first-hand exposure to certain places, things or
individuals important to the client's case, in order to prepare adequately for trial, is a matter of
professional judgment. Similarly, the detennination as to whether the lawyer must examine
certain documents - e.g., medical records -- directly, rather than relying upon lay or paralegal
summaries, is a matter ofprofessional judgment. Indeed, in some instances, the lawyer's
first-hand review may be necessary in order to avoid potential malpractice liability. Limiting
compensation for such fact-gathering or document review to paralegal rates would create a
material disincentive to the lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment, putting the
client's interests at unacceptable risk. On the other hand, guidelines providing a tentative
allocation of lawyer and nonlawyer/paralegal tasks appropriate to the case, or setting a reasonable
tentative budget for investigative effort or document review, and providing a process for ongoing
consultation, would be acceptable.
3. May a lawyer agree to representation under guidelines requiring prior approval of
compensationfor additional lawyers or experts with whom the principal lawyer may wish to
confer, or prior approval ofcompensation for a lawyer's trial preparation exceeding a specified
pretrial period (e.g., thirty days)? The answer is yes, if (but only if) the lawyer reasonably
determines that the issues in the case do not immediately appear to require such conferences or
protracted trial preparation, and that approval of additional costs can be obtained for needs
becoming manifest as the case unfolds. Thus, the guidelines must provide a process for ongoing
consultation with the insurer.
4. May a lawyer agree to guidelines establishing detailed billing and reporting procedures, with
deadlines for certain submissions? The answer is yes, if (but only if) the guidelines contain
reasonable time frames, provide a consultation process to accommodate extenuating
circumstances, and do not impose upon the lawyer extreme and uncompensated time burdens that
impede, or create a material disincentive to, the lawyer's performance ofduties required by the
attorney-client relationship. Pursuant to KBA Ethics Opinions E-404 and E-409, the lawyer also
would be required to ascertain that no billing infonnation and reports containing confidential
infonnation would go to the insurer or to outside auditors for review, without the client's
informed consent.
In all of the foregoing situations, the lawyer-insurer relationship contemplates a process for ongoing
consultation. Such consultation must be genuine, with the lawyer basing each expenditure or activity
request on the needs of the insured, and the insurer giving each request careful consideration in light of
the lawyer's independent professional judgment. If the insurer's guidelines do not provide such a
process, the lawyer should decline a proffered representation. In any event, the lawyer must not
undertake, and an insured client cannot be asked to accept, a representation so limited in scope that it
abridges the client's rights, or narrows the lawyer's duties, under the Rules. See Comment 5 to Rule
1.2. After the representation of a client has begun -- and continuously thereafter until the representation
concludes or is properly terminated under Rule 1.16 -- the lawyer must perform his or her professional
duties fully, and must exercise independent professional judgment in loyalty to the client, regardless of
limitations imposed by the insurer.
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Introduction
The 00 - "ought-ought" decade presents challenges for plaintiff employment
lawyers. New technology ought to give us the tools to "level the playing field" so we can
effectively combat high priced defense counsel for unreasonable employers.
Recent statistics show the number of job bias suits more than tripled from 6,936
in 1990 to 21,540 in 1998. A disturbing statistic shows that a Plaintiff in an employment
case who wins in the district court is far more likely than Defendants to be reversed on
appeal. The reversal rate on appeal by Plaintiff where Defendant won was 5.80/0. The
Founder of the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) and co-founder and former
chairman of National Employee Rights Institute (now Workplace Fairness). This article is based in part
upon a talk given at the ATLA National College of Advocacy and also upon an article in the NELA
Employee Advocate.
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reversal rate' on appeal by Defendant where Plaintiff won was 53.610/0.'1 The election of
President George W. Bush will of course lead to the appointment of more federal judges
with a pro-employer background. These new conservative judges will continue the
pattern of pro-employer court rulings harmful to plaintiffs in discrimination and wrongful
discharge litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court as presently constituted stands, in
general, 5-4 pro-employer. Probably President Bush will have an opportunity to appoint
a new conservative judge before his term expires.
It's time to look back to the 1990s.
TOP TEN EVENTS OF THE 90'S:
1. The Civil Rights Act Amendment of 1991, aqding compensatory and
punitive damages and jury trial for victims of race, sex, religious, and national origin
discrimination, and reversing several conservative decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
2. The enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act (A.D.A.) and Family
Medica,l Leave Act (F.M.L.A.), with their protections for disabled employees and those
with serious health conditions.
3. The dramatic trend of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) featuring
a. A growing increase in management's interest in pre-suit settlement.
b. Corporate America's introduction of mandatory arbitration
clauses in their handbooks and pre-hire employment agreements.
c. The increased use of mediation to help settle disputes.
4. The continued arrogance of certain companies which practice the
stonewall, "deny and delay" strategy of dealing with the claims of terminated
Eisenberg & Schwab "Double Standard on Appeal" htty://www.findjustice.com.
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employee's. The continued use of downsizing, reorganizatioil, and restructuring as a
result of mergers aDd short term stock market driven decision making, which has
resulted in massive layoffs.
5. The increased use of temporary and part-time employees, alleged and
often misclassified independent contractors, and leased employees in order to a.void
payment of fringe benefits and other liabilities.
6. The upsurge of Plaintiffs' success in sex harassment litigation and the
disappointing results encountered in ERISA and ADA cases.
7. New right to privacy issues caused by increased employer monitoring of
employee behavior and communications at work and off duty.
8. The slow down in expansion of common law rights and erosion of the at-
will doctrine.
9. The hostile attitude of the federal bench towards employment cases,
featuring increased use of summary judgment proceedings to dismiss.cases.
10. The strengthening of the Plaintiffs' employment bar as exemplified by the
growth of ATLA's Employee Rights Section and the National Employment Lawyers
Association (NELA) and its local affiliates.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE PRACTICE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
IN THE NEXT DECADE?
1. Current ADR Trends Will Continue
There will be more mediations.
Representatives of both Plaintiffs and Defendants like mediation as a way of
settling disputes. State and federal judges like to refer cases to mediation.
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Adrninistrative agencies like the EEOC, now encourage mediation. The "cottage
industry" of mediators flourishes. The number of private mediations has skyrocketed.
Congress, state legislators and government agencies are enacting laws and rules
requiring mediations as part of the litigation dispute handling process. Companies now
insert mediation as a step in their internal grievance appeal systems. Frustrated with
the aggravation, delays, expenses, complexities and results of court litigation, everyone.
has turned to mediation as a" better way to resolve disputes. This trend will continue.
There will be more pre-suit settlements by private negotiations.
The publicity concerning "ADR" and the success of mediation has forced the
parties to focus on the necessity of serious exploration of "early" settlement prior to the
filing of suit. In smaller cases companies are willing to analyze cost-of-defense figures
and are less likely to let "machismo" and "principle" stand in the way of an expeditious,
modest settlement. Employment lawyers will be doing more investigating and
negotiating the~ ever before.
The trend towards non union "in-house" arbitration procedures will
continue, albeit slowly.
The Courts should hold that 'mandatory' arbitration as a condition of employment
in handbooks or'employment applications is generally not "knowing and voluntary" and
is therefore an invalid waiver of important statutory rights. However, any such holdings
may not stop the trend of corporate America to include arbitration as the final step of
internal appeal procedures. I.n addition, the courts tend to be yieldin'g to public
endorsement of ADR, and approving mandatory arbitration, as long as it provides
minimum due process. In all events, most employees with minor claims will take
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advantage of "voluntary" arbitration that is cheap, speedy and informal. .However, the
Plaintiffs' bar will continue to resist arbitration of major common law and statutory
discrimination claims which permit trial by jury.
2.. The Laws Regulating The Workforce Will Continue To Proliferate and
Multiply, With Resulting Complexity and Confusion For All
Concerned..
.It is a certain that there will be new legislation and regulations affecting the
workplace and the practice of employment law. Some of these new laws will be
salutory - extending and improving protections e.g. in the field of health insurance and
401 k plans. Other laws will hold the promise to the lips but will break the hearts of
many because they will not live up to expectations. For certain, the complexities of the
laws, the complicated interplay between federal and state law, and the complicated
interplay between administrative and court law will continue to grow. For the ordinary
citizen, the employment laws will often be incomprehensible and so complex as to be
beyond understanding.
3. There will be no change in the "employment-at-will" doctrine and any
further judicial erosion will be glacial rather than galloping.
The state courts in the late 70's and early 80's made a massive assault upon the
"employment-at-will" doctrine by engrafting numerous e.xceptions, by extending the law
of contracts (e.g. the implied employment agreement theory) and torts (e.g. the public
policy tort, defamation, etc.) to the workplace. However, state courts, with a few
exceptions, have been unwilling to extend the "convenant of good faith and fair dealing"
and similar doctrines to the employment relationship. State courts have halted the trend
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of expanding the torts of outrage arid privacy which at present are of little help to
employees.
Neither the state legislatures nor Congress are likely to enact legislation requiring
employers to discharge employees only for "just cause". However, modern employees
will not tolerate on-the-job abuse, bullying, insensitivity, unsafe unhealthy working
conditions a~d discrimination. Employees will continue to seek remedies for unfair,
discriminatory and retaliatory treatment at work.
4. The Plaintiffs' Employment Law Bar Will Continue To Grow In
Numbers, Strength, and Importance.
Through publications, seminars, and other activities, ATLA and NELA do an
excellent job of educating their members. The Plaintiffs' bar is now recognized in the
governing councils and committees of the ABA and local bar association committees.
About ten thousand employees are terminated each day. Because of publicity
and continued awareness of rights, employees continue to turn to lawyers to help them.
The Plaintiffs' employment bar will continue to flourish. Million dollar verdicts will
continue, although tort reform efforts will also continue to try to limit the power of juries
to award large amounts of punitive damages. Big verdicts will continue to encourage
settlements, which in turn will supply enough incentives for tne Plaintiffs' bar to continue
to represent victims of gross injustice.
Voice mail, fax, e-mail, internet and web-site communications, are helping small .
firm practitioners to practice law, engage in research, discovery, and trial preparation
with more efficiency. Modern technology will continue to help level the playing field in
the struggle between the "little guy" Plaintiffs law firm and the big Defense firm.
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5. Fringe Benefit And Health Related Issues Will Continue To' Be Of
Importance.
Americans are more and more concerned with medical and retirement issues.
The cost of health insurance continues to skyrocket. The importance of employer -
sponsored welfare plans continues. There is concern and conflict with respect to new
cash-balance plans, ergonomics in the workplace, managed care, ADA disability and
FMLA leave of absence cases. The preemption doctrine and other defects in ERISA
will continue to plague and discourage employee advocates. Recent Supreme Court
decisions have further weakened the ADA as an effective instrument for disabled
Americans. Undoubtedly the Enron. scandal will produce some new legislation
protecting employee investors in 401 k Plans.
6. The Growth Of Discrimination Claims Slows Down.
The number of discrimination suits filed in the federal courts has tripled in the
past decade. The Civil Rights Act Amendment of 1991 and the passage of the ADA
have contributed to this growth. However, the growth trend has abated. The
conservative federal bench, the difficulties of proof, the trend towards summary
judgment, and the high costs of litigation have contributed to the counter trend.
7. The Ordinary Citizen Has Difficulty Finding Lawyers To Handle
Modest Claims Of Injustice.
Profit minded, s~ock market driven corporations conti.nue to downsize,
reorganize, and restructure, causing thousands of layoffs. Companies continue to seek
to eliminate older workers and those with health problems. Sex harassment and
discrimination against women and minorities flourishes. Millions' of victims of workplace
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injustice need and will be seeking legal counsel. However, the Plaintiffs' bar is wary
about accepting risKy cases on a contingency fee basis. The ordinary citizen simply
cannot afford hourly rate representation. The result is that thousands of injustices go
unremedied. The legal system will be challenged to find new ways to provide non-
contingency representation on an affordable basis.
8. New Technology Has Created Dramatic Changes In The Way
Work Is Performed and In Attitudes Towards The Workplace.
The telecommuter home worker is a new phenomenon made possible by home
computers. There is an increased use of independent contractors, temporary and
leased employees. The new "free agent" model employee does not expect job security
or have job loyalty. Concern about the right of privacy has surfaced in response to .
attempted corporate regulation and monitoring of electronic communications, medical
records, and off duty behavior. The dramatic high speed information revolution will
continue to create new legal problems in the workplace requiring new innovative legal
solutions.
9. The Problem Of Employee "Consent" To "Unconscionable"
Employer Policy. '. .
Employers seek to impose mandatory arbitration of disputes on employees, and
set forth arbitration rules and regulations in job applications, policy handbooks, or
bilateral agreements. Frequently, employees are asked to sign statements they have
read, understood and agree to obey the arbitration provision. Similarly employees sign
non competition agreements upon hire and during the course of employment, and as a
condition of receiving severance pay. Finally, employers more and more are issuing
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annoutlcements notifying employees that the company will be monitoring all personal e-
mails and claiming implied consent to other invasions of privacy as a result of company
rules in handbooks. Hopefully, the courts will examine concepts requiring "knowing and
voluntary" release of statutory and contract rights and also doctrine invalidating
contracts which are unconscionable, where there is an imbalance in bargaining power,
the content is one-sided, and the employee is unable to understand the consequences·
of the so-called agreement or waiver.
10. The Major Problem Is The Failure Of The Courts To Promote
The Values Of Individualism.
A gross example of the failure of the law to protect individuals in the workplace is
the weakening law of privacy. Americans proclaim the importance of private matters
remaining private - free from unreasonable intrusion. Yet, current laws permit
companies almost unbridled freedom to drug test, monitor e-mail, search cars, lockers,
desks, review medical records, and engage in surveillance and spying. Companies'
citation of the need to regulate the workforce, enforce discipline, maintain security, and
prevent legal liabilities, violence, and crime is usually enough to justify almost every
interference with privacy. The events of September 11,2001, and the war on
"terrorism" has encouraged employers to take more steps to monitor the workforce.
The teaching of Professor Clyde W. Summers,who recently spoke at this
Institute, bears repeating:
"In [many court] cases, not only might the reasons for the
discharges be viewed as "outrageous", but the brutal way
they were done should be viewed as "intolerable in a
civilized society." But the judges were unmoved. The
refusal to find liability in these cases underlines the courts'
reluctance to recognize and protect emplo.yees from
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egregious employer conduct whictl destroys their sense of
self worth strips away their human dignity.
"Freedom of contract was conceived as an instrument of
individualism and personal freedom, with the employment
contract supposedly expressing the individual choices of the
employer and employee. However, employment at will,
theoretically a product of freedom of contract, is the ultimate
expression of employer domination over the employee. It
empowers an employer to control the employees' lives not
only in their work, their dress, their speech and associations
in the workplace, but also their activities and associations off
the job. It empowers the employer, out of whim,
vindictiveness or corrupt motives, ~o dismiss employees who
act out of a sense of social responsibility, ethical obligation
on personal conscience. To be sure, there ar~ limits, and
most employers recognize the personal worth of their
employees. But courts, reasoning from employment at will,
too often give little or no weight to the interests of
employees. Employment at will has transformed the
individualism and personal freedom into a denial of personal '
freedom and autonomy.
"Individualism, when expressed in terms of freedom of
contract in the employment relation makes labor a
commodity of trade. The individual worker becomes
vulnerable to economic forces in the market where the
collectivized economic power of the employer enables it to
treat the worker as an object to be used, not a human being
entitled to dignity, respect, individuality and autonomy.
"Employment necessarily requires some loss of individual
autonomy, for the production process requires cooperation
and discipline. But neither the courts nor the legislatures
have reflectively sought to balance or accommodate these
competing interests. Instead, they give conclusive dominant
weight to the employer's interests. This invites the question
why, in the. employment relation, the complex of personal
interests of autonomy have been given so little weight by the
law in a society that prides itself on individual rights. In part,
it may be that the individual's interest in autonomy is so
intangible, abstract and indefinite that it is too elusive to
weight, while the employer's interest in efficiency and
production is tangible and visibly substantial so that its
weight is obvious. But the relative weight given to these two
interests may be indicative that today in' our society we are
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more concerned with increased production than
enhancement of human worth; that what we see in the law is
a refection of ourselves; that despite our declarations of
individualism, we secretly prefer products to personal
autonomy."
Clyde W. Summers - - Collectivism and Autonomy in
American Labor Law - Employee Rights and Employment
Policy Journal; (2001) Volume 5; Number 2; Page 453
WHERE SHOULD THE PRACTICE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW BE GOING?
The "hope chest" of the Plaintiffs' bar.
In the recent Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products. Inc., 120S.Ct. 2097
(2000) case the U.S. Supreme Court buried the "pretext plus" doctrine once and for all
and revalidated the rule that prima facie discrimination plus evidence of pretext, without
more, constitutes sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict. Justice O'Connor writing
for the majority held:
"In appropriate circumstances, the trier. of fact can
reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the
employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose. . . Thus, a Plaintiffs prima facie case, combined
with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the empl.oyer unlawfully discriminated."
Hopefully the recent Eighth Circuit ruling in Mems v. St. Paul, 8th Cir. No. 99-2782 (Aug
3, 2000) is indicative of the future. There, Judge Heaney noted "Summary Judgment
seldom should be granted in discrimination cases because such cases often depend on
inferences rather than direct evidence." Some judges believe that employment cases
unnecessarily clog the federal courts. Hopefully judicial "docket clearing" practices will
now cease.
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The following passage from the Third Circuit opinion in Aman v. Cort Furniture
Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1'074, 1082 (1996) is appropriate.
"Discrimination continues to pollute the social and economic
mainstream of American life, and is often simply masked in
more subtle forms. It has become easier to coat various
forms of discrimination with the appearance of propriety, or
. to ascribe some other less odious intention to what is in
reality discriminatory behavior. In other words, while.
discriminatory conduct persists, violators have learned n'ot to
leave the proverbial 'smoking gun' behind. As one court has
recognized, '[d]defendants of even minimal sophistication
will neither admit discriminatory animus or leave a paper trial
demonstrating it.' But regardless of the form that
discrimination takes, the impermissible impact remains the
same, and the law's prohibition remains unchanged.
'The sophisticated would-be violator has made our job a little
more difficult. Courts today must be increasingly vigilant in
their efforts to ensure that prohibited discrimination is not
approved under the auspices of legitimate 'conduct, and 'a
plaintiffs ability to prove discrimination indirectly,
circumstantially, must not be crippled. '.. because of
crabbed notions of relevance or excessive mistrust af
juries.'" [Citations omitted].
Hopefully the common law and legislatures of the various states will move forward
to protect victims of workplace abuse. Hopefully Congress will enact the Civil Rights
Tax Fairness Act to make settlements .non-ta'xable. Hopefully Congress will modify
ERISA to provide expanded remedies and modify the preemption doctrine. Hopefully
the "tort reform" movement will slow down. The public needs to recognize the deterrent
effect and immense social good resulting from corporate fear of jury trials and large
punitive damage awards. Fulfillment of these dreams will mean a healthier environment
for all employees and employment practitioners.
The fast changing times demand that the plaintiffs' bar be resilient and
flexible
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The changes in technology and communication featuring internet, email,
voicemail, websites, cell phones, fax machines, etc., require employment lawyers to
modify old methods of pr~ctice, to "work smart" and focus on efficiency. The increased
use of mediation and the likely increase in arbitration will mean more cases can be
handled in a much shorter time~ Some lawyers will continue to "cherry pick" and select
only the sure winners to litigate where large verdicts are likely after many years of
litigation. However, there will be a need for more lawyers to help in the smaller cases,
where the employee needs counsel to assist in company grievance procedures. There
will be a continued need for counseling of efTlployee victims of bullying, harassment,·
downsizing and reorganizations. Employees will continue to need help negotiating
severance packages and releases. The world of employee benefits, e.g. pensions,
IRA's, and medical insurance, will continue to be of great concern. Employees will be
tu.rning to lawyers more and more to unravel the complexities of benefit plans and their
rights thereunder.
As the French say, "plus ca change plus c'est la meme chose", (the more
something apparently changes - the more it essentially remains the same). Although
the technical aspects of the Plaintiffs practice will change e.g. methods of research, use
of a-mail, websites, etc., there remains the continuing need fo~ courageous advocates
who are willing to 'act as Davids in battle with Goliaths.
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. CONCLUSION
An important New York Times article by Barbara Ehrenreich is entitled "Warning:
This Is·A Rights-Free Work Place" and notes "Today more than ever, American
workers check their freedoms at the office door. The mystery is why?" and concludes:
"What we need is nothing less than a new civil rights
movement - this time, for American workers. Who will·
provide the leadership remains to be seen, but clearly the
stakes go way beyond "Iabor issues," as these are
conventionally defined. We can hardly call ourselves the
world's pre-eminent democracy if large numbers of citizens
spend half of their waking hours in what amounts, in plain
terms, to a dictatorship."
The Plaintiffs' bar hopefully will be in the forefront of a new civil rights movement
for American workers.
In all events, the practice of employment law continues to be exciting, interesting,
and challenging and provides great opportunity for lawyers to play an important role in
. the .community.
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ERISA LITIGATION
Whitney Wallingford
May 31,2002
1. Introduction. In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(nERISA n) primarily in response to growing concerns regarding the inadequate standards and
safeguards then applicable to the establishment, operation and funding of employee benefit plans.
ERISA §2 (29 USC §1001). Initially, ERISA's comprehensive civil enforcement scheme was
intended to address issues related primarily to pension plans. Because of the increasing
importance of welfare plans to employee benefit structures, the courts continue to develop and
refine the rights, duties and obligations under ERISA. Basic issues which continue to be addressed
include whether a jury trial may be required under ERISA, the types of damages and other
remedies which are available, who has standing to sue, and what standard of review is appropriate
for use by federal courts in reviewing the decisions of plan fiduciaries. ERISA's sweeping
preemption provisions often result in unobtainable relief and the courts, in an attempt to remedy
the inequities created by ERISA's broad preemption and limited damages provisions, are
increasingly willing to create federal common law causes of action under ERISA.
ERISA litigation arises primarily in the context ofenforcement proceedings, private actions
brought by plan participants, beneficiaries or fiduciaries and actions brought by employees,
interested parties, or the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (npBGc n).
Enforcement of ERISA rights is authorized pursuant to ERISA §502 (29 USC §1132)
which governs (a) persons empowered to bring a civil action, (b) actions related to qualified plans,
and (c) penalties related to administrators' failure to provide information or file returns (also
subject to Internal Revenue Code penalties).
2. Enforcement Proceedings
2.1 §502 of ERISA (29 USC §1132) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to investigate
civil and criminal violations of ERISA and related laws and to forward violations to the Attorney
General for appropriate action.
2.2 The Secretary may sue to enjoin any act or practice which violates the reporting and
disclosure requirements, or the participation, vesting and funding rules ofERISA, or to obtain any
other appropriate reliefnecessary to enforce those rules. ERISA §502(a)(5); 29 USC §1132(a)(5).
2.3 The Secretary may not bring an action for equitable- relief for violation of the
participation, vesting or funding rules of ERISA in the case of a qualified plan, or a plan for which
an application for qualification is pending, unless requested to do so by the Secretary of the
Treasury. ERISA §502(b)(I)(A); 29 USC §1132(b)(I)(A).
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2.4 Participants, beneficiaries or plan fiduciaries may request that the Secretary exercise
enforcement authority with regard to the participation, vesting or funding rules. ERISA
§502(b)(1)(B); 29 USC §1132(b)(1)(B).
2.5 The Secretary may sue a plan fiduciary in order to secure restitution to the plan for
any losses resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty and to seek the removal of the breaching
fiduciary.
2.6 The PBGC has authority to make investigations and may sue in federal district court
for appropriate legal and/or equitable relief in order to enforce the termination insurance
provisions of ERISA. ERISA §4003; 29 USC §1303.
2.7 The Department of Labor's ("DOL") preferred method of handling ERISA
violations is through voluntary compliance unless immediate action is necessary in order to
preserve plan assets or to protect participants' rights.
2.8 In determining whether immediate action is necessary, the DOL will consider such
factors as the flagrancy of the violation and the threat of loss of plan assets or records during the
voluntary compliance period.
2.9 Judicial review of DOL regulatory actions is governed by the Administrative
Procedures Act which is specifically incorporated into the labor provisions of Title I of ERISA.
2.10 Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions for judicial review
brought under Title I of ERISA. Such actions are to be brought in the district court in the district
where the plan has its principal office or in the District of Columbia federal district court. ERISA
§502(t), 29 USC §1132(t).
2.11 The DOL has instituted an initiative to detect "criminal activity" in ERISA plan
administration. Statutes applied by the DOL include:
(a) 18 USC §664 governs theft or embezzlement from employee benefit plans.
Specifically, the statute provides that:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or converts
to his own use or to the use of another, any of the. moneys, funds, securities,
premiums, credits, property, or other assets of any employee welfare benefit plan
or employee pension benefit plan, or of any fund connected therewith, shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
As used in this section, the term "any employee welfare benefit plan or employee
pension benefit plan" means any employee benefit plan subject to any provision of
title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
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(b) 18 USC §1027 governs false statements and concealment of facts in relation
to documents required by ERISA. Specifically, the statute provides:
Whoever, in any document required by title I of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (as amended from time to time) to be published, or kept as
part of the records of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension
benefit plan, or certified to the administrator of any such plan, makes any false
statement or representation of fact, knowing it to be false, or knowingly conceals,
covers up, or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure of which is required by such
title [29 USC §1001 et seq.] or is necessary to verify, explain, clarify or check for
accuracy and completeness any report required by such title to be published or any
information required by such title to be certified, shall be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(c) 18 USC §1954 governs the offer, acceptance, or solicitation to influence operations
of employee benefit plans. Generally, the statute makes it a crime to accept "kickbacks" from
plans.
The statute applies to anyone who is (1) an administrator, officer, trustee, custodian,
counsel, agent, or employee of any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit
plan; or (2) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employer any of whose employees are
covered by such plan; or (3) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employee organization
any of whose members are covered by such plan; or (4) a person who, an officer, counsel, agent,
or employee of an organization which, provides benefit plan services to such plan.
Persons limited by the statute are precluded from receiving value with the intent to be
influenced in their decisions. The applicable penalties are a maximum $10,000 fine or a three year
imprisonment term.
3. Private Actions
3.1 Standing to Sue
(a) Not only does ERISA §502(a) enumerate the causes of action, the statute
also identifies the parties with "standing" to bring an action. The enumerated parties under
ERISA §502(a) include participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the DOL.
(b) A fiduciary, plan participant or beneficiary may bring a private action under
§502 of ERISA (29 USC §1132) in order to enjoin any act or practice which violates the
provisions of title I of ERISA, the rules for the protection of employee benefit rights, or the terms
of the plan, or in order to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations.
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(c) A civil action may be brought by a plan participant or beneficiary to recover
benefits due, enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits under
the terms of the plan. ERISA §502(a)(I); USC §1132(a)(I).
(d) §510 ofERISA (29 USC §1140) prohibits anyone from discharging, fining,
suspending, expelling, disciplining or discriminating against a participant or beneficiary for
exercising rights protected by ERISA or taking part in a legal proceeding under its provisions.
(e) Outside parties who deal with an employee benefit plan do not have standing
to sue to enforce their rights against the plan under ERISA.
(t)
(g)
under ERISA.
An employee benefit plan may also sue (or be sued) under title I of ERISA.
Recent cases have dealt with the issue of who has standing to bring suit
(i) Most Circuits agree that "enumerated" parties are the exclusive
parties that may sue. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest
Areas Pension Fund 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1986). However, there is controversy over whether
non-enumerated parties, e.g., ERISA plans, have ERISA standing.
(ii) Non-enumerated party jurisdiction may be predicated on the federal
question statute (28 USC §1331). Where an action "arises under" federal common law, a federal
district court may have jurisdiction over the suit. Federal courts have been authorized to evolve
a federal common law of pension plans in appropriate cases. The Sixth Circuit found that
preemption of state law and the congressional directive to develop a federal common law of
employee benefit plans require the application of federal law to actions premised on contractual
obligations created by ERISA plans. Thus, an employer could sue a plan for restitution of
contributions made as the result of a mistake of law. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central
States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth
Circuit held that an insurance company (a non-enumerated party) had standing to bring an action
for reimbursement against an ERISA-covered health plan. The court said that where the ERISA
preemption provision had effectively deprived a plaintiff of a state law claim, the court had
jurisdiction based on federal common law. Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Thorn Apple Valley,
Inc. 31 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 1986), 18 EBC 1545.
(iii) At one time, the courts generally held that a plan participant who
received a lump sum distribution was no longer a participant with standing to bring suit under
ERISA because such a participant was no longer eligible to receive benefits under the plan. In an
action by a former pension plan participant the Seventh Circuit, while holding that the participant
lacked standing, stated that there was "merit to the argument that a former employee who has
already received vested benefits should be allowed to bring an action within a reasonable amount
of time against the administrator for failure to provide information and in order to ascertain the
accuracy of the amount already received." The court, however, refused to find standing as the
participant waited three years from her date of termination to file suit. Winchester v. Pension
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Committee of Michael Reese Health Plan, etc., 942 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1991). ERISA §502(a)(9)
now makes it clear that a person who was a participant at the time of the alleged violation has
standing.
(iv) The Fourth Circuit, invoking its prerogative to create federal
common law under ERISA, held that the federal courts have jurisdiction over a suit brought by
a plan administrator under §502(a)(I)(B) of ERISA (29 USC §1132). The court held that while
§502(a)(I)(B) of ERISA provides a federal cause of action only for participants or beneficiaries,
an ERISA action governed by federal common law arises under federal law where the issues in
dispute are of central concern to the federal statute. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co.
v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1990), eert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 512 (1990).
(v) In Kennedy v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.
1991), the court held that a health care provider has standing under ERISA to sue for benefits
assigned to him by a participant in an employee welfare benefit plan. The court held that in such
a situation the health care provider was a beneficiary within the meaning of ERISA.
(vi) The court in Hawaii Teamsters v. City Express Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1426 (D.
Haw. 1990), held that where a union is the bargaining representative of plan participants, the
union has standing to sue under ERISA to vindicate rights under the plan on behalfof its members.
3.2 Statute of Limitations
(a) ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations period for suits brought to
enforce its provisions except for actions brought for breach of fiduciary duty or for actions under
the special provisions relating to multi-employer plans.
(b) The controlling limitation period will be that contained in the most
analogous state statute of limitations.
(c) The courts will apply the statute of limitations of the state in which the
operative events relating to the cause of action occurred.
(d) An attempt by a plan to impose a shorter statute of limitations in its plan
provisions may be effective if found to be reasonable. While some plan documents specify
particular limitation periods in disputes, there is disagreement in the courts as to the effect of the
period of limitations. Some courts suggest that the analogous state statute of limitations should
be used, even though a shorter period is specified in the plan documents. Other courts have given
effect to a plan document's adoption of a shorter statute of limitations. In the case of Order of
United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (a non-ERISA case), the Supreme
Court upheld as valid a contract provision limiting the period of limitations, provided that the
shorter period itself is a reasonable period. On the basis of Wolfe, an ERISA plan's use of a 3
year limitation for bringing a lawsuit regarding a claim was found reasonable and thus could be
enforced without regard to any particular state limitation statute. Chilcote v. Blue Cross & Blue
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Shield United, 841 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Wis. 1993). See also Scheirerv. NMU Pension &
Welfare Plan, 585 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. N.Y 1984).
(e) Generally, a participant's cause ofaction is said to arise when the participant
becomes aware of the facts necessary to state a claim, not when the participant discovers that he
or she has a possible legal claim based upon those facts.
(t) According to §413 of ERISA (29 USC §1113) claims based upon a breach
of fiduciary duty, absent fraud or concealment, may not be brought:
(i) more than three years after the complaining party has actual
knowledge of the breach or after the filing of a report with the Secretary of Labor from which the
complaining party could have reasonably been expected to obtain knowledge of the breach; or
(ii) more than six years after the date of the last action constituting a
breach, or, in the case of an omission, the last date by which a fiduciary could have acted to cure
the breach;
(1) Ziegler v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 548 (9th
Cir. 1990), held that not all actions for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA require that harm
occur as a result of the breach before they will accrue. The court stated that the language of §413
of ERISA clearly states that actual knowledge, and not harm, triggers the limitations period. The
court applied a two part test in determining when the statute of limitations period should
commence, looking first at the time that the alleged breach or violation occurred and secondly at
the time that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of such breach or violation.
The court noted that to require actual harm before an action may be brought for breach of
fiduciary duty would prevent the prosecution of breaches of fiduciary duty which Congress
intended should be prosecuted in enacting ERISA. Such breaches include the failure to perform
fiduciary duties for the exclusive benefit of participants and their beneficiaries or the transfer of
plan assets to parties in interest.
(2) Another case which recognized the stringent requirement of
actual knowledge, not merely constructive knowledge, for barring claims against fiduciaries prior
to the expiration of the six year statute of limitations was Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168,
15 EBC 1095 (3rd Cir. 1992). The court held that "actual knowledge of a breach or violation" as
required under §413 of ERISA requires that a plaintiff have actual knowledge of all material facts
necessary to understand that some claim exists. Such facts might include necessary opinions of
experts, knowledge of a transaction's harmful consequences, or actual harm.
(iii) In the case of fraud or concealment, fiduciaries remain vulnerable
to suit for a period of six years from the discovery of their breach or violation.
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(1) The courts are divided as to whether the term "fraud or
concealment" refers to the action giving rise to the ERISA claim or only to actions by the fiduciary
to hide the breach.
(a) Radiology Center, S.C. v. Stiefel, Nicolaus & Co.,
919 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1990) held that the six year statute of limitations only applies to situations
where a defendant fiduciary fraudulently tries to conceal an ERISA breach.
(b) Conversely, Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors,
874 F.2d 912 (2nd Cir. 1989), held that the six year statute of limitations governs claims against
trustees for breach of fiduciary duty involving fraud or concealment.
(2) Some cases have argued a concept of "ongoing breach" of
fiduciary duty to avoid the limitations period. See Dameron v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. ,
815 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987).
(a) In Masengill v. Rye, 747 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ky. 1990), the
plaintiffs sued for conversion ofplan assets arguing that the "breach" should continue for each day
the fiduciary retained control of the assets or should be said to occur each time the fiduciary
refused the plaintiffs' demands for the assets. The court rejected the plaintiffs' position, holding
that such an interpretation would subject fiduciaries to liability forever thereby rendering ERISA's
limitation provisions meaningless.
3.3 Appeals Procedure
(a) §503 of ERISA (29 USC §1133) requires that every employee benefit plan
establish special appeal procedures which provide for written notice of a claim denial to the
participant or beneficiary making the claim for benefits and a reasonable opportunity for a full and
fair review of the decision denying the request.
(i) Many courts require the exhaustion of interplan claim procedures as
a prerequisite to bringing a suit for benefits under ERISA.
(1) InBaxterv. C.A. MuerCorp., 941 F.2d451 (6thCir. 1991),
the court held that a plan participant who is not provided with a written denial of benefits, as
required under ERISA, may still be required to appeal the claim denial before proceeding in
federal court. The court held that even though a written denial of benefits was not issued, the
participant, who had a copy of the plan document, was notified of the denial and could have sought
review.
(2) Springer v. Wal~Mart Associates' Group Health Plan, 908
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1990), held that a plan administrator's refusal to process a claim did not
excuse a participant from the requirement that the participant exhaust the administrative remedies
available under the plan prior to filing a suit for benefits.
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(ii) This prerequisite may be waived if the appeals procedures would be
futile or if there has been a wrongful denial of access to such procedures.
(1) In Curry v. Contract Fabricatory, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan,
891 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1990), the court permitted a participant to maintain an action under
ERISA for the denial of benefits despite the participant's failure to exhaust the plan's
administrative remedies. The plan administrator failed to provide the participant with plan
documents describing the remedies available under the plan or to document the reasons for the
denial of the participant's claims. The court held that the plan administrator's actions denied the
participant meaningful access to the review process and therefore exhaustion of the plan's
administrative remedies was not required.
Note: In Graphic Communications v. GCIU - Employer Retirement Plan, 917 F.2d 1184
(9th Cir. 1990), the plan stated that a claim for benefits would initially be reviewed by the plan
administrator whose decision could then be appealed to the fund trustees. If a participant was
dissatisfied with the trustees decision, a participant could take the remaining step in the plan's
administrative process which was final and binding arbitration. A participant in the plan declined
to arbitrate and instead filed suit in federal district court under §502 of ERISA (29 USC §1132)
contending that the arbitration provisions in the plan were unenforceable. The court held that
judicial review of the benefit claim denial was unavailable due to the participant's failure to follow
the plan's mandatory arbitration procedures. The court stated that arbitration clauses are
unenforceable when the claim in question is one that arises under ERISA, but are enforceable
where the claim involves plan interpretation. The court held that ERISA does not forbid
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate questions of coverage under ERISA plans.
(2) The Sixth Circuit has consistently followed the futility
exception to the exhaustion requirement. See Fallick v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,
162 F.3d 410,22 EBC 2221 (6th Cir. 1998); Costantino v. TRW Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 17 EBC 1606
(6th Cir. 1994); see also Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 93 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 1996);
Diaz v. United Agr. Employee Welfare Benefit Plan, 50 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1995); Drinkwater
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1988); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559,
2 EBC 2536 (9th Cir. 1980); Dameron v. Sinai Hosp., 626 F. Supp. 1012,6 EBC 2742 (D. Md.
1986), af!'d in pertinent part, 815 F.2d 975, 9 EBC 1246 (4th Cir. 1987).
(b) Jurisdiction
(i) Except for (a)(l)(B) actions (actions by a participant or beneficiary
to recover benefits due under the terms of a plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan), the federal district courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions brought by participants, beneficiaries or plan fiduciaries.
(ii) The federal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with state courts
in actions brought by participants and beneficiaries to recover benefits, enforce rights or clarify
future rights. Such actions are subject to removal to federal court. Federal courts have exclusive
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jurisdiction for retaliation claims under ERISA §510. Smith, Hinchman & Gryllis·v. Tassic, 990
F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1993).
(iii) Interpretation of federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction is a federal
question to be decided by federal courts. Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 558 F.2d 680 (2nd
Cir. 1977). Whether the matter is subject to ERISA is, however, a matter properly decided by
a state tribunal. Weiner v. Blue Cross of Maryland, 925 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1991).
(iv) Federal courts have pendent jurisdiction over non-ERISA matters.
28 USC §1367(a).
(v) Venue for civil actions under ERISA is the place where the plan is
administered, where the breach that is the subject of the suit occurred, or where the defendant
resides or may be found.
(c) Venue and Nationwide Service of Process - ERISA §502(e)(2) provides
that:
[W]here an action under this subchapter is brought in a district court
of the United States, it may be brought in the district where the plan
is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant
resides or may be found, and process may be served in any other
district where a defendant resides or may be found.
(d) Removal to Federal Court - Most state court filings can be removed to
federal court because ERISA creates an independent basis for the removal (either on the basis of
exclusive jurisdiction or on the basis of federal question (28 USC §1331».
(e) Availability of Jury Trial
(i) ERJSA does not expressly provide for the right to a jury trial in any
of the causes of action enumerated under ERISA §502. The overwhelming weight of authority
is that there is no right to a jury trial in ERISA cases. Faced with Congress' silence on the jury
right issue, courts have made the determination that there is no right to a jury trial in ERISA cases
because such cases are equitable in nature, since they were formerly brought under the law of
trusts.
(ii) ERISA has generally been regarded as an equitable statute, and since
it does not expressly provide for jury trials, the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial has
generally been held not to apply to ERISA actions. However, two U.S. Supreme Court cases had
indicated that remedies other than equitable ones may be available under ERISA. In Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S.Ct. 948 (1989), the Court compared benefit claims to breach
of contract actions which are legal in nature, and in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct.
478 (1990), the Court indicated that compensatory damages, a legal remedy, are within the scope
of ERISA. In light of these developments, courts need to re-examine the issue of the right to a
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jury trial under ERISA. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 16 EBC 2169 (1993), it appears that jury trials are not authorized.
(iii) In Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Pils Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court held that the right to a jury trial guaranteed under the Seventh
Amendment applies to actions under §510 ofERISA, which prohibits discrimination against a plan
participant or beneficiary for the exercise of rights under ERISA.
(iv) In McDonald v. Artcraft Electric Supply Company, 774 F. Supp.
29 (D.D.C. 1991), the court held that plaintiffs seeking damages under ERISA have a right to a
jury trial both under ERISA and the Seventh Amendment. The court held that the Seventh
Amendment applies when a statutory right is based on a legal cause of action and traditional legal
relief is available under the statute. Therefore, the Seventh Amendment gives parties the right to
a jury trial when they bring claims under ERISA that would have entitled them to a jury trial had
they been brought under state law prior to ERISA.
4. ERISA Preemption
4.1 Statutory Framework
(a) Preemption clause - ERISA §514(a) provides that ERISA supersedes state
laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.... " The
Supreme Court has held that the phrase "relate to" should be given a broad common-sense
meaning, "such that a state law trelate[s] to' a benefit plan tin the normal sense of the phrase, if
it has a connection with or reference to such a plan'." See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389 (1985) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983». In fact, the Court has stated that the preemption clause was
designed to displace all state laws falling within its scope, even laws that mirror ERISA's
substantive provisions. Id., 105 S. Ct. at 2389 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99). The Court has
emphasized, however, "that the pre-emption clause is not limited, to tstate laws specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans. '" See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,47-
48, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (1987) (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98). This broad interpretation of
the preemption clause is consistent with the legislative history of the statute, and the Supreme
Court has noted that congressional purpose is the "ultimate touchstone" in determining whether
a state law is preempted by federal law. Id. at 45, 107 S. Ct. at 1552.
(b) Savings clause - ERISA §514(b) permits states to regulate insurance,
banking and securities. The preemption clause is qualified by §514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA.' That
section, known as the "saving clause, "provides, "Except as providedin subparagraph (B), nothing
in this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any state which
regulates insurance .... " 29 USC §1144(b)(2)(A). For a state law to be "saved" from the
application of the preemption clause, it must, according to the Supreme Court, pass a test which
may, depending on the facts of the case, have two parts. The first prong of the test, which is
present in every case, is whether a law "regulates insurance." To determine whether a law
regulates insurance, the Supreme Court has devised a two-step test. First, it asks whether the
statute in question regulates insurance from a "common-sense view." See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
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Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 1553 (1987). To pass this test, "a law must not just
have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry. "
See id. at 50, 107 S. Ct. at 1554. The second part of the "regulates insurance" test asks whether
the law at issue meets certain criteria used to determine whether a particular practice falls within
the McCarran-Ferguson Act's reference to the "business of insurance." Those criteria are:
"'[Flirst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and
the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. '"
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2391
(1985) (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129, 102 S. Ct. 3002,3008
(1982)) (emphasis in original). If a state law passes both the "common-sense" and the McCarran-
Ferguson tests, it will fall under the "regulates insurance" language of the saving clause.
Even if the state law passes the "regulat[ing] insurance" hurdle, it still might not be held
to be saved from preemption. In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52, 107 S. Ct.
1549, 1555 (1987), the Court found that because "the state cause of action seeks remedies for the
improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan, our understanding of
the saving clause must be informed by the legislative intent concerning the civil enforcement
provisions provided by ERISA §502(a), 29 USC §1132(a)." In other words, where the state law
at issue is remedial in nature, the Court found that it had to consider not only the tests for meeting
the "regulates insurance" language of the saving clause, "but also the role of the saving clause in
ERISA as a whole." See id. at 51, 107 S. Ct. at 1555. The Court in Pilot found that the civil
enforcement scheme set forth in §502(a) was intended to be the exclusive remedy for asserting
improper processing of claims, and that this exclusivity would be undermined if ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries could obtain relief under varying state law remedies that were
rejected by Congress when it crafted ERISA. In holding that the state law cause of action for
improper processing of an insurance claim was not saved by the saving clause, and was therefore
preempted by the preemption clause, the Court noted that the most important factor in its decision
was Congress' intent that ERISA's civil enforcement provision be exclusive. See id. at 52,54,
57, 107 S. Ct. at 1555-56, 1558. Consequently, in cases where the state law in question might
affect the remedies section of ERISA, it is not enough that the state law meets the "regulating
insurance" test; it must also pass the "role-of-the-saving-clause-in-ERISA-as-a-whole" test.
In UNUM v. Ward, 526 US 358, 22 EBC 2745(1999), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
9th Circuit holding that California's "notice-prejudice" rule regulated insurance and was thus
"saved" from preemption by ERISA. Here, the state law required that "[A] defense based on an
insured's failure to give timely notice [of a claim] requires the insurer to prove that it suffered
actual prejudice. Prejudice is not presumed from delayed notice alone. The insurer must show
actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice." ERISA did, however, preempt the
California rule that the employer is the agent of the insurer.
(c) Deemer clause - ERISA §514(b)(2)(B) precludes a state from "deeming" a
plan to be an insurance company, bank, etc. for purposes of bringing it under state regulation.
Even if a state law meets all the applicable requirements of the saving clause test, it still may be
preempted by virtue of §514(b)(2)(B) of ERISA, known as the deemer clause. That clause
provides:
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Neither an employee benefit plan described in §4(a) [29 USC §1003(a)], which is not
exempt under §4(b) [29 USCS §1003(b)] (other than a plan established primarily for the
purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business
of insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance
companies . . . [or] insurance contracts . . .. 29 USC §1144(b)(2)(B).
The Supreme Court has interpreted the effect of the deemer clause: "If a plan is insured,
a State may regulate it indirectly through regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance
contracts; if the plan is uninsured, the State may not regulate it." SeeF.C. Corp. v. Holliday, 111
S. Ct. 403,411 (1990). An uninsured or self-insured plan is one which "set[s] aside a fund to
meet losses instead of insuring against such through insurance." Black's Law Dictionary 1360
(6th ed. 1990). As a result of the Court's holding in F.C., employers attempting to implement
self-insured plans affecting employees in different states should not have to confront "conflicting
or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans." F.C. Corp., 111 S. Ct. at
411 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2901 (1983)
(quoting remarks of Sen. Williams».
4.2 Application to Health Insurance Arrangements
One of the landmark cases that dealt directly with health insurance arrangements was
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985). In that case,
the Court considered whether a Massachusetts statute, which required minimum mental health
benefits be provided to Massachusetts residents who were insured under a general insurance
policy, an accident or sickness policy, or an employee health-care plan covering hospital and
surgical expenses, was preempted by ERISA. Because the Attorney General of Massachusetts
found that appellant insurers Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and Travelers Insurance
Company were issuing policies outside of Massachusetts which failed to provide the requisite
mental health coverage mandated by the statute, and because the insurance companies reserved the
right to challenge the applicability of the statute to any policy they issued to an ERISA plan within
Massachusetts, he brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce the statute. The
insurers asserted, inter alia, that the mandated- benefits statute was preempted by ERISA, while
Massachusetts argued that the statute, as applied to insurance companies that sell insurance to
ERISA plans, was a law regulating insurance and was thereby saved by virtue of the saving clause
from the operation of the preemption clause. See id. at 733-34, 105 S. Ct. at 2385-86. The Court
noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had found that the statute related to a
benefit plan and thus would be preempted by ERISA unless it fell under one of the exceptions to
the preemption clause. The lower court found that the statute was a law which regulated insurance
and therefore was not preempted by ERISA. It rejected the insurers' claim that the saving clause
was intended only to save "traditional" insurance laws (such as laws directly regulating insurers
and laws regulating such matters as the way insurance may be sold), finding no such limitation in
ERISA's language. In so finding, however, the lower court understood the saving clause to apply
only to state laws that were unrelated to ERISA's substantive provisions. Because ERISA did not
regulate the content of welfare plans, the court declared that state regulation of insurance that
indirectly affected the content of the plans themselves was not preempted by ERISA. Further, the
lower court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act embodied Congress' intent that federal laws
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should not be found to supersede state laws regulating the business of insurance. Because the
statute in question affected insurance and insurance policies, the court found that it was protected
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and that therefore it was not preempted by ERISA. See ide at 735-
37,741, 105 S. Ct. at 2387,2390.
The Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, although it employed a broader reading of the
saving clause. See ide at 758, 105 S. Ct. at 2399. In arriving at its ultimate holding that the statute
was not preempted by ERISA, the Court first examined whether the statute was related to ERISA
within the meaning of the preemption clause. Noting that the phrase "relate to" was to be given
a broad reading, the Court found that although the statute was not designated as a benefit plan law,
it bore indirectly on but significantly affected all insured ERISA plans, because it required them
to purchase the mandated benefits specified in the statute when they purchased certain kinds of
insurance policies. Thus, the Court agreed with the lower court that the statute related to ERISA
plans and thus fell within the preemption clause. See id.. at 739, 105 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
The Court found that the saving clause saved the statute from preemption. See ide at 744,
105 S.Ct. at 2391. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court first examined the statute from a
common-sense point of view. It noted that because on its face the statute regulated the terms of
certain insurance contracts, it seemed to be saved from preemption by operation of the saving
clause as a law which regulated insurance. See ide at 740, 105S.Ct. at 2389. The Court stated
that its interpretation was reinforced by the deemer clause, which provides that a plan "shall not
be deemed to be an insurance company 'for purposes of any law ofany State purporting to regulate
insurance companies ... [or] insurance contracts . ... '" Id. at 740-41, 105 S. Ct. at 2389
(quoting 29 USC §1144(b)(2)(B» (emphasis in original).
The Court then turned to the question of whether the statute met the criteria for defining
the business of insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. As to the first factor, the Court
found that the statute effected the spreading of risk, as it was enacted to spread the risk of mental
health patients through more risk pools. Second, the Court found that the statute regulated an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured by defining the type of
insurance that an insurer could sell. Finally, the Court found that the practice was limited to
entities within the insurance industry, as the mandated-benefit law imposed its requirements only
on insurers. In light of the fact that the statute met the common-sense definition of regulating
insurance and all three McCarran-Ferguson factors, the Court held that mandated-benefit statutes
such as the one in question were saved from the preemption clause by virtue of the saving clause.
See ide at 743-44, 105 S. Ct. at 2391.
The Court expanded on its analysis of the saving clause in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987). In Pilot, Dedeaux, an employee of Entex, Inc. ("Entex"),
injured his back in an employment related accident. Entex had in place a disability benefit plan
which it established by purchasing a group insurance policy from Pilot Life Insurance Co. ("Pilot
Life"). Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following his accident, but Pilot Life
terminated his benefits two years after the accident. Subsequently, Pilot Life reinstated and
terminated Dedeaux's benefits several times. Five years after the accident, Dedeaux sued Pilot
Life for tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud in the inducement. Pilot
Life argued that Dedeaux's claims were preempted under ERISA, and the district court agreed,
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granting Pilot Life's motion for summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Id. at 43-44, 107
S. Ct. at 1551. The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Fifth Circuit. Id., 107 S. Ct. at
1551. The Court quickly dispatched of the question of whether the common law causes of action
related to an employee benefit plan; it held that they did. See ide at 47-48, 107 S. Ct. at 1553.
The Court next turned to the question of whether the saving clause saved Dedeaux's cause of
action for tortious breach of contract/bad faith. The Court found that the cause of action for bad
faith did not meet the common-sense prong of the regulating insurance test. See ide at 48, 107 S.
Ct. at 1553. The Court stated that in order for a law to regulate insurance, it "must not just have
an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry." Id.
at 50, 107 S. Ct. at 1554. Noting that the Mississippi Supreme Court had identified the law ofbad
faith with the insurance industry, the Court nevertheless held that the foundation of the law could
be found in general principles of tort and contract law. Further, the Court found that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act factors did not support Dedeaux's claim that the bad faith law regulated
insurance. The Mississippi common law of bad faith could not be said to effect a spreading of
policyholder risk, the Court noted, nor could it be said under the third factor that the law was
specifically directed towards entities within the insurance industry, as the law of bad faith had
derived from general principles of tort and contract law. Although the Court acknowledged that
the common law of bad faith could be construed to concern the policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured, it found that the relationship was tenuous. See ide at 50-51, 107 S. Ct. at
1554-55.
The Court went on to state that it had to be guided not only by the factors it considered in
Metropolitan Life, but also by "the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole." Id., 107 S.
Ct. at 1555. The Court noted that in this case, unlike Metropolitan Life, the plaintiff was seeking
remedies for improper processing of a benefits claim, and therefore the court had to consider the
civil enforcement provisions of ERISA. The Court found that the civil enforcement provisions
of ERISA were intended to be the exclusive means by which ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits could recover, based on the
language and structure of the statute and the legislative history of the statute. See ide at 51-52, 107
S. Ct. at 1555. Thus, the Court held that based on the common-sense and the McCarran-Ferguson
prongs of the regulating insurance test and the congressional intent that ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions be exclusive, the common law cause of action for bad faith was preempted by ERISA.
See ide at 57, 107 S. Ct. at 1558.
After the Court's decision in Pilot Life, a question that many of the lower courts addressed
was whether a statutory claim for improper handling of claims/unfair settlement practices would
survive the preemption analysis laid down in Pilot Life. For example, one court addressed the
issue of whether a statutory cause of action under the California insurance code for failure to pay
claims promptly was preempted by ERISA. See Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867
F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1988), eert. denied, 492 U.S. 906 (1989). The Kannes sought reimbursement
for airline fare to transport their son for surgery, as well as compensation for emotional distress
caused by the delay in payments for the airline, doctor, and hospital bills. The lower court had
awarded the Kannes over $750,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 491. The court
noted that California Insurance Code §790.03(h) prohibited unfair insurance practices with respect
to the processing of claims. Among the unfair practices listed in the statute was an insurer's
failure "to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims
H(a) · 14
arising under insurance policies." Id. at 493 (quoting Cal. Ins. Code §790.03(h)(2». The Kannes
argued that the statute was not preempted by ERISA because it was saved as a law regulating
insurance. The court granted them the assumption that the statute was a law regulating insurance
within the meaning of the saving clause. Nevertheless, the court decided that the private right of
action for violation of the statute was preempted by ERISA. Id.
In deciding that the California statute was preempted, the court noted that the Supreme
Court "made [it] abundantly clear that its preemption holding [in Pilot Life] was equally based [on
the regulation of insurance test and] on its acceptance of the Solicitor General's view that
'Congress had clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA §502(a)
be the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting
improper processing of a claim for benefits.'" Id. at 494 (quoting Pilot Life, 107 S. Ct. at 1555).
In interpreting the Supreme Court's language, the court held that it could not allow a state statute
like the one in question to supplement the ERISA civil enforcement provisions. As a result, the
court found that the Kannes' statutory cause of action for failure to pay claims promptly was
preempted.
Further, the decision of the Court in Pilot Life has been extended to preempt a state
common law holding that an insurer of a group employment health plan was required to notify
plan participants of the cancellation or modification of the insurance policy caused by failure of
the employer to pay the insurance premiums. See Presley v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama,
744 F. Supp. 1051 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
4.3 Application to Professional Negligence Claims
(a) As a general rule, courts will not find that ERISA preempts state law claims
based upon negligence or malpractice. This appears to hold true for claims against physicians
(DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. Super. 1988) (malpractice claim for personal
injuries "only remotely related to ERISA" and therefore not preempted», accountants and
actuaries (Framingham Union Hosp., Inc. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1478, 1490
(D. Mass. 1989) (malpractice claim against accountant not preempted»; and legal counsel (Custer
v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156,20 EBC 1569 (4th Cir. 1996».
(b) In addressing the application of the preemption doctrine to medical
malpractice cases, the courts continue to be confronted and struggle with the notion of the
relationship of the law at issue and the benefit plan. Some courts have decided that medical
malpractice claims are preempted. For example, the Eighth Circuit in Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d
939, 23 EBC 2062 (8th Cir. 1999), eert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1242, 23 EBC 3016 (2000), held
preempted claims against a plan's administrator for medical malpractice arising from the
administrator's alleged failure to exercise a sufficient degree of care in diagnosing and treating a
participant and for vicarious liability of the plan. The primary care physician of the participant
twice requested authorization for a particular test. The physician's requests were denied by the
plan's administrator. Instead the administrator, a physician, authorized a different test. The
participant claimed that as a result of the plan administrator's action, he suffered additional heart
disease. He claimed a doctor-patient relationship between himself and the plan administrator. The
court determined that the participant's claims were based on a denial of benefits. Because the
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claims related to the administration of benefits, the court concluded, they were preempted. See
also Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482,20 EBC 1580 (7th Cir. 1996), and
Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 16 EBC 2745 (8th Cir.
1993).
Recent cases holding that ERISA preempts medical malpractice claims include:
(i) Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan, 992 F.2d 298, 16 EBC 2745
(8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994), involving a claim against an HMO for
denying surgical precertification preempted by ERISA;
(ii) Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 15 EBC 1793
(1993), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 812 (1992), involving the preemption of a claim against an HMO
for failure to provide hospitalization to expectant mother resulting in death of unborn child; and
(iii) Papas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711,20 EBC 1106 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1996),
refusing to apply preemption in a case where a medical facility failed to timely transfer a patient.
Here the court looked at the economic interest of the entity.
5. Fiduciary Liability
5.1 Under ERISA a plan fiduciary is liable for breaches of fiduciary duty. ERISA
§§409 and 502(a)(2). Liability does not exist, however, for "settlor functions."
5.2 A person is a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan to the extent that the person:
(1) exercises discretionary authority or control respecting management of such plan or
management or disposition of its assets; (2) renders or has authority or responsibility to render
investment advice for a fee; or (3) has discretionary authority or responsibility in the
administration of such plan. ERISA §3(21)(A).
5.3 Settlor Functions
(a) A plan sponsor may amend the terms of a plan to provide encouragement
for early retirement, and in so doing is acting in a settlor function. Lockheed Corporation v.
Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1996).
(b) Spink was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Hughes Aircraft v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999), where the amendment of a plan was intended to convert the
benefit structure of a defined benefit plan and to add a contributory component.
(c) In certain cases, HMO eligibility decisions have been held to be non-
fiduciary in nature. Pegram v. Hendrick, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 24 EBC 1641 (2000).
(d) The Third Circuit held that the imposition of a penalty on a plan participant
who failed to obtain precertification approval as required by the plan prior to his hospitalization
was not an action subject to ERISA's fiduciary responsibility rules as an employer has no fiduciary
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liability for design decisions that it makes with respect to its employee benefit plans. Nazay v.
Miller, 949 F.2d 1323 (3rd Cir. 1991)
(e) In Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991), the
District Court held that an employer serving as the plan administrator of its self-insured medical
plan did not breach ERISA's fiduciary responsibility rules by unilaterally reducing the lifetime
coverage limit from $1 million to $25,000. A plan participant with AIDS challenged the
reduction, but the Court held that the employer was not prohibited from "acting in accordance with
its interests as an employer when not administering the plan or investing its assets." The court
further held that the reduction was permissible as ERISA's fiduciary responsibility rules do not
apply to the elimination of non-vested benefits.
(f) The court in Bryant v. Food Lion Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1484 (D.S.C. 1991),
held that corporate officers do not breach their fiduciary duty by utilizing a permissible graded
vesting schedule which results in only a small fraction of employees becoming vested in their
accrued benefits due to high employee turnover. The court held that the selection of a permissible
vesting schedule was a design decision made by the employer and was not subject to ERISA's
fiduciary responsibility rules.
(g) In Carich v. James River Corp., 958 F2d. 861 (9th Cir. 1992), a plan
administrator and fiduciary was held to have breached its fiduciary obligations under ERISA due
to the employer's unreasonable delay in transferring a plan participant's plan assets from one
investment fund to another. The court held that authorization in the plan to value stock as of the
date of sale, regardless of any delay resulting from improper handling, gave the plan and its
administrator unlimited discretion in the handling of fund transfers which was contrary to the
principles underlying ERISA. The court held that in the absence of notice to the participant
concerning the likelihood of delay, the participant was entitled to have the transfer made as of the
date requested, or at least within a reasonable time following such request. The employer's failure
to act with due diligence was held to be arbitrary and capricious and in violation of its contractual
obligations to the participant. The court held that any risk of unreasonable delay due to the
administration of the plan was a risk to be borne by the employer, and not by the plan participants.
(h) Insurers as Fiduciaries
(i) In Mack Boring & Parts v. Meeker Sharkey Moffitt, Actuarial
Consultants of New Jersey, 930 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third Circuit held that an insurance
company was not a plan fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA where the insurer entered into a
deposit authorization contract with an employer to fund the employer's defined benefit plan. The
contract provided for the employer to make annual contributions to the insurer in the form of
premiums which were credited to a "guaranteed fund account." This fund was a bookkeeping
device in which interest was credited at a guaranteed minimum rate with the possibility of higher
returns at the discretion of the insurer. The premium payments were held as part of the insurer's
general assets and when a plan participant retired, the insurer issued a guaranteed annuity pursuant
to the terms of the plan. The cost of the annuity was then deducted from the guaranteed fund
account. The court concluded that the deposit authorization contract was a guaranteed benefit
policy because the contract provided benefits to participants, the amount ofwhich were guaranteed
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by the insurer in the form of an annuity. Since §401(b)(2) of ERISA (29 USC §1101) states that
amounts paid by a plan to an insurer under a guaranteed benefit policy are not considered plan
assets, the court held that the insurer was not a plan fiduciary as it did not have discretionary
authority or control over plan assets.
In reaching this conclusion the Third Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's analysis in
Peoria Union Stock Yard Co. Retirement Planv. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320 (7th
Cir. 1983), in which the Seventh Circuit held that a similar contract was comprised of two phases:
an accumulation phase, during which premium payments were held by the insurer in its general
account for investment purposes; and a payment phase, during which the insurer made payments
to plan participants in the form of annuities upon retirement. The Seventh Circuit concluded that
the contract was not a guaranteed benefit policy since the premiums paid to the insurance company
during the accumulation phase were not used to provide "benefits, the amount of which is
guaranteed by the insurer," as required by the §401(b)(2) (29 USC §1101) exception.
The Third Circuit concluded that such contracts do not fail to satisfy the guaranteed benefit
policy exception merely because the benefits provided under the contract are not delivered
immediately. The court stated that the variable interest credited to the guaranteed fund does not
vary benefits payable to participants, but merely shifts a portion of the investment risk from the
insurer to the employer. The Third Circuit's holding suggests that the investment component of
such contracts are irrelevant if the insurer guarantees the participants' benefits, regardless of the
amount of control the insurer exercises over the amounts available to pay such benefits.
5.4 In Varity Corporation v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), the Supreme Court held that
representations of financial condition of a plan were administrative in nature, and the employer
was acting in a fiduciary capacity rather than a settlor.
5.5 Liability of Non-Fiduciary - Mertens
In a decision that has profound implications impacting liability for ERISA non-fiduciary
service providers, the Supreme Court held in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S.Ct 2063, 16
EBC 2169 (1993) that "appropriate equitable relief" within the meaning of §502(a)(3) of ERISA
does not include a claim for money damages against a non-fiduciary. It is also implied in the
decision that there is no cause of action against a non-fiduciary under ERISA §502(a)(3), or by
analogy under §502(a)(5), for a claim of knowing participation in a fiduciary breach.
In Mertens the plaintiff, a plan beneficiary, alleged that the plan's actuarial consultant
(Hewitt), had knowingly participated in the plan sponsor's fiduciary breach of deliberately failing
to adequately fund the plan. The primary breach resulted from the use of actuarial assumptions
that ultimately resulted in under-funding as well as a failure to disclose the under-funding. At the
time of suit, the plan had been terminated and taken over by the PBGC. Because of PBGC
limitation on insured benefits, the plan payments were less than pre-termination payments or
payment promises. Despite styling the damages as restitution, the plaintiff sought monetary
damages sufficient to restore the plan's funded status to what it would have been absent the breach.
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Framed in simple terms, the plaintiff was seeking to impose monetary liability against a
non-fiduciary for knowingly participating in a fiduciary breach. The case was initially dismissed
by the Northern California federal district court, and the dismissal was upheld by the Ninth
Circuit.
In the Supreme Court the plaintiff sought to argue that the damages were, in effect
"appropriate equitable relief" under ERISA §502(a)(3). Noting that monetary damages represent
the "classic form of legal relief," the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit.
In the wake of Mertens a number of lawsuits for money damages against non-fiduciaries
were dismissed. At the same time, suits brought against non-fiduciaries seeking equitable relief
(e.g., restitution to the plan) have been able to survive dismissal, because Mertens did not rule
out such relief. In Reich v. Compton, 834 F. Supp. 743, 17 EBC 1321 (E.D. Pa.), a suit for
damages brought by the DOL against a non-fiduciary engaged in transactions with ERISA plans
was dismissed in light of Mertens.
In Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d 25, 17 EBC 2521 (1st Cir. 1994), the First Circuit contrasted
actions against non-fiduciaries alleging participation in a fiduciary's breach with actions against
non-fiduciary parties in interest alleging participation in prohibited transactions. According to the
court, transactions prohibited under ERISA §406 constitute acts or practices for which ERISA
§502(a)(5) provides a remedy.
In Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 120 S. Ct. 2180, 24 EBC
1654 (2000), the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, adopted the position that ERISA
§502(a)(3), and the similarly worded ERISA §502(a)(5), authorizes a civil action against a
non-fiduciary who participates in a transaction prohibited by ERISA.
6. Standard of Review
6.1 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the proper standard of review which
should be applied with respect to the denial of benefit claims in Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101
(1989). The Court held that a denial of benefits which is challenged under §502(a)(I)(B) of
ERISA (29 USC §1132(a)(I)(B» should be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the plan
gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or
to construe the terms of the plan. However, the Court held that if the administrator or fiduciary
is operating under a conflict of interest, the conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining
whether an abuse of discretion has occurred.
(a) The courts in applying and interpreting Firestone have generally been
unable to agree on the degree of specificity necessary in the plan language to confer sufficient
discretion to insure review under an arbitrary and capricious standard. In many cases, language
conferring discretion on plan administrators and trustees to "construe and interpret" the plan has
been deemed sufficient. See Fuller v. CBT Corp., 905 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1990); DeWitt v. State
Farm Ins. Co. Ret. Plan, 905 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1990). , Other courts have required an
unambiguous authorization of discretion with respect to the specific issue before the court. See
e.g., Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989). In Baxter the plan stated that the trustees had
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"final authority" to determine all matters of eligibility for the payment of claims. The Eighth
Circuit held that such language did not grant the discretionary authority necessary within the
meaning of Firestone to interpret ambiguous plan terms, and therefore a de novo standard of
review should be applied.
(b) The court in Firestone did not clearly define the meaning of de novo review
or the extent to which evidence not presented to plan administrators must be considered.
(i) In Perry v. Simplicity Eng' g, 900 F.2d 963 -(6th Cir. 1990) the court
interpreted Firestone narrowly and limited de novo review to the evidence before the plan
administrator. The Sixth Circuit stated that a primary goal of ERISA was to provide for the
inexpensive and expeditious resolution ofdisputes concerning benefits, and that permitting courts
to hear evidence not presented to plan administrators will result in employees and their
beneficiaries receiving less protection than Congress intended.
(ii) However, in Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86
(11th Cir. 1989), the Eleventh Circuit held that Firestone permits a court conducting a de novo
review to consider facts not available to the plan administrator at the time the final determination
was made. According to the court, restricting the facts on review to only those which were
available to the plan administrator would afford less protection to employees and their
beneficiaries than existed before the enactment of ERISA.
(c) There is a split among the Circuits as to whether a plan administrator's
factual, as well as interpretive, determinations are subject to de novo review.
(i) The Third Circuit in Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, and
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991), held that the de novo standard of review
should be applied to a plan administrator's fact-based determinations where the plan does not
confer authority on the plan administrator to decide disputes between beneficiary claimants or
require deference to the plan administrator's factual determinations. The court stated that the
factual determinations of a plan administrator should not be given deference due to the fact that
plan administrators are often lay persons who lack training, experience, or an understanding of
ERISA, the rules of evidence, or the legal procedures necessary to assist them in fact finding.
(ii) In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Pierte v. Connecticut General Life
Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir. 1991), held that the de novo standard of review applies only to
instances ofplan interpretation in which the facts are not in dispute, and that a plan administrator's
factual determinations in such a situation should be entitled to deference. According to the court,
the discretion to make factual determinations is inherent in the nature of the plan administrator's
job and, unlike the Third Circuit, the court believed that plan administrators are qualified to make
such factual determinations.
(iii) The Second Circuit has held that even where it is undisputed that a
plan confers discretionary authority to determine eligibility. and to interpret the plan, if an
eligibility determination turns on a question of law, the reviewing court must apply a de novo
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standard of review. Weil v. Retirement Plan Administrative Committee of the Terson Co., 913
F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated in part on rehearing, 933 F.2d 106 (2nd Cir. 1991).
(d) Under Firestone, ifa plan provides the plan administrator with discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe the terms of the plan, decisions of
the plan administrator will be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard rather than the
de novo standard.
(i) Some courts have interpreted the arbitrary and capricious standard
to requir~ an evaluation of the reasonableness of a fiduciary's determination. In Lister v. Stark,
942 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit held that a fiduciary's interpretation ofthe plan
should be given deference unless it is unreasonable. The court stated that a plan administrator's
decision will be considered unreasonable where the fiduciary fails to consider important aspects
of the issues involved, offers an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence, or
where the decision is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of the fiduciary's expertise.
(ii) Other courts have rejected the arbitrary and capricious standard in
favor of an abuse of discretion standard. While most courts use the terms "arbitrary and
capricious" and "abuse of discretion" interchangeably, the court in Nunez v. Louisiana Benefit
Committee, 757 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. La. 1991), rejected the arbitrary and capricious standard in
favor of an abuse of discretion standard stating that the court in Firestone explicitly rejected the
arbitrary and capricious standard which would require the affirmation of a plan administrator's
decision if any evidence existed to support it.
(iii) In Yusufv. Yusov, 920 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit
held that under the arbitrary and capricious standard a court may reverse a denial of benefits only
where a decision is made in bad faith, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is erroneous on
a question of law.
(e) According to Firestone, the existence of a conflict of interest on the part of
a plan fiduciary is relevant to the determination of whether the fiduciary's decisions will be
entitled to deference.
(i) In Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 898 F.2d
1556 (11th Cir. 1990), eert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 712 (1991), the Eleventh Circuit held that "when
a plan beneficiary demonstrates a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary
responsible for benefit determinations, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove that its
interpretation of plan provisions was not tainted by self-interest." Id. at 1566. Brown involved
an insured group health plan which was administered by the insurer providing coverage. The
court held that an inherent conflict of interest existed between the roles assumed by the insurance
company, since an insurance company pays claims out of its own assets rather than out of a trust,
which places the insurance company's fiduciary role in conflict with its profit making role as a .
business. In such a situation, the court held that the fiduciary's determination will be arbitrary and
capricious if it advances the fiduciary's self-interest at the expense of the beneficiary, unless the
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fiduciary can justify its interpretation on the basis of the benefit provided to the entire class ofplan
participants.
(ii) In Callahan v. Rouge Steel Co., 941 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1991), in
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to a denial of severance benefits, the Sixth Circuit
found that the fact that the employer was also the plan administrator created a conflict of interest
and declined to hold as a matter of law that the employer/plan administrator did not act arbitrarily
and capriciously in denying the benefits.
Note: Cases involving conflicts of interest on the part of plan administrators, although
normally reviewable under an arbitrary and capricious standard, generally must survive a de novo
standard of review in which the burden of proof will most likely be on the plan fiduciaries to
justify their decision.
7. Other Issues
7.1 Employer Contributions
(a) Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 951 F.2d 76, 14
E.B.C. 2284 (5th Cir. 1992), held that an employer's contributions of unencumbered property to
satisfy its pension plan funding obligations were not prohibited transactions subject to excise taxes
under the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"). The employer contributed five truck terminals
and real property to the trust to satisfy its minimum funding obligations. The terminals and
property were not subject to mortgages and were not covered by employer lease-back agreements.
The employer claimed deductions for the property's fair market value and reported the difference
between its cost and fair market value at the time of the transfer as capital gains. The court held
that §4974(f)(3) of the Code, which prohibits self-dealing transactions between an employer and
a plan, states that a transfer of property encumbered by a mortgage or lien which a plan assumes
shall be treated as a sale or exchange. The court concluded that this implies that the transfer of
unencumbered property is not to be treated as a prohibited sale or exchange. The court further
noted that §4971 of the Code, which imposes taxes on any funding deficiencies resulting from the
contribution of overvalued assets, provides protection for potential abuse involving transfers of
overvalued assets. The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Fifth Circuit, ruling that
because Congress intended §4975(f)(3) to expand, not limit, the scope ofthe prohibited-transaction
provision to include contributions of encumbered property that do not satisfy funding obligations.
(b) Conversely, Wood v. Commissioner, 955 F.2d 908, 14 E.B.C. 2401 (4th
Cir. 1992), held that an employer's transfer ofpromissory notes to satisfy his pension plan funding
obligation was a prohibited transaction subject to excise tax under §4975(c) of the Code. The
employer contributed three non-recourse promissory notes to the plan to meet its funding
requirement. The notes were later paid in full and the employer claimed a deduction for the
contribution in excess of the fair market value of the notes at the time they were transferred. The
court held that §4975 of the Code involved a blanket prohibition on transactions between a plan
and a disqualified person because of the inherent potential for abuse. The court stated that the
purpose of the prohibition was to avoid contributions of overvalued property to the detriment of
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the plan. The court noted that the DOL has interpreted a parallel provision in ERISA to bar the
transfer of non-cash property to satisfy a plan sponsor's funding obligation.
7.2 §502(c)(I) Litigation
ERISA requires plan administrators to provide each participant with a summary plan
description (ERISA §102; 29 USC §1022), a summary annual report (ERISA §104(b)(3); 29 USC
§1024(b)(3», and upon written request, a statement indicating the participant's total accrued
benefits and his or her nonforfeitable interest (ERISA §105(a); 29 USC §1025(a». §502(c)(I) of
ERISA (29 USC §1132(c)(I» requires plan administrators to comply with requests for information
within 30 days.
(a) The courts are generally reluctant to impose liability under §502(c)(I) of
ERISA for failure to comply with the reporting and disclosure requirements, holding that a
participant will not be entitled to recover under §502(c)(I) unless the participant files a written
request for information with the plan administrator. In Williams v. Caterpillar Inc., 944 F.2d 658
(9th Cir. 1991), the court held that a mere allegation that a plan administrator failed to provide a
requested summary plan description ("SPD") will not establish a claim under §502(c)(1) ofERISA
where the participant fails to offer proof that the SPD was ever requested from the plan
administrator.
(b) Additionally, courts typically will deny recovery under §502(c)(1) ofERISA
unless the participant can demonstrate that they have been prejudiced or harmed by the plan
administrator's delay in providing the requested information, or that the plan administrator has
acted in bad faith or intentionally failed to provide the information requested. In United
Paperworkers International Union, Local 14 v. International Paper Co., 777 F. Supp. 1010 (D.
Me. 1991), the court held that a participant did not have standing to complain of a plan
administrator's violation of the reporting and disclosure requirements of ERISA absent a showing
of some significant reliance on, or possible prejudice flowing from, the reporting and disclosure
violations.
(c) In Starr v. JCI Data Processing, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1991), the
court imposed liability on an employer under §502(c)(I) of ERISA for failure to comply with the
funding, participation, and vesting requirements of ERISA as well and the requirement that a plan
be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument. The employer acknowledged that
the participant had requested general as well as specific information concerning the plan and his
benefits, but declined to respond to the request because the plan administrator believed the
participant knew he was not entitled to benefits under the plan, because the employer had no SPD,
and because the plan administrator did not believe that the plan was subject to ERISA. The court
did not require the participant to demonstrate specific harm resulting from the employer's failure
to respond to his request, holding that the employer exhibited a lack of good faith in ignoring the
participant's request.
(d) In Veilleux v. Atochen North America, Inc., 929 F.2d 74 (2nd Cir. 1991),
the Second Circuit stated that in situations where violations of the ERISA disclosure provisions
work a "substantive harm" on participants who are denied benefits, courts may find that the
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violations warrant a fmding that the denial of benefits was "arbitrary and capricious." In the
situation presented, the court rejected the participants' claims due to the fact that they were unable
to demonstrate any harm or prejudice resulting from the employer's failure to disclose the
requested information.
However, the issue addressed by the Second Circuit of whether violations of reporting and
disclosure requirements may give rise to liability for benefits under an ERISA plan is significant
in that, unlike the damages that may be imposed under §502(c)(I) of ERISA, a finding that the
denial of benefits under a plan is arbitrary and capricious directly impacts on the administration
of the plan.
(e) Lee v. Benefit Plans Administration of Armco, Inc., S.D. Tex., No. H-90-
3642 (4/30/92), found a pension plan administrator subject to ERISA's maximum $100.00 per day
penalty for failure to timely provide a participant with plan information. The court awarded the
participant a total of $7,800 in penalties against the administrator and $25,000 for attorney's fee
incurred at trial as well as $5,000 in attorney's fees for a successful appeal to the Court ofAppeals
and an additional $5,000 in attorney's fees for a successful appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,
should such appeals occur. The court held that the failure to provide timely information under
ERISA, whether negligent or intentional, renders an administrator liable unless the failure results
from a matter beyond the administrator's reasonable control. The court found that the
administrator acted with deliberate indifference to its ERISA duties by failing to train its staffhow
to process requests for information or to advise the staff of the requirement that information be
disclosed within 30 days.
7.3 Punitive Damages
It has generally been held that ERISA does not provide for the recovery of extra-
contractual damages. According to §409(a) ofERISA (29 USC §1109), which establishes liability
for breach of fiduciary duties, any fiduciary who is liable for a breach of fiduciary duty will be
required to make good to the plan losses resulting from the breach, to restore to the plan any
profits which the fiduciary received due to the improper use of plan assets and "shall be subject
to such other equitable or remedial relief a~ the court may deem appropriate, including removal
of such fiduciary." §502(a) of ERISA (29 USC §1132(a)), which provides for civil enforcement
procedures under ERISA, states that an action may be brought under §409 for breach of fiduciary
duty by the Secretary of Labor, a participant, beneficiary or plan fiduciary for appropriate relief
under §409 or for "other appropriate equitable relief." The courts have generally held that neither
§409(a) or 502(a) of ERISA permits the recovery of extra-contractual or punitive damages.
(a) The Supreme Court in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 105
S.Ct. 3085 (1985), held that §409(a) of ERISA does not provide a cause of action for extra-
contractual damages by a plan participant or beneficiary. The Court held that while §502(a)(2)
of ERISA authorizes participants or beneficiaries to bring actions against a fiduciary for violation
of §409 of ERISA, recovery for such violations inures to the benefit of the plan as a whole and
not to the individual participant or beneficiary. The Court stated that the legislative history of
ERISA indicated that the primary concerns in drafting §409 of ERISA were the possible misuse
ofplan assets and remedies that would protect the entire plan rather than the rights of an individual
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beneficiary. Additionally, the Court noted that the statutory provisions under §502(a) of ERISA
are silent as to the recovery of extra-contractual damages. The Court concluded that in enacting
a comprehensive legislative scheme such as ERISA, which includes an integrated system of
procedures for enforcement, Congress deliberately omitted any such remedy. The Court declined
to address the issue whether §409 of ERISA authorizes the recovery of extra-contractual
compensatory or punitive damages in an action by a plan against a fiduciary.
(b) In Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1988),
the First Circuit noted that while the Supreme Court's decision in Russell was limited to remedies
available under §502 for violations of §409 of ERISA, the Court expressly reserved the question
of whether extra-contractual damages might be a form of "other appropriate equitable relief"
available under §502. However, the First Circuit agreed with and followed the holdings of other
circuits that extra-contractual damages are unavailable under §502, and that the term "equitable"
is meant to intend injunctive or declaratory relief.
(c) Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), held that punitive damages could not be sought under §409 of ERISA. The court stated
that the §409(a) grant of authority permitting a court to award equitable relief does not encompass
extra-contractual or punitive damages. In reaching its decision the court looked to the analysis of
the circuits in determining whether §502(a) of ERISA encompasses extra-contractual or punitive
damages for fiduciary violations. The court concluded that Congress intended for ERISA to
incorporate the fiduciary principals of the law of trust, under which trustees are generally not
liable for punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Additionally, the court stated that
ERISA's legislative history with regard to remedies for breaches of fiduciary duty contemplates
traditional forms of equitable relief such as injunctions, constructive trusts, and the removal of
fiduciaries.
(d) Although the Seventh Circuit in a previous decision left open the possibility
of extra-contractual recovery under §502 of ERISA, the court held that such damages were not
available where the only extra-contractual damages sought by the plaintiff were punitive in nature
and the allegations in the complaint did not support a claim for such damages. The court, relying
on the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone, supra, that ERISA is to be construed consistently
with the common law oftrusts, denied punitive damages as such damages are generally unavailable
in the trust context. Petrilli v. Drechsel, 910 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1990).
(e) In Gaskell v. Harvard Cooperative Society, 762 F. Supp. 1539, 14 EBC
1290 (D. Mass. 1991), the plaintiff, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ingersoll- Rand
Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478 (1990), in which Justice O'Conner, in dicta, suggested that
compensatory and punitive damages were within the power of federal courts to provide, sought
such damages in relation to an ERISA violation by his employer. However, the court held that
if the Supreme Court had intended to expand the realm of potential relief available under ERISA
and to overrule its prior holdings, it would have done so explicitly and not in dicta. The court
refused to overrule the express holding of the First Circuit in Drinkwater, supra, without a clear
indication that the law will provide for extra-contractual damages under ERISA.
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(t) In Novak v. Anderson Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 15 EBC 1127 (8th Cir. 1992).
The court found that an ESOP participant was not entitled to monetary damages due to the
employer's failure to notify the participant that his plan distribution could be rolled over into a tax
deferred plan. The court held that the reference in §502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA to "other equitable
relief" does not include monetary damages. The court concluded that neither the statutory
language or the legislative history permits an expansion of the traditional equitable relief available
- injunctive and declaratory relief and the imposition of a constructive trust - to include monetary
damages.
7.4 SPD v. Plan Document
While many courts follow the language of the plan document rather than the terms of the
summary plan description ("SPD"), cou~s are increasing likely to hold employers to the terms of
the SPD where the terms of the SPD and the plan document are in conflict.
(a) In Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903 (2nd Cir. 1990), the court held that
where the terms of a plan and the SPD are in conflict the SPD will control. According to the
court, the SPD should govern because, unlike the plan, it must be filed with the Secretary ofLabor
and distributed to employees. The court concluded that ERISA contemplates that the SPD should
be the primary source of information upon which employees are entitled to rely and that to permit
the plan to contain different terms that supersede the terms of the SPD would defeat the purpose
of providing employees with such summaries.
(b) In Lasseter v. Administrative Committee of the Kieser Aluminum Salaried
Employees Retirement Plan, 1991 U.S App. LEXIS 6202 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit denied
participant benefits based on the language in the SPD. The SPD stated that an employee whose
age and years of service totaled 70 or more could retire early with full benefits under the early
retirement provisions upon the sale of the company. The plan was later amended to provide that
the early retirement benefit was not available to any participant offered a suitable position by a
purchaser of a division of the company. No new SPD was distributed to employees. However,
the court concluded that the SPD added caveats to the eligibility criteria for early retirement which
could not lead a reasonable person to believe that if his part of the company was sold, but
operations continued and his job continued, that he could nevertheless elect early retirement.
(c) In Spivey v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4439
(9th Cir. 1991), the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to additional insurance proceeds
upon the death of his participant spouse due to the fact that the deceased participant had never
spent an "active day at work" in the position to which she was promoted prior to her death. The
plaintiff husband alleged that the terms of the SPD were ambiguous and contradictory with regard
to the term "active day at work." The court noted that the SPD explicitly stated: "If you are not
actively at work on the date the amount of your insurance will otherwise be increased, such
increase is not effective until the next following day on which you are actually at work." The
court refused to require SPDs to contain specific information about all of the circumstances which
could result in a loss of benefits so long as the SPD contained sufficient information to appraise
participants that "danger lurked. "
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7.5 Plan Qualification and Disqualification
(a) In Lima Surgical Associates, Inc. VEBA v. U.S., 944 F.2d 885, 14 EBC
1346 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the court held that a purported VEBA did not qualify as a tax exempt
VEBA because it provided benefits similar to pension or retirement benefits. The plan had filed
an application for recognition of tax exempt status as a VEBA under §501(c)(9) of the Code which
was denied by the IRS. After paying the income taxes assessed against the plan by the IRS the
plan sought a refund. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Claims denying the VEBA
tax exempt status holding that although the plan provided for medical, life and accident benefits,
it also provided for retirement benefits which do not qualify as "other benefits" under the VEBA
rules.
(b) The court in Basch Eng'g, Inc. v. Comm'r, 59 T.e.M. (CCH) 482 (1990),
permitted the retroactive revocation of a.plan's qualified .status due to the employer's failure to
amend the plan on a timely basis to comply with changes in the tax law. The employer received
a final adverse determination letter from the IRS indicating that the plan had not met the
requirements for qualified status for years ending on or after March 31, 1985 due to the failure
to amend the plan to ~omply with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
("TEFRA"), the Tax Reform Act of 1984 ("TRA 84") and the Retirement Equity Act of 1984
("REA"). The employer contended that the plan "substantially complied" with the requirements
ofTEFRA, TRA 84 and REA, and that none of the changes in those Acts would have any impact
upon the operation of the plan. The court held the fact that the defective provisions in the plan
were not operative did not mean that the plan satisfied the statutory requirements for qualification.
The court concluded that the IRS, under the broad discretion granted it in §7805(b) of the Code,
did not abuse its discretion in revoking the ruling retroactively.
(c) In TCS Manufacturing, Inc., Employee's Pension Trust v. Comm'r, 60
T.C.M. (CCH) 1312 (1990), the tax court held that a plan was disqualified due to the employer's
refusal to amend the plan to meet certain conditions imposed on the qualification by the IRS in
order for the plan to receive a favorable determination. The employer had adopted its pension
plan prior to the enactment of ERISA and failed to amend the plan to comply with ERISA for a
number ofyears. The employer received a retroactive favorable determination letter from the IRS
which was conditioned upon eliminating excess contributions and including earnings allocable to
the contributions in income. The court held that since the favorable determination letter was
conditioned upon the employer meeting the contributions and earnings provisions, neither the plan
nor the trust was qualified during the years in issue.
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I. Introduction
This outline presents a summary view of litigation under the Employees Retiremetn
Income Security Act ("ERISA), from the point ofview of the plaintiff's counsel. It examines
some of the issues that counsel should recognize and review when assessing potential ERISA
claims and/or representing plaintiffs in ERISA and benefits cases. The author wishes to thank
David M. Cook, David M. Cook, LLC, 22 West Ninth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, (513) 721-
7500, for his assistance in this outline.
II. ERISA Preemption
ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1000 et seq.) preempts and "supercedes any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" as "employee benefit
plan" is defined under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 11_(a). A state law that "regulates insurance,
banking, or securities" is not preempted, 29 U.S.C. § 11_(b)(2)(A), but that limitation is narrow.
A state's "notice-prejudice" rule, for example, is not preempted, Unum Life Insur. Co. v. Ward,
526 U.S. 358 (1999), but a state law claim for "bad faith" on by an insurer is preempted.
Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ryenolds, 113 F.3d 1450 (6th Cir. 1997). Thus, while state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over benefits claims as described below, those cases are removable;
as a practical matter, all ERISA litigation is in federal court.
ID. Types of Cases
A. A "participant" or "beneficiary" of an employee benefit plan may bring a civil action
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) "to recover benefits due to him under the terms ofhis plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms ofthe plan." These benefits claims comprise the vast majority ofERISA cases brought in
Kentucky.
B. A participant or beneficiary may bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) "for appropriate reliefunder [ERISA] section 409," 29 U.S.C. § 1109. In
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these claims, however, the plaintiffbrings the claim on behalf of the plan, and the remedy must
be paid to the plan. These cases can arise where a plan trustee or fiduciary mismanages the assets
of a benefit plan such as a pension plan or 401 (k) plan, or overpays for employer stock held by an
employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP"), or really in any variety ofways. The requirement that
the action be brought on behalf of the plan gives such actions many of the characteristics of a
class or derivative action, although they are not technically Rule 23 class actions.
C. A plaintiffmay bring a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) "to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief" Claims brought under this section include claims brought by plan
participants who believe that they were misinformed by their employers or plan fiduciaries a
about their employee benefit. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065 (1996);
Krohn v. Huron Memorial Hospital, 173 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (Hospital liable as fiduciary to
respond to plaintiff-beneficiary's husband's request for benefits, and to alert LTD insurer that
plaintiff had made an application for benefits). The Supreme Court has decided the issue of
whether a health maintenance organization may be liable for breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA for refusing treatment. In Herdrich v. Pegram, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), the Court ruled that
even though the defendant physicians managed the plan, including the doctor referral process, the
nature and duration of treatment and every aspect of the HMO's governance, and resolved
disputed claims, they did not rise to the level of plan fiduciaries, because Congress intended for
HMOs to operate in that manner. Trustees of plans also have standing to bring suit under this
section. Harris Trust v. Salomon-Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000).
D. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1140, it is unlawful "to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline,
or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled
under the provisions of an employee benefit plan" or ERISA, or "for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled." This section
was enacted primarily to prevent an employer from terminating employees just as their pensions
were to vest, but it has been interpreted to prohibit an employer from interfering with an
employee's right to attain any other covered benefit.
E. While other causes of action exist, the other ofnote is one that arises under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(I)(A) and (c), when an employer or a plan fails to provide participants with copies of
plan documents that other sections of ERISA require to be provided to participants. The remedy
for such failure can be up to $110/day; a letter from the plaintiff's attorney citing these sections
will ordinarily convince the employer or plan to comply with its disclosure requirement. See
Davis v. Featherstone, 97 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 1996); Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062
(6th Cir. 1994) (district court did not abuse discretion by considering defendant's good faith and
lack ofprejudice in not imposing penalty).
IV. Benefits Claims.
A. Benefits claims generally are those for short- or long-term disability benefits, for
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payment or reimbursement ofmedical expenses under a health insurance plan, for severance pay
under a severance pay plan, for retirement benefits (including disability retirement benefits), for
group life insurance benefits, and for similar benefits. Practice tip: Group life insurance plans
often contain disability clauses that provide continued insurance if the claimant becomes
disabled, without further payment ofpremiums; this benefit is often forgotten, and it can be lost
if not pursued promptly.
B. Claims procedures. ERISA requires that employee benefit plans have "reasonable"
internal procedures under which a plan participant can make a claims for benefits. 29 U.S.C. §
1333. Ordinarily, a claimant must exhaust these procedures· before filing a civil action.
Ravencraft v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2000). Typically, a claimant must
make an initial claim for benefits, and the plan must respond within periods set forth in the
regulation, depending on the type of claim. If the plan denies the claim, then the plan must
explain the reasons for the denial in detail. The applicable regulation, 29 CFR 2560.503-1(as
amended, effective January 1,2002 for non-health plans; health plans must establish new
procedures by January 1, 2003), sets forth in detail what the claims procedures must include and
how the plan must communicate with the claimant.
If the claim is denied, the claimant must then effectively appeal the decision (or make a
"request for review" of the denial) to the plan administrator or other fiduciary, who (at least in
theory) makes a "full and fair" review of the denial. Again, 29 CFR 2560.503-1 is the
controlling regulation. The claimant may present additional evidence to support his claim and
otherwise argue that he is entitled to the benefit in question. The plan administrator or fiduciary
must then make a written ruling on the claim under the standards set forth at 29 CFR 2560.503-
1(j). If the claim is denied, the writing must explain the specific reasons for the denial, set forth
the claimant's right to copies of all documents that the administrator used in denying the claim,
and set forth the claimant's appeal rights, including the right to file a civil action.
Practice tip: ERISA requires plans to prepare a "summary plan description" or SPD and provide
a copy to participants. The SPD is supposed to be a plain-language description of the plan's
benefits and claims procedures. Try to get a copy of the SPD from your client or from the
employer as soon in the process as possible. If the SPD differs from the actual plan document
(which could be an insurance policy), then the SPD controls. University Hospitals of Cleveland
v Emerson Electric Co., 202 F.3d 839, 851 (6th Cir. 2000).
Practice tip: 29 CFR 2560-503-1 (h)(2)(iii) and (i)(5) requires the plan administrator to provide
free copies of all materials used in denying the claim. Always request this material in writing as
soon as the denial is received, because it is the bulk of the "administrative record" that the federal
court will eventually review. Insurance companies and other plan administrators often try to slip
additional material into the court record, and an early request for ALL material used in the
administrative process will make this practice much more difficult.
Practice tip: When reviewing the plan administrator's written denial, pay careful attention to
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who actually made the decision to deny the benefit. Often, a plan document will designate a
committee or other entity and ascribe to that committee the discretionary authority to make
benefits decisions, but the actual decision to deny a benefit will have been made by the employer
itself. When that occurs, the courts will NOT apply the arbitrary and capricious standard,
because the decision was not "made in compliance with plan procedures." Sanford v. Harvard
Industries, Inc., 262 F.3d 590,597 (6th Cir. 2001).
C. No Right To A Jury Trial. ERISA does not expressly provide for trial by jury for any
causes of action it creates. Courts are now unanimous in holding benefit claims as well as claims
for breaches of fiduciary duty and other statutory violations are equitable in nature and no right to
a jury trial exists for such claims. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156
(10th Cir. 1998) (no right to jury trial in §502(a)(1)(B) claims); Tischmann v. ITT/Sheraton
~, 145 F.3d 561 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 406 (1998); DeFelice v. American IntI.
Life Assurance, 112 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1997); Bittinger v. Tecumseh Products Co., 123 F.3d 877
(6th Cir. 1997). Instead, the district court's job is limited to reviewing the decision of the plan
administrator to deny the claim.
D. Standard of Review. The standard of review that the district court applies is the key
issue in a case involving a claim for benefits.
1. The Firestone case. The seminal case on standard of review is Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948 (1989), in which the Court
explained that principles of trust law supply the appropriate standard of review in
ERISA benefits cases. The Court ruled that a district court is to review the
administrator's decision de novo, "unless the benefit plan gives the
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Id., at 115. When the plan does
have such language, then the court reviews the decision under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the issue for
the federal court is not (for example) whether the plaintiff is actually disabled
given the administrative record before it, but instead whether the plan
administrator (often an insurance company) acted arbitrarily in denying the
benefit.
"Under the deferential 'arbitrary and capricious' standard, courts will uphold a
benefit determination if it is rational in light of the plan's provision. Stated
differently, when it is possible to offer a reason explanation, based on the
evidence, for a particular outcome, that outcome is not arbitrary or capricious."
University Hospitals of Cleveland v. Emerson Electric Co., 202 F.3d 839,846
(6th Cir. 2000)(intemal quotations and citations omitted).
Naturally, after Firestone, benefit plans scurried to insert language that granted the
plan administrator such discretionary authority. The practical effect of the ruling,
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particularly when an insurance company is the plan administrator, is that the
insurance company abandons its fiduciary duty to review the claim on its merits,
and instead reviews the claim with the idea of showing to the federal judge that its
denial ofbenefits was "rational in light of the plan's provisions."
2. Sixth Circuit Standard of Review Cases. The Sixth Circuit has issued several
opinions under Firestone, and the earlier decisions were harsh on plaintiffs. See
Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1996)(plan
language requiring that a claimant submit "satisfactory proof of total disability to
us" was sufficient to confer arbitrary and capricious review); Peruzzi v. Summa
Medical Plan, 137 F.3d 431,433 (6th Cir. 1997)(ruling that the inherent conflict of
interest in a self-funded plan did not alter the standard of review, but "should be
taken into account as a factor in determining whether the ... decision was
arbitrary and capricious"; the decision failed to indicate how the plaintiff could
show the influence of the conflict); Borda v. Hardy, Lewis, Pollard Page, P.C.,
138 F.3d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998)(under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
the plan's decision must be upheld if the decision was "rational in light of the
plan's provisions").
The Sixth Circuit in recent decisions, however, has been more sympathetic to
plaintiffs. In Sanford v. Harvard Industries, Inc., 262 F.3d 590, 597 (6th Cir.
2001), the court ruled that de novo review was appropriate because the company
had made the decision to deny the benefit, and not the plan trustee, to whom the
plan document had assigned authority to decide the claim. See also Williams v.
International Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2000)(finding a plan interpretation
to be arbitrary and capricious, regardless of the plan's practice of consistently
making the same interpretation on similar claims); Shelby County Health Care
Corp. v. Southern Council of Workers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 203 F.3d
926 (6th Cir. 2000)(finding a claims denial to be arbitrary and capricious where the
plan's interpretation of ambiguous provisions was not reasonable); University
Hospitals of Cleveland v. Emerson Electric Co., 202 F.3d 839,849 (6th Cir.
2000)(ruling that a plan's interpretation of its pre-existing condition exclusion
was contrary to plan language, and finding that the plan had "exceeded its power
to interpret the Plan, and has instead effectively rewritten it"). University
Hospitals also applied the "rule of contra proferentum" and construed ambiguities
in the plan against the drafter of the plan. [d., at 847. Finally, the case discussed
conflicts of interests in note 4:
[W]e believe it appropriate to observe here that the mere existence of fiduciary
duties, which always are present in any benefit detennination governed by
ERISA, does not obviate the need to more carefully examine decisions that
might be tainted by a conflict of interest. Courts should be particularly
vigilant in situations where, as here, the plan sponsor bears all or most of the
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risk ofpaying claims, and also appoints the body designated as the final arbiter
of such claims. Under these circumstances, the potential for self-interested
decision-making is evident.
3. De Novo Review. In Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609
(6th Cir. 1998), the court made a variety of rulings that affect how ERISA claims
are presented. First, it applied de novo review and upheld a denial of disability
benefits. It also held that in the absence of a "due process" challenge to the claims
process, a district court may not look at affidavits never reviewed by the plan
administrator. The court also rejected a bench trial and the summary judgment
process as the appropriate way to resolve ERISA benefit cases under a de novo.
In such cases, evidence is limited to that considered by the plan (what is known as
the "administrative record"), and a bench trial under Rule 52 or the summary
judgment process under Rule56 would be inappropriate.
E. Discovery. Generally speaking, there is no discovery in benefits cases, although
courts may be willing to allow limited discovery on the actual contents of the administrative
record, or how the inherent conflict of interest in a self-funded or insurance-based plan actually
affected the plan's detemrination. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
115,109 S.Ct. 948 (1989)("Ofcourse, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or
fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r]
in detennining whether there is an abuse of discretion.' Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187,
Comment d (1959)").
F. The Administrative Record. Generally, after filing the Rule 26 report to the court, the
court will order the parties to agree on the administrative record of the facts and documents that
were before the plan administrator when it made the decision. The order will usually require the
parties to enter into factual stipulations and to agree on the documents that the plan used to make
its detennination. Under 29 CFR 2560-503-1 (i)(5) and (j)(3) and (m)(8), the plan must provide
copies-before suit is filed-of "all documents, records, and other information relevant to the
claimant's claim for benefits," which includes information that "was relied on in making the
benefit detennination," or was "submitted, considered, or generated in the course ofmaking he
benefit detennination."
The parties will then file briefs, and the court will then make a ruling based on the administrative
record and the briefs. The court will not look at materials or documents not before the
administrator when it made the adverse benefit detennination. This rule generally applies
regardless of the standard ofreview. See Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609
(6th Cir. 1998); Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1996)(under
arbitrary and capricious standard, a district court can only consider facts "known to" the plan at
the time the decision was made). Practice tip: The Yeager case states that the court can consider
what is "known to" the plan when it made its decision. Plaintiff's counsel should therefore
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insist on stipulations that fairly present what was known to the plan committee but not
necessarily committed to paper.
G. Avenues For Avoiding The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard. The arbitrary and
capricious standard is clearly an uphill struggle for a plaintiff: unless of course the plan simply
failed to follow its own rules or ignored the record altogether. The first task for plaintiffs
counsel, then, is to avoid the standard from the outset. The author suggest resolving the
following questions to avoid the deferential standard:
1. Does ERISA even apply? ERISA does not apply to ALL benefit plans.
"Governmental plans" are exempt from ERISA under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). A
governmental plan (29 U.S.C. § 1002(32» is one sponsored by a governmental
entity, which in Kentucky could include state government, hospital districts, water
boards, libraries, cities, and a host of other entities. Many SPDs for such plans
will include language that would lead the participate to believe that the plan is an
ERISA plan, when in fact it is not. (Church plans are also exempt.) If the plan is
a governmental or church plan, the case can be heard in state court (subject to
being removed on diversity of citizenship grounds), before a local jury, in which
the case is styled Local Citizen v. Out-of-State Insurance Company.
2. Did the employee pay for the benefit? ERISA may not apply to certain
insurance benefits that an employee pays for through a payroll deduction. A
benefit plan covered by ERISA is any "plan, fund, or program which [is]
established or maintained by an employer or by an eQ1ployee organization." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1). The regulation pertaining to this definition (29 CFR 2510.3-
1(j), known as the "safe harbor" regulation) excludes:
a group or group-type insurance program offered by an insurer to employees
or members of an employee organization, under which
(1) No contributions are made by an employer or employee
organization;
(2) Participation in the program is completely voluntary for employees
or members;
(3) The sole functions of the employer or employee organization with
respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to pemrit the
insurer to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect
premiums through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to
the insurer; and
(4) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration
in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than
reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services
actually rendered in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs."
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See Thompson v. American Home Assurance Co., 95 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1996); B-
T Dissolution, Inc. v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 175 F.Supp.2d 978
(S.D. Ohio 2001).
Thus, long-term disability policies that are paid for by the employee often are not
covered by ERISA, and employee can bring a claim under those policies in state
court, and again before a local jury.
3. Did the plan follow its own procedures in denying the claim? Under 29 CFR
2560.503-1(1), a plan's failure to establish and follow reasonable claims
procedures allows the claimant to file suit without fully exhausting the plan's
procedures. Presumably, the court would look at the claims file de novo, because
there is simply no administrative ruling to be deferred to. Practice tip: The
plaintiff's attorney should be completely unforgiving of a benefit plan that is even
the slightest bit late in responding to a claim. File the suit as soon as it is clear
that the time limits in 29 CFR 2560.503-1(i) have passed.
4. Did the plan assist the claimant secure Social Security benefits? Some ifnot
most long-term disability benefit plans have provisions that require or encourage
the claimant to make a claim for Social Security disability benefits. Believe it or
not, many insurers will pay for an attorney to help the claimant pursue the Social
Security claim, then (once the SSDI claim has been won) tum around and find that
the claimant is not disabled under the terms of the policy. That fact pattern was
the subject ofblistering pro-plaintiff decision in Ladd v. ITT Corp., 148 F.3d 753,
756 (7th Cir. 1998).
H. Remedies. The remedy in a benefits claims case is the payment of the benefit;
nothing will be awarded for extra-contractual damages. Davis v. Kentucky Finance Co.
Retirement Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1989), eert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990) (and
cases collected therein).
I. Attorney's fees. Attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party under 29
U.S.C. § 1132 (g). Note that an award of fees and costs is discretionary, not mandatory; a
prevailing party is not automatically entitled to a fee award. See McElwaine v. U.S. West, Inc.,
176 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Travelers Insur. Co., 167 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999); Florence
Nightingale Nursing Service v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 41 F.3d 1476 (11 th Cir.), eert. denied,
514 U.S. 1128 (1995); Schake v. Colt Industries Op. Corp., 960 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1991);
Anthuis v. Colt Industries Op. Corp., 971 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992). Also, a fee award can be
made to either party; there is no limitation that fee awards be made only to "prevailing parties",
although awards to prevailing defendants are rare.
In exercising their discretion under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(I), the courts tend to consider what has
become known as the "5 Factor Test". The application and relative weight of each factor tends to
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vary fromjurisdiction to jurisdiction. The 5 factors are:
*
*
*
*
*
the relative bad faith or culpability of the opposing parties;
the ability of the opposing party to satisfy an award;
the deterrent value of an award with respect to the offending party and
others similarly situated;
the extent to which the party seeking fees sought to benefit all plan
participants or to resolve a significant legal issue regarding ERISA; and
the relative merits of the parties' respective positions.
Wells v. U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 76 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 1996); Armistead v.
Vemitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1991). In the Sixth Circuit, fees are awarded only for
work done in connection with the litigation of the claim, and not for work done in the
administrative process. Anderson v. Procter & Gamble Co., 220 F.3d 449 (6th Cir.2000).
v. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims
A. There are two general types of claims for breach of fiduciary duty. The first, under
under 29 U.S.C.. § 1132(a)(2), allows a participant to bring a claim on behalf of the benefit plan
"for appropriate relief under [ERISA] section 409," 29 U.S.C. § 1109. As noted above, however,
the plaintiffbrings the claim on behalf of the plan, and the remedy must be paid to the plan. The
second type of case may be brought by one or more plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)
"to obtain other appropriate equitable relief"
1. The claims under ERISA § 409 are made against a "fiduciary" of the plan, and
typically raise issues that would have arisen under the common law of trusts.
ERISA imposes a duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(I) for the plan fiduciary to:
discharge his duties with respect to the plan solely in the interest of
participants
and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims;
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(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so;
and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions
of this title and title IV.
See, e.g., Chao v. Hall Holding Co., 285 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2002), and cases cited
therein.
These cases arise in a lot of contexts, but primarily involve either a fiduciary's
self-dealing or its failure to invest plan assets prudently. From the point of view
ofplaintiff's counsel, these cases usually involve substantial sums ofmoney and
affect a great number ofpersons. Practice tip: A transaction known as a
"leveraged" employee stock ownership plan, where an ESOP is created and then
caused to borrow money to purchase the stock of a retiring or departing company
executive, is a particularly fertile ground for litigation, because the incentives for
self-dealing typically overwhelm the parties involved. Chao v. Hall Holding Co.,
285 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2002). This author believes, in fact, that it is virtually
impossible to implement a leveraged ESOP transaction without somebody's
breaching a fiduciary duty to the plan.
2. The claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) "to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief' present a variety of fact patterns. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116
S.Ct. 1065 (1996)(parent corporation re-shuffled all its money-losing divisions
(and their employees) into a new subsidiary, which became insolvent and unable
to pay benefits promised employees when they transferred); Krohn v. Huron
Memorial Hospital, 173 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999) (Hospital liable as fiduciary to
respond to plaintiff-beneficiary's husband's request for benefits, and to alert LTD
insurer that plaintiff had made an application for benefits); Sprague v. General
Motors Corp., 92 F.3d 1425 (6th Cir. 1996)(seeking to enforce promise of retiree
medical benefits; these cases are very hard to win); McAuley v. International
Business Machines Corp., 165 F.3d 1038 (6th Cir. 1999)( severance pay case
arising out of IBM's offer of severance package in reduction-in-force; where an
enhanced severance package is under "serious consideration," the employer or
fiduciary is under a fiduciary obligation to inform the potential participants of the
enhanced package).
B. Discovery. Discovery in breach of fiduciary duty actions is taken the same way as any
other civil action in federal court.
C. Jury Trial. There is no right to a jury trial in breach of fiduciary duty cases. The
remedy is considered to be equitable, and any trial will be to the bench.
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D. Remedies. Remedies are equitable, not legal, and the plan is typically seeking its
losses arising out of the defendant's conduct. Individuals are also able only to receive equitable
relief: such as restitution. This has created a mass of confusing and often contradictory rulings
on remedies, an explanation ofwhich is beyond the scope of this outline. For an example, see
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 122 S.Ct. 708 (2002). Counsel confronted with
a breach of fiduciary duty case under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) "to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief' should review relevant cases carefully when drafting the prayer for relief
VI. Claims Under ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140
A. As noted above, ERISA § 510 is ERISA's anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation
provision. The section makes it unlawful to discharge or discriminate against a person for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit pIa" or
ERISA, or "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled." The purpose of § 510 is to prevent an employer from taking
actions such as discharging or discriminating against participants and beneficiaries for exercising
their rights under a plan or under the statute. Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir.
1983). Thus, § 510 prohibits an employer from taking actions "that might interfere with a
person's ability to collect present or future benefits or which punish a participant for exercising
his or her rights under an employee benefit plan." Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129,
1139 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, 274 F.3d 1106, 1113 (6th
Cir. 2001)(finding ERISA §510 protects rights tofuture benefits as well as accrued benefits). It
is now clear that § 510 applies to welfare benefit plans, which do not automatically vest, as well
as pension plans. Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
520 U.S. 510 (1997).
B. Right to a Jury Trial. It is unclear whether a § 510 claim can be tried to ajury. While
many cases have held to the contrary, there is some Sixth Circuit authority that would support a
jury trial. Pennington v. Western Atlas, Inc., 202 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2000) (jurythat decided an
ADEA claim acted as an advisory jury on an ERISA § 510 claim); Walsh v. United Parcel
Service, 201 F.3d 718 (6th Cir 2000) (indirectly suggesting jury right in a 510 action if a genuine
issue of fact had existed about whether non-discriminatory reason for discharge was pretextual)
C. Statute of Limitations. ERISA § 510 does not contain a specific limitations period,
but courts have applied state statute of limitations pertaining to claims ofwrongful discharge or
employment discrimination. When analyzing the statute of limitations, courts look at the
requested relief such as back and front pay, reinstatement, benefits, and the type of claim, such
as, retaliation or discharge. See, e.g., Burrey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 159 F.3d 388 (9th Cir.
1998) (one-year limitation period for wrongful tennination against public policy applies to
transfer to leasing company); Musick v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 81 F.3d 136, 139
(11th Cir. 1996) (refusing to apply state contract period; applying two-year limitations period
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without deciding whether retaliatory discharge or wage law is most appropriate); Ellis v. Ford
Motor Co., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996) (table) (borrowing state employment discrimination
limitations period);
D. Prima Facie Cases and Shifting Burdens. ERISA § 510 is handled much like
discrimination cases, where the plaintiff must state a prima facie case, and the burden shifts from
one party to the other. The Sixth Circuit set forth the analysis in Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d
857, 865 (6th Cir. 1997):
To state a claim under § 510, the plaintiff must show that an employer had a
specific intent to violate ERISA. In the absence of direct evidence of such
discriminatory intent, the plaintiff can state a prima facie case by showing the
existence of (1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the purpose of
interfering (3) with the attainment of any right to which the employee may
become entitled. Although ... not classif[ied] ... as part of the plaintiffs prima
facie case, ... a plaintiffmust show a causal link between pension benefits and the
adverse employment decision. In order to survive [the] defendants' motion for
summary judgment, [the] plaintiffmust come fOlWard with evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that the defendants' desire to avoid pension liability
was a determining factor in [the] plaintiffs discharge.... [I]n an interference
claim, the alleged illegal activity will have a causal connection to the plaintiffs
ability to receive an identifiable benefit. [Internal citations and quotations
omitted.]
See also Penningtonv. Western Atlas, Inc., 202 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2000); Humphreys v.Bellaire
Qm1., 966 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that "the proximity to vesting provides at least
some inference of intentional, prohibited activity" sufficient to survive a prima face case.
E. Class Actions. ERISA § 510 can be applied to classes as well. See Millsap v.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 162 F.Supp2d 1262 (N.D. Okla. 2001)(finding that
McDonnell-Douglas closed a plant to avoid employee benefit obligations).
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
On March 21, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court held that victim-initiated
employment claims -- including statutory employment claims -- can be subject to
mandatory arbitration. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). The
Circuit City case is perhaps one of the most significant employment decision in 25
years. It is not an overstatement to say that the decision could potentially abolish
victim-initiated, employment-related lawsuits should all employers choose to
implement mandatory arbitration agreements. 1
I. WHY THE CIRCUIT CITY CASE IS
IMPORTANT FROM A PRACTICAL STANDPOINT
There are three major reasons the Circuit City decision is important: (i) it will
allow employers to try cases in a friendlier forum -- in front of an arbitrator, as
opposed to an often hostile jury capable of rendering a "runaway" verdict; (ii) it is
unlikely that arbitration will result in the "jumbo" settlements that have become
commonplace in employment lawsuits; and (iii) the arbitration process is generally
more expedient and less expensive for employers. Each of these reasons is
significant with respect to an employer's ability to defend against employment claims
made by a current or former employee.
1 It is important to emphasize that the Circuit City case only addresses
employment-related lawsuits initiated by the victim. As will be demonstrated in a
later section of this paper, an employment-related lawsuit initiated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a current or former
employee, is not unlawful, despite the existence ofa valid and enforceable arbitration
agreement between the employer and employee. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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A. Employers Are Losing More Often And "Bigger" Than At Any Time In
Recent Years.
A recent USA Today article reported that the probability of a plaintiff
prevailing in an employment suit has gone from 49% in 1994 to 71 % in 1999.
Equally troubling is the average recovery in these types of cases. Again, according
to USA Today, the median compensatory damages award received by plaintiffs in
employment cases has gone from $127,500 in 1996 to $200,000 in 1999. More
troubling are the recent cases in which juries have awarded plaintiffs small fortunes
in employment suits:
1. In Dawson v. Starkey Lab, a plaintiffclaimed that she was terminated
without cause after she refused to sign an agreement giving up her
right to deferred compensation. A jury awarded her $62,000,000;
2. In Sonnier v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, a plaintiffclaimed he was
terminated because he objected to being asked to engage in bad faith
claims practices. A jury awarded him $10,456,000;
3. In McCarthy v. The Ground Round, plaintiffs claimed wrongful
discharge and age discrimination after the defendant discharged them
during a reorganization and hired new people in allegedly new
positions. The jury awarded them $6,692,402;
4. In Hughes v. K-Mart, the plaintiffclaimed she was fired in retaliation
for complaining about wage discrimination. The jury awarded her
$6,218,700;
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5. In Clifton v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation, a plaintiff claimed
that he was racially harassed in his position as foreman. There was
name calling, he was shot at with bottle rockets and firecrackers, and
his locker was defaced with racist epithets. The jury awarded him
$5,500,000; and
6. position as a computer consultant after returning from maternity
leave. She was allegedly told that she was being terminated because
she was a woman with a family. The jury awarded her $5,500,000.
In addition, when plaintiffs prevail on statutory employment claims, most statutes
also require the employer to pay the plaintiff's attorney fees -- which can frequently
equal or exceed the cost of the judgment.
B. Employee Lawsuits Are Resultine In Huee Settlements.
Newspapers have been replete in recent years with record breaking
settlements in employment lawsuits. The following are just a few well-publicized
settlements:
1. On November 28, 2000, a group of black, hourly employees at
Texaco received a $140,000,000 settlement arising out oftheir claims
of racial discrimination;
2. On December 13, 2000, temporary employees at Microsoft agreed to
settle a class action for $97,000,000;
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3. On October 7, 2000, black employees at the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation tentatively agreed to settle their claims ofrace
discrimination for $14,000,000;
4. On November 18,2000, 14 women employed by Ford Motors were
paid a $9,000,000 settlement in a sexual harassment case; and
5. In June 1998, Mitsubishi made a $34,000,000 settlement in a sexual
harassment/discrimination case.
While the above settlements all involve classes or multiple plaintiffs, employers are
paying more to settle individual claims as well. Many employers feel it more prudent
to settle employment claims rather than risking an adverse jury verdict.
c. Employers Are Spending Significant Sums To Defend Employment
Lawsuits.
With attorney rates exceeding $250 an hour in most regions, the cost of
defending employment suits has escalated. Moreover, with the "scorched-Earth"
discovery tactics employed by both defense and plaintiffcounsel, it is not unusual for
fees to exceed $100,000 even before trial. Fees through trial, post-trial motions and
appeal can easily approach $150,000 to $200,000. In addition to attorney fees, an
employer is also responsible for its deposition costs and expert witness fees. All of
these costs and fees add up, especially when you consider that most cases take up to
two years to even get to trial.
Against this backdrop, employers have been looking for alternatives to
employment litigation. Arbitration is that alternative, and employers would be remiss
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if they did not consider its application. At a minimum, employers should be· familiar
with the process and its potential benefits.
II. WHAT IS ARBITRATION AND WHY WOULD
AN EMPLOYER BENEFIT FROM THE PROCEDURE?
Arbitration has been aptly defined as a "simple proceeding voluntarily chosen
by parties who want a dispute determined by an impartialjudge oftheir own mutual
selection, whose decision, based on the merits of the case, they agree in advance to
accept as final and binding." Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works at 2 (4th Ed.
1985), quoting Chappell, Arbitrate ... AndAvoid Stomach Ulcers, 2 Arb. Mag. Nos.
11-12, pp. 6-7 (1944). While this quote speaks to the mutual advantages of
arbitration, the procedure is often advocated by employers for a number ofreasons:
1. Employers see arbitration as a way to avoid runaway jury verdicts.
Many commentators attribute the increase in runaway verdicts to
juries reacting emotionally to employee claims, as opposed to simply
applying the law. An advantage to arbitration is that cases are
generally heard by a single arbitrator who is presumably trained in
employment law. It is less likely that an arbitrator will be swayed by
pure emotion. Even where an arbitrator finds that an employee's
legal rights have been violated, it is anticipated that the arbitrator will
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fashion a remedy commensurate to the harm, and not award a
financial windfall;2
2. Requiring an employee to submit employment claims to arbitration
should also help employers in settling such claims. If a plaintiff and
his/her counsel know from the outset they do not have an opportunity
to make an emotional plea to a jury, it is likely that they will not value
their employment claims as highly as they would have in recent years.
This, in turn, should help employers to better posture these cases for
settlement; and
3. Arbitration can be more expedient and less costly than civil litigation.
Claims can be heard in a matter of months, as opposed to years.
Discovery procedures and depositions -- while available -- can be
limited by an arbitrator.
Given the foregoing, it is easy to see why so many employers are encouraged
by the Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City. Before implementing an arbitration
procedure, however, it is necessary to understand the issues Circuit City addressed,
as well as those it left unresolved.
2 Because the use of arbitration in employment claims is still a recent
phenomenon (and because most employment arbitration decisions are confidential),
there is no real track record for predicting employer success. However, in labor
arbitrations in the union setting, employers appeared to have won approximately 70%
ofall arbitrations held in 2000. Bureau ofNational Affairs (Labor Arbitration 2000).
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ID. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CIRCUIT CITY DECISION
Circuit City utilized an employment application which provided that "all ...
claims, disputes or controversies arising out ofor relating to my ... employment with
Circuit City would be resolved exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a
neutral arbitrator." ld. slip Ope at 2. The application specifically identified all claims
arising under federal, state or local statutory or common law as well as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), as being
subject to this provision.
Saint Claire Adams applied for employment with Circuit City in October
1995, and was hired as a sales consultant in Circuit City's Santa Rosa, California
store. Two years later, he filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit
City in state court, asserting claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing
Act. Circuit City responded by filing suit in the federal district court, seeking to
enjoin the state court action and to compel arbitration ofAdams' claims, pursuant to
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").
The federal district court held that Adams was obligated by the arbitration
provision in his employment application to submit his claims to binding arbitration.
Adams appealed this decision. While Adams' appeal was pending, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held in another case that the FAA did not apply to contracts of
employment. In reaching this result, the Ninth Circuit relied on language in the FAA
which excludes from its coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
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employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce...." The court then applied its ruling to Adams' appeal and held that the
language in Circuit City's employment application constituted an employment
contract which was not subject to arbitration.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision,
holding instead that the FAA exempted from its coverage "only contracts of
employment of transportation workers." All other employment contracts may be
subject to mandatory arbitration. The Court also pointed out that in requiring
employees to submit their employment disputes to binding arbitration, employers are
not depriving employees of their substantive statutory rights. They are merely
committing the dispute to an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum. 3
Finally, the Court commented on the deference -- ifany -- that should be paid
to state arbitration statutes, i. e. , laws that prohibit employers from utilizing
mandatory arbitration agreements. Responding to criticism that its holding would
preempt states' power to limit the arbitrability of certain employment disputes, the
Court reiterated its holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465U.S. 1(1984), that the
FAA applies in state courts and preempts contrary state anti-arbitration laws. Among
3 The plaintiff in Circuit City brought claims under California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act and other claims based on general tort theories.
Federal courts have also enforced mandatory arbitration ofa broad range ofstatutory
claims, including the following: Title VII, see, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Security
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); the ADA and Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA"), see, e.g., Millerv. Public Storage Management, Inc., 121 F.3d215 (5th
Cir. 1997); Savarin v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.Supp. 609 (N.D. Tex. 1996);
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), see, e.g., Pritzker v.
Merrill Lynch, 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993).
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these provisions is KRS 336.700 -- Kentucky's anti-arbitration statute -- which
prohibits an employer from requiring an employee or person seeking employment to
arbitrate "any existing or future claim, right, or benefit to which the employee or
person seeking employment would othelWise be entitled under any provision of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes or any federal law" as a condition or pre-condition of
employment. Many other states have similar statutes restricting arbitration. Under
the Supreme Court's holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the FAA preempts any
inconsistent state law.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT IN CIRCUIT CITY
LEFT MANY ISSUES UNRESOLVED
Given the reaction to its decision, one might assume that the Supreme Court
had issued the final word on employment arbitration. However, the Court did not
place its imprimatur on the Circuit City arbitration program, the specifics ofwhich
were not even mentioned.4 Instead, the Court left for another day the difficult issues
4 In fact, on remand, the Ninth Circuit held that, under California law, Circuit
City's arbitration program was unenforceable because it contained procedurally and
substantively unconscionable provisions and such provisions could not be severed.
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, a number
ofother state and federal courts have held portions ofthe Circuit City program to be
contrary to the public policies underlying various civil rights statutes. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821, 2000 WL 19166 (4th Cir.)
(unpublished), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1276 (2000); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 2001 WL 930550 (8th Cir. 8/17/2001) (provision in arbitration agreement
limiting punitive damages held invalid, but it could be severed and remainder of
agreement enforced); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F.Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D.
Ala. 2000) (holding that although provision limiting award ofpunitive damages and
back/front pay precluded employee from meaningful opportunity to vindicate
statutory rights, rule ofseverability applied to uphold the arbitration agreement with
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concerning how a mandatory arbitration program should b~ structured, how (or even
if) it should be reviewed by courts, and the balance between federal and state law
which is inherent in the FAA. The Court also failed to address whether a valid
arbitration agreement between an employer and employee would preclude
employment litigation initiated by a federal agency on behalf of the employee.
The unresolved issues fall within one of three major categories: (a) state law
issues concerning contract·fonnation and enforcement; (b) federal issues relating to
arbitration procedures, judicial review, the interaction/involvement of the National
Labor Relations Board (''NLRB''), and the preclusive effect of arbitration awards;
and (c) federal issues relating to the EEOC's positionregarding mandatory arbitration
agreements and the lawfulness of an EEOC-initiated employment action, on behalf
of a current or former, when there exists a valid and enforceable arbitration
agreement between the employer and the employee.5
A. Contract Formation Issues
Arbitration is a "creature of contract." What that means is that an employer
and employee(s) must have an agreement to submit an employment dispute to
arbitration. What constitutes an "agreement," however, is an issue the Supreme
Court did not address. To address the issue, you must frrst answer the following
questions:
modification ofremedies to provide the full range of remedies available by statute).
Compare, Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F.Supp. 2d815 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
5 This question has actually now been resolved by the Supreme Court in
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
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1. What assent on the part of an employee is necessary to support
an aereement to arbitrate?
Although arbitral contract formation is a matter of state law, see, Patterson
v. TenetHealthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d832, 834 (8thCir. 1997); Geigerv. Ryan's Family
SteakHouses, Inc., 134 F.Supp.2d985 (S.D. Ind. 2001), in Circuit City, the Supreme
Court implicitly endorsed a simple means to obtain such assent in the application
process:
I agree that I will settle any and all previously
unasserted claims, disputes or controversies arising
out of or relating to my application or candidacy for
employment, employment and/or cessation of
employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final
and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator.
By way of example only, such claims include claims
under federal, state, and local statutory or common
law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, including the amendments of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the law of contract and the law of tort.
Circuit City, 2001 WL 273205, slip Ope at p.2 (emphasis in original).
As with contracts in general, courts have not been receptive to challenges
claiming that an employee did not read the agreement or understand its terms. See,
e.g., Flynn v. Aerchem, Inc., 102 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1060 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (rejecting
employee's claim that she was forced to sign the agreement while under economic
duress and without knowledge ofits contents); Walker v. MDM Services Corp., 997
F.Supp. 822 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
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2. Does an employee have to sien a written arbitration aereement?
Some courts have found there is no need for a signed arbitration agreement
between the parties. See, e.g., Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., Civil Action No. 3:97-CV-
499-R (W.D. Ky. 1/8/1998) (attached at Tab 1); Jenkins v. Workman, Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 7612, 2000 WL 962821 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (upholding validity of
arbitration program, noting the employee did not have to sign form for agreement to
exist); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1439-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1044 (1994) (arbitration program valid where employee received but did not
sign handbook containing program); Kinnebrew v. GulfIns. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 189, 1994 WL 803508 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (court compelled arbitration
where an employer mailed its employees copies of its arbitration policy without
explaining its effect or seeking the employees' agreement to the policy; simply
receiving a copy of the arbitration policy and continuing to be employed was
sufficient to bind the employees to submit any employment claim to arbitration).
Compare Romo v. Y-3 Holdings, Inc., 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(California Court ofAppeals panel held that an employee's signature acknowledging
that she signed for, received, understood, and agreed to the tenns in an employee
handbook did not bind her to an arbitration agreement set forth in the handbook).
Although an employer generally need not have a signed agreement with its
employees to enforce an arbitration clause, a signed agreement is the best evidence
of an employee's assent to arbitrate employment claims. However, obtaining signed
agreements is particularly troublesome in situations involving current employees. If
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an employee refuses to sign, the employee would be forced to do one of two things.
First, the employer could make signing a condition ofcontinued employment. If the
employee refused to sign, he/she could be terminated. Such a course probably
presents the ideal scenario for the EEOC to seek an injunction on a theory that the
employer was interfering with its employees' statutory rights under Title VII and
related employment laws. Or, second, the employer could simply advise the
employee of the implementation date for the arbitration procedure. Should the
employee continue working after that date, the employer could argue that the
employee had acquiesced to the arbitration procedure. Of course, the employer
would likely incur the wrath of the employees who did sign. Moreover, employees
who did not sign could argue that the employer's acquiescence to their not signing
waives the employer's right to enforce the agreement.
3. Does a statute need to be specifically referenced in an arbitration
clause?
An issue exists as to whether an arbitration clause must refer to a particular
statute in order to be enforceable with respect to that statute. This will, again, require
a review of state contract law. As noted in Kraus and Vuchlewski, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Arbitration ofStatutory Discrimination and Other Employment
Claims, American Bar Association, March 1998 ("Alternative Dispute Resolution"):
"The fact that an arbitration clause does not make specific reference to a particular
civil rights statute does not necessarily negate its enforceability. So long as the
arbitration provision makes reference to disputes between the employee and
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employer in a way that encompasses employment discrimination and/or wrongful
termination, it will most probably withstand judicial scrutiny." Id. at 5.
However, courts generally require that an employee knowingly and
voluntarily waive statutory rights. Unless the specific statute is set forth in the
arbitration agreement, an employee could certainly make an argument that he/she did
. not knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to pursue an action in state or federal
court under that statute.
B. Is the Arbitration Aereement Enforceable?
A critical question to enforcing arbitration agreements relates to the issue of
legal consideration, i. e., what does an employee get in exchange for agreeing to
submit his/her claim to arbitration? Depending upon the timing, consideration in
these cases is usually deemed to be the offer of employment, or in the case of a
current employee, the promise of continued employment.
1. When an employee is hired -- the offer of employment
The Circuit City decision at least implies that federal courts will endorse
agreements accepted in the application process. State courts have likewise enforced
agreements entered into at the beginning of employment. See, e.g., Gibson v.
Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Indiana
law, initial offer of employment may constitute consideration for an employee's
promise to submit claims to arbitration); Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc. v. Brooks-
Shades, 781 So.2d 215 (Ala. 2000) (affirming trial court's dismissal of employee's
claims based on signed arbitration agreement); Mueller v. Hopkins & Howard, P. C.,
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5 S.W.3d 182 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare, 99
Cal.Rptr.2d 745 (Cal. 2000); Walker, 997 F.Supp. 822 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
2. For current employees -- is continued employment sufficient
consideration?
Whether continued employment is sufficient consideration to enforce an
arbitration agreement depends on each state's laws regarding contract formation. As
a general rule, however, most states have found that an employer's offer to continue
a current employee's employment -- albeit on "at-will" terms -- is sufficient
consideration to support an arbitration agreement. Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc., 100
Cal.Rptr.2d 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (a party's acceptance of an arbitration
agreement can be implied-in-fact where the employee's "continued employment
constitutes her acceptance ofan agreement proposed by her employer"); Kreimer v.
Delta Faucet Co., 2000 WL 962817 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (employee became bound by
the arbitration agreement by receiving the benefit of continued employment for
"more than a year after she signed the acknowledgment form"); Patterson, 113 F.3d
832 (an arbitration clause contained in an employee handbook, signed by the
employee after four years of employment, was a valid and enforceable arbitration
agreement); Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., (W.D. Ky. 1/8/1998) (continued employment
constitutes sufficient consideration to support a binding arbitration agreement, even
where the employee did not sign an agreement). Compare, Environmental Products
Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889 (W.Va. 1981) (continued employment is insufficient
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consideration to support covenant not to compete after employment has been
commenced without such a restriction).
3. Other forms of consideration
Courts have also recognized forms of consideration other than continued
employment. In Flynn, the court found that considerationwas evidenced not only by
the employee's continued employment, but also by the employer's reciprocal promise
to: (i) arbitrate all claims, (ii) be bound by the arbitrator's decisions, and (iii) be
responsible for any and all charges arising from the arbitration. Flynn, 102
F.Supp.2d at 1061. See also, Gibson, 121 F.3d 1126 (finding no consideration
because employer failed to make promise in "Understanding" signed by employee
to also submit disputes to arbitration).
C. Mutuality -- What Concessions Must An Employer Make To Enforce An
Arbitration Aereement?
Courts define mutuality in very different ways; a standard approach is
difficult to discern. For example, the California Supreme Court recently held that an
arbitration agreement in an adhesive context, such as employment, will be
unconscionable "ifit requires one contracting party, but not the other, to arbitrate all
claims·arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or
occurrences." Armendariz, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at 772. It is unclear whether this would
require an employer to submit to arbitration any claim it might wish to bring arising
out of an employee's alleged breach of a confidentiality agreement, covenant not to
compete, intellectual property assignment agreement, or any other similar agreement.
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As a practical matter, however, an employer will not likely have a significant amount
of claims against its employees, and any concern in this regard is rather speculative.
Other courts seem to address mutuality in the context ofprocedural fairness.
For example, the Fourth Circuit has held that an arbitration agreement with the
following elements was fatally flawed -- it allowed the employer, but not the
employee, to bring suit in court to vacate or modify the arbitrator's award; it required
the employee to list all facts supporting his claim as well as fact witnesses with a
brief summary of their knowledge, but the employer did not have to supply any
responsive pleadings, notice of its defenses or witness lists; the arbitrator had to be
chosen from a list compiled by the employer; and, the employee ~ould not record the
arbitration hearing, although the employer was permitted to do so. Int'l Paper Co.
v. Schwabedissen Maschinen &Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000). See
also, Hooters ofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Gibson, 121
F.3d 1126 (applying Indiana law, Seventh Circuit held that both parties must be
bound by the terms of a contract for it to be enforceable and that the employer's
failure to make a reciprocal promise to be bound by the arbitration agreement at issue
resulted in a lack of consideration).
Still other courts take a much less restrictive approach. In Wright, 82
F.Supp.2d at 1284, the court held that the employer's promise to be bound to the
arbitration process and results ofdisputes that are initiatedby employees constituted
sufficient consideration because the employer had agreed to arbitrate a specified class
ofclaims -- those brought by the employees. See also, Wilson Elec. Contractors, Inc.
1·17
v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1989); Kelly v. UHC
Management Co., 967 F.Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
D. Defenses To Enforcement Of Arbitration Aereements
In an effort to avoid mandatory arbitration after signing an arbitration
agreement, employees have raised a handful ofdefenses to contract formation. These
include unconscionability, duress, adhesion, fraudulent inducement and
misrepresentation, and failure to knowingly and voluntarily waive statutory rights.
See, e.g., Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that more than a disparity in bargaining power is needed to show
unwillingness to enter into agreement); Kelly, 967 F.Supp. 1240 (holding that the
knowing and voluntary standard does not apply to an agreement to arbitrate because
it merely changes the forum for adjudicating statutory rights); Walker, 997 F.Supp.
822 (holding that there must be evidence of fraud or coercion beyond mere unequal
bargaining power to find arbitration agreement unconscionable); Flynn, 102
F.Supp.2d 1055. While these defenses require factual inquiries on a case by case
basis, courts have generally recognized the prevalent federal policy favoring
arbitration and have rejected these defenses.
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v. FEDERAL LAW ISSUES
A. "Due Process" Concerns6
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), arbitration is supposed to be a reasonable substitute for
a judicial forum. With this in mind, several courts have analyzed the need for
arbitration agreements to provide statutory remedies and the right to representation,
the proper allocation of arbitration related fees and expenses, and the extent of
permissible discovery.
1. Remedies
In addressing the remedies available to an employee in arbitration, an
employer's arbitration program will pass judicial scrutiny if it provides for the same
remedies that are available in a judicial forum, particularly if the employee's claim
is one based on a statutory right. For example, in Gannon, the court held that
because the arbitration agreement failed to provide remedies equivalent to those
allowed under the statutory claims at issue, it prevented the employee from
effectively vindicating her rights. The statutory rights in Gannon were based on both
federal law, Title VII, and state law, the Missouri Human Rights Act. Gannon, 2001
WL 930550, at *2-4 (affirming severance ofarbitration agreement provision limiting
punitive damages so as to permit enforcement of remainder of agreement). The
6 The "due process" terminology is misleading, as it implies the existence of
constitutional protection to disputes against non-governmental employers. The
courts' use of the term in arbitration cases actually refers to fairness and conformity
with state and federal statutes.
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California Supreme Court has likewise held that, to be valid, an arbitration agreement
must provide for all types of relief that would otherwise be available in court.
Armendariz, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at 759-60. See also, Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482.
2. Rieht to representation
If the arbitration forum is to serve as a substitute for a judicial forum,
employees should clearly have the right to representation. Who should and/or can
pay for the attorneys' fees is not so clear. One court invalidated that portion of an
arbitration agreement intended to waive the employee's right to attorneys' fees as a
prevailing party because it was inconsistent with the policy goals of Title VII.
DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 1996 WL 697928 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Compare,
Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (upholding an arbitration agreement that allowed
representation by attorney at employee's own expense). Generally, courts will
uphold a provision that requires the employer to pay reasonable attorneys' fees.
Given the courts' general desire that the arbitral forum allow statutory remedies,
"reasonable" attorneys' fees will most likely be those determined by an arbitrator, in
essentially the same manner that judges currently consider fee applications.
3. Costs
In Cole, the D.C. Circuit, after a thorough analysis of the Supreme Court's
holding in Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, held that employers should be solely responsible for
the arbitrator's fees. Cole, 105F.3dat 1484. Thecourtreasonedthatemployeeswho
elect to bring their claims in federal court are not required to pay for the services of
a judge. The court acknowledged that an employee may have to pay some fees:
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"There is no doubt that parties appearing in federal court may be required to assume
the cost of filing fees and other administrative expenses, so any reasonable costs of
this sort that accompany arbitration are not problematic." Id. The court also
dismissed concerns that the arbitration process would become subverted by having
only one party pay the arbitrator. The court stated that if an arbitrator is likely to
"lean" in favor of the employer, it would be because the employer is a source of
future arbitration business, not because the employer paid all of the costs. Id.
Additionally, in Jones v. Fujitsu Network Communications, Inc., 81
F.Supp.2d 688 (N.D. Tex. 1999), the court held unenforceable a fee-splitting
provision which required the employee to pay half of the arbitrator's fees, the court
reporter's fee, the fee for the arbitrator's copy ofthe transcript, and the facility costs.
See also, Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management, 1997 WL 416405 (D. Colo.
1997); Baron v. Best Buy Co., 79 F.Supp.2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 1999). Compare,
Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. ofAmerica, 232 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000)(upholding
a cost-splitting provision in an agreement to arbitrate ERISA claims). In line with
this authority, it would be reasonable for an employer to require the employee to pay
a filing fee and other reasonably limited costs, but the employer should pay the
arbitrator's fees.
4. Discovery
Courts generally uphold provisions in an arbitration agreement limiting the
extent of discovery, as long as they provide for more than "minimal discovery."
Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482. See also, Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (holding that employee's
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arbitration agreement, which effectively waived the state-created right to litigation-
type discovery, was enforceable under the FAA); Armendariz, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at
760-61.
Similarly, an arbitrator has authority to order discovery necessary to a full and
fair exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of
arbitration. This may include deposition, interrogatories, document production and
other methods. American ArbitrationAssociation NationalRules For the Resolution
ofEmployment Disputes (attached at Tab 2).
5. Statute of Limitations
Some courts have upheld an arbitration agreement's shorter statute of
limitations than was provided under the applicable law. Soltani v. Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038 (9th eir. 8/6/2001) (six month limitations
period for wrongful discharge claims not unconscionable and thus enforceable);
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F.Supp.2d 815, 827 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(holding that the one-year statute of limitations period in the arbitration agreement
was fair and reasonable, even though shorter than that provided by Title VII). An
Alabama district court has, however, suggested in dicta that ifan employee's ability
to vindicate his rights was hindered by the shorter statute oflimitations period in the
agreement, the court would modify the agreement to make it consistent with the
applicable statute oflimitations. Wright, 82 F.Supp.2d at 1288 n.5. It is noteworthy
that under the American Arbitration Association's Rules, if an employee's dispute
involves a statutory right, he has the same time limit to file the dispute as established
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by the applicable statute of limitations. Ifno statutory rights are involved, then the
time limit established by the arbitration agreement is followed.
B. Judicial Review
1. The FAA
Under the FAA, parties to an arbitration award can submit the award to a
district court for an order confitming, modifying or correcting the award. 9 U.S.C.
§13. Such judgments by the district court will have the same force and effect as a
judgment in an action brought before the court. I d. Section 16 limits the appeals that
may be taken from a court's order to those that: (i) refuse a stay ofany action under
section 3 ofthe FAA; (ii) deny a petition to order arbitration to proceed; (iii) deny an
application to compel arbitration; (iv) confirm or deny confirmation of an award or
partial award; or (v) modify, correct or vacate an award. Id. at §16.
The FAA also clearly states the circumstances under which a district court can
vacate, modify or correct an arbitrator's decision. In section 10, the FAA grants a
district court authority to vacate an award where the court finds corruption, fraud or
undue means in the procurement of the award; partiality, corruption or misconduct
on the part of the arbitrator; and, if the arbitrator exceeded his powers. Id. at §10.
A district court may also modify or correct an award where the arbitrator makes a
mistake involving a miscalculation of figures or evidence, grants an award upon a
matter not submitted to him, or the award is imperfect in matter ofform. Id. at §11.
Given the Supreme Court's holding in Southland, 465 U.S. 1, reiterated in Circuit
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City, 2001 WL273205, slip Ope at pp. 14-15, the FAA's provisions onjudicial review
would preempt any conflicting state laws.
2. Judicial review based on "manifest disreeard"
In addition to the above statutory grounds for judicial review, the federal
courts have recognized a judicially-created ground for modifying or vacating an
arbitration award where the arbitrators engaged in "manifest disregard of the law."
First Options ofChicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); DiRussa v. Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc.,121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049
(1998); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.,957 F.Supp. 1460
(N.D. Ill. 1997); Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F.Supp.
218 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that manifest disregard of the law doctrine requires
more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law). To modify or vacate
an arbitration award on this ground, a court must find that "(1) the 'arbitrators knew
ofa governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether,' and (2)
the 'law ignored by the arbitrators ... [was] well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable' to the case." DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821 (quoting Folkways Music
Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1993».
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit has suggested that judicial review ofarbitration
rulings on statutory claims should be less deferential than the limited review
normally conducted in the collective bargaining context. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.
The Cole court observed:
The strict deference accorded to arbitration decisions
in the collective bargaining arena may not be
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appropriate in statutory cases in which an employee
has been forced to resort to arbitration as a condition
of employment. Rather, in this statutory context, the
"manifest disregard of law" standard must be defined
in light ofthe bases underlying the Court's decision in
Gilmer type cases.
ld. The D.C. Circuit further called for judicial review to be "sufficiently rigorous to
ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory law." ld.
The FAA clearly limits a court's review ofthe arbitrator's award. In Circuit
City, the Supreme Court reiterated its policy regarding arbitration previously stated
in both Gilmer and MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
u.S. 614 (1985), that "'by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution
in an arbitral, rather than ajudicial, forum. ,,, Circuit City, 2001 WL 273205, slip op.
at p.16 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, andMitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). Given the
prevailing public policy in favor of arbitration, courts should only review arbitration
decisions for legal or gross factual error. Even though the D.C. Circuit states that
judicial review should be greater when statutory rights are at issue than judicial
review of traditional contractual issues, see Cole, 105 F.3d 1465, it is unclear
whether courts outside the D.C. Circuit will apply heightened scrutiny to arbitration
awards that involve statutory claims. Additionally, this does not suggest that judicial
review of statutory rights is a de novo review. Compare, EEOC Notice, "Policy
Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition of Employment," No. 915.002, July 10, 1997 (stating that
employers should not be "permitted to deprive civil rights claimants ofthe choice to
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vindicate their statutory rights in the courts -- an avenue of redress detennined by
Congress to be essential to enforcement").
Moreover, when a court is faced with deciding whether an issue is arbitrable,
the Supreme Court has expressly favored arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983). The Supreme Court
stated: "Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor ofarbitration, whether the problem at hand is in the contract language itselfor
an allegation ofwaiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id.
c. The NLRB's role and likely stance
The NLRB also opposes mandatory arbitration of employment disputes and
has indicated that if an agreement to arbitrate prevents an employee from filing
charges with the NLRB, it will find the agreement to be an unfair labor practice.7 See
Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F.Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (citing NLRB General Counsel Report, January to September 1995, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at E - 6-7 (Feb. 23, 1996». The NLRB's position regarding
arbitration is advanced in Bentley's Luggage Corp., General Counsel Advice
Memorandum, Case 12-CA-16658 (Aug. 21,1995) (attached at Tab 4). In Cole, the
D.C. Circuit also acknowledged the NLRB's concerns regarding the inability of
arbitration to adequately remedy employment discrimination, but upheld the
arbitration agreement because it did not undennine the relevant statutory scheme.
7 The NLRB's position is somewhat disingenuous; the Board has long-
advocated deferral to arbitration of unfair labor practice charges filed in the union
setting. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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105 F.3d at 1467-68. The Sixth Circuit has even indicated that an employee can
effectively agree to arbitrate claims under the FLSA. See, Floss v. Ryan's Family
SteakHouses, Inc., 211 F.3d306 (6thCir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001).
See also, Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 1996 WL 257602 (9th Cir. 1996). While the
NLRB may attempt to preserve an employee's ability to file charges directly with the
agency and even argue that an agreement requiring arbitration of such charges is an
unfair labor practice, a reviewing court could uphold the arbitration agreement if it
found that it satisfied "due process" considerations and vindicated the employee's
statutory rights.
D. Preclusive effect of arbitration awards
The Supreme Court has drastically altered its position concerning whether
employees have the right to pursue statutory employment law remedies in both an
arbitral and judicial forum. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47,
59-60 (1974), the Court concluded that because Title VII ''vest[s] federal courts with
plenary powers to enforce ..." that statute, and "specifies with precision the
jurisdictional prerequisites that an individual must satisfy ... to institute a lawsuit,"
an employee must be pennitted "to pursue both his remedy under the grievance
arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement and his cause ofaction under
Title VII" which claim "the federal court should consider ... de novo."
By 1991, only four members of the unanimous Court which had decided
Gardner-Denver remained. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991), the Court considered whether an individual employee could waive his
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right to ajudicial forum over his ADEA claim. By a 7-2 majority, the Court held that
a claim under the ADEA could be subjected to compulsory arbitration enforceable
under the FAA. The Court found that "[a]n individual ADEA claimant subject to an
arbitration agreement will still be free tq file a charge with the EEOC, even though
the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial action." Id. at 28.
Thus, assuming that procedural "due process"concerns have been adequately
addressed, Gilmer appears to have othelWise resolved whether an arbitration award
involving a non-union employee will have preclusive effect on subsequent civil
litigation an employee brings against his employer.
VI. FEDERAL LAW ISSUES REGARDING THE EEOC'S POSITION
A. EEOC's opposition to mandatory arbitration aereements
The EEOC's policy regarding mandatory arbitration agreements states "that
agreements that mandate binding arbitration of discrimination claims as a condition
of employment are contrary to the fundamental principles evinced in these laws."
EEOC Notice, "Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration ofEmployment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition ofEmployment," No. 915.002, July 10, 1997
(see attached at Tab 3). The .EEOC argues that Congress explicitly entrusted the
primary responsibility for the interpretation, administration and enforcement of the
discrimination laws to the federal government, and specifically vested in the federal
courts the final responsibility for statutory enforcement through the "construction and
interpretation of the statutes, the adjudication of claims, and the issuance of relief"
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[d. The EEOC further identifies inherent defects in arbitration: it prevents
development of the law, it limits an employee's rights, and it maintains structural
biases against employees. [d.
Despite the EEOC's opposition to mandatory employment arbitration
agreements, courts continue to uphold them. See, Cole, 105 F.3d at 1468. Although
the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the EEOC's concerns regarding the "potential
inequities and inadequacies of arbitration in individual employment cases" and the
"competence of arbitrators and the arbitral forum. to enforce effectively the myriad
of public laws protecting workers and regulating the workplace," it held that if an
arbitration agreement does not undennine the relevant statutory scheme, the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer mandates enforcement of the arbitration agreement. [d.
at 1468-69. Because of Gilmer, and until either the Supreme Court overrules itself
or Congress passes an amendment to the FAA, it is probable that courts will continue
to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements if they do not undennine the relevant
statutory scheme, which relates back to the "due process" considerations noted
above.
B. The EEOC now has independent jurisdiction to pursue claims otherwise
subject to individual arbitration aereements
The Supreme Court recently held that the EEOC lawfully may attempt to
obtain monetary damages on behalfofemployees covered by enforceable arbitration
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agreements. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). This holding
undercuts the effectiveness ofemployer/employee mandatory arbitration agreements
to some extent. As discussed throughout this paper, an employee bound by an
arbitration agreement will likely be precluded from filing an employment-related
lawsuit against his current or former employer. However, pursuant to Waffle House,
the EEOC may lawfully pursue a federal court action in its own name on behalfof
the employee who is otherwise limited by an arbitration agreement.
Notwithstanding the significance of the Waffle House decision, given the
small number of cases the EEOC currently takes to trial and the agency's limited
resources, this decision will likely not have a great impact on most small to mid-size
employers. Valid arbitration programs will still significantly reduce the number of
employment-related lawsuits.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS/SUGGESTED PROGRAM
In light of the above discussion and our experience with traditional labor
arbitrations and employment mediations, we offer the following suggestions for
employment arbitration programs:
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A. Strike While The Iron Is Hot
Now is an opportune time to implement an arbitration program. Members of
Congress have already proposed amending the FAA to bar prospective agreements
to arbitrate employment disputes. Should control of Congress and the Presidency
change, these proposals could become law. The window of opportunity for
employers to utilize arbitration may thus be short-lived -- get everything you can
from the process while you can.
B. Specifically Reference Major State And Federal Statutes In The
Arbitration Aereement
To ensure that employees have knowingly agreed to arbitrate statutory
employment claims, the agreement should reference the major statutes by name. The
agreement should, however, also include broad "catch-all" language, i.e., "any and
all claims, including statutory claims, arising out of your employment or cessation
of employment, including but not limited to.... "
c. Require New Employees To Sign The Arbitration Agreement At The
Outset Of Employment
New employees should be required to sign an arbitration agreement as part
ofthe application process or following ajob offer, but prior to their start dates. The
refusal to sign will disqualify them from employment.
D. Advise All Current Employees Of The Decision To Implement An
Arbitration Procedure, But Do Not Require Them To Sign An
Aereement
The problem with requiring employees to sign an agreement to arbitrate is
that many may balk. This puts the employer in the position of having to terminate
1·31
anyone who refuses (as noted earlier, this would likely beg a response from the
EEOC). By implementing without a signed agreement, the employer avoids this
pitfall. Moreover, several courts have indicated that a signed agreement is not
necessary for enforcement. An employer would simply ~gue that the employees
agreed to arbitration by continuing to work. If an employee attempts to sue in state
or federal court, the employer could ask a federal court to stay the proceeding and
enforce the arbitration agreement. Even if the federal court finds the arbitration
procedure unenforceable because there was no signed agreement to arbitrate, the
employer is merely left defending a suit in the usual forum -- a state or federal court.
The employer could then choose to require signed agreements to arbitrate as a
condition of continued employment.
E. Require An Employee To Pay A Filing Fee Equivalent To That He
Would Have To Pay In Federal Court
This would serve as a sort of"earnest money," ensuring that employees incur
some cost before pursuing their claims.
F. Appoint Arbitrators Throueh The AAA
We recommend using the AAA, because: (i) usmg a universally
acknowledged neutral third party addresses many ofthe above due process concerns,
and (ii) the AAA is getting much better at handling employment law disputes, with
arbitral panels experienced in these matters. We further recommend that the
employer pay the arbitral fees and expenses.
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G. Consider Limitine Discovery
By far the biggest expense in employment litigation is the often protracted
and unwieldy discovery process. We suggest limiting each side to one or two
depositions, while affording each party the opportunity to ask the arbitrator for leave
to take additional depositions, or conduct additional written discovery.
H. Consider Includine A Limitations Period
Because Kentucky law allows a five year limitations period for all state civil
rights and some employment related tort claims, you may wish to consider
incorporating a shorter limitations period into the arbitration agreement. Some recent
federal cases have affirmed the validity of shorter contractual limitations periods,
which serve the important purpose of ensuring some finality to employment claims
within a reasonable period after employment ends. Absent such provisions, and in
light of an often transient workforce, defending years old claims is often extremely
difficult.
I. Provide For Summary Judement Proceedines
Federal courts dismiss many lawsuits in favor of employers -- a process
referred to as "summaryjudgment." One ofthe primary disadvantages ofarbitration
programs is that arbitrators tend not to dismiss cases as readily as federal judges.
However, arbitrators also tend not to award the runaway verdicts juries sometimes
impose. In essence, arbitration is a form of insurance against the "big hit," while
accepting the likelihood that some damages may be awarded. However, by
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instituting a summary judgment procedure, that balance may be shifted more to the
employer's favor.
J. Require A Transcript Of The Arbitration Hearing, Give Both Parties
The Opportunity To Submit Pre-Hearing Briefs, And Require The
Arbitrator To Issue A Written Opinion Containing Findings Of Fact
And Conclusions Of Law
To the extent that judicial review occurs, it will only be meaningful if the
parties, and the reviewing court, are provided: (i) the factual and legal rationale
behind the decision, and (ii) a record of the proceedings, including a transcript and
at least the opportunity to briefthe issues. We also recommend that the transcript be
provided to both parties at the Company's expense.
K. Provide For Confidentiality
One ofthe primary advantages ofprivate arbitration is that, unlike litigation,
it is not a matter ofpublic record. Moreover, the AAA due process regime permits
confidential proceedings.
L. Deny Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Effect To Proceedings Involving
Other Employees
A corollary to confidentiality is that arbitration results are not binding in
subsequent arbitrations involving different employees. Although this might have the
effect of denying the Company a defense it would othelWise employ in court, it has
the salutary effect of avoiding an avalanche of "me-too" claims following a
successful arbitration. Employees are much less likely to choose to endure the time
and trouble of arbitration if they have no certainty of success.
I· 34
M. Class Action Or Joint Claims Should Not Be Permitted, Unless All
Parties Aeree
The risk ofa substantial damages award may be unacceptably great by giving
a single arbitrator the power to decide such claims. Of course, in appropriate
circumstances -- particularly where the damages exposure is limited -- the Company
may choose to agree to class or joint claims, as it will be more efficient to resolve all
such claims in one proceeding.
N. Include A Severability Clause
An employer should include a severability clause that allows a court to "blue
pencil" portions of the arbitration agreement should it find any provision unlawful.
Courts will apply the rule of severability if the unlawful provisions in the agreement
are not "so interdependent with the other parts ofthe agreement as to make them not
severable." Wright, 82 F.Supp. 2d 1279. For example, in Wright, the court
concluded that a provision in the agreement limiting award ofpunitive damages and
back/front pay could be severed in order to save the agreement. The court then
provided the full range ofremedies provided under· the statutory law. Id.
VIII. POST CIRCUIT CITY CASE DIGEST
The following cases digested are Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
addressing the enforceability of employer/employee arbitration agreements (and,
thus, dismissal of employment-related lawsuits in favor of arbitration) in light of
Circuit City. To the extent that the Courts' analysis in each ofthese cases addresses
Circuit City, the Federal Arbitration Act's ("FAA") coverage ofemployment-related
arbitration agreements, and federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
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agreements, the cases are quite similar. The cases differ, however, in their analysis
of the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreements at issue.
A. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002)
The Ninth Circuit found that, in light of the employee's meaningful
opportunity to opt out ofemployer's binding arbitration program, which employee
didnot exercise, the arbitration agreementwas notprocedurally unconscionable and
thus was enforceable.
Factual Background
One month after Mohammad S. Ahmed began working as a sales counselor
for Circuit City, the company instituted an arbitration program. Each employee
received a package ofmaterials on this program, including a handbook, Circuit City's
Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures, and an "opt-out" form. Ahmed signed an
acknowledgment of receipt of such package. The materials indicated an employee
would be automatically part of the arbitration program and would therefore be
required to arbitrate all employment-related disputes ifhe failed to mail the opt-out
form to Circuit City within 30 days. The materials further indicated that, if an
employee decided to opt-out of the arbitration program, he would be allowed
to keep his job and simply not participate in the program. Ahmed did not mail in the
opt-out form.
Approximately two years later, Ahmed filed suit against Circuit City in state
court under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). Circuit
City sought an order compelling arbitration. .
Ninth Circuit Decision
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration.
The Ninth Circuit held the agreement to arbitrate was not procedurally
unconscionable because Ahmed was given a meaningful opportunity to opt out ofthe
agreement. Moreover, the terms ofthe agreement were clearly spelled out in written
materials and a video presentation, Ahmed was encouraged to contact Circuit City
representatives or consult an attorney prior to deciding whether to participate in the
program, and he was given 30 days in which to decide whether to participate. Thus,
because the arbitration agreement was not one-sided and was fairly entered-into by
both Ahmed and the Company, the Ninth Circuit found it valid and enforceable.
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B. Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595 (3rd Cir. 2002)
The Third Circuit found mandatory arbitration provision contained in
employee handbook was supported by adequate consideration under Pennsylvania
law and thus was enforceable on those grounds. However, the Court reversed and
remanded to provide employee opportunity to show resort to arbitration would deny
her aforum to vindicate her statutory rights, given both herfinancial capacity and
provisions of the agreement requiring parties to each pay one-half arbitrator's
compensation.
Factual Background
During Blair's employment with Scott Specialty Gases ("Scott"), an updated
employee handbook was distributed to all employees. Pursuant toa provision
contained in the employee handbook, Scott had a unilateral ability to modify
provisions therein. However, alteration ofmaterial aspects ofthe handbook required
written notice to employees. The handbook also contained a mandatory arbitration
agreement that included a fee-sharing provision. Blair signed an acknowledgment
ofreceipt ofthe handbook, acknowledging she had read the arbitration provision and
agreed that she and Scott would submit any employment-related disputes to final and
binding arbitration.
Approximately one year after she resigned from the company, Blair filed a
complaint against Scott in federal court alleging sexual harassment, sex
discrimination, and constructive discharge under Title VII, the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act ("PHRA"), and the Pennsylvania Constitution and alleging several
state tort claims. Scott filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Blair had agreed
to submit all employment-related claims to binding arbitration. Blair, in response,
argued the arbitration agreement was not a validly formed contract because it was not
supported by adequate consideration. In the alternative, Blair argued the agreement
should not be enforced on public policy grounds because it required her to pay one-
half of the arbitrator's fees.
Third Circuit Decision
The Third Circuit held the agreement was a validly formed contract. Basing
its holding on Pennsylvania contract law, the Court held the agreement was supported
by adequate consideration because both Scott and Blair agreed to be bound by
arbitration. The language ofthe arbitration clause specifically states, "ifany dispute
arises from your employment with Scott, you and Scott agree that final resolution of
the dispute will occur exclusively in a final and binding arbitration proceeding."
(emphasis added).
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Moreover, the Third Circuit articulated, Scott's unilateral ability to alter the
agreement without notice or consent did not render the agreement illusory. The
company did not have an unfettered right to alter the employment agreement. Scott's
right to alter the agreement was actually quite limited - it could only unilaterally
make non-material changes to the handbook without notice or consent. The Court
opined that c4anges to the arbitration agreement would not be categorized as non-
material.
Although the Third Circuit held the agreement was a validly fotmed contract,
the Court still remanded the case based on Blair's affidavit of her limited financial
capacity and the agreement's fee-sharing provision. After an extensive analysis of
.an important Supreme Court decision8 (and other circuit court decisions) regarding
the enforceability of arbitration agreements containing fee-sharing provisions, the
Court determined that the court below had not allowed enough discovery to fully
explored the cost issue. The Third Circuit, therefore, required that, on remand, the
district court conduct limited discovery regarding the rates charged by the arbitration
service, the approximate length of similar arbitration proceedings, and any other
potentially relevant information. The Court reasoned that the district court will then
be in a better position to determine whether resort to arbitration would deny Blair a
forum to vindicate her statutory rights, given that she would have to pay one-halfof
the costs.
c. Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2001)
The Fourth Circuit found the collective bargaining agreement provided a
, clear and unmistakable waiver ofemployee's statutory rights to afederal forum on
a Title VII claim and employee's good faith compliance with the grievance
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement did not preserve the right to
pursue Title VII claims in a federal forum.
Factual Background
Lori Safrit was employed at Cone Mills' plant in Salisburg, North Carolina
and, during her employment, was a member of the United Needletrades, Industrial,
8 Green Tree Financial Corp. -Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
In this case, the plaintiff, on appeal from a district court order compelling arbitration,
argued that the arbitration agreement's silence on the subject of fees created a risk
that she would be required to bear a prohibitive proportion of the arbitration costs,
forcing her to forego arbitration and relinquish her rights. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, held that the articulated risk to the plaintiffwas too speculative to justify
invalidating the arbitration agreement.
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and Textile Employee Union ("UNITE"). The Collective Bargaining Agreement
("CBA") between UNITE and Cone Mills, the agreement covering Safrit's
employment, gave the Union the exclusive option to proceed to arbitration.
Specifically, the CBA provided a four-step grievance procedure and, ifthe complaint
was still unresolved, after the four steps, the Union could proceed to arbitration.
Safrit could not proceed at any level without the Union.
In 1994, Safrit filed a grievance alleging Cone Mills failed to train her
properly and denied her job opportunities because ofher gender. The Union took her
case to the fourth step ofher grievance process. Once at the fourth step, Cone Mills
agreed to correct its actions and the Union stopped pursuing the grievance. Safrit
alleges, even after agreeing to correct its actions, the Company continued to
discriminate against her. This time, however, the Union did not file a second
grievance on her behalf Thus, after filing a charge ofdiscrimination with the EEOC,
Safrit initiated this Title VII lawsuit against Cone Mills. Cone Mills sought dismissal
of the case, arguing that the CBA clearly and unmistakably provided for arbitration
as the sole remedy for alleged violations of Title VII. The company based its
argument on Section XX ofthe CBA, which provided:
...agree that they will not discriminate against any employee
with regard to race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin or
disability....The parties further agreed [sic] that they will abide by all
requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964....Unresolved grievances arising under this section are the
proper subjects of arbitration....
Fourth Circuit Decision
The Fourth Circuit held Section XX of the CBA clearly and unmistakably
waived Safrit's right to a federal forum for her Title VII claims. The Court noted that
there were two ways in which a clear and unmistakable waiver can occur. First, the
agreement can contain an explicit arbitration clause in which the parties agree to
submit to arbitration all federal causes ofaction arising out ofemployment. Second,
a general clause requiring arbitration under the agreement can be coupled with a
provision which makes unmistakably clear that the employment-related statute at
issue is part of the agreement. The Court then held that Section XX of the CBA
clearly falls under the second of these two ways (with respect to Title VII) and,
therefore, waived Safrit's right to a federal forum on her Title VII claim.
The Fourth Circuit found Safrit's argument, that her good faith compliance
with the grievance provisions ofthe CBA should preserve her right to pursue claims
in a federal forum, had no merit. The Court noted that, pursuant to binding Fourth
Circuit case law, a collectively bargained agreement to arbitrate a statutory
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discrimination on claim is enforceable. For the foregoing reasons, the Fourth Circuit
affinned the district court's grant of summary judgment to Cone Mills.
D. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
285 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2002)
The Sixth Circuit found that employer had not presented an actual case or
controversy in its action to compel former employee to arbitrate her sexual
harassment dispute because employee, herself, had not sued employer.
Federal Background
As a condition to being hired by Circuit City, Julie Shelton was required to
sign a form acknowledging her approval and acceptance ofCircuit City's arbitration
agreement. By signing the agreement, Shelton agreed to submit all her federal, state
and local statutory and common-law employment-related claims to binding
arbitration. Shelton signed the agreement in 1997 and was thereafter hired.
Shelton worked at Circuit City for slightly over one year. She then filed a
complaint with the EEOC, claiming she had been constructively discharged as a
result of sexual harassment. The EEOC subsequently filed suit against Circuit City
in federal court. The Company filed a separate suit against Shelton, seeking to
compel arbitration of her sexual harassment claim against the Company. Upon
motion by the EEOC, the two actions were consolidated.
Sixth Circuit Decision
The Sixth Circuit affinned the district court's decision to dismiss Circuit
City's action against its former employee and ordered the Company to respond to the
EEOC-initiated action. The Court premised its decision on the recent Supreme Court
Waffle House decision. Thus, the Court found the agreement between Circuit City
and Shelton, although valid and enforceable, still did not bar the EEOC from pursing
an enforcement action under Title VII on behalf of Shelton. With respect to the
lawsuit filed by Circuit City against Shelton, the Court held the Company did not
have a case or controversy against Shelton - Shelton did not breach her arbitration
agreement with the Company because she did not file suit.
E. Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001)
The Seventh Circuitfound the contract between the employee andarbitration
service was unenforceable because it contained only an illusory promise by the
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service. The Court, therefore, affirmed the district court's denial ofthe company's
motion to compel arbitration.
Factnal Background
Before Penn was employed at Ryan's Family Steak Houses ("Ryan's"), the
Company had entered a contract with Employment Dispute Services, Inc. ("EDS")
to have EDS provide an arbitration forum for all employment-related disputes
between Ryan's and its employees. Thereafter, when Penn applied for a job at
Ryan's, the Company required him to ·execute an arbitration agreement. The
agreement was not with Ryan's; instead, Penn was required to enter this arbitration
agreement with EDS.
In this agreement, EDS agreed to provide an arbitration forum for Penn in
exchange for Penn's agreement to submit all employment-related disputes against
Ryan's to arbitration with EDS. The agreement provided EDS with full discretion
over the arbitration rules and procedures and further provided EDS with the
unlimited right to modify the rules without first obtaining Penn's consent. Although
Ryan's was not a party to the agreement between Penn and EDS, it was a third-party
beneficiary ofPenn's promise to arbitrate all ofhis disputes.
Penn worked as a server for Ryan's in Fort Wayne, Indiana from 1996 until
1998. After he was fired, he fued suit under The Americans With Disabilities Act
("ADA") alleging harassment and retaliation for his complaints about harassment.
Ryan's filed a motion to stay the case and compel arbitration, alleging Penn was
bound by the arbitration agreement he signed when he applied for his job at Ryan's.
Seventh Circuit Decision
In affirming the court below, the Seventh Circuit held that Penn never entered
into an enforceable arbitration agreement. The Court noted that, under Indiana's
ordinary contract principles, in order for a contract to exist, each party's promise
must impose on the party a binding obligation. A party's promise fails to create a
binding obligation when: (1) in effect, it promises nothing at all; (2) the party making
the promise retains the right to decide whether or how to perfonn its promised act;
or (3) the promise is so indefinite that legal enforcement would be virtually
impossible.
Here, EDS promised to provide an arbitration forum in exchange for Penn's
promise to submit any employment-related disputes to arbitration. EDS' promise did
not impose on it a binding obligation because it retained the right to choose how it
would perform its promise. Further, EDS' promise was extremely indefinite,
allowing it to retain the right to modify the applicable arbitration rules and
procedures without Penn's consent. Because the Court found the arbitration
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agreement between EDS and Penn unenforceable, it affirmed the district court's
denial of Ryan's motion to compel arbitration.
F. Perez v. Globe Airport Security Sues., Inc., 253 F.3·d 1280 (11 th Cir. 2001)
The Eleventh Circuit held cost-sharing provision ofarbitration agreement
illegal and rendered entire arbitration agreement unenforceable.
Factual Backgronnd
As a prerequisite to being hired by Globe Airport Security Sues., Inc.
("Globe"), Perez was required to signa "Pre-dispute Resolution Agreement" calling
for the arbitration ofany and all disputes relating to her employment. The Agreement
expressly provided that the parties would share the fees and costs of arbitration
equally. The Agreement also provided her an opportunity to consult with an attorney
before signing it. However, Perez was aware she would not be considered for
employment with Globe unless she signed the Agreement. She signed the Agreement
and was subsequently hired.
One year after Perez's employment with Globe ended, Perez filed this law
suit, alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. Globe raised the
arbitration agreement as an affinnative defense in its Answer. Globe then moved to
compel arbitration and requested the trial court dismiss or stay the court action.
Perez responded, in part, by arguing that the fee and cost-sharing provision in the
arbitration agreement rendered the agreement unenforceable.
Eleventh Circnit Decision
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding that the arbitration
agreement's fee and cost-sharing provision rendered the entire agreement
unenforceable. The court held the fee and cost-sharing provision was unenforceable
because it circumscribed an arbitrator's authority to grant effective relief pennitted
under Title VII. The Court noted that an employee who agrees to arbitrate her
statutory claims does not forego her substantive rights afforded by a statute. A
substantive right afforded by Title VII is the prevailing party's right to potentially be
awarded reasonable attorneys fees, including expert fees and costs. Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned, because the fee and cost-sharing provision contained in
this arbitration agreement prevents an employee from receiving attorneys fees and
costs, it actually proscribes a substantive right afforded by Title VII. As such, the
provision is illegal.
Rather than simply severing the illegal prOVISion from the otherwise
enforceable arbitration agreement, the Eleventh Circuit held the entire agreement
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unenforceable. The Court acknowledged that several other courts sever illegal
provisions contained in arbitration agreements either relying on a severability
provision contained in the agreement or simply relying on the general federal policy
in favor of enforcing arbitration. The Court, however, declined to sever the illegal
provision for two reasons. First, this agreement did not contain a severability
provision. Second, the Eleventh Circuit disfavors the severing of illegal provisions
from otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements and chooses instead to void such
agreements altogether. The Court voids such agreements because courts that will
sever unlawful provisions from otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements (rather
than void such agreements altogether) provide employers with incentive to continue
to include unlawful provisions in their arbitration agreements. Because the Eleventh
Circuit found the entire arbitration agreement unenforceable, the Court affirmed the
district court's denial of Globe's motion to compel arbitration.
G. Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001)
The Ninth Circuit held that Harden, a delivery driver who signed an
employment contract containing an arbitration provision, could maintain his race
discrimination and wrongful termination lawsuit against Roadway Package Systems,
Inc. because the FAA is inapplicable to employment contracts of drivers, like
Harden, who are engaged in interstate commerce. 9 The Ninth Circuit, therefore,
found the district court lacked the authority to compel arbitration.
H. Horenstein v. Mortgage Market, Inc., 2001 WL 502010 (9th Cir. 2001)
Despite appellants' argument that the arbitration clauses contained in their
employment agreements should not be enforced because they eliminate the
employee's right to process as a class action, the Ninth Circuit found employees'
Fair Labor Standard Act ("FLSA'j claims were subject to arbitr.ation. The court,
9 Section 1 of the FAA provides "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts ofemployment ofseamen, railroad employees or any other class ofworkers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. §1. As a delivery driver for
Roadway, Harden contracted to deliver packages throughout the United States, with
connecting international service. Thus, he engaged in interstate commerce that is
exempt from the FAA.
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therefore, affirmed the district court's grant of employer's motion to compel
arbitration.
The Ninth Circuit found the employees' contention, that the arbitration clause
in their employment agreements should not be enforced because it eliminates their
statutory right to a collective action, insufficient to render the arbitration clause
unenforceable. The Court first looked to the text ofthe FLSA, its legislative history,
and the arbitration clause and found nothing indicating that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration of FLSA claims. The Court then acknowledged that plaintiffs
who sign arbitration agreements lack the procedural right to proceed as a class.
However, it noted that these plaintiffs nonetheless retain all substantive rights under
the statute. Further, the Court cited Supreme Court precedent in concluding that only
those who consent to binding arbitration agreements are forced to abandon class
action. The employees here knowingly signed valid agreements to arbitrate their
statutory claims; accordingly, they abandoned their right to enforce those claims as
part of a class action. For the reasons described herein, the Ninth Circuit held the
employees' FLSA claims are subject to arbitration and affirmed the district court's
grant of the Company's motion to compel arbitration.
I· 44
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:97-CV-497-R
DAVID STEPHEN BROWN, eL aL
vs.
J.C. PENNEY CO., INC., et. aL
l\1EMORANDUM OPINION
.PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS
This matter is before the court upon motions submitted by the parties. Fo·r the reasons
that follow, Plaintiffs' motions to remand to the Jefferson Circuit Court and to stay proceedings
pending this Court's ruling on the motion to remand are DENIED;.Defendants' motion to
dismiss Defendants Weidle;Walters, and O'Brien is GRANTED; and Defendant's motion to stay
proceedings regarding PlaintiffBrown pe~ding arbitration is GRANTED.
-I. FACTS AND CLAIMS
Plaintiffs are fonner employees ofDefendant I.C. Penney. Plaintiffs claim that their
employment with Defendant J.e.Penney was terminated based upon their medical disabilities, in
violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky.Rev.Stat. Ch. 344. (Complaint, Dkt. # 1). No
federal claim has been asserted. PlairitiffBrown suffered from a knee injwy, and Plaintiff
Matthis suffered from epilepsy. Plaintiffs claim that their emplo:yment was tenninated in order
for Defendant I.C. Penney to save on health care expenses. Defendants WeidIe, Walters, and
O'Brien were supervisors o(~laintiffs during their employment with Defendant I.C. Penney.
This action was removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 from $e Jefferson Circuit Court on
July 3, 1997. Defendant I.C. Penney asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction based
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on diversity of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiffs and Defendants Wieldle, Walters,
and O'Brien are all Kentucky residents. Defendant I.C. Penney claims that the individually
named Defendants have been fraudulently joined and, thus, the individually named Defendants
should be dismissed, and this Court has subj~ctmatter jurisdiction over the remaining action.
The motion to stay proceedings pending mandatory arbitration applies only to Plaintiff
. David S. Brown. PlaintiffBrown was employed as a "Loss Prevention Manager" by I.C.Penney.
Defendant claims that Plaintiffmust arbitrate his claim under the so-called "ICPenney
AltemativeU Program ("Program"). Employees hired or promoted into a position covered by the
Program after March 1, 1996, were required to sign an agreement which stated that adherence to
the Program was a condition to employment. Those already holding covered positions at the
time of implementation w.ere not made to sign such an agreement. However, they were given
. materials which, after explaining the Program, stated,
The JCPENNEY ALTERNATIVE will be expanded to remaining General
Management and all Store Management associates. You and JCPenney are
required to use this program. In the future, ifyou feel you have been unlawfully
tenninated, you must use THE JCPENNEY ALTERNATIVE program, rather
than courtroom litigation to resolve difference~ regarding that tennination.
Dkt. # 5, Defendant's Exhibit #1, at 9. Covered employees were also shown a video tap.e
explaining the program. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff agreed to abide by the arbitration
program by continuing his employment. Plaintiffcontends that further discovery is necessary to
detennine whether there was a sufficient "meeting of the minds" for these acts to constitute a
contract.
II. FRAUDULENT JOINDER
The Sixth Circuit has established that the burden to establish federal jurisdiction is on the
removing party and that the "rem~vingparty bears the burden ofdemonstrating-fraudulent
joinder." Alexand~rv. Electronic Data Systems, 13 F.3d 940, 948-49 (6th eire 1994). The Court
recognized that,
[t]here can be no fraudulent joinder unless it be clear that there can be no recovery
under the law ofthe state on the cause alleged or on the facts in view of the law..
. . O~e or the other at least would be required before it could be said that there was
no real intention to get a joint judgment, and that there was no colorable ground
for so claiming. -
Id. at 949 quoting Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172, 176
(5th Cir. 1968).
The Court established that the ambiguities should benefit the party moving for remand.
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"[A]ny disputed questions and fact ambiguities and ambiguities in the controlling st~te law
[should be resolved] in favor of the nonremoving party." Id. quoting Carriere v. Sears Roebuck"
& Co., 893 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1990)
Defendants claim that Defendants Weidle, Walters, and O'Brien claim were fraudulently
joined because there is no individual liability for supervisors under Kentucky civil rights laws.
Kentucky courts have not addressed this issue.
Ky.Rev.Stat. 344.020(1)(a) states that purpose of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act is to
"provide for execution within the state ofthe policies embodied in [Federal Civil Rights laws.]
Therefore, Kentucky co~s often look to federal law in interpreting the Kentucky Act." See
Palmerv. International Ass'n o/Machinists, 882 S.W.2d 117 (Ky. 1994); White v. Rainbo
Baking Co., 765 S.W.2d 26 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) Despite Plaintiffs' assertions that-remand is
appropriate because Kentucky Courts have not ruled on this issue, it is clear that it is appropriate
to look at federal interpretations of the Kentucky Act.
It is well established that there is no individual liability for supervisors under Title VII.
Wathen v. General Electric Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit has held that the.
substantive legal analysis for claims asserted against individual supervisors is the same under
Title vII "and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.. Id. at 404. Other Federal District Courts have
denied remand to state courts in situations identical to the case at bar. Woodrum v. Lane Bryant
the Limited, Inc., 964 F.Supp. 243 (W.D. Ky. 1997).
. . " In response, Plaintiffs claim that the individually named Defendants can be held liable
under a conspiracy theory based upon Ky.Rev.Stat. 344.?80. aowever, that statute creates a
cause ofaction for someone who was retaliated against for exercising their civil rights. Plaintiffs
in q:ris case present no allegations ofa conspiracy for such retaliation.
Based on the Sixth Circui.t's holding in Alexander, this Court need only fi~d a
"reasonable basis for predicting that state law might impose liability on the "facts inv~lved." 13
F.3d at 949, quoting Carriere v. Sears Roebuck & Co." 893F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1990)
However, based upon the Sixth Circuit's clear rejection of liability for individual superVisors
under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, there is no such reasonable basis in the current case.
Therefore, the individual Defen4ants must be dismissed from this action. Without the
indiVidually named Defendants, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action based
on diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the motion to remand to the Jefferson Circuit Court
must be denied.
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III. ARBITRATION
A. APPLICATION OF FAA TO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
The federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ I et.seq. ("FAA;'), mandates that suits pending
in federal courts regarding matters covered by a contractual arbitration clause must be stayed
pending such arbitration. The FAA states, .
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any ofthe courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application ofone of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the tenns of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
9U.S.C. § 3.
Pursuant to this section, Defendant I.C. Penney has filed a motion to stay proceedings
pending arbitration. PlaintiffBrown claims that the FAA does not apply to this case for a
number of reasons.
1. Exception for seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of worker
engaged "in foreign or interstate commerce,
The FAA does not apply to "contracts ofemployment ofseamen, rai~oad employees, or
any other class ofworkers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. at § 1. A minority of
jurisdictions have applied.this ex~eption to all employment contracts. Slawsky v. True Form
Foundations, 1991 WL 98906 (E.D.Pa. 1991) However, the weight ofcase law takes a narrow
view ofthis exception.
The Supreme Court has held that federal statutory employment-related claims are subject
t~ resolution by mandatory arbitration where there is no law specifically prohibiting arbitration.
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). In Qilmer, the Court held that a
financial services manager must arbitrate his age discrimination claim against his employer
because he had signed a securities registration application which mandated such arbitration. The
Court detennined that it did not have to determine whether the FAA applied to employment
disputes because the contract in that case was with a trade association.
The Sixth Circuit has adopted a very narrow interpretation of the § 1 exemption in
Asplundh Tree Expert Company v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995). The Bates Court
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concluded that "the exclusionary clause of § 1 of the Arbitration Act should be narrowly
construed to apply to employment contracts ofseamen, railroad workers, and any other class of
workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the same way that
seamen and railroad workers are." Id. at 600-01
The Court did acknowledge that the employee in Bates was 'a highly paid employee, "the
arbitration clause is contained in an employment contract between a highly paid executive and
his corporate employer. The parties included in their bargain an agreement that any disputes
would be resolved by arbitration.t~ 71 F.3d at 602. However, there is nothing in the decision
which indicates that the bargaining position of the employee is relevant to the enforceability of
the contract provision.
2. "Maritime" or "Transaction Involving Commerce" Requirement
The FAA applies to "a written provision in any maritime transaction or contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce ...." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Plaintiff interprets this
provision to' mean that the FAA only applies to contracts direCtly involving a ''transaction
involving commerce." Plaintiffrelies on Rushton v. Meijer, Inc., 225 Mich.App. 150 (available
at 1997 WL 476366 (Mich.App.), for this proposition. Base~ upon Rushton, Plaintiff asserts that
the FAA does not apply to the current case because the employment contract in question does not
directly involve commerce. The Michigan state court's decision, however, is contradicted by the
weight of federal case law.
The Supreme Court has stated that the "commerce" requirement should be viewed "not
as an inexplicable limitation on the power ofthe federal courts, but as a necessary qualification
on a statute intended to apply in state and federal courts." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 14 (1984). The Sixth Circuit has acknowledged that under Keating, "§ 2 gives [the FAA] as a
whole the same reach as Congress's commerce clause power." Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v.
B~tes, 71 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir.. 1995) quoting DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guaranty Bnk, 807 F.Supp.
947, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
While the exception for employment contracts for any "class ofworkers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce" has been narrowly interpreted, it is clear that the scope of the
FAA itself is the equivalent to the broad scope of the commerce clause.
3. State Constitutional Protections
Plaintiffclaims that he should be able to proceed with the current action despite .the
alleged arbitration agreement because ofthe protections of the Kentucky Constitution.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts state law. The Supreme
Court has stated that "[i]n § 2 ofthe [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
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claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) In Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), the Court held that § 2 of the
FAA preempted § 229 of the California Labor Code, which provided that actions for the .
collection ofwages may be maintained "withollt regard to the existence of any private agreement
to arbitrate." Id.
The Sixth Circuit has compelled arbitration of discrimination claims under state and
federal civil rights laws and state contract law in Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d
305 (6th Cir. 1991) In Willis, the Plaintiffhad signed the same type ofsecurities registration
applica:ti~n that was in issue in Gilmer. She brought suit under Ky.Rev.Stat. § 344.040, Title
VII, and common law claims ofoutrage and breach ofcontract. The district court ~ompelled
arbitration on the contract claims, but denied the motion to compel the civil rights claims. The
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial.
Plaintiffs assertion that contractual rights do not consume one's statutory right to bring a
civil rights action confuses the real issue in this case. While the existence ofa contractual cause
of action does not prevent a claimant from asserting a statutory cause ofaction, the existence ofa
federal statute mandating arbitration does preempt state statutory or constitutional claims.
Based upon the Sixth Circuit~sholding in Bates, this Court must apply the FAA to
employment contracts. It is clear that Defendant's employees who signed employment contracts
which state~ that adherence to the Program was a condition to employment would be bound by
that agreement. Therefore, the question becomes whether Brown's receipt of the materials
describing the program constitutes an enforceable employment contract in the absence ofa
. writing signed by the parties.
B. APPLICATION OF FAA TO IMPLIED EMPLOYMENT CONTRActs
1. Writing Requ~rementUnder the FAA
Plaintiffasserts that there is no enforceable contract in this case because there is no
writing signed by both parties. Again, the FAA applies to a ''written provision in any maritime
transaction or contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ...." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
Plaintiff fails to offer any authority that the FAA only applies to written contracts signed by the
parties. A number of federal cases have detennined that while the FAA requires a writing~ "it
does not require that the writing be signed by the parties.~' Genesco, Inc. v. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd.,
815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1'987) citing Medical Development Corp. v. Indusrial Molding Corp.,
.479 F.2d 345, 348 (lOth Cir. 1973).
Plaintiffdoes not dispute that he received documents explaining the I.e.Penney
Alternative prior to the effective date of the program. Therefore the writing requirement is
satisfied.
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2. Consideration for Modification of Employment Contracts
The Kentucky Supreme Court has indicated that continued employment is sufficient
consideration for modification ofan employment contract. Higdon Food Service, Inc. v. Walker,
641 S.W.2d 750 (Ky. 1982) In Higdon_ an employee had worked for a wholesale grocery
company for four years with no written employment contract. All employees were then required
to sign an anti-compete agreement, arguably with no consideration to themselves. The Court
held that the contract signed by the employees was the equivalent ofa u new employment" and
stated U[t]he hiring itself (or rehiring, ifone prefers that word) was sufficient consideration for
the c~nditions agreed to by [the employee]" Id. at 751
Higdon strongly indicates that under Kentucky law, continued employnlent is sufficient
consideration for modification of an employment con~act.1 Therefore, the question becomes
whether an employer can impose a binding employment contract on existing employees absent a
signed contract.
3. Creation of Implied Employment Contracts in Kentucky
A federal court in Kentucky has found that while "Kentucky courts have not specifically
addressed the requirements for creating an implied employment contract.... They have held that
the at-will employment relationship may be modified, without additional consideration if the
employer clearly states an intention to do so." Hines v. ElfAtochem North America, Inc._ 813
F.Supp. 550 (W.D. Ky. 1993) citing Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489
(Ky. 1983). The Court concluded 4;'that in certain circumstances the Kentucky Supreme Court
will treat employment manuals or other statements 'ofpolicy as contracts binding on the
employer." Id. at 552 The Court held that the employer's posting ofmles ofconduct could be
construed as creating an impli~employment contract and thus denied the employer's motion to
dismiss the claim for breach ofan implied contract. Id. at 553. If such an implied contract is
binding on the employer, it must ~e binding on the employee.
Based on this case.law, it appears that Kentucky general contract law would find an
implied e~ploymentcontract where the employer notifies the employee ofa change in pol~cy
and the employee continues working.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff received the materials explaining the program.
Therefore, the Court must detennine whether the language of the materials given to Plaintiffare
sufficient, as a matter of law, to put the employee on notice ofa change in his employment terms.
I However, the Court did fmd in the alternative that the employee did receive consideration because the
new contract indicated that he could only be discharged for good cause as opposed to "at will". 641 S.W.2d at 752.
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4. Implied Employment Contract as a Matter of Law
Plaintiffasserts that the existence ofa contract is a fact question for the jury, and Plaintiff
correctly asserts that there was no question ofwhether a contract existed in the cases cited by
Defendant that enforced the FAA. Plaintiffclaims that further discovery is necessary to
detennine whether PlaintiffBrown agreed to ~the arbitration provision as a condition ofcontinued
employment, and thus, whether there was a sufficient "meeting of the minds~' to fonn a contract.
Plaintiffcites to Hathaway v. Gen'I Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1986), in which the
Texas Supreme Court held that in order for a employment contract modification to be effective,
"an employer asserting modification must prove that he unequivically notified the employee of
·definite changes in employment tenns." Id. at 229. The Texas court also held that once notice is
proven, the employee's continued employment was proofof the employees acceptance of the.
modification. The Hathaway Court found that there was an issue of fact in that case because the
parties told different versions ofwhat the employee was told. In the case at hand, there is no
dispute whether PlaintiffBrown· received the above quoted materials.
Plaintiffalso cites to Barger v.·Gen'l Electric Co., 599 F.Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1984) for
4 the proposition that while an employment contract may be modified and continuing to work may
be co~ideredacceptance of the changes, the question ofwhether there was a contract, as well as
the teOns of the alleged contract, were "triable issues of fact." The Court interpreted Virginia
employment law as follows:
First, an employer may make several different promises in addition to a promise
ofsalary in exchange for the employee's single promise to faithfully render his
. service~; there is no failure ofconsideration so long as .b·oth parties have made
some obligation. Second, an employer can con~ctuallysurrender his power to
tenninate at-will. Even if the employee can still quit at will, the contract is not
void for lack ofconsideration; there is no requirement ofcomplete mutuality of
.obligation. Third, an employee's continued service and his failure to exercise his
power to te~natehis employment is sufficient consideration for an additional
promise by the employer whi~hmodifies the teons ofthe employment contract.
Id. The Barger court remanded the proceedings to detennine whether the employee handbook
could be enforced against the employer as a employment contract.
A Federal District Court in South Carolina has ruled on a case nearly identical to the
current case in Reese v. Commercial Credit Corpor:ation, 955 F.Supp. 567 (D.S.C. 1997). The
court, applying South Carolina general contract law, found that the employee's continued
employment.after receiving notice ofthe employer's change in policy requiring arbitration for
wrongful terinination claims constituted a valid employment contract. Id.
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Plaintiffdistinguishes Reese by claiming that Kentucky Constitutional protections make
application ofSouth Carolina general contract law inapplicable. However, since the FAA
preempts Kentucky Constitutional protections, such protections against arbitration should not be
considered when looking at general contract law in Kentucky for purposes ofwhether there was a
binding implied contract in this situation. In other words, it is not enough to claim that Kentucky
general contract law would not recognize an arbitration provision in this situation because the
FAA states that such provisions are not invalid as a matter of law. In order to invalidate the
provision, Plaintiffwould have to demonstrate that the contract is invalid for a reason beyond the
mere inclusion ofan arbitration provision.
Plaintiffcites to The Prudential Insur. Co. ofAmerica v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1993) where the Ninth Circuit detennined that a signed securities exchange fonn mandating
arbitration did not apply to a sexual discrimination claim against the claimant's employer. The
Court concluded that "a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to forego her statutory remedies
and arbitrate her claims ifshe has knowingly agreed to submi~ such suits to arbitration." Id. at
1305. The court held that since the fonn signed by the plaintiff"did not purport to describe the
types ofdisputes that were to be subject to arbitration," the plaintiffdid not knowingly forego her
statutory remedies and could not be forced to arbitrate her sexual discrimination.claim. Id.
Unlike in Lai, the language of the materials provided by Defendant I.C. Penney clearly
described the types ofdisputes that were to be subject to arbitration. The materials received· by
Plaintiff stated, "ifyou feel you have been unlawfully terminated, you must use the JCPENNEY
ALTERNATIVE program [mandatory arbitration], rather than courtroom litigation to resolve
differences regarding that tennination."
Based on this weight ofauthority, it is clear that the ~aterials received by Plaintiffare
. sufficient to establish an implied employment contra.ct as a matter of law. This 'con~ct includes
a provision calling for mandatory arbitration ofemployment disputes, therefore, the FAA must
be applied, and the litigation.reg~dingPlaintiffBrown must be stayed pending such arbitration.
c. PUBLIC POLICY
While there appears to be some legitimate public policy concerns regarding the ability of
~ employer to force an employee to contract away constitutional and statutory rights, the
overwhelming weight ofauthority discounts such public policy concerns. Mandatory arbitration
merely denies immediate access to the courts, it does not denying the substance of the underlying
claim. The Supreme Court has noted that plaintiffs who arbitrate their statutory claims do not
C'forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute." Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628, 105
S.Ct. at 3354. The FAA provides a remedy should the arbitration proceedings not be conducted
fairly. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
Given the weight ofcase law enforcing the FAA in these situatIons, and the U.S.
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Supreme Court's encouragement ofarbitration under the FAA, any such public policy arguments
against mandatory arbitration ultimately fail.
The Sixth Circuit has detennined that the FAA applies to most employment contracts that
contain such a clause. The FAA preempts state constitutional protections. While there was no
expressly bargained for signed contract in the case at hand, Kentucky case law indicates that the
tenns imposed upon l.e.Penney's employees were contractually effective. Therefore,
I.e.Penney's motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration must be granted.
An appropriate order shall issue.
/' ...
/J.~
Thomas B. Russell, Judge
United States District Court
ENTERED
JAN B
atrAE~I~E
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MEDIATION FEE SCHEDULE
Introduction
Federal and state laws reflecting societal intolerance for certain workplace conduct, as well as court decisions
interpreting and applying those statutes, have redefined responsible corporate practice and employee
relations. Increasingly, employers and employees face workplace disputes involving alleged wrongful
termination, sexual harassment, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age and
disability.
As courts and administrative agencies become less accessible to civil litigants, employers and their
employees now see alternative dispute resolution rADR") as a way to promptly and effectively resolve
workplace disputes. ADR procedures are becoming more common in contracts of employment, personnel
manuals and employee handbooks. Increasingly, corporations and their employees look to the American
Arbitration Association as a resource in developing prompt and effective employment procedures for
employment-related disputes.
These rules have been developed for employers and employees who wish to use a private alternative to
resolve their disputes, enabling them to have complaints heard by an impartial person with expertise in the
employment field. These procedures benefit both the employer and the individual employee by making it
possible to resolve disputes without extensive litigation.
Role of the American Arbitration Association
The American Arbitration Association, founded in 1926, is a not-for-profit, public service organization
dedicated to the resolution of disputes through mediation, arbitration, elections, and other voluntary dispute
resolution procedures. Over 4,000,000 workers are now covered by employment ADR plans administered by
theAAA.
In addition, the AAA provides education and training, specialized publications, and research on all forms of
dispute settlement. With 36 offices nationwide and cooperative agreements with arbitral institutions in 38
other nations, the American Arbitration Association is the nation's largest private provider of ADR services.
For seventy-five years, the American Arbitration Association has set the standards for the development of fair
and equitable dispute resolution procedures. The development of the National Rules for the Reso~ution of
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Employment Disputes, and the reconstitution of a select and diverse roster of expert neutrals to hear and
resolve disputes, are the most recent initiatives of the Association to provide private, efficient and cost-
effective procedures for out-of-court settlement of workplace disputes.
Legal Basis of Employment ADR
Since the beginning of this decade, Congress has twice reaffirmed the important role of ADR in the area of
employment discrimination - in the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, and a year later in Section 118 of
the Civil Rights Act in 1991. While technically not dealing with a contract of employment, the seminal court
case dealing with the arbitration of disputes relating to the non-union workplace is Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Cl1647 (1991). The Supreme Court refused to invalidate
Gilmer's agreement with the New York Stock Exchange that he would arbitrate disputes with his employer
(Interstate/ Johnson Lane) simply because he was obliged to sign it in order to work as a securities dealer
whose trades were executed on the Exchange. Although the Gilmer Court found that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act did not predude arbitration of age discrimination daims, it specifically declined to decide
whether employment arbitration agreements were the type of "contracts of employment- which are not made
enforceable by the Federal Arbitration Act.
Since Gilmer, lower federal courts have generally enforced employer-imposed ADR programs, as long as the
programs are fair. Some courts have held that the employee must have received adequate notice of the
program. However, the issue of binding arbitration programs that are a condition of employment is still
giving rise to litigation.
The Fairness Issue: The Due Process Protocol
,The Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment
Relationship was developed in 1995 by a speClial task force composed of individuals representing
management, labor, employment, civil rights organizations, private administrative agencies, government, and
the American Arbitration Association. The Due Process Protocol, which was endorsed by the Association in
1995, seeks to ensure fairness and equity in resolving workplace disputes. The Due Process Protocol
encourages mediation and arbitration of statutory disputes, provided there are due process safeguards. It
conveys the hope that ADR will reduce delays caused by the huge backlog of cases pending before
administrative agencies and the courts. The Due Process Protocol ·recognizes the dilemma inherent in the
timing of an agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate statutory disputes· but does not take a position on whether
an employer can require a pre-dispute. binding arbitration program as a condition of employment
The Due Process Protocol has been endorsed by organizations representing a broad range of
constituencies. They include the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association Labor and
Employment Section, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and the National Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. The
National Employment Lawyers Association has endorsed the substantive provisions of the Due Process
Protocol. It has been incorporated into the ADR procedures of the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination (MCAD) and into the Report of the United States Secretary of Labor's Task Force in
Excellence in State and Local Government
AAA's Employment ADR Rules
On June 1, 1996, the Association issued National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes. The
rules reflected the guidelines outtined in the Due Process Protocol and were based upon the AAA's California
Employment Dispute Resolution Rules, which were developed by a committee of employment management
and plaintiff attorneys. retired judges and arbitrators, in addition to Association executives. The revised rules
were developed for employers and employees who wish to use a private alternative to resolve their disputes.
The rules enabled parties to have complaints heard by an impartial person of their joint selection, with
expertise in the employment field. Both employers and individual employees benefit by having experts
resolve their disputes without the costs and delay of litigation. The rules included procedures which ensure
'due process in both the mediation and arbitration of employment disputes. After a year of use, the rules have
been amended to address technical issues.
AAA's Policy on Employment ADR
The AAA's policy on employment ADR is guided by the state of existing law, as well as its obligation to act in
an impartial manner. In following the law. and in the interest of prOViding an appropriate forum for the
resolution of employment disputes, the Association administers dispute resolution programs which meet the
d~e process standards as outlined in its National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes and the
Due Process Protocol. If the Association determines that a dispute resolution program on its face
substantially and materially deviates from the minimum due process standards of the National Rules for the
Resolution of Employment Disputes and the Due Process Protocol, the Association may decline to administer
cases under that program. Other issues will be presented to the arbitrator for determination.
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Notification
If an employer intends to utilize the dispute resolution services of the Association in an employment ADR
plan, it shall, at least thirty (30) days prior to the planned effective date of the program: (1) notify the
Association of its intention to do so; and (2) provide the Association with a copy of the employment dispute
resolution plan. If an employer does not comply with this requirement, the Association reserves the right to
decline its administrative services. Copies of all plans should be sent to the American Arbitration
Association's Office of Program Development, 335 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017; FAX: 212-716-
5913.
Designing an ADR Program
The guiding principle in designing a successful employment ADR system is that it must be fair in fact and
perception. The American Arbitration Association has considerable experience in administering and assisting
in the design of employment ADR plans, which gives it an informed perspective on how to effectively design
ADR systems, as well as the problems to avoid. Its guidance to those designing employment ADR systems is
summarized as follows:
The American Arbitration Association encourages employers to consider the wide range of legally.
available options to resolve workplace disputes outside the courtroom.
A special emphasis is placed by the Association on encouraging the development of in-house dispute
resolution procedures, such as open door policies, ombuds, peer review, and internal mediation.
The Association recommends an external mediation component to resolve disputes not settled by the
internal dispute resolution process.
Programs which use arbitration .as a final step may employ:
pre-dispute, voluntary final and binding arbitration;
pre-dispute, mandatory nonbinding arbitration;
pre-dispute, mandatory final and binding arbitration; or
post-dispute, voluntary final and binding arbitration.
Although the AM administers binding arbitration systems that have been required as a condition of
initial or continued employment, such programs must be consistent with the Association's National Rules for
the Resolution of Employment Disputes and the Due Process Protocol.
Specific guidance on the responsible development and design of employment ADR systems is contained in
the Association's publication, Resolving Employment Disputes: A Practical Guide, which is available from any
AM office.
Alternative Dispute Resolution Options
Open Door Policy: Employees are encouraged to meet with their immediate manager or supervisor to
discuss problems arising out of the workplace environment. In some systems, the employee is free to
approach anyone in the chain of command.
Ombuds: A neutral third party (either from within or outside the company) is designated to confidentially
investigate and propose settlement of employment complaints brought by employees.
Peer Review: A panel of employees (or employees and managers) works together to resolve employment
complaints. Peer review panel members are trained in the handling of sensitive issues.
Internal Mediation: A process for resolving disputes in which a neutral third person from within the company,
trained in mediation techniques, helps the disputing parties negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement.
Mediation is a nonbinding process in which the parties discuss their disputes with an impartial person who
assists them in reaching a settlement. The mediator may suggest ways of resolving the dispute but may not
impose a settlement on the parties.
Fact-Finding: The investigation of a complaint by an impartial third person (or team) who examines the
complaint and the facts and issues a non-binding report. Fact-finding is particularly helpful for allegations of
sexual harassment, where a fact-finding team, composed of one male and one female neutral, investigates
the allegations and presents its findings to the employer and the employee.
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Arbitration: Arbitration is generally defined as the submission of disputes to one or more impartial persons
for final and binding determination. It can be the final step in a workplace program that includes other dispute
resolution methods. There are many possibilities for designing this final step. They include:
Pre-Dispute, Voluntary Final and Binding Arbitration: The parties agree in advance, on a
voluntary basis, to use arbitration to resolve disputes and they are bound by the outcome.
Pre-Dispute, Mandatory Nonbinding Arbitration: The parties must use the arbitration process to
resolve disputes, but they are not bound by the outcome.
Pre-Dispute, Mandatory Final and Binding Arbitration: The parties must arbitrate unresolved
disputes and they are bound by the outcome.
Post-Dispute, Voluntary Final and Binding Arbitration: The parties have the option of deciding
whether to use final and binding arbitration after a dispute arises.
Types of Disputes Covered
The dispute resolution procedures contained in this booklet can be inserted into an employee personnel
manual, an employment application of an individual employment agreement, or can be used for a specific
dispute. They do not apply to disputes arising out of collective bargaining agreements.
NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
1. Applicable Rules of Arbitration
The parties shall be deemed to have made these rules a part of their arbitration agreement whenever they
have provided for arbitration by the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter fAAAA") or under its National
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes. If a party establishes that an adverse material
inconsistency exists between the arbitration agreement and these rules, the arbitrator shall apply these rules.
If, within thirty (30) days after the Association's commencement of administration, a party seeks judicial
intervention with respect to a pending arbitration, the Association will suspend administration for sixty (60)
days to permit the party to obtain a stay of arbitration from the court.
These rules, and any amendment of them, shall apply in the form obtaining at the time the demand for
arbitration or submission is received by the AAA.
2. Notification
An employer intending to incorporate these rules or to refer to the dispute resolution services of the AAA in an
employment ADR plan, shall, at least thirty (30) days prior to the planned effective date of the program:
i) notify the Association of its intention to do so and,
iQ provide the Association with a copy of the employment dispute resolution plan.
Compliance with this requirement shall not preclude an arbitrator from entertaining challenges as provided in
Section 1. If an employer does not comply with this requirement, the Association reserves the right to decline
its administrative services.
3. AAA as Administrator of the Arbitration
When parties agree to arbitrate under these rules, or when they provide for arbitration by the AAA and an
arbitration is initiated under these rules, they thereby authorize the AAA to administer the arbitration. The
authority and duties of the AAA are prescribed in these rUles, and may be carried out through such of the
AAA's representatives as it may direct.
4. Initiation of Arbitration
Arbitration shall be initiated in the following manner.
a. The parties may submit a joint request for arbitration.
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b. In the absence of a joint request for arbitration:
(i) The initiating party (hereinafter "Claimant(s]") shall:
(1) File a written notice (hereinafter "Demand") of its intention to arbitrate at any regional office
of the AAA, within the time limit established by the applicable statute of limitations if the dispute
involves statutory rights. If no statutory rights are involved, the time limit established by the
applicable arbitration agreement shall be followed. Any dispute over such issues shall be referred
to the arbitrator. The filing shall be made in duplicate, and each copy shall include the applicable
I arbitration agreement. The Demand shall set forth the names, addresses, and telephone numbers
of the parties; a brief statement of the nature of the dispute; the amount in controversy, if any; the
remedy sought; and requested hearing location.
(2) Simultaneously mail a copy of the Demand to the party (hereinafter "Respondent[s]").
(3) Include with its Demand the applicable filing fee, unless the parties agree to some other
method of fee advancement.
(ii) The Respondent(s) shall file an Answer with the AAA within ten (10) days after the date of the
letter from the AAA acknowledging receipt of the Demand. The Answer shall provide the
Respondent's brief response to the claim and the issues presented. The Respondent(s) shall make
its filing in duplicate with the AAA, and simultaneously shall mail a copy of the Answer to the Claimant.
(iii) The Respondent(s):
(1) May file a counterclaim with the AAA within ten (10) days after the letter from the AAA
acknowledging receipt of the Demand. The filing shall be made in duplicate. The counterclaim shall
set forth the nature of the claim, the amount in controversy, if any, and the remedy sought.
(2) Simultaneously shall mail a copy of any counterclaim to the Claimant.
(3) Shall include with its filing the applicable filing fee provided for by these rules.
(iv) The Claimant may file an Answer to the counterclaim with the AM within ten (10) days after
the date of the letter from the AAA acknowledging receipt of the counterclaim. The Answer shall
provide Claimant's brief response to the counterclaim and the issues presented. The Claimant shall
make its filing in duplicate with the AAA, and simultaneously shall mail a copy of the Answerto the
Respondent(s).
c. The form of any filing in these rules shall not be subject to technical pleading requirements.
5. Changes of Claim
Before the appointment of the arbitrator, if either party desires to offer a new or different claim or
counterclaim, such party must do so in writing by filing a written statement with the AAA and simultaneously
mailing a copy to the other party(s), who shall have ten (10) days from the date of such mailing within which to
file an answer with the AM. After the appointment of the arbitrator, a party may offer a new or different claim
or counterclaim only at the discretion of the arbitrator.
6. Administrative and Mediation Conferences
Before the appointment of the arbitrator, any party may request, or the AM, in its discretion, may schedule an
administrative conference with a representative of the AAA and the parties and/or their representatives. The
purpose of the administrative conference is to organize and expedite the arbitration, explore its administrative
aspects, establish the most efficient means of selecting an arbitrator, and to consider mediation as a dispute
resolution option. There is no administrative fee for this service.
At any time after the filing of the Demand, with the consent of the parties, the AM will arrange a mediation
conference under its Mediation Rules to facilitate settlement. The mediator shall not be any arbitrator
appointed to the case, except by mutual agreement of the parties. There is no administrative fee for initiating
a mediation under AAA Mediation Rules for parties to a pending arbitration.
7. Discovery
The arbitrator shall have the authority to order such discovery, by way of deposition, interrogatory, document
I· 60
'l'he AAA Website - Kules
production, or otherwise, as the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in
dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration.
8. Arbitration Management Conference
As soon as possible after the appointment of the arbitrator but not later than sixty (60) days thereafter, the
arbitrator shall conduct an Arbitration Management Conference with the parties and/or their representatives,
in person or by telephone, to explore and resolve matters that will expedite the arbitration proceedings. The
specific matters to be addressed include:
(i) the issues to be arbitrated;
(ii) the date, time, place and estimated duration of the hearing;
(iii) the resolution of outstanding discovery issues and establishment of discovery parameters:
(iv) the law, standards, rules of evidence and burdens of proof that are to apply to the proceeding;
(v) the exchange of stipulations and declarations regarding facts, exhibits, witnesses and other
"issues;
(vi) the names of witnesses (including expert witnesses), the scope of witness testimony, and
witness exclusion;
(vii) the value of bifurcating the arbitration into a liability phase and damages phase;
(viii) the need for a stenographic record;
(ix) whether the parties will summarize their arguments orally or in writing;
(x) the form of the award;
(xi) any other issues relating to the subject or conduct of the arbitration;
(xii) the allocation of attorney's fees and costs.
The arbitrator shall issue oral or written orders reflecting his or her decisions on the above matters and may
conduct additional conferences when the need arises.
There is no AAA administrative fee for an Arbitration Management Conference.
9. Location of the Arbitration
The parties may designate the location of the arbitration by mutual agreement. In the absence of such
agreement before the appointment of the arbitrator, any party may request a specific hearing location by
notifying the AAA in writing and simultaneously mailing a copy of the request to the other party(s). If the AAA
receives no objection within ten (10) days of the date of the request, the hearing shall be held at the
requested location. If a timely objection is filed with the AAA, the AAA shalt have the power to determine the
location and its decision shall be final and binding. After the appointment of the arbitrator, the arbitrator shall
resolve all disputes reg~rding the location of the hearing.
10. Date and Time of Hearing
The arbitrator shall have the authority to set the date and time of the hearing in consultation with the parties.
11. Qualifications to Serve as Arbitrator and Rights of Parties to Disqualify Arbitrator
a. Standards of Experience and Neutrality
(i) Arbitrators serving under these rules shall be experienced in the field of employment law.
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(ii) Arbitrators serving under these rules shall have no personal or financial interest in the
results of the proceedings in which they are appointed and shall have no relation to the underlying
dispute or to the parties or their counsel that may create an appearance of bias.
(iii) The roster of available arbitrators will be established on a non-discriminatory basis. diverse
by gender, ethnicity, background and qualifications.
(iv) The Association may. upon request of a party or upon its own initiative, supplement the list
of proposed arbitrators in disputes arising out of individually negotiated employment contracts with
persons from the regular Commercial Roster, to allow the Association to respond to the particular
needs of the dispute. In multi-arbitrator disputes, at least one of the arbitrators shall be experienced
in the field of employment law.
b. Standards of Disclosure by Arbitrator
Prior to accepting appointment, the prospective arbitrator shall disclose all information that might be
relevant to the standards of neutrality set forth in this Section, including but not limited to service as
a neutral in any past or pending case involving any of the parties and/or their representatives or that
may prevent a prompt hearing.
c. Disqualification for Failure To Meet Standards of Experience and Neutrality
An arbitrator may be disqualified in two ways:
(i) No later than ten (10) days after the appointment of the arbitrator. all parties jointly may
challenge the qualifications of an arbitrator by communicating their objection to the AAA in writing,
Upon receipt of a joint objection. the arbitrator shall be replaced. .
(ii) Any party may chaUenge the qualifications of an arbitrator by communicating its objection to
the AAA in writing. Upon receipt of the objection, the AAA either shall replace the arbitrator or
communicate the objection to the other parties. If any party believes that the objection does not
merit disqualification of the arbitrator, the party shall so communicate to the AAA and to the other
parties within ten (10) days of the receipt of the objection from the AAA. Upon objection of a party
to the service of an arbitrator, the AAA shall determine whether the arbitrator should be disqualified
and shall inform the parties of its decision, which shall be conclusive.
12. Number and Appoinbnent of Neutral Arbitrators
a. If the parties do not specify the number of arbitrators, the dispute shall be heard and determined by
one arbitrator. If the parties cannot agree upon the number of arbitrators, the AAA shall have the authority to
determine the number of arbitrators.
b. If the parties have not appointed an arbitrator and have not provided any method of appointment. the
arbitrator shall be appointed in the following manner:
(i) Immediately after it receives the Demand, the AAA shall mail simultaneously to each party a
letter containing an identical list of the names of all arbitrators who are members of the regional
Employment Dispute Resolution Roster.
(ii) Each party shall have ten (10) days from the date of the letter in which to select the name of a
mutually acceptable arbitrator to hear and determine their dispute. If the parties cannot agree upon a
mutually acceptable arbitrator, they shall so notify the AAA. Within ten (10) days of the receipt of that
notice. the AAA shall send the parties a shorter list of arbitrators who are members of the regional
Employment Dispute Resolution Roster. Each party shall have ten (10) days from the date of the
letter containing the revised list to strike any names objected to, number the remaining names in order
of preference, and return the list to the AAA. If a party does not return the list within the time
specified, aU of the listed persons shall be deemed acceptable to that party.
(iii) The AAA shall invite the acceptance of the arbitrator whom both parties have selected as
mutually acceptable or, in the case of resort to the ranking procedure, the arbitrator who has received
the highest rating in the order of preference that the parties have specified.
(iv) If the parties fail to agree on any of the persons whom the AAA submits for consideration, or if
mutually acceptable arbitrators are unable to act, or if for any other reason the appointment cannot be
made from the list of persons whom the AAA submits for consideration, the AAA shall have the power
to make the appointment from among other members of the Roster without the submission of
additional lists.
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13. Vacancies
If for any reason an arbitrator is unable to perform the duties of the office, the AM may, on proof satisfactory
to it, declare the office vacant. The vacancy shall be filled in accordance with applicable provisions of these
Rules.
In the event of a vacancy in a panel of neutral arbitrators after the hearings have commenced, the remaining
arbitrator or arbitrators may continue with the hearing and determination of the controversy, unless the parties
agree otherwise,
14. Representation
Any party may be represented by counselor other authorized representative. For parties without
representation the AM will, upon request, provide reference to institutions which might offer assistance. A
party who intends to be represented shall notify the other party and the AM of the name and address of the
representative at least ten (10) days prior to the date set for the hearing or conference at which that person is
first to appear. If a representative files a Demand or an Answer, the obligation to give notice of representative
status is deemed satisfied.
15. Stenographic Record
Any party desiring a stenographic record shall make arrangements directly with a stenographer and shall
notify the other parties of these arrangements at least three days in advance of the hearing. The requesting
party or parties shall pay the cost of the record. If the transcript is agreed by the parties, or determined by the
arbitrator to be the official record of the proceeding, it must be provided to the arbitrator and made available to
the other parties for inspection, at a date, time, and place determined by the arbitrator.
16. Interpreters
Any party wishing an interpreter shall make all arrangements directly with the interpreter and shall assume the
costs of the service.
17. Attendance at Hearings
The arbitrator shall have the authority to exclude witnesses, other than a party, from the hearing during the
testimony of any other witness. The arbitrator also shall have the authority to decide whether any person who
is not a witness may attend the hearing.
18. Confidentiality
The arbitrator shall maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and shall have the authority to make
appropriate rulings to safeguard that confidentiality, unless the parties agree otherwise or the law provides to
the contrary.
19. Postponements
The arbitrator: (1) may postpone any hearing upon the request of a party for good cause shown; (2) must
postpone any hearing upon the mutual agreement of the parties; and (3) may postpone any hearing on his or
her own initiative.
20. Oaths
Before proceeding with the first hearing, each arbitrator may take an oath of office and, if required by law,
shall do so. The arbitrator may require witnesses to testify under oath administered by any duly qualified
person and, if it is required by law or requested by any party. shall do so.
21. Majority Decision
All decisions and awards of the arbitrators must be by a majority, unless the unanimous decision of all
arbitrators is expressly required by the arbitration agreement or by law.
22. Order of Proceedings and Communication with Arbitrators
A hearing shall be opened by: (1) filing the oath of the arbitrator, where required; (2) recording the date, time,
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and place of the hearing; (3) recording the presence of the arbitrator, the parties, and their representatives, if
any; and (4) receiving into the record the Demand and the Answer, if any. The arbitrator may, at the beginning
of the hearing, ask for statements clarifying the issues involved.
The parties shall bear the same burdens of proof and burdens of producing evidence as would apply if their
claims and counterclaims had been brought in court.
Witnesses for each party shall submit to direct and cross examination as approved by the arbitrator.
With the exception of the rules regarding the allocation of the burdens of proof and going forward with the
evidence, the arbitrator has the authority to set the rules for the conduct of the proceedings and shall
exercise that authority to afford a full and equal opportunity to all parties to present any evidence that the
arbitrator deems material and relevant to the resolution of the dispute.
Documentary and other forms of physical evidence, when offered by either party, may be received in
evidence by the arbitrator.
The names and addresses of all witnesses and a description of the exhibits in the order received shall be
made a part of the record.
There shall be no ex parte communication with ihe arbitrator, unless the parties and the arbitrator agree to the
contrary in advance of the communication.
23. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party or Representative
Unless the taw provides to the contrary, the arbitration may proceed in the absence of any party or
representative who, after due notice, fails to be present or fails to obtain a postponement. An award shall not
be based solely on the default of a party. The arbitrator shall require the party who is in attendance to present
such evidence as the arbitrator may require for the making of the award.
24. Evidence
The parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material to the dispute and shall produce such
evidence as the arbitrator deems necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. An
arbitrator or other person authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or documents may do so upon the request
of any party or independently.
The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence offered, and conformity to
legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary. The arbitrator may in his or her discretion direct the order of
proof, bifurcate proceedings, exclude cumulative or irrelevant testimony or other evidence, and direct the
parties to focus their presentations on issues the decision of which could dispose of all or part of the case. All
evidence shall be taken in the presence of all of the arbitrators and all of the parties, except where any party
is absent, in default, or has waived the right to be present.
25. Evidence by Affidavit or Declaration and PosteHearing Filing of Documents or Other Evidence
The arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of witnesses by affidavit, but shall give it only such
weight as the arbitrator deems it entitled to after consideration of any objection made to its admission.
"If the parties agree or the arbitrator directs that documents or other evidence may be submitted to the
arbitrator after the hearing, the documents or other evidence shall be filed with the AAA for transmission to the
arbitrator, unless the parties agree to a different method of distribution. All parties shall be afforded an
opportunity to examine such documents or other evidence and to lodge appropriate objections, if any.
26. Inspection or Investigation
An arbitrator finding it necessary to make an inspection or investigation in connection with the arbitration shall
dired the AM to so advise the parties. The arbitrator shall set the date and time~ and the AM shall notify the
parties. Any party who so desires may be present during the inspection or investigation. In the event that one
or all parties are not present during the inspedion or investigation, the arbitrator shall make an oral or written
report to the parties and afford them an opportunity to comment
27. Interim Measures
At the request of any party. the arbitrator may take whatever interim measures he or she deems necessary
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with respect to the dispute, including measures for the conservation of property.
Such interim measures may be taken in the form of an interim award and the arbitrator may require security
for the costs of such measures.
28. Closing of Hearing
The arbitrator shall specifically inquire of all parties whether they have any further proofs to offer or witnesses
to be heard. Upon receiving negative replies or if satisfied that the record is complete, the arbitrator shall
declare the hearing closed.
If briefs are to be filed, the hearing shall be declared closed as of the final date set by the arbitrator for the
receipt of briefs. If documents are to be filed as provided in Section 25 and the date set for their receipt is later
than that set for the receipt of briefs, the later date shall be the date of closing the hearing. The time
limit within which the arbitrator is required to make the award shall commence to run, in the absence of other
agreements by the parties, upon closing of the hearing.
. 29. Reopening Qf Hearing
The hearing may be reopened by the arbitrator upon the arbitrator's initiative, or upon application of a party for
cause shown, at any time before the award is made. If reopening the hearing would prevent the making of the
award within the specific time agreed on by the parties in the contract{s) out of which the controversy has
arisen, the matter may not be reopened unless the parties agree on an extension of time. When no specific
date is fixed in the contract, the arbitrator may reopen the hearing and shall have thirty (30) days from the
dosing of the reopened hearing within which to make an award.
30. Waiver of Oral Hearing
The parties may provide, by written agreement, for the waiver of oral hearings in any case. If the parties are
unable to agree as to the procedure, the AAA shall specify a fair and equitable procedure.
31. Waiver of Objection/Lack of Compliance with These Rules
Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after knowledge that any provision or requirement of these rules
has not been complied with, and who fails to state objections thereto in writing, shall be deemed to have
waived the right to object.
32. Extensions of Time
The parties may modify any period of time by mutual agreement. The AAA or the arbitrator may for good
cause extend any period of time established by these Rules, except the time for making the award. The AAA
shall notify the parties of any extension.
33. Serving of Notice .
Each party shall be deemed to have consented that any papers, notices, or process necessary or proper for
the initiation or continuation of an arbitration under these Rules; for any court adions in connection therewith;
or for the entry of jUdgment on an award made under these procedures may be served on a party by mail
addressed to the party or its representative at the last known address or by personal service, in or outside the
state where the arbitration is to be held.
The AAA and the parties may also use facsimile transmission, telex, telegram, or other written forms of
electronic communication to give the notices required by these Rules.
34. The Award
a. The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or
specified by law, no later than thirty (30) days from the date of closing of the hearing or, if oral hearings have
been waived, from the date of the AAA's transmittal of the final statements and proofs to the arbitrator.
b. An award issued under these rules shall be publicly available, on a cost basis. The names of the
parties and witnesses will not be publicly available, unless a party expressly agrees to have its name made
public in the award.
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c. The award shall be in writing and shall be signed by a majority of the arbitrators and shall provide the
written reasons for the award unless the parties agree otherwise. It shall be executed in the manner required
bylaw.
d. The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable, including
any remedy or relief that would have been available to the parties had the matter been heard in court. The
arbitrator shall, in the award, assess arbitration fees, expenses, and compensation as provided in Sections
38, 39, and 40 in favor of any party and, in the event any administrative fees or expenses are due the AAA, in
favor of the AAA.
e. The arbitrator shall have the authority to provide for the reimbursement of representative's fees, in
whole or in part, as part of the remedy, in accordance with applicable law.
f. If the parties settle their dispute during the course of the arbitration, the arbitrator may set forth the
terms of the settlement in a consent award.
g. The parties shall accept as legal delivery of the award the placing of the award or a true copy thereof
in the mail, addressed to a party or its representative at the last known address, personal service of the
award, or the filing of the award in any manner that may be required by law.
h. The arbitrator's award shall be final and binding. Judicial review shall be limited, as provided by law.
35. Modification of Award
Within twenty (20) days after the transmittal of an award, any party, upon notice to the other parties, may
request the arbitrator to correct any clerical, typographical, technical or computational errors in the award.
The arbitrator is not empowered to redetermine the merits of any claim already decided.
The other parties shall be given ten (10) days to respond to the request. The arbitrator shall dispose of the
request within twenty (20) days after transmittal by the AAA to the arbitrator of the request and any response
thereto.
If applicable law requires a different procedural time frame, that procedure shall be followed.
36. Release of Documents for Judicial Proceedings
The AAA shall, upon the written request of a party, furnish to the party, at that party's expense, certified
copies of any papers in the AAA's case file that may be required in judicial proceedings relating to the
arbitration.
37. Judicial Proceedings and Exclusion of Liability
a. No judicial proceeding by a party relating to the subject matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a
waiver of the party's right to arbitrate.
b. Neither the AAA nor any arbitrator in a proceeding under these rules is or shall be considered a
necessary or proper party in judicial proceedings relating to the arbitration.
c. Parties to these procedures shall be deemed to have consented that jUdgment upon the arbitration
award may be entered in any federal or state court having jurisdiction.
d. Neither the AAA nor any arbitrator shall be liable to ahy party for any act or omission in connection
with any arbitration conducted under these procedures.
38. Administrative Fees
As a not-far-profit organization, the AAA shall prescribe filing and other administrative fees to compensate it
for the cost of providing administrative services. The AAA administrative fee schedule in effect at the time the
demand for arbitration or submission agreement is received shan be applicable.
The filing fee shall be advanced by the initiating party or parties, subject to final apportionment by the
arbitrator in the award.
The AAA may, in the event of extreme hardship on any party, defer or reduce the administrative fees.
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39. Expenses
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the expenses of witnesses for either side shall be borne by the party
p"roducing such witnesses. All expenses of the arbitration, induding required travel and other expenses of the
arbitrator, AM representatives, and any witness and the costs relating to any proof produced at the direction
of the arbitrator, shall be borne equally by the parties, unless they agree otherwise or unless the arbitrator
directs otherwise in the award.
The arbitrator's compensation shall be borne equally by the parties unless they agree otherwise, or unless the
law provides otherwise.
40. Neutral Arbitrator's Compensation
Arbitrators shall charge a rate consistent with the arbitrator's stated rate of compensation. If there is
disagreement concerning the terms of compensation, an appropriate rate shall be established with the
arbitrator by the AM and confirmed to the parties.
Any arrangement for the compensation of a neutral arbitrator shall be made through the AM and not directly
between the parties and the arbitrator. Payment of the arbitrator's fees and expenses shall be made by the
AM from the fees and moneys collected by the AM from the parties for this purpose.
41. Deposits
The AM may require the parties to deposit in advance of any hearings such sums of money as it deems
necessary to cover the expenses of the arbitration, including the arbitrator's fee,. if any, and shall render an
accounting to the parties and return any unexpended balance at the conclusion of the case.
42. Interpretation and Application of Rules
The arbitrator shall interpret and apply these rules as they relate to the arbitrator's powers and duties. When
there is more than one arbitrator and a difference arises among them concerning the meaning or application
of these Rules, it shall be resolved by a majority vote. If that is not possible, either an arbitrator or a party may
refer the question to the AM for final decision. All other procedures shall be interpreted and applied by the
AM.
For disputes arising out of employer-promulgated plans:
ADMINISTRAnVE .FEE SCHEDULE
Administrative Fee
The AM's administrative fees are based on filing and service charges. Arbitrator compensation is not
included in this schedule. Unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitr~tor compensation and administrative
fees are subject to allocation by the arbitrator in the award.
Filing Fees
In cases before a single arbitrator, a nonrefundable filing fee in the amount of $500 is payable in full by a filing
party when a claim is filed, unless the plan provides otherwise.
In cases before three or more arbitrators, a nonrefundable filing fee in the amount of $1 ,500 is payable in full
by a filing party when a claim is filed, unless the plan provides otherwise.
Hearing Fees
For each day of hearing held before a single arbitrator, an administrative fee of $150 is payable by each party.
For each day of hearing held before a multi-arbitrator panel, an administrative fee of $250 is payable by each
party.
There is no AM hearing fee for the initial Arbitration Management Conference.
Postponement/Cancellation Fees
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A fee of $150 is payable by a party causing a postponement of any hearing scheduled before a single
arbitrator.
A fee of $250 is payable by a party causing a postponement of any hearing scheduled before a multi-
arbitrator panel.
Hearing Room Rental
The hearing fees described above do not cover the rental of hearing rooms, which are available on a rental
basis. Check with the administrator for availability and rates.
Suspension for Nonpayment
If arbitrator compensation or administrative charges have not been paid in full, the administrator may so
inform the parties in order that one of them may advance the required payment. If such payments. are not
made, the arbitrator may order the suspension or termination of the proceedings. If no arbitrator has yet been
appointed, the administrator may suspend the proceedings.
For disputes arising out of individually-negotiated employment agreements and contracts and
commission sales agreements
The AAA's Commercial Fee Schedule, listed below, will apply to disputes arising out of individually-negotiated
employment agreements and contracts and commission sales agreements. Any questions or disagreements
about whether a matter arises out of an employer-promulgated plan or an individually-negotiated agreement
or contract shall be detennined by the AAA and its determination shall be final.
Administrative Fee
The administrative fees of the AAA are based on the amount of the claim or counterclaim. Arbitrator
compensation is not included in this schedule. Unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrator compensation
and administrative fees are subject to allocation by the arbitrator in the award.
Fees
A nonrefundable initial filing fee is payable in full by a filing party when a claim, counterclaim or additional
claim is filed.
A case service fee will be incurred for all cases that proceed to their first hearing. This fee will be payable in
advance at the time that the first hearing is scheduled. This fee will be refunded at the conclusion of the case
if no hearings have occurred.
However, if the Association is not notified at least 24 hours before the time of the scheduled hearing, the case
service fee will remain due and will not be refunded.
These fees will be billed in accordance with' the follOWing schedule:
Amount of Claim Initial Filing Fee Case Service Fee
Above $0 to $10,000 $500 N/A
Above $10,000 to $75,000 $750 N/A
Above $75,000 to $150,000 $1,250 $750
Above $150,000 to $300,000 $2,750 $1,000
Above $300,000 to $500,000 $4,250 $1,250
Above $500,000 to $1,000,000 $6.000 $2,000
Above $1,000,000 to $7,000,000 $8,500 $2,500
Above $7,000,000 to $10,000,000 $13,000 $3,000
Above $10,000,000 * .
No Amount Stated $3,250 $750
·Contact your local AAA office for fees for claims in excess of$1°million.
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** This fee is applicable when no amount can be stated at the time of filing, or when a claim or counterclaim is
not for a monetary amount. The fees are subject to increase or decrease when the claim or counterclaim is
disclosed.
The minimum fees for any case having three or more arbitrators are $2,750 for the filing fee, plus a.$1,OOO
case service fee.
Hearing Room Rental
The fees described above do not cover the rental of hearing rooms, which are available on a rental basis.
Check with the AAA for availability and rates.
EMPLOYMENT MEDIATION RULES
1. Agreement of Parties
Whenever, by provision in an employment dispute resolution program, or by separate submission, the parties
have provided .for mediation or conciliation of existing or Mure disputes under the auspices of the American
Arbitration Association (hereinafter -AAA") or under these rules, they shall be deemed to have made these
rules, as amended and in effed as of the date of the submission of the dispute, a part of their agreement.
2. Initiation of Mediation
Any party to an employment dispute may initiate mediation by filing with the AAA a submission to mediation or
a written request for mediation pursuant to these rules, together with the applicable administrative fee.
3. Request for Mediation
A request for mediation shall contain a brief statement of the nature of the dispute and the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of all parties to the dispute and·those who will represent them, if any, in the
mediation. The initiating party shall simultaneously file two copies of the request with the AAA and one copy
with every other party to the dispute.
4. Appointment of Mediator
Upon receipt of a request for mediation, the AAA will appoint a qualified mediator to serve. Normally, a single
mediator will be appointed unless the parties agree otherwise or the AAA determines otherwise. If the
agreement of the parties names a mediator or specifies a method of appointing a mediator, that designation
or method shall be followed.
5. Qualifications of Mediator
No person shall serve as a mediator in any dispute in which that person has any financial or personal interest
in the result of the mediation, except by the written consent of all parties. Prior to accepting an appointment,
the prospedive mediator shall disclose any circumstance likely to create a presumption of bias or prevent a
prompt meeting with the parties. Upon receipt of such information,' the AAA shall either replace the mediator
or immediately communicate the infonnation to the parties for their comments. In the event that the parties
disagree as to whether the mediator shall serve, the AAA will appoint another mediator. The AAA is
authorized to appoint another mediator if the appointed mediator is unable to serve promptly.
6. Vacancies
If any mediator shall become unwilling or unable to serve, the AAA will appoint another mediator, unless the
parties agree otherwise.
7. Representation
Any party may be represented by a person of the party's choice. The names and addresses of such persons
shall be communicated in writing to all parties and to the AAA.
8. Date, Time, and Place of Mediation
The mediator shall fIX the date and the time of each mediation session. The mediation shall be held at the
appropriate regional office of the AAA, or at any other convenient location agreeable to the mediator and the
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parties. as the mediator shall determine.
9. Identification of Matters in Dispute
At least ten (10) days prior to the first scheduled mediation session, each party shall provide the mediator with
a brief memorandum setting forth its position with regard to the issues that need to be resolved. At the
discretion of the mediator, such memoranda may be mutually exchanged by the parties.
At the first session. the parties will be expected to produce all info.rmation reasonably required for the
mediator to understand the issues presented. The mediator may require any party to supplement such
information.
10. Authority of Mediator
The mediator does not have the authority to impose a settlement on the parties but will attempt to help them
reach a satisfactory resolution of their dispute. The mediator is authorized to conduct joint and separate
meetings with the parties and to make oral and written recommendations for settlement. Whenever
necessary. the mediator may also obtain expert advice concerning technical aspects of the dispute, provided
that the parties agree and assume the expenses of obtaining such advice. Arrangements for obtaining such
advice shall be made by the mediator or the parties, as the mediator shall determine.
The mediator is authorized to end the mediation whenever, in the judgment of the mediator. further efforts at
mediation would not contribute to a resolution of the dispute between the parties.
11. Privacy
Mediation sessions are private. The parties and their representatives may attend mediation sessions. Other
persons may attend only with the permission of the parties and with the consent of the mediator.
12. Confidentiality
Confidential information disclosed to a mediator by the parties or by witnesses in the course of the mediation
shall not be divulged by the mediator. All records, reports, or other documents received by a mediator while
serving in that capacity shall be confidential. The mediator shall not be compelled to divulge suc;:h records or
to testify. in regard to the mediation in any adversary proceeding or judicial forum.
The parties shall maintain the confidentiality of the mediation and shall not rely on. or introduce as evidence in
any arbitral, judicial. or other proceeding:
a. views expressed or suggestions made by another party with respect to a possible settlement of the
dispute;
b. admissions made by another party in the course of the mediation proceedings;
c. proposals made or views expressed by the mediator; or
d. the fact that another party had or had not indicated willingness to accept a proposal for settlement
made by the mediator.
13. No Stenographic Record
There shall be no stenographic record of the mediation process.
14. Termination of Mediation
The mediation shall be terminated:
a. by the execution of a settlement agreement by the parties;
b. by a written declaration of the mediator to the effect that further efforts at mediation are no longer
worthwhile; or
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c. by a written declaration of a party or parties to the effect that the mediation proceedings are
terminated.
15. Exclusion of Liability
Neither the AAA nor any mediator is a necessary party in judicial proceedings relating to the mediation.
Neither the AAA nor any mediator shall be liable to any party for any act or omission in connection with any
mediation conducted under these rules.
16. Interpretation and Application of Rules
The mediator shall interpret and apply these rules insofar as they relate to the mediators duties and
responsibilities. All other rules shall be interpreted and applied by the AAA.
17. Expenses
The expenses of witnesses for either side shall be paid.by the party producing such witnesses. All other
expenses of the mediation, including required traveling and other expenses of the mediator and
representatives of the AAA, and the expenses of any witness and the cost of any proofs or expert advice
produced at the direct request of the mediator, shall be borne equally by the parties unless they agree
otherwise.
MEDIATION FEE SCHEDULE
Mediation fees vary around the country. Please check with the AAA regional office or case management
center nearest to you for fee information and mediator availability.
Rules, forms, procedures and guides are subject to periodic change and updating. To ensure that you have
the most current information, see our World Wide Web home page at www.adr.org
AAA121-1/01
C2002 American Arbitration Association. M Rights Reserved.
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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
EEOC NOTICE
Number 915.002
Date July 10, 1997
1. SUBJECT: Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration
of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of
Employment
2. PURPOSE: This policy statement sets out the Commission's
policy on the mandatory binding arbitration of employment
discrimination disputes imposed as a condition of employment.
3. EFFECTIVE DATE: Upon issuance.
4. EXPIRATION DATE: As an exception to EEOC Order 205.001,
Appendix B, Attachment 4, § a(5), this Notice will remain in
effect until rescinded or superseded.
5. ORIGINATOR: Coordination and Guidance Programs, Office of
Legal Counsel.
6. INSTRUCTIONS: File in Volume II of the EEOC Compliance
Manual.
7. SUBJECT MATTER:
The United States Equal Employment 0PP9rtunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), the federal agency charged with the
interpretation and enforcement of this nation's employment
discrimination laws, has taken the position that agreements that
mandate binding arbitration of discrimination claims as a
condition of employment are contrary to the fundamental
principles evinced in these laws. EEOC Motions on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, Motion 4 (adopted Apr. 25, 1995), 80 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-1 (Apr. 26, 1995).1 This policy statement sets
out in further detail the basis for the Commission's position.
I. Background
An increasing number of employers are requ1r1ng as a
condition of employment that applicants and employees give up
their right to pursue employment discrimination claims in court
and agree to resolve disputes through binding arbitration. These
agreements may be presented in the form of an employment contract
or be included in an employee handbook or elsewhere. Some
employers have even included such agreements in employment
applications. The use of these agreements is not limited
to particular industries, but can be found in various sectors of
the workforce, including, for example, the securities industry,
retail, restaurant and hotel chains, health care, broadcasting,
and security services. Some individuals subject to mandatory
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arbitration agreements have challenged the enforceability of
these agreements by bringing employment discrimination actions in
the courts. The Commission is not unmindful of the case law
. enforcing specific mandatory arbitration agreements, in
particular, the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 u.s. 33 (1991).2 Nonetheless,
for the reasons stated herein, the Commission believes that such
agreements are inconsistent with the civil rights laws.
II. The Federal Civil Rights Laws Are Squarely Based In This
Nation's History And Constitutional Framework And Are Of A
Singular National Importance
Federal civil rights laws, including the laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment, play a unique role in American
jurisprudence. They flow directly from core Constitutional
principles, and this nation's history testifies to their
necessity and profound importance. Any analysis of the mandatory
arbitration of rights guaranteed by the employment discrimination
laws must, at the outset, be squarely based in an understanding
of the history and purpose of these laws.
Title VII of the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
u.s.c. § 2000e et seq., was enacted to ensure equal
opportunity in employment, and to secure the fundamental right to
equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.3 Congress considered this national policy against
discrimination to be of the "highest priority" (Newman v. ·Piggie
Park Enters., 390 u.s. 400, 402 (1968», and of "paramount
importance" (H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2 (1963) (separate views
of Rep. McCulloch et al.»,4 reprinted in 1964 Leg. Hist. at
2123.5 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et
seq., was intended to conform "[t]he practice of American
democracy . . . to the spirit which motivated the Founding
Fathers of this Nation -- the ideals of freedom, equality,
justice, and opportunity." H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 2 (1963)
(separate views of Rep~ McCulloch et al.), reprinted in 1964 Leg.
Hist. at 2123. President John F. Kennedy, in addressing the
nation regarding his intention to introduce a comprehensive civil
rights bill, stated the issue as follows:
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as
old as the Scriptures and it is as clear as the American
Constitution.
The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be
afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we
are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be
treated.
President John F. Kennedy's Radio and Television Report to the
American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), Pub. Papers 468,
469 (1963).6
Title VII is but one of several federal employment
discrimination laws enforced by the Commission which are "part of
a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace
nationwide," McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S.
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352, 357 (1995). See the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 29
U.S.C. § 206{d); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101 et seq. The ADEA was enacted "as part of an
ongoing congressional effort to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace" and "reflects a societal condemnation of invidious
bias in employment decisions." McKennon, 513 u.s. at 357. The
ADA explicitly provides that its purpose is, in part, to invoke
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 29
U.S.C. § 12101(b) (4). Upon signing the ADA, President
George Bush remarked that "the American people have once again
given clear expression to our most basic' ideals of freedom and
equality." President George Bush's Statement on Signing the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (July 26, 1990), Pub.
Papers 1070 (1990 Book II).
III. The Federal Government Has The Primary Responsibility
For The Enforcement Of The Federal Employment Discrimination Laws
The federal employment discrimination laws implement
national values of the utmost importance through the institution
of public and uniform standards of equal opportunity in the
workplace. See text and notes supra in Section II. Congress
explicitly entrusted the primary responsibility for the
interpretation, administration, and enforcement of these
standards, and the public values they embody, to the federal
government. It did so in three principal ways. First, it
created the Commission, initially giving it authority to
investigate and conciliate claims of discrimination and to
interpret the law, see §§ 706{b) and 713 of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) and 2000e-12, and subsequently
giving it litigation authority in order to bring cases in court
that it could not administratively resolve, see § 706(f) (I)
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1). Second, Congress
granted certain enforcement authority to the Department of
Justice, principally with regard to the litigation of cases
involving state and local governments. See §§
706(f) (1) and 707 of Title VII, 42 p.S.C. §§ 2000e-
5(f) (1) and 2000e-6. Third, it established a private right of
action to enable aggrieved individuals to bring their claims
directly in the federal courts, after first administratively
bringing their claims to the Commission. See § 706(f) (1) of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5{f) (1).7
Whi~e providing the states with an enforcement role, see 42
u.s.c. §§ 2000e-5(c) and (d), as well as recognizing
the importance of voluntary compliance by employers, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), Congress emphasized that it is the
federal government that has ultimate enforcement responsibility .
.As Senator Humphrey stated, "[t]he basic rights protected by
[Title VII] are rights which accrue to citizens of the United
States; the Federal Government has the clear obligation to see
that these rights are fully protected." 110 Cong. Rec. 12725
(1964). Cf. General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 u.S. 318, 326 (198~)
(in bringing enforcement actions under Title VII, the EEOC "is
guided by 'the overriding public interest in equal employment
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opportunity ... asserted through direct Federal enforcement'")
(quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972).
The importance of the federal government's role in the
enforcement of the civil rights laws was reaffirmed by Congress
in the ADA, which explicitly provides that its purposes include
"ensur[ing] that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in [the ADA] on behalf of
individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101{b) (3).
IV. Within This Framework, The Federal Courts Are Charged
With The Ultimate Responsibility For Enforcing The Discrimination
Laws
While the Commission is the primary federal agency
responsible for enforcing the employment discrimination laws, the
courts have been vested with· the final responsibility for
statutory enforcement through the construction and interpretation
of the statutes, the adjudication of claims, and the issuance of
relief.8 See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 454 u.s.
461, 479 n.20 (1982) ("federal courts were entrusted with
ultimate enforcement responsibility" of Title VII); New York
Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 u.S. 54, 64 (1980) ("Of courSe
the 'ultimate authority' to secure compliance with Title VII
resides in the federal courts").9
A. The Courts Are Responsible For The Development And
Interpretation Of The Law
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 u.s. 36, 57 (1974), "the resolution of statutory
or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts,
and judicial construction has proved especially necessary.with
respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be
given meaning only by reference to public law concepts." This
principle applies equally to the other employment discrimination
statutes.
While the statutes set out the basic parameters of the law,
many of the fundamental legal principles in discrimination
jurisprudence have been developed through judicial
interpretations and case law precedent. Absent the role of the
courts, there might be no discrimination claims today based on,
for example, the adverse impact of neutral practices not
justified by business necessity, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 u.S. 424 (1974), or sexual harassment, see Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 u.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 4~7 u.s. 57 (1986). Yet these two doctrines have proved
essential to the effort to free the workplace from unlawful
discrimination, and are broadly accepted today as key elements of
civil rights law.
B. The Public Nature Of The Judicial Process Enables The
Public, Higher Courts, And Congress To Ensure That The
Discrimination Laws Are Properly Interpreted And Applied
Through its public nature -- manifested through published
decisions -- the exercise of judicial authority is subject to
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public scrutiny and to system-wide checks and balances designed
to ensure uniform expression of and adherence to statutory
principles. When courts fail to interpret or apply the
antidiscrimination laws in accord with the public values
underlying them, they are subject to correction by higher level
courts and by Congress.
These safeguards are not merely theoretical, but have
enabled both the Supreme Court and Congress to play an active
and continuing role in the development of employment
discrimination law. Just a few of the more recent Supreme Court
decisions overruling lower court errors include: Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (former employee may bring a
claim for retaliation); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers,
Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996) (comparator in age discrimination
case need not be under forty); McKennon, 513 u.s. 352 (employer
may not use after-acquired evidence to justify discrimination);
and Harris 510 u.S. 17 (no requirement that sexual harassment
plaintiffs prove psychological injury to state a claim).
Congressional action to correct Supreme Court departures
·from congressional intent has included, for example, legislative
amendments in response to Court rulings that: pregnancy
discrimination is not necessarily discrimination based on sex
(General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 u.S. 125 (1978), and Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), overruled by Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978); that an employer does not have the
burden of persuasion on the business necessity of an employment
practice that has a disparate impact (Wards Cove Packing Co. v .
. Atonio, 490 u.s. 642 (1989), overruled by §§ 104 and
'105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); that an employer avoids
liability by showing that it would have taken the same action
absent any discriminatory motive (Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 u.s. 228 (1989), overruled, in part l by § 107 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991); that mandatory retirement pursuant to
a benefit plan in effect prior to enactment of the ADEA is not
prohibited age discrimination (United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,
434 U.S. 192 (1977), overruled by 1978 ADEA amendments); and,
that age discrimination in fringe benefits is not unlawful
(Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 u.s. 158
(1989), overruled by Older Workers Benefits Protection Act of
1990) .
C. The Courts Play A Crucial Role In Preventing And
Deterring Discrimination And In Making Discrimination Victims
Whole
The courts also play a critical role in preventing and
deterring violations of the law, as well as providing remedies
for discrimination victims. By establishing precedent, the
courts give valuable guidance to persons and entities covered by
the laws regarding their rights and responsibilities, enhancing
voluntary compliance with the laws. By awarding damages,
backpay, and injunctive relief as a matter of public record, the
courts not only compensate victims of discrimination, but provide
notice to the community, in a very tangible way, of the costs of
discrimination. Finally, by issuing public decisions and orders,
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the courts also provide notice of the identity of violators of
the law and their conduct. As has been illustrated time and
again, the risks of negative publicity and blemished business
reputation can be powerful influences on behavior.
D. The Private Right Of Action With Its Guarantee Of
Individual Access To The Courts Is Essential To The Statutory
Enforcement Scheme
The private right of access to the judicial forum to
adjudicate claims is an essential part of the statutory
enforcement scheme. See, e.g., McKennon, 513 u.s. at 358
(granting a right of action to an injured employee is "a vital
element" of Title VII, the ADEA, and the EPA). The courts cannot
fulfill their enforcement role if individuals do not have access
to the judicial forum. The Supreme Court has cautioned that,
"courts should ever be mindful that Congress . . . thought it
necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution
of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to
assure the full availability of this forum." Gardner-Denver, 415
u.s. at 60 n.21.10
Under the enforcement scheme for the federal employment
discrimination laws, individual litigants act as "private
attorneys general." In bringing a claim in court, the civil
rights plaintiff serves not only her or his private interests,
but also serves as "the chosen instrument of Congress to
vindicate fa policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority.'" Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 u.s. 412,
418 (1978) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 u.S.
400, 402 (1968». See also McKennon, 513 u.S. at 358 ("[t]he
private litigant who seeks redress for his or her injuries
vindicates both the deterrence and compensation objectives of
the ADEA") .
v. Mandatory Arbitration Of Employment Discrimination
Disputes "Privatizes" Enforcement Of The Federal Employment
Discrimination Laws, Thus Undermining Public Enforcement Of The
Laws
The imposition of mandatory arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment substitutes a private dispute resolution
system for the public justice system intended by Congress to
govern the enforcement of the employment discrimination laws.
The private arbitral system differs in critical ways from the
public judicial forum and, when imposed as a condition of
employment, it is structurally biased against applicants and
employees.
A. Mandatory Arbitration Has Limitations That Are
Inherent And Therefore Cannot Be Cured By The Improvement Of
Arbitration Systems
That arbitration is substantially different from litigation
in the judicial forum is precisely the reason for its use as a
form of ADR. Even the fairest of arbitral mechanisms will differ
strikingly from the judicial forum.
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1. The Arbitral Process Is Private In Nature And
Thus Allows For Little Public Accountability
The nature of the arbitral process allows -- by design --
for minimal, if any, public accountability of arbitrators or
arbitral decision-making. Unlike her or his counterparts in the
judiciary, the arbitrator answers only to the private parties to
the dispute, and not to the public at large. As the Supreme
Court has explained:
A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic.
He is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by
superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept.
He has no general charter to administer justice for a
community which transcends the parties. He is rather part
of a system of self-government created by and confined to
the parties ..
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 u.s. 574, 581 (1960) (quoting from Shulman, Reason, Contract,
and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999, 1016 (1955)).
The public plays no role in an arbitrator's selection; slhe
is hired by the private parties to a dispute. Similarly, the
arbitrator's authority is defined and conferred, not by public
law, but by private agreement.11 .While the courts are charged
with giving force to the public values reflected in the
antidiscrimination laws, the arbitrator proceeds from a far
narrower perspective: resolution of the immediate dispute. As
noted by one commentator, "[a]djudication is more likely to do
justice than . . . arbitration . . . precisely because it vests
the power of the state in officials. who act as trustees for the
public, who are highly visible, and who are committed to reason."
Owen Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 Yale L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985).
Moreover, because decisions are private, there is little, if
any, public accountability even for employers who have been
determined to have violated the law. The lack of public
disclosure not only weakens deterrence (see discussion supra at
8), but 'also prevents assessment of whether practices of
individual employers or particular industries are in need of
reform. "The disclosure through litLgation of incidents or
practices which violate national policies respecting
nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, for the
occurrence of violations may disclose patterns of noncompliance
resulting from a misappreciation of [Title VII's] operation or
entrenched resistance to its commands, either of which can be of
industry-wide significance." McKennon, 513 u.s. at 358-59.
2. Arbitration, By Its Nature, Does Not Allow For
The Development Of The Law
Arbitral decisions may not be required to be written or
.reasoned, and are not made public without the consent of the
parties. Judicial review of arbitral decisions is limited to
the narrowest of grounds.12 As a result, arbitration affords no
opportunity to build a jurisprudence through precedent. 13
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Moreover, there is virtually no opportunity for meaningful
scrutiny of arbitral decision-making. This leaves higher courts
and Congress unable to act to correct errors in statutory
interpretation. The risks for the vigorous enforcement of the
civil rights laws are profound. See discussion supra at section
IV. B.
3. Additional Aspects Of Arbitration Systems Limit
Claimants' Rights In Important Respects
Arbitration systems, regardless of how fair they may be,
limit the rights of injured individuals in other important ways.
To begin with, the civil rights litigant often has available the
choice to have her or his case heard by a jury of peers, while in
the arbitral forum juries are, by definition, unavailable.
Discovery is significantly limited compared with that available
in court and permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, arbitration systems are not suitable for
resolving class or pattern or practice claims of discrimination.
They may, in fact, protect systemic di~criminators by forcing
claims to be adjudicated one at a time, in isolation, without
reference to a broader -- and more accurate -- view of an
employer's conduct.
B. Mandatory Arbitration Systems Include Structural
Biases Against Discrimination Plaintiffs
In addition to the substantial and inevitable differences
between the arbitral and judicial forums that have already been
discussed, when arbitration of employment disputes is imposed as
a condition of employment, bias inheres against the employee.14
First, the employer accrues a valuable structural advantage
because it is a "repeat player." The employer is a party to
arbitration in all disputes with its employees. In contrast, the
employee is a "one-shot player"; s/he is a party to arbitration
only in her or his own dispute with the employer. As a result,
the employee is generally less able to make an informed selection
of arbitrators than the employer, who can better keep track of an
arbitrator's record. In addition, results cannot but be
influenced by the fact that the employer, and not the employee,
is a potential source of future business for the arbitrator.1S A
recent study of nonunion employment law cases16 found that the
more frequent a user of arbitration an employer is, the better
the employer fares in arbitration.1?
In addition, unlike voluntary post-dispute arbitration --
which must be fair enough to be attractive to the employee -- the
employer imposing mandatory arbitration is free to manipulate the
arbitral mechanism to its benefit. The terms of the private
agreement defining the arbitrator's authority and the arbitral
process are characteristically set by the more powerful party,
the very party that the public law seeks to regulate. We are
aware of no examples of employees who insist on the mandatory
arbitration of future statutory employment disputes as a
condition of accepting a job offer -- the very suggestion seems
far-fetched. Rather, these agreements are imposed by employers
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because they believe them to be in their interest, and they are
made possible by the employer's superior bargaining power. It is
thus not surprising that many employer-mandated arbitration
systems fall far short of basic concepts of fairness. Indeed,
the Commission has challenged -- by litigation, amicus curiae
participation, or Commissioner charge -- particular mandatory
arbitration agreements that include provisions flagrantly
eviscerating core rights and remedies that are available under
the civil rights laws.18
The Commission's conclusions in this regard are consistent
with those of other analyses of mandatory arbitration. The
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (the
"Dunlop Commission") 'was appointed by the Secretary of Labor and
the Secretary of Commerce to, in part, address alternative means
to resolve workplace disputes. In its Report and Recommendations
(Dec. 1994) ("Dunlop Report"), the Dunlop Commission found that
recent employer experimentation with arbitration has produced a
range of programs that include "mechanisms that appear to be of
dubious merit for enforcing the public values embedded in our
laws." Dunlop Report at 27. In addition, a report by the u.s.
General Accounting Office, surveying private employers' use of
ADR mechanisms, found that existing employer arbitration systems
vary greatly and that "most" do not conform to standards
recommended by the Dunlop Commission to ensure fairness. See
"Employment Discrimination: Most Private-Sector Employers Use
Alternative Dispute Resolution" at 15, HEHS-95-150 (July 1995) .
The Dunlop Commission strongly recommended that binding
arbitration agreements not be enforceable as a condition of
employment:
The public rights embodied in. state and federal employment
law -- such as freedom from discrimination in the workplace
. -- are an important part of the social and economic
protections of the nation. Employees required to accept
binding arbitration of such disputes would face what for
many would be an inappropriate choice: give up your tight to
go to court, or give up your job.
Dunlop Report at 32. The Brock 'Commission (see supra n.13)
agreed with the Dunlop Commission's opposition to mandatory
arbitration of employment disputes and recommended that all
employee agreements to arbitrate be voluntary and post-dispute.
Brock Report at 81-~2. In addition, the National Academy of
Arbitrators recently issued a statement opposing mandatory
arbitration as a condition of employment "when it requires waiver
.of direct access to either a judicial or administrative forum for
the pursuit of statutory rights." See National Academy of
Arbitrators' Statement and Guidelines (adopted May 21, 1997), 103
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-1 (May 29, 1997).
C. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Will Adversely
Affect The Commission's Ability To Enforce The Civil Rights Laws
The trend to impose mandatory arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment also poses a significant threat to the
EEOC's statutory responsibility to enforce the federal employment
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discrimination laws. Effective enforcement by the Commission
depends in large part on the initiative of individuals to report
instances of discrimination to the Commission. Although
employers may not lawfully deprive individuals of their statutory
right to file employment discrimination charges with the EEOC or
otherwise interfere with individuals' protected participation in
investigations or proceedings under these laws,19 employees who
are bound by mandatory arbitration agreements may be unaware that
they nonetheless may file an EEOC charge. Moreover, individuals
are likely to be discouraged from coming to the Commission when
they know they will be unable to litigate their claims in
court.20 These chilling effects on charge filing undermine the
Commission's enforcement efforts by decreasing channels of
information, limiting the agency's awareness of potential
violations of law, and impeding its ability to investigate
possible unlawful actions and attempt informal resolution.
VI. Voluntary, Post-Dispute Agreements To Arbitrate
Appropriately Balance The Legitimate Goals Of Alternate Dispute
Resolution And The Need To Preserve· The Enforcement Framework Of
The Civil Rights Laws
The Commission is on record in strong support of ·voluntary
alternative dispute resolution programs that resolve employment
discrimination disputes in a fair and credible manner, and are
entered into after a dispute has arisen. We reaffirm that
support here. This position is based on the recognition that
while even the best arbitral systems do not afford the benefits
of the judicial system, well-designed ADR programs, including
binding arbitration, can offer in particular cases other valuable
benefits to civil rights claimants, such as relative savings in
time and expense.21 Moreover, we recognize that the judicial
system is not, itself, without drawbacks. Accordingly, an
individual may decide in a particuiar case to forego the judicial
forum and resolve the case through arbitration. This is
consistent with civil rights enforcement as long as the
individual's decision is freely made after a dispute has
arisen.22
VII. Conclusion
The use of unilaterally imposed. agreements mandating binding
arbitration of employment discrimination disputes as a condition
of employment harms both the individual civil rights claimant and
the public interest in eradicating discrimination. Those whom
the law seeks to regulate should not be permitted to exempt
themselves from federal enforcement of civil rights laws. Nor
should they be permitted to deprive civil rights claimants of the
choice to vindicate their statutory rights in the courts. an
avenue of redress determined by Congress to be essential to
enforcement.
Processing Instructions For The Field And Headquarters
1. Charges should be taken and processed in conformity
with priority charge processing procedures regardless of whether
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the charging party has agreed to arbitrate employment disputes.
Field offices are instructed to closely scrutinize each charge
involving an arbitration agreement to determine whether the
agreement was secured" under coercive circums"tances (e. g ., as a
condition of employment). The Commission will process a charge
and bring suit, in appropriate cases, notwithstanding the
charging party's agreement to arbitrate.
2. Pursuant to the statement of priorities in the
National Enforcement Plan, see § B(l) (h), the Commission
will continue to challenge the legality of specific agreements
that mandate binding arbitration of employment discrimination
disputes as a condition of employment. See, e.g., Briefs of the
EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., No. 96-CV-
5971 (E.D. Pa.) (Br. filed Jan. II, 1997); Gibson v. Neighborhood
Health Clinics, Inc., No. 96-2652 (7th eir.) (Br. filed Sept. 23,
1996); Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., No. 4-96-107 (D.
Minn.) (Br. Filed May 17, 1996); Great Western Mortgage Corp. v.
Peacock, No. 96-5273 (3d Cir.) (Br. filed July 24, 1996).
/s/
Date Gilbert F. Casellas
Chairman
1. Although binding arbitration does not, in and of itself,
undermine the purposes of the laws enforced·by the EEOC, the
Commission believes that this is the result when it is imposed as
a term or condition of employment.
2. The Gilmer decision is not dispositive of whether
employment agreements that mandate binding arbitration of
discrimination claims are enforceable. As explicitly noted by
the Court, the arbitration agreement at issue in Gilmer was not
contained in an employment contract. 500 u.s. at 25 n.2. Even
if Gilmer had involved an agreement with an employer, the issue
would remain open given the active role of the legislative branch
in shaping the development of employment discrimination law. See
discussion infra at section IV. B.
3. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt. 1 (1963),
reprinted in United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Legislative History of Title VII and XI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("1964 Leg. Hist.") at 2016 (the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was "designed primarily to protect and provide more
effective means to enforce... civil rights"); H.R. Rep. No.88-
914, pt.2" (1963) (separate views of Rep. McCulloch et al.),
reprinted in 1964 Leg. Hist. at 2122 ("[a] key purpose of the
bill . . . is to secure to all Americans the equal protection of
the laws of the United States and of the several States");
Charles & Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A legislative
history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 104 (1985) (opening
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statement of Rep. Celler on House debate of H.R. 7152: "The
legislation before you seeks only to honor the constitutional
guar~ntees of equality under the law for all.... (W]hat ·it
does is to place into balance the scales of justice so that the
living force of our Constitution shall apply to all people . . .
. "); H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Labor, Legislative
History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 ("1972
Leg. Hist.") at 63 (1972 amendments to Title VII are a
"reaffirmation of our national policy of equal opportunity in
employment").
4. William McCulloch (R-Ohio) was the ranking Republican of
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Judiciary Committee, to which the
civil rights bill (H.R. 7152) was referred for initial
consideration by Congress. McCulloch was among the individuals
responsible for working out a compromise bill that was ultimately
substituted by the full Judiciary Committee for the bill reported
out by Subcommittee No.5. His views, which were joined by six
members of Congress, are thus particularly noteworthy.
5. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 u.s. 405,
416 (1975) (The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a "complex
legislative design directed at an historic evil of national
proportions") .
6. Commitment to our national policy to eradicate
discrimination continues today to be of the utmost importance.
As President Clinton stated in his second inaugural address:
Our greatest responsibility is to embrace a new spirit of
community for a new century . . . . The challenge of our past
remains the challenge of our future: Will we be one Nation, one
people, with one common destiny, or not? Will we all come
together, or come apart?
The divide of race has been America's constant curse. And
each new wave of immigrants gives new targets to old prejudices
· · · These forces have nearly destroyed our Nation in the past.
They plague us still.
President William J. Clinton's Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1997),
33 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 61 (Jan. 27, 1997).
7. Section 107 of the ADA specifically incorporates the
powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in Title VII with
respect to the Commission, the Attorney General, and aggrieved
individuals. See 42 U.S.C.§ 12117. Similar enforcement
provisions are contained in the ADEA. See 29 u.s.c. §§
626 and 628.
8. In addi~ion, unlike arbitrators, courts have coercive
authority, such as the contempt power, which they can use to
secure compliance.
9. See also H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, pt.2 (1963) (separate
views of Rep. McCulloch et al.), reprinted in 1964 Leg. Hist. at
2150 (explaining that EEOC was not given cease-and-desist powers
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in the final House version of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R.
7152, because it was "preferred that the ultimate determination
of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary").
10. See also 118 Cong. Rec. S7168 (March 6, 1972)
(section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal Opportunity
Act of 1972, as agreed to by the conference committees of each
House; analysis of § 706(f) (1) provides that, while it is
hoped that most cases will be handled through the EEOC with
recourse to a private lawsuit as the exception, "as the
individual's rights to redress are paramount under the provisions
of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for
quick and effective relief~).
11. Article III of the Constitution provides federal judges
with life tenure and salary protection to safeguard the
independence of the judiciary.' No such safeguards apply'to the
arbitrator. The importance of these safeguards was stressed in
the debates on the 1972 amendments to Title VII. Senator
Dominick, in offering an amendment giving the EEOC the right to
file a civil action in lieu of cease-and-desist powers, explained
that the purpose of the amendment was to "vest adjudicatory power
where it belongs -- in impartial judges shielded from political
winds by life tenure." 1972 Leg. Hist. at 549. The amendment
was later revised in minor respects and adopted by the Senate.
12. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitral awards
may·be vacated only for procedural impropriety such as
corruption, fraud, or misconduct. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
Judicially created standards of review allow an arbitral award to
be vacated where it clearly violates a public policy that is
explicit, well-defined, "dominant" and ascertainable from the
law, see United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.
29, 43 (1987), or where it is in "manifest disregard" of the law,
see Wilko v. Swan, 346 u.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). The latter
standard of review has been described by one commentator as Ita
virtually insurmountable" hurdle. See Bret F. Randall, The
History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created
Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 759,
767. But cf. Cole v. Burns Int=l Sec. ~ervs., 105 F.3d 1465,
1486-87 (1997) (in the context of mandatory employment
arbitration of statutory disputes, the court interprets judicial
review under the "manifest disregard" standard to be sufficiently
broad to ensure that the law has been properly interpreted and
applied) .
13. Congress has recognized the inappropriateness of
ADR where "a definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter
is required for precedential value, and such a proceeding is not
likely to be accepted generally as an authoritative precedent,"
see Alternative Dispute Resolution Act,S U.S.C. § 572(b) (1)
(providing for use of ADR by federal administrative agencies
where the parties agree); or where "the case involves complex or
novel legal issues," see Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 652(c) (2) (providing for court-
annexed arbitration; §§ 652{b) (1) and (2) also require the parties'
consent to arbitrate constitutional or statutory civil rights claims).
Similar findings were made by the u.s. Secretary of Labor's Task
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Force on Excellence in State and Local Government Through Labor-
Management Cooperation ("Brock Commission"), which was charged
with examining labor-management cooperation in state and local
government. The Task Force's report, "Working Together for
Public Service" (1996) ("Brock Report"), recommended "Quality
Standards and Key Principles for Effective Alternative Dispute
Resolution Systems for Rights Guaranteed by Public Law and for
Other Workplace Disputes" which include that "ADR should normally
not be used in cases that represent tests of significant legal
principles or class action." Brock Report at 82.
14. A survey of employment discrimination arbitration
awards in the securities industry, which requires as a condition
of employment that all brokers resolve employment disputes
through arbitration, found that "employers stand a greater chance
of success in arbitration than in court before a jury" and are
subjected to "smaller" damage awards. See Stuart H. Bompey &
Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look at Compulsory
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 21 Empl. ReI. L.J. 21, 43 (autumn
1995) .
15. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and
Dispute Resolution, 88 Yale L.J. 916, 936 (1979) ("an arbitrator
could improve his chances of future selection by deciding
favorably to institutional defendants: as a group, they are more
likely to have knowledge about past decisions and more likely to
be regularly involved in the selection process"); Reginald
Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights 'Waived' and
Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 381, 428
(Spring 1996) ("statutory discrimination grievances relegated to
. . . arbitration forums are virtually assured employer-favored
outcomes," given "the manner of selecting, controlling, and
compensating arbitrators, the privacy of the process and how it
catalytically arouses an arbitrator's desire to be acceptable to
one side").
16. Arbitration of labor disputes pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement is less likely to favor the
employer as a repeat-player because the union, as collective
bargaining representative, is also a repeat-player.
17. See Lisa Bingham, "Employment Arbitration: The
effect of repeat-player status, employee category and gender on
arbitration outcomes," (unpublished study on file with the
author, an assistant professor at Indiana U. School of Public &
Environmental Affairs).
18. Challenged agreements have included provisions
that: (1) impose filing deadlines far shorter than those provided
by statute; (2) limit remedies to "out-of-pocket" damages; (3)
deny any award of attorney's fees to the civil rights claimant,
should s/he prevail; (4) wholly deny or limit punitive and
liquidated damages; (S) limit back pay to a time period much
shorter than that provided by statute; (6) wholly deny or limit
front pay to a time period far shorter than that ordered "by
courts; (7) deny any and all discovery; and (8) allow for payment
by each party of one-half of the costs of arbitration and, should
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the employer prevail, require the claimant, in the arbitrator's
discretion, to pay the employer's share of arbitration costs as
well.
19. See "Enforcement Guidance on non-waivable employee
rights under Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
statutes," Vol. III EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) at N:2329 (Apr. 10,
1997) .
20. The Commission remains able to bring suit despite .the
existence of a mandatory arbitration agreement because it acts
"to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment
discrimination," General Tel., 446 u.s. at 326. Cf. S.Rep. No.
101-263 (1990), reprinted in, Legislative History of The Older
Workers Benefits Protection Act, at 354 (amendment to ADEA §
626(f) (4), which provides that "no waiver agreement may affect
the Commission's rights and responsibilities to enforce [the
ADEAl," was intended "as a clear statement of support for the
principle that the elimination of age discrimination in the
workplace is a matter of public as well as private interest").
As a practical matter, however, the Commission's ability to
litigate is limited by its available resources.
21. Despite conventional wisdom to the contrary, the
financial costs of arbitration can be significant and may
represent.no savings over litigation in a judicial forum. These
costs may include the arbitrator's fee and expenses; fees charged
by the entity providing arbitration services, which may include
filing fees and daily administrative fees; space rental fees; and
court reporter fees.
22. The Dunlop Commission similarly supported voluntary forms
of ADR, but based its opposition to mandatory arbitration on the
premise that the avenue of redress for statutory employment
rights should be chosen by the individual rather than dictated by
the employer. Dunlop Report at 33.
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TO: Rochelle Kentov, Regional Director Region 12
*1 SUBJECT: Bentley's Luggage Corporation
Case 12-CA-16658
August 21, 1995
DIGEST NO.S:
506-6090-4900, 512-5006-5096, 512-5081-7000, 512-5090-7525, 596-0866-5000, 625- 2233-7200,
625-7728-2200
This case was submitted for advice on the following issues:
(1) whether the Employer violated Section Sea) (1), (3) and (4) of the Act by requiring
employees and applicants to sign an agreement requiring employees to submit their
employment claims to binding arbitration and pay a portion of the costs before they seek
redress from any other forum concerning employment issues or terminationi
(2) whether the Employer unlawfully discharged the Charging Party because he refused to
sign such an arbitration agreement;
***
FACTS
The Employer operates a chain of luggage stores nationwide. Its employees nationwide are
not represented by any union. In November 1993, Charging Party Allen Robert Letwin
(Letwin) began working for the Employer in its Ft. Lauderdale Galleria Mall store as a
regular part-time sales employee.
On June 7, 1994, the Employer imposed a nationwide condition for continued employment, by
requiring all current employees to sign an arbitration agreement which provided the
following:
By remaining a Bentley's employee, you agree that before filing any legal action
regarding your employment or the termination of your employment, the dispute will be
submitted to binding arbitration before a neutral third party, pursuant to the procedures
of the American Arbitration Association. You also agree that any lawsuit filed, before the
arbitration has been conducted should be dismissed.... Each party will bear its own costs
and attorneys' fees. The arbitrator's fee will be divided equally between the parties.
The Company emphasizes, and the employee hereby acknowledges, that employment with
Bentley's is at-will and that neither this application nor any other document should be
interpreted as creating a "just cause" standard of employment. The Company and the
employee hereby agree that all claims, including claims alleging a contract, tort or
violation of any statute, be submitted to arbitration. If a court decides that this policy
is not enforceable for some claims, the employee and the Company agree that claims which
are legally subject to this policy should be dismissed by the court.
The agreement appear~ to be in effect during employees' tenure with the Employer.
Further, the agreement states several times that employment with the Employer is "at will"
and termination need not be based on just cause.
Letwin was terminated on July 12, 1994, because he refused to sign the agreement. Prior
to his termination, Letwin informed his supervisor, Store Manager Donna Pollio, that he
felt that by signing he was giving up all his rights. Pollio agreed that she felt the
agreement was "unfair" but insisted that it had to be signed in order for Letwin to keep
his position. Letwin discussed his position regarding the arbitration agreement with
fellow employees. They told Letwin that they too had problems with signing the agreement
but that they could not afford to refuse to sign the agreements and lose their jobs.
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*2 On October 11, Letwin filed the instant charge alleging that the Employer violated
Section 8(a) (1) and (4) of the Act by terminating him because he refused to sign the
arbitration agreement. On January 27, 1995, Letwin filed a first amended charge, which
alleged that the Employer's conduct also violated Section 8(a) (3) and sought a remedy for
all employees similarly situated to Letwin. [FN1]
On March 29, 1995, Letwin filed a second amended charge which alleged that the June 28,
1994, termination of William Kelly, another employee, for his refusal to sign the
arbitration agreement also violated the Act.
The Employer has offered to settle this matter on the following terms: (1) the Employer
will send a memorandum to all current employees stating that the arbitration agreement was
not meant to prohibit employees from access to the Board; (2) the Employer will insert a
clause in the arbitration agreement stating that it was not meant to prohibit employees
from 'access to the Board; (3) the Employer will reinstate Letwin if he signs the modified
arbitration agreement; (4) the Employer will pay backpay only for Letwin if he is
reinstated; (5) a nonadmission clause.
ACTION
We conclude that the Region should issue a complaint, absent settlement, alleging that
the Employer violated Section 8(a) (1) and (4) (FN2] of the Act by maintaining the
arbitration agreement and discharging Letwin because he refused to sign the agreement.
Initially, we concluded that the Employer violated Section Sea) (1) and (4) by maintaining
the arbitration agreement and ~nsisting that employees sign that agreement as a term and
condition of employment. The agreement impermissibly requires employees to waive their
statutory right to file charges with the Board.
Section lO(a) of the NLRA provides in relevant part that the Board
is empowered ... to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise. [FN3]
From its inception, the NLRA has permitted the Board to treat individual contracts of
employment, when used to frustrate the exercise of statutory rights, as either void or
voidable. In National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, [FN4] after the union obtained majority
status, the employer refused to grant the union recognition and instead circulated a
petition for a bargaining committee. The bargaining committee negotiated individual
contracts between the employer and every employee, in which the employees relinquished the
right to strike and the right to demand a union-security clause or a written contract with
any union. While the contracts granted employees the right to arbitration as to wages and
hours, they expressly foreclosed arbitration as to discharge. The Supreme Court found that
the individual employment contract imposed illegal conditions·on the exercise of Section 7
and 8 rights. The effect of the clause barring arbitration of discharge was to
"discourage, if not forbid,· the presentation of grievances, by discharged employees to
the employer through a union, or in any way except personally. [FNS]
*3 Consistent with National Licorice, the Board has regularly held that an employer
violates the Act when it insists that an employee waive his statutory right to file
charges with the Board or to invoke his contractual grievance- arbitration procedure.
[FN6] A union similarly violates Section 8(b) (1) (A) when it conditions use of the union's
hiring hall on the signing of a form containing a waiver of an employee's right to sue the
union because of an employment dispute. [FN7]
The arbitration agreement involved in this case has precisely the same unlawful effect as
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these waiver demands or agreements long condemned by the Board. The arbitration agreement
requires, as a condition of employment, that the employee subordinate his/her right to
file charges with the Board concerning employment to the Employer's unilaterally chosen
arbitration process. Hence, a Section 8(a) (4) and (1) complaint is warranted, absent
settlement, as to the Employer's maintenance of the arbitration agreement as a term and
condition of employment and its discharge of Letwin for refusing to sign the agreement.
We note that the complaint in Kinder-Care, supra, alleged only a Section Sea) (1)
violation, not an additional Section 8(a) (4) violation. However, the rule in Kinder-Care,
which stated that employees had to bring their employment- related disputes to the
employer "immediately," [FN8] did not explicitly bar employees from asserting their
statutory rights, even though the Board construed the rule as having such an effect. On
the other hand, in Great Lakes Chemical Corp., supra, where employees were required to
sign a statement waiving their rights to bring any legal action against the employer as a
result of their layoff or termination, the Board affirmed the conclusion of the ALJ, at
622, that the employer violated Section Sea) (4), as well as Section Sea) (1), by
conditioning employment on the signing of the waiver. Like the waiver demand in Great
Lakes Chemical, supra, the arbitration agreement in this case explicitly requires an
employee not to assert his statutory rights, and even to withdraw any legal actions
instituted pursuant to those statutory rights, before using the Employer'S compulsory
arbitration procedure. The rule thus deters employees from seeking to file charges with
the Board, because the rule requires those employees to resort to the Employer'S
arbitration procedure before filing charges or otherwise seeking to vindicate their
employment rights. Such an open attack on an employee's right to seek access to the Board
is appropriately litigated through a Section Sea) (4) allegation. [FN9] Hence, a Section
8(a} (4) complaint is warranted even though Letwin was discharged for refusing to sign the
arbitration agreement, not for filing a charge with the Board.
The Employer contends that this agreement is lawful under Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 u.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991). In that case, Gilmer, a 62-year-old
stockbroker employed by Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., had been required as a condition of
registration as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange to agree to
arbitrate any dispute arising out of his employment or termination from employment. When
Gilmer filed an ADEA charge with the EEOC following his termination, the employer sought
to compel arbitration of the claim pursuant to the agreement. The Court held that the
agreement was enforceable against Gilmer. Gilmer argued that the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. Sec. 1, (FAA) barred mandatory arbitration of "contracts of employment," because
it stated that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." The Court held that it was "inappropriate" to discuss the scope of this
exclusion because "the arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a
contract of employment." [FNIO] Instead, the arbitration agreement was part of Gilmer's
registration with the New York Stock Exchange, and there was no claim or evidence that
Gilmer and his employer were parties to an employment agreement that contained a written
arbitration clause. Therefore, the Court specifically left "for another day" the meaning
of Section 1 of the FAA. [FN11]
*4 The Court further noted that it found no evidence that Gilmer, an experienced
businessman, "was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his
registration application." [FN12] The Court rejected the argument that there was
inequality of bargaining power between Gilmer and his employer and noted that such mere
inequality is not "a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable in the employment context." [FN13] Instead, it held that such claims should be
addressed in specific cases. [FN14] The Court also noted, at 1653, that an individual
employee subject to an arbitration agreement could nonetheless file an ADEA charge with
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the EEOC, as Gilmer had done. The Court further noted, ibid., that the EEOC had the
authority to investigate age discrimination problems even in the absence of a cnarge
alleging a violation.
We conclude that Gilmer is not applicable in this case. In Gilmer, the Court stated that
while not all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, the person entering
into such an agreement must be held to the agreement, "unless Congress evidenced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."
[FN15] As noted above at page 4, Section 10(a) of the Act gives the Board authority to
prevent or remedy unfair labor practices, regardless of any oth~r dispute resolution
mechanism that may be available. The Board's decision to defer to contractually-
negotiated grievance-arbitration between an employer and a union is thus an exercise of
the Board's discretionary authority and the antithesis of the purpose of the Employer's
attempt here to preclude the Board from exercising its jurisdiction in any manner.
Moreover, the Court in Gilmer was merely enforcing an arbitration agreement that Gilmer
had previously signed; it did not have to confront the question raised by this case, that
is, whether the signing of an arbitration agreement that also constitutes a waiver of an
employee's statutory rights is a lawful term and condition of employment. Thus, Gilmer
does not overrule the Board's position, as set forth in the cases listed in fn. 8, supra,
that efforts to secure such waivers from employees are unlawful. [FN16] We further note
that while the EEOC can investigate age discrimination questions and problems on its own
initiative, even in the absence of a charge, the Board requires the filing ofa charge to
initiate its processes; thus, any attempt by an employer to bar an employee from filing an
unfair labor practice charge would foreclose the Board from exercising its statutory
jurisdiction.
We further conclude that the Employer's arbitration plan is not comparable to or an
adequate substitute for the Board's processes. The Act permits the employee to claim that
his termination violated his statutory rights. The arbitration agreement, on the other
hand, is essentially illusory because the Employer states that its employees are "at will-
and no just cause is required to terminate an employee. [FN17] Thus, this agreement does
not give an employee a basis upon which to claim that a termination is improper.
*s The Employer also contends that the arbitration agreement does not bar the processing
of an unfair labor practice charge. The clear language of the agreement is contra. Thus,
the agreement specifically states that an asserted ·violation of any statute· must be
submitted to arbitration. Moreover, the Board affirmed an ALJ's rejection of a similar
argument in Construction and General Laborers, Local 304, supra, at 607, noting that the
fact that the agreement barred suits as to any matter meant that it was intended to bar
unfair labor practice charges, even though the Board was not named in the agreement.
Indeed, the Board has construed even vaguer language as requiring employees to waive their
statutory rights to file charges. Thus, in Kinder-Care Learning Centers, supra, the
employee .handbook maintained a "parent communication rule· that stated that it was
"essential· that employees bring their employment-related complaints to the employer
"immediately" or use the company's problem-solving procedure; the penalty for failure to
follow this procedure was discharge. The employer required employees to sign copies of
this ·parent communication rule,· acknowledging that they had received a notice of the
rule. The Board. specifically found, at 1172, that the ALJ ·erred· in failing to find that
this rule unlawfully interfered with employees' statutory rights to bring their complaints
to persons and entities other than the company, "including a union or the Board· even
though the rule did not "on its face prohibit employees" from such actions. The Board
further concluded, that the rule was unlawful because it ·conflicts directly with the
statutory policy of facilitating the ability of employees to organize and bargain
collectively" and -tends to inhibit employees from banding together .... " Ibid. [FN18]
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Therefore, the employer also violated the Act by requ1r1ng employees to sign a copy of the
rule, thus acknowledging their adherence to the rule. Id. at 1178.
The Employer also argues that the arbitration agreement merely requires an employee to
use the Employer's arbitration procedure before filing charges and that it does not bar
the employee from filing charges before the Board. Although the arbitration clause merely
provided that employees must -first- seek redress of their claims through arbitration,
theoretically permitting employees to exercise their statutory rights once the arbitration
is concluded, such redress would be largely meaningless given the six-month statute of
limitations in the NLRA and the time delays in getting cases decided by an arbitrator.
Further, since the arbitration agreement specifically provides that employees must seek
dismissal of any actions pending in other forums, the Employer has effectively thwarted
any attempt to utilize a deferral or abeyance system in some other forum. Such language is
a strong indication that the Employer's purpose in proposing this language was to preclude
employees' access to alternative forums. .
*6 Gilmer's reliance on the plaintiff's education and extensive business experience as
evidence that he, was not likely to be a victim 'of inequality of bargaining power between
an individual and his employer is also inapposite in considering the merits of an unfair
labor practice charge. Section 2(3) of the Act does not define protected employees in
terms of education, experience or sophistication. Moreover, the Act specifically protects
professional employees, including highly educated ones, as defined in Section 2(12).
(FN19]
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the Employer violated Section 8(a) (4) and
(1) by insisting that, as a term and condition of employment, employees agree to waive
their statutory rights to file'charges with the Board. It'follows that the Employer
violated Section 8(a) (4) and (1) when it discharged Letwin because of his refusal to sign
the agreement.
***
For all of the above reasons, a Section 8(a} (4) and (1) charge should issue, absent
settlement. [FN22]
Barry J. Kearney
Acting Associate General Counsel
Division of Advice
FNl Letwin has also filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that his termination violated
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq., and a civil suit
under Florida law. These proceedings are pending.
FN2 The Section 8(a) (3) allegation should be dismissed, absent withdrawal. There is no
evidence of any union activity on Letwin's part and any remedy which would be available
under Section 8(a} (3) would also be available under Section 8(a) (1).
FN3 The House Conference Report No. 510 on H.R.3020 (the Taft-Hartley Act) reads:
The Senate amendment (to Section 10(a) ], because of its provisions authorizing
temporary injunctions enjoining alleged unfair labor practices and because of its
provisions making unions usable, omitted the language giving the Board exclusive
jurisdiction of unfair labor practices, but retained that which provides that the Board's
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention. The conference
agreement adopts the provisions of the Senate amendment. 1 Legislative History of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 556.
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FN4 309 u.s. 350 (1940).
FN5 Id. at 360. See also J.I. Case v. NLRB, 321 u.s. 332, 337 (1944), where the Supreme
Court held that individual employment contracts were not a bar to the selection of a
collective-bargaining representative, noting, "Wherever private contracts conflict with
[the Act's] functions, they must obviously yield or the Act would be reduced to a
futility. "
FN6 See, e.g., Kolman/Athey Division of Athey Products Corporation, 303 NLRB 92 (1991);
Kinder-Care Learning Centers, 299 NLRB 1171 (1990); Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 298 NLRB
615, 622 (1990); Retlaw Broadcasting Co., 310 NLRB 984 (1993).
FN7 Construction and General Laborers, Local 304 (AGe of California), 265 NLRB 602 (1982).
FN8 299 NLRB at 1171.
FN9 Congress enacted Section 8(a) (4) to ensure that all persons would be "free from
coercion against reporting [possible unfair labor practices] to the Board." Nash v.
Florida Industrial Commission, 389 u.S. 235, 238 (1967).
FN10 Id. at 1651-52, fn. 2.
FN11 Ibid.
FN12 111 S.Ct. at 1655-56 (such claims will be resolved based on the facts of specific
cases) .
FN13 Id. at 1655.
FN14 Id. at 1656.
FN15 Id. at 1652, quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
u.s. 614, 628 (1985).
FN16 See also EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, 67 FEP Cases 1243 (SD TX.1995),
in which a federal court enjoined the employer from insisting that employees agree to an
ADR (alternative dispute resolution) policy that would preclude or interfere with the
employees' rights to file charges with the EEOC or file suits under Title VII, and would
require employees to pay the costs of the ADR proceeding. The employer was also enjoined
from retaliating against employees who filed complaints with the EEOC or opposed the
employer's mandatory ADR policy. The EEOC and the employer subsequently agreed to a
consent order consistent with the above injunction. The question of the lawfulness of the
discharges of several employees was reserved for a trial de novo. See Daily Labor
Reporter, July 3, 1995, at A-2. Neither the original injunction "nor the consent order
mention Gilmer.
The EEOC has since issued a policy statement stressing that any participation in ADR
proceedings under the EEOC's auspices must be voluntary because "the unique importance of
the laws against employment discrimination requires that a federal forum always be
available to an aggrieved individual. M "EEOC Policy Statement on Alternative Dispute
Resolution," Number 915.002, Daily Labor Reporter, July 18, 1995, at E-13.
FN17 See, e.g., A-1 King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 265 NLRB 850, 860 fn. 20 (1982), enfd.
732 F.2d 872 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied 469 u.s. 1034, finding a grievance-arbitration
provision "essentially illusory- because it did not apply to a sweeping list of management
rights, including the right to discipline and discharge employees.
FN18 See also Central Security Services, 315 NLRB 239, 243, 253-54 (1994).
Cope. <9 West 2002 No Claim to Drig. U.S. Govt. Works
1·93
1995 WL 912536
(Cite as: 1995 WL 912536 (N.L.R.B.G.C.»
FN19 Compare OPEIU Local 2, 268 NLRB 1353, 1356 (1984), enf'd sub nom. Eichelberger v.
NLRB, 765 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.1985), where, in find that a union did not breach its duty of
fair representation in handling a grievance filed by an employee of the union, noted that
the employee was thoroughly familiar with her contract rights, including the right to file
a grievance without the union's participation, and had previously demonstrated an ability
to exercise those rights.
Office of General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B.)
1995 WL 912536 {N.L.R.B.G.C.}
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INTRODUCTION
It is not a news flash that employers today face an increasingly perilous landscape. In
addition to the significant challenges that flow from a confusing economic picture, employers are
faced with more frequent and dangerous claims by current and fonner employees. Among the
claims that give rise to the biggest financial risk are those involving a request for class relief.
For obvious reasons, employers want to do everything possible to avoid class exposure.
This outline will include a discussion of the fundamental requirements of a class action
and the principal issues faced by parties when litigating employment law class actions. It will
also include a brief discussion of emerging employment law issues in the class context.
BACKGROUND
A party may pursue a class action only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (often abbreviated as "numerosity"); (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class (often abbreviated as "commonality"); (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (often abbreviated as
"typicality"); and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class (often abbreviated as "fair and adequate representation"). 1 If all of these requirements
are satisfied, the court may certify a class if, in addition, the class representatives meet anyone
of the following requirements:2
(a) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of:
I FRCP 23(a). Because a significant majority of class cases have been pursued in the federal courts, this outline
focuses on class relief under federal law.
2 These additional requirements are set forth in FRCP 23(b).
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(i) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(ii) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(b) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(c) The court finds3 that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.4
The party se~king class certification bears the burden ofproof 5 and the
class mechanism is not available merely because a lawyer designates a group of
persons or entities as a "class" in the pleadings.6 Although a hearing prior to the
class detennination is not required in every instance, " 'it may be necessary for
3 The matters pertinent to these fmdings include: .(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature ofany litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability ofconcentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action. FRCP 23(b)(3).
4 The Supreme Court has held that district courts must conduct a "rigorous analysis" into whether the prerequisites
ofRule 23 are met before certifying a class. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
s General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
6 Cash v. Swifton Land Com., 434 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1970).
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the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification
question' ,,7 As the Sixth Circuit has noted:
Mere repetition of the language of Rule 23(a) is not sufficient.
There must be an adequate statement of the basic facts to
indicate that each requirement of the rule is fulfilled.
Maintainability may be determined by the court on the basis of
the pleadings, if sufficient facts are set forth, but ordinarily the
determination should be predicated on more information than
the pleadings will provide ....The parties should be afforded
an opportunity to present evidence on the maintainability of the
class action.8
I. Rule 23 (a) requirements.
A. Numerosity.
As noted above, to satisfy FRCP 23(a), a party seeking class reliefmust
demonstrate that the proposed class is so numerous that the joinder of all
members is impracticable.9 The test for numerosity is not precise and involves an
examination of the specific facts of each case. to In determining whether joinder is
impracticable, courts often will consider not only the size of the proposed class,
but also "the class's geographical dispersion, the ability of claimants to bring
individual suits, and whether the members' names are easily ascertainable.,,1 1
Even so, when the class size is extremely large, the impracticability requirement
7 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. at
160 (1982)).
8 Weathers v. Peters Realty Com., 499 F.2d 1997, 1200 (6th eir. 1974) (citation omitted).
9 FRCP 23(a)(I).
10 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th eir. 1996).
II O'Neil v. Appeal, 165 F.R.D. 479,489 (W.O. Mich. 1996).
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is normally satisfied. 12 At least one court has concluded that fewer "than twenty-
one [members] is inadequate,.more than forty [is] adequate, with numbers
between varying according to other fa~tors.13
It is important to note that mere conclusory allegations that joinder is
impracticable are not sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement. 14 Indeed, it
is proper for a court to rule against class certification when the contentions
concerning the size of the class are purely speculative. IS
As with all of the requirements of class status, a claimant typically must
establish the numerosity requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. 16
B. Commonality.
A party seeking class status must prove that there are questions of law or
fact common to the class. 17 Although a claimant can satisfy this requirement even
if the claims are not identical, when the resolution of a common legal issue is
dependent upon factual determinations that will be different for each purported
class member, the courts have consistently refused to find that the commonality
12 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Ilhardt v. A.O. Smith Corp., 168
F.R.D. 613,617 (S.D. Ohio 1996) ("Numerosity maybe satisfied by numbers alone").
13 N.A.A.C.P. v. City ofThomasville School Dist., 187 F.R.D. 690,696 (M.D. Ga. 1999) (quoting Cox v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986».
14 See Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Marketing Corn., 149 F.R.D. 65, 74 (D.. N.J. 1993).
IS Vigue v. Ives, 138 F.R.D. 6, 8, (D. Maine 1991).
16 Ilhardt v. A.O. Smith Corp., 168 F.R.D.613, 618 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
17 FRCP 23(a)(2).
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requirement was satisfied. IS Thus, where there is a finding that common issues do
not predominate, certification is improper. I9
The Sixth Circuit has noted that the "commonality requirement is
interdependent with the impracticability ofjoinder requirement, and the 'tests
together fonn the underlying conceptual basis supporting class actions' ".20
C. Typicality.
To meet the typicality requirement, the party seeking class status must
establish that the claims or defenses of the representative party are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class.21 Stated otherwise, the class representative's
interests must be aligned with those of the represented group so that "in pursuing
his own claims, the named plaintiff will be advancing the int~ests of the class
members.,,22 This test is nonnally met as long as there is "a nexus between the
class representatives' claims" and the common questions of fact or law
concerning the class.23 If there is a defense that is peculiar to the named plaintiff,
class certification may be denied.24
18 See, e.g., Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Marketing Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 76 (D.N.J. 1993). See also
McCauley v. International Business Machines, 165 F.3d 1038, 1046-47 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that to meet the
commonality requirement, the allegations of misrepresentations upon which the class claims are based must "be
uniform among class members ....")
19 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he products are different, each plaintiff has
a unique complaint, and each received different information and assurances from his treating physician").
20 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 1 Newberg on Class Action, § 3.l0, at
3-47).
21 FRCP 23(a)(3).
22 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082 (6th Cir. 1996).
23 Cook v. Rockwell International Com., 151 F.R.D. 378,385 (D. Colo. 1993).
24 BalIan v. Upjohn Co., 473 F.R.D. 473,480 (W.O. Mich. 1994).
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D. Adequacy ofRepresentation.
Whether representation is adequate is generally considered a question of
fact based upon the circumstances of each case.25 For a representative to meet the
test: (a) he or she must have common interests with the unnamed members ofa
class; and (b) it must appear that the representative will vigorously prosecute the
interests of a class through qualified counsel.26 Applying these factors, courts will
review whether there is any antagonism between the interests of the named
plaintiff and the other members of the class and also review the experience and
the ability of the attorneys for the class.27 In addition, the class representative
must" 'posses the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class
members.,,28 With respect to that point, a person will not be deemed an adequate
class representative ifhe or she fails to establish the existence of a case or
controversy.29 Moreover, standing must exist both at the time the complaint is
filed and at the time the class is certified.30
On a similar point, special mootness rules exist for class actions. Once a
class is certified, "the mooting of the named plaintiffs claim does not moot the
action" and "the court continues to have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the
2S Id. at 482.
26 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1083 (6th Cir 1996).
27 BalIan v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473,482 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
28 General Tel. Co. v.Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982); James v. Jones, 148 F.R.D. 196,201 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
29 Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 141 F.R.D. 516,523 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
30 Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 1993).
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action if a controversy between any class member and the defendant exists.,,3! On
the other hand, where the named plaintiffs claim becomes moot before
certification, dismissal of the action is required.32
II. Rule 23(b) Requirements.
As discussed above, a party seeking class relief may pursue a class action ifhe or
she meets the Rule 23(a) "prerequisites" and, in addition, demonstrates the applicability
ofone of the three subparts of Rule 23(b).
A. Risks From Prosecution of Separate Actions.
Rule 23(b)(1) recognizes the propriety ofa class action if the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites are met and the prosecution of separation action by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
establish incompatible standards for the party opposing the class; or (b)
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests. A judgment in a Rule 23(b)(1) case "shall" include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members of the class.33
B. Conduct Giving Rise to Injunctive or Declaratory Relief.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), class reliefwill be deemed proper if the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites are satisfied and the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
31 Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 1993).
32 Id.
33 FRCP 23(c)(3). This same requirement applies to a judgment entered in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.
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act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole.
c. Predominance of Common Questions.
Class relief is appropriate under the last subpart of Rule 23(b) if the Rule
23(a) prerequisites are satisfied and the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.34 The
Rule specifically identifies the following list of factors that are "pertinent to the
findings": (a) the interest ofmembers of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of .
the claims in the particular forum; and (d) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.35
With respect to a FRCP 23(b)(3) class action, the court is required to
direct to the members of the class the "best notice practicable under the
circumstances", including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort.36 Such notice "shall" advise each member that: (a) the
court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a
34 FRCP 23(b)(3).
3S Id.
36 FRCP 23(c)(2).
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specified date; (b) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (c) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.37
Due process concerns mandate the opt-out mechanism.38
A judgment entered in a Rule 23(b)(3) case "shall" include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in the preceding paragraph was
directed, and.who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class.39
Issues of damages in a Rule 23(b)(3) action may, where appropriate, be
reserved for individual treatment, with the question of liability tried as a class
action.4o In complex cases where no single set ofoperative. facts establishes
liability, where no single proximate cause applies to each potential class members
and to each defendant, and where individual issues outnumber common issues,
however, the district court should question the appropriateness of a class action
for resolving the controversy.41
III. Other Procedures.
A. Class Certification.
Rule 23 specifically provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after the
commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by
37 Id.
38 Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 193 F.3d 415, 425 (6th Cir. 1999).
39 FRCP 23(c)(3).
40 Ilhardt v. A.O. Smith Com., 168 F.R.D. 613, 619 (S.D.Ohio 1996).
41 Id.
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order whether it is to be so maintained.,,42 .Providing the court a.measure of
flexibility, the Rule also provides that "[a]n order under this subdivision may be
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.,,43
In the Sixth Circuit, there is an abuse of discretion standard for the review of a
trial court's class action certification.44 In addition, if the· parties agree to class
certification or if the opposing party does not contest the assertions of the party
seeking class certification as to the existence of a prerequisite, the district court
may conclude that certification is proper or that the prerequisites are properly
established without making a specific finding.45
B. Discrete Issues and Subclasses.
Rule 23 explicitly recognizes that an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues.46 Similarly, a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class.47
C. Orders in Conduct of Actions.
Rule 23 provides that a court in a class action may make appropriate
orders: (1) determining the course ofproceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or
argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
42 FRCP 23(c)(I).
43 Id.
44 McCauley v. International Business Machines Com., 165 F.3d 1038, 1046 (6th Cir. 1999).
45 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079-80 (6th Cir. 1996).
46 FRCP 23(c)(4).
47 Id.
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otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the c<;>urt may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of
the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of the members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene
and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing
conditions on. the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of
absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar
procedural matters.48
D. Dismissal or Compromise.
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.49
E. Appeals.
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of
. a district court granting or denying class action certification under the Rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order.50 An appeal does
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of
appeals so orders.51
48 FRCP 23(d).
49 FRCP 23(e).
50 FRCP 23(t). It is noteworthy that there is no corresponding provision under Rule 23 of the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure.
51 Id.
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IV. Emerging Class Issues in Employment Law.
A. Claims Regarding Employee Benefits.
Among the most prevalent class action claims in the employment law area
are those regarding employee benefits.52 Such claims typically are pursued under
the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA,,).53 Class
claims under ERISA may involve such issues as "nondisclosure, breach ofduty,
or nonforfeiture provisions.,,54
B. Discrimination Claims.
Employers today face an increasing risk of defending discrimination
claims by groups of fonner, or even current, employees. In earlier cases under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, many courts tended to be more lenient
in finding compliance with Rule 23 than in other types of cases.55 That tendency
ended after the United States Supreme Court emphasized that a Title VII class
plaintiffmust satisfy all of the requirements of Rule 23,56 noting:
We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination are often by their very nature class suits,
involving classwide wrongs. Common questions of law or
facts are typically present. But careful attention to the
requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 remains nonetheless
indispensable. The mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or
ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that·the party
who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative
52 This topic has been addressed extensively by other speakers.
53 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et. seq.
54 5 James Wm. Moore, et al. Moore's Federal Practice § 23.23 [5][i] (3d ed. 2000).
55 Lindemann & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, Vol. II at 1582 (3d ed. 1996).
56 East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodrigues, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
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of those who may have been the real victims of that
discrimination.57
As a general proposition, disparate treatment discrimination claims are
often not appropriate for class treatment because allegations of intentional
discrimination often raise individual issues.58 Stated another way, "[i]t is more
difficult to find commonality and typicality in disparate treatment claims as
opposed to disparate impact claims.,,59 Among the problems with the pursuit of .
disparate treatment class claims is that the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages in Title VII cases "requires individualized and independent proof of
injury to, and the means by which discrimination was inflicted upon, each class
member.,,6o As the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit has noted:
The plaintiffs' claims for compensatory and punitive damages
must therefore focus almost entirely on facts and issues specific
to individuals rather than the class as a whole: what kind of
discrimination was each plaintiff subjected to; how did it affect
each plaintiff emotionally and physically, at work and at home;
what medical treatment did each plaintiff receive and at what
expense; and so on and so on. Under such circumstances, an
action conducted nominally as a class action would 'degenerate
in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried. ,61
A Title VII plaintiffbringing a disparate impact claim must identify a
specific practice or specific practices as the cause of the alleged impact, unless the
S7 Id. at 405-06.
S8 Lindemann & Grossman, n. 55, supra, at 1593.
S9 Carter v. West Publishing Co., 79 FEP 1494, 1498 (D. Fla. 1999). See also Zachery v. Texaco Exploration &
Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 239 (W.O. Tex. 1999) ("Because disparate treatment claims are by their nature
individual, the class treatment of these claims requires close scrutiny of the proposed class and claims.").
60 Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Com., 151 F.3d 402,419 (5th Cir. 1998).
61 Id.
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elements of the decision making process are not capable of separation for
analysis.62 Courts generally find the Rule 23(a) requirements met in disparate
impact cases when the plaintiffs identify a particular test or other objective
selection devise that created the disparate impact.63
C. Harassment Claims.
Although harassment claims more often than not involve allegations of
individual harassment, there is precedent for class actions that arise from an
alleged pervasive course ofharassing conduct affecting a large number of
persons.64
D. Wage and Hour Claims.
Wage and hour claims, like those asserted under ERISA, can give rise to
significant exposure for relatively minor missteps. Under Federal Law,6S there
are special rules concerning 'collective claims that, in contrast to those in Rule 23,
require claimants to opt in to a potential class.66 Oddly, the Kentucky Wage and
Hour chapter, though based in significant part on the Fair Labor Standards Act,
does not explicitly contain a similar "opt in" provision.67
62 Lindemann & Grossman, n. 55, supra, at 1591.
63 Id., 2000 cum. supp. at 881.
64 See. e.g., Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 1998).
6S The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. section 201, et seq. requires payment of minimum wages and overtime
to employees covered by the Act. .
66 29 U.S.C. § 216 (''No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing
to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.").
67 See KRS 337.385 ("Such action may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by anyone (1) or more
employees for and in behalf of themselves.").
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Although many employees in Kentucky still find it surprising, under the doctrine of
employment at-will, a person's employment generally may be terminated at any time, with or
without notice, for any reason or no reason at all. Of course, employees also have the right to
end their employment ,at any time and for any ,reason or ,no reason at all. This doctrine is simple
in appearance, but not in application due to ever increasing exceptions to it. This paper explores
the current state of the employment at-will doctrine in Kentucky and comments on its future.
HISTORY
The doctrine of employment at-will can be traced to the Middle Ages. In 1349, King
Edward ill of England promulgated the Statute of Labourers to alleviate labor shortages caused
by the Black Death, a bubonic plague that killed nearly half of the population of Great Britain.
The Statute compelled workers to accept employment at wages as they existed prior to the Black
Death. It also prohibited workers from quitting before the end of the agreed-upon employment
term. Workers who departed before the agreed-upon time of service were imprisoned. 1
The Statute of Labourers controlled until 1562, when Queen Elizabeth I promulgated the
Statute of Artificers. Like the Statute of Labourers, the impetus for the Statute of Artificers was
a plague, this one reducing England's population by five percent. The law was designed to
prevent employers from hiring laborers only during harvesting season, and then dismissing them
during winter months. It was also designed to prevent laborers from leaving their employment
just before the most difficult time of the year. To that end, employment for industrial and
agricultural workers was mandated to be for at least one year. The statute provided a loophole,
however, for leaving employment in the case of "some reasonable and sufficient cause or matter
to be allowed before two justices of the peace, or one at the least, within the said county...."2
William, Schwab, and Burton, Employment Law, (2d ed. 1998), pp. 49-50.
Id. at 50-51.
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The Statute ofArtificers remained in force until it was formally repealed in l·1875. During
this time, William Blackstone authored his now-famous rule on employment that was for no
specified period of time. In his Commentaries (1765), Blackstone stated: "If the hiring be
general without any particular time limited, the law construes it to. be a hiring for a year; upon a
principle of natural equity that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout
all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well when there is work to be done, as when there
is not: but the contract may be made for any longer or smaller term." Again, the rule was
designed to prevent employers from dismissing laborers during the off-season, and to prevent
laborers from leaving their work before the hardest part of the year.
As England and the United States moved away from an agrarian economy, and toward an
industrial economy, the one-year employment rule began to make less sense. Accordingly,
courts began to develop the at-will employment doctrine. The earliest mention in Kentucky of
something similar to this rule appeared at the end of the 19th century in Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Company v. Harvey, 34 S.W. 1069 (Ky. 1896), which noted the general rule in
Kentucky that an employment contract, in the absence of a specific agreement concerning
duration, is terminable at-will. This rule solidified as Kentucky dealt with the Great Depression.
See Clay v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 71 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1934); Western
Union Telegraph Company v. Ramsey, 88 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. 1935).
THE DOCTRINE
The most popular current statement of the employment at-will doctrine in Kentucky
comes from Firestone Textile Company Division, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v.
Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1983), where the Court stated: "ordinarily an employer
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may discharge his at-will employee for good cause, for no cause, or for a cause that some might
view as morally indefensible."
One should always acknowledge that every employment relationship is contractual, even
if that contract is terminable at-will. See, Richard A.Balesand Joseph S. Bums, A Survey of
Kentucky Employment Law, 28 Northern Kentucky Law Review 219,220 (2001). This point is
often lost on employers, employees and scholars.
The doctrine of employment at-will is really no different from the ordinary contract law
rule that a contract which does not specify its duration is terminable at the will of either party.
See KRS § 355.2-309(2) (Article 2, Part 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, governing "general
obligation and construction of contract"); Kirby v. Scroggins, 246 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1952). It
simply would be too much work for courts to guess at what the parties intended the duration of
every indefinite contract to be. Thus, to preserve judicial resources, courts allow contracts of
indefinite duration to be cancelled by either party at any time.
The at-will employment doctrine applies this principle to contracts for employment.
(Remember, all employment relationships are contractual). Thus, when an employer and
employee enter into an employment relationship for an indefinite duration, both parties have the
privilege of ending the relationship at any time and for any reason, subject to many exceptions.
Employees are often surprised to learn they can be terminated without a good reason.
Courts sometimes attempt to mollify angry plaintiffs by explaining the benefits of the rule. See
MacKenzie v. Miller Brewing Company, 2001 WL 273843 (Wis. 2001). Commentators have
similarly tried to justify the rule:
The employment at-will doctrine derives its vitality from the fact
that the future is unknowable. Although the employee may tell his
or her employer that he/she will be available for a certain period of
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time, subsequent events may cause the employee to leave, either to
pursue an opportunity elsewhere or for some personal reason.
Similarly, an employer may be unable to project what will happen in the future.
The future is not clearly known. More important, employees, like
employers, know what they do not know. They are not faced with
a bolt from the blue, with an "unknown unknown." Rather they
face a known unknown for which they can plan. The at-will
contract is an essential part of that planning because it allows both
sides to take a wait-and-see attitude to that relationship so that new
and more accurate choices can be made on the strength of
improved infonnation.
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At-Will, 51 University of Chicago Law
Review 947, 969 (1984).
EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
It is dangerous for an employer to believe it always has the right to tenninate an at-will
employee for "no cause," or for a "morally indefensible" cause. Several exceptions to the at-will
doctrine have been created by the Kentucky General Assembly. The broadest of these
exceptions is found in the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS Chapter 344, which makes it
unlawful for an employer "To fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, tenns, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
age forty (40) and over,because the person is a qualified individual with a disability, or because
the individual is a smoker or nonsmoker, as long as the person complies with any workplace
policy concerning smoking...." KRS § 344.040. This statute prohibits essentially the same
discriminatory tennination as its federal equivalent, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
u.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. See also 42 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act) and 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Americans with Disabilities Act).
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The Kentucky Civil Rights ·Act and the Federal Civil Rights Act, by their express
language, limit the circumstances under which an employer can discharge an employee. These
limitations become very apparent when one considers the burden of proof under these statutes.
Under the well known case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, .411 U.S. 792 (1973), a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that (1) s/he belongs
to a protected category, (2) s/he was qualified for the job that he or she sought or held, (3) s/he
suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants. Obviously, this burden ofproof is minimal.
Most employees who fall into one of the protected categories listed in Title VII or KRS
Chapter 344 will be able to meet the burden. Once the prima facie case has been established, the
burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. In other words, if an employee falls into one of the protected
categories of the civil rights acts, and the employee is discharged (or suffers some other adverse
employment action), an employer must generally have a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the discharge if the employer wishes to avoid liability. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-
3. This requirement - that the employer have a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
discharging employees in protected groups - undercuts the employment at-will doctrine.
Other statutes have further eroded the employment at-will rule. KRS § 342.197 prohibits
an employer from retaliating against an employee who pursues a worker's compensation claim.
A plaintiff relying on this statute for a cause of action must show that (1) s/he engaged in
statutorily protected activity, (2) s/he was discharged, and (3) there is a causal connection
between the protected activity and the discharge. A causal connection can be established by
demonstrating a retaliatory reason for the discharge "was a substantial and motivating factor" in
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the decision to tenninate the' employee~ First Property Management Corp. v. Zarebidaki, 867
S.W.2d 185, 188 (Ky. 1993). An employer may not evade liability by showing that the
discharge would have occurred even absent the retaliatory motive. Id. However, if the employer
can demonstrate that the employee was discharged .. as a result of - for example - a neutral
attendance policy, the plaintiff will not succeed in demonstrating the requisite causal connection.
Daniels v. R. E. Michel Company, Inc., 941 F.Supp. 629 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
Kentucky has also passed a statute protecting public employees against discharge in
retaliation for disclosures of violations of the law. The so-called "whistleblower" statute, KRS §
61.101 et seq., prohibits discharge or other retaliation against a public employee who, in good
faith, reports an actual or suspected violation of any law, statute, executive order, administrative
regulation, or rule of the federal or state government. KRS § 61.102. Employees are also
covered if they make disclosure on behalf of another employee. KRS § 61.103. The statute
specifically allows employees to bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or punitive
damages, or both. KRS § 61.103(2). Employees need only show that their disclosure was a
contributing factor to their discharge in order to succeed. The burden then shifts to the employer
to show by "clear and convincing" evidence that the disclosure was not a material factor in the
discharge. KRS § 61.103(3).
Kentucky courts have also created exceptions to the at-will doctrine. The most common
exception created by the courts provides an employee with a cause of action for "wrongful
discharge." This cause of action is a favorite with employees because it supports the general
misconception that employees have the right to keep their job so long as they are doing a "good"
job.
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The tort of wrongful discharge first,.appeared in Kentucky in Firestone Textile Company
Division, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Ky. 1983),
where the court held an employee has a cause of action for wrongful tennination where his or her
discharge is contrary to a "public policy [which] must be evidenced by a constitutional or
statutory provision." Firestone, 666 S.W.2d at 731 (emphasis added). The court recognized
that KRS Chapter 342, the Kentucky Worker's Compensation Statute, contains just such a
policy. (Firestone predated the enactment of KRS 342.197). An employee must "be free to
assert a lawful claim for benefits without suffering retaliatory discharge." Id. at 731. According
to the court, "the only effective way to prevent an employer from interfering with his employees'
rights to seek compensation is to recognize that the latter has a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge when the discharge is motivated by the desire to punish the employee for seeking the
benefits to which he is entitled by law." Id at 734. Justice Stephenson dissented, believing the
Firestone decision would begin the abandonment of the employment at-will doctrine because a
good lawyer could "always find a right implicit in the statute...." Id. at 734.
Two years later, however, the court clearly delineated and limited the Firestone public
policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine:
1. The discharge must be contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy
as evidenced by existing law.
2. That policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision.
3. The decision of whether the public policy asserted meets these criteria is a
question of law for the court to decide, not a question of facts.
Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985). In Grzyb, the plaintiff had alleged wrongful
discharge, and had alleged a public policy against sex discrimination3 to fonn the basis of her
The Plaintiffs complaint in Grzyb did not explicitly reference KRS Chapter 344; it merely alleged that the
plaintiff was fIred for fraternizing with a female employee. The Court assumed, for the purposes of argument, that
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argument. Importantly, the court held this was impermissible. KRS Chapter 344 not only
created the public policy upon which the plaintiff relied, but it also pre-empted the field of its
application. According to the court, "where the statute both declares the unlawful act and
specifies the civil remedy available to the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the
remedy provided by the statute." Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401. Thus, in Kentucky, an employee
cannot base a wrongful discharge claim on a public policy set forth in a statute that also specifies
a civil remedy.
Less than a decade later, the Kentucky Supreme Court again whittled away at the
Firestone decision. In Boykins v. Housing Authority ofLouisville, 842 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1992),
the court limited the type of statutory or constitutional policy that can form the basis of a
wrongful discharge claim. The plaintiff, Karen Boykins, was employed as an executive secretary
by the Housing 'Authority of Louisville. Her infant son was allegedly injured in an apartment
owned, operated, and managed by the Housing Authority. Boykins filed a negligence suit on
behalf of her son, and was subsequently fired by the Housing Authority. She then brought a
second suit, this time in her own name, alleging retaliatory discharge for having brought the first
lawsuit. She based her claim for wrongful discharge on the "open courts" provision of the
Kentucky Constitution. Kentucky Constitution, Section 14. The court rejected this claim.
Reasoning that the "open court" provision has nothing to do with employment rights, the court
denied Boykins' claim because there is no "employment-related nexus between the constitutional
policy stated in Section 14 and Boykin's discharge." Boykins, 842 S.W.2d at 530. Thus, in
Kentucky, for a wrongful discharge claim to succeed, the constitutional or statutory provision
upon which the plaintiff relies must have an "employment-related nexus" to the employee's
discharge.
the complaint sufficiently alleged sex discrimination.
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, Despite the existence of a cause of action for wrongful discharge, the law imposes no
obligation on employers to treat employees with "good faith." Nearly every other contractual
relationship has an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of all parties to the
contract. However, this is not the case with the employment contract. In Wyant v. SCM
Corporation, 692 S.W.2d 814 (Ky.App. 1985), an employee sought to recover against his former
employer for wrongful discharge, as well as bad faith and defamation. The court dismissed the
employee's wrongful discharge and defamation claims with little discussion. On the claim of
bad faith, the court dealt with the employee's argument that his 17-year tenure with the company
imposed an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing upon his employer. The court rejected
this argument as being inconsistent with the doctrine of employment at-will. After all, if an
employer can end an employee's employment at any time, and for any reason, an implied duty of
good faith in an employment contract would render the at-will doctrine meaningless. Thus, in
Kentucky, there is no cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in an
employment contract.
FURTHER MODIFICATION
Aside from the rather narrow exception to the employment at-will doctrine provided by
the tort of wrongful discharge, there exist several other ways in which the parties may modify
their at-will relationship. The most obvious way is through contract. Since even an at-will
employment relationship is a contractual one, both parties may agree that the rule of at-will
employment will not apply. Modification of the employment at-will relationship may be either
oral or writt~n..Also, even if the parties do not agree on a specified duration for the employment
relationship, the parties may still agree that the relationship is terminable only for cause.
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The seminal case in Kentucky on contractual modification of the employment at-will
doctrine is Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corporation, 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983).
American Synthetic recruited Shah from a job in St. Louis, Missouri. According to Shah, he
relied on various sales pitches from American Synthetic designed to induce him to relocate to
Kentucky. As part of these sales pitches, Shah alleged that he and American Synthetic agreed,
among other things, to an employment contract under which Shah would serve a. 90-day
probationary period. During the probationary period, American Synthetic could discharge him
for any cause whatsoever. After the 90 days had elapsed, Shah alleged that he became a
permanent employee dischargeable only for cause in accordance with the personnel policies and
procedures established by American Synthetic. "For cause" was defined by one of American
Synthetic's personnel managers as "something like work connected performance,
insubordination, violation ofpolicy or rules, or lack ofwork." Shah, 655 S.W.2d at 491.
Shah was fired after the 90-day probationary period, and he brought suit against
American Synthetic. The trial court held that Shah's employment was for an indefinite period of
time and, therefore, was terminable at-will. The court granted summary judgment for American
Synthetic, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed. According to the Supreme Court, parties
may enter into a contract of employment terminable only pursuant to its express terms. So long
as parties clearly state their intention to enter into such a contract, it is valid "even though no
other consideration than services to be performed are promised, is expected by the employer, or
performed or promised by the employee." Shah, 655 S.W.2d at 492. The court remanded for a
determination of whether Shah's employment contract contained a clause permitting his
termination only for cause, or whether he was fired in accordance with company policies and
procedures.
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An employee faced a similar situation in Hammond v. Heritage Communications, Inc.,
756 S.W.2d 152 (Ky.App. 1988). The plaintiff was an employee of two radio stations in Barren
County, Kentucky. Both stations were owned by the defendant. Plaintiff specifically alleged
. that she was encouraged by her employer to appear in Playboy magazine. At the very least, her
supervisor told her that she would not lose her job if her photograph were to appear in the
magazine. After her photograph was published, she was terminated. She brought suit, alleging
wrongful discharge and breach of an oral contract. On appeal, the court focused on the
plaintiffs argument that an oral contract had been created. The record was undisputed that the
plaintiffs supervisor told her that she would not lose her job if her photograph appeared in
Playboy. The Court of Appeals held that this fact made summary judgment inappropriate.
Plaintiff was entitled to establish that her at-will status was altered by the oral assurances she
received from her supervisor. A reasonable jury could find that an oral contract existed, which
the company breached by terminating the plaintiff.
The at-will employment relationship may also be modified by employee handbooks and
policies. In Nork v. Fetter Printing Company, 738 S.W.2d 824 (Ky.App. 1987), several cases4
were appealed simultaneously which presented common material facts and issues relating to
wrongful discharge claims. In each case, the employee and the employer operated under an
employee manual or handbook which set forth personnel policies. Each plaintiff argued that
these handbooks altered the at-will employment relationship by manifesting an expression of
contractual agreement. However, in each case, the employee handbook contained a clear
disclaimer stating that it was not intended to be a contract. Each handbook contained a statement
that the parties' relationship was intended to be "at-will." The court relied heavily upon these
4 Nork, Scheurich v. Cross Motors Corp. and Baker v. Slack were consolidated.
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statements. Since the parties did not mutually intend to modify the at-will relationship, the court
entered summary judgment for each employer.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reached a similar decision in Noel v. Elk Brand
Manufacturing Company, 53 S.W.3d 95 (Ky.App. 2000). The parties in Noel operated under an
employee handbook that did not expressly provide that the employees were at-will employees.
The handbook did specifically state that employees could rely on the company for wages,
benefits, holidays, and seniority. The plaintiff argued that this handbook abrogated the default
rule of at-will employment. However, the court rejected the plaintiffs arguments because the
employee handbook specifically provided that it was "not a contract." Noel, 53 S.W.3d at 99.
Thus, while the disclaimer in the Elk Brand handbook was different from the one in the Nork
case, the court still held that the disclaimer was effective to prevent the handbook from
modifying the at-will employment relationship. Caveat: Employers are advised to include the
full "at-will" disclaimer in all applications and handbooks.
In addition to their reliance on employee handbooks, employees sometimes argue that the
at-will employment relationship has been modified by looking to written or oral offers of
employment, and to statements of an employee's compensation. For example, an offer letter that
indicates an employee will be employed at a wage rate of "$40,000.00 per year" can be
construed as an offer of one year employment. Similarly, an offer to employ someone for a 90-
day probationary period could also be construed as an offer to provide employment for a
minimum of 90 days, or to provide pennanent employment after the expiration of the 90 days.
Statements like these can unintentionally create contracts for a specific duration. See Putnam v.
Producer's Livestock Marketing Ass'n., 75 S.W.2d 1075 (Ky. 1934). Once the parties operate
under a contract for a specific duration, the employment at-will rule is no longer applicable. See
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also Hu,nter v. Weh'r Constructors, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 899 (Ky., App. 1993) (an offer to employ
plaintiff for a project that mentioned the project's duration creates a jury question as to whether
acceptance of the offer created a contract for a definite term).
Employers should also be aware that oral representations can modify an at-will
employment relationship. In Audiovox Corp. v. Moody, 737 S.W.2d 468 (Ky.App. 1987), the
plaintiff was an at-will office manager for the defendant. She came to believe that her supervisor
was diverting company funds to his own use and benefit. When the company's management
became suspicious of the plaintiffs books and began to inquire about them, she responded that
she was fearful of saying anything because her supervisor would terminate her. The plaintiff
testified that management assured her that if she would divulge what she knew she would not be
discharged. Management then performed an audit of the company's books, but found no
discrepancies. Plaintiffs supervisor summoned her into his office and asked what she had told
management. When she pretended to be ignorant on the subject, her supervisor discharged her.
She sued, alleging that an oral contract modifying the at-will employment relationship had been
created. Audiovox defended by relying on the statute of frauds, claiming that, even if a contract
had been created, it was not capable of being performed within one year. The court disagreed,
holding that Audiovox could have performed the contract by intervening on the plaintiffs behalf
when her supervisor discharged her. Instead, the company chose to breach its oral contract with
the plaintiff. The company's reliance on the statute of frauds was held to be inapplicable, and
the at-will relationship was modified by the company's oral assurances.
Employers and employees who agree to a probationary period of employment may
unwittingly alter the at-will nature of their relationship. In Norris v. Filson Care Home, Ltd.,
1990 WL 393903 (Ky.App. 1990), the plaintiff filled out a one-page application for employment
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indicating that her employment was "at-will." She was also issued·an employee handbook which
stated that new employees were subject to a three-month probationary period, during which
period they could be terminated for any reason at all. The handbook also contained a list of
offenses for which the employee could be terminated. The handbook stated that "If an employee
is to be discharged for unsatisfactory service after the three-month period is completed, a
warning notice will be given and placed in the employees' file.... Three warnings within a 12-
month period of time will be grounds for dismissal."
The plaintiff was dismissed after 90 days without receiving any warning notices. She
sued for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the employer, but the
Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed. According to the Court of Appeals, in a true employment
at-will relationship, a probationary period is unnecessary. If the employment is truly at-will, the
relationship may be terminated at any time for any reason. Thus, the court concluded that the
employer must have intended something other than employment at-will when it drafted the
above provisions of its employee handbook. The court found it especially relevant that the
employee handbook did not contain a disclaimer that it was not intended to be a contract, or that
the plaintiffs employment was at-will.
Recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court supported employees who argued that the at-will
nature of their employment relationship was undermined by the employer's alleged fraud. In
United Parcel Service Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1999), the employee established an
alleged fraudulent failure to hire despite the existence of an at-will employment relationship.
UPS formerly contracted its air delivery service to several subcontractors. In the mid-
1980s, UPS decided to take its air delivery service in-house. Rickert was a pilot for one of these
contract air carriers. According to Rickert, someone from UPS told him that, so long as he
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· remained in his contract carrier position until the transition was complete, he would have a job at
UPS. Rickert was unable to establish who made this "promise," but this fact did not trouble the
majority.
When Rickert did not obtain a job for UPS, he filed suit. UPS argued that, even if the
promise was made as Rickert alleged, it was of insufficient specificity to support an action for
fraud. Kentucky law demands "clear and convincing" evidence of fraud. Wahba v. Don Corlett
Motors, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Ky. App. 1978). As the dissent pointed out, Rickert failed as
a matter of law to establish an oral contact because, as Rickert testified, "UPS merely offered
him a 'chance' of employment ifhe chose to remain with his contract carrier...." (UPS at 471.)
If Rickert were to succeed on his fraud claim, UPS argued that he would transform the
alleged indefinite "promise" for employment into a guaranteed contract of employment for life.
UPS argued that the trial court impermissibly allowed the jury to award Rickert damages for an
I8-year employment contract. After all, at most, Rickert would have been an at-will employee
ofUPS ifhe had been hired.
The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected UPS' argument and held that Rickert established
the six elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., (1) material representation (2)
which is false (3) that was known to be false or made recklessly (4) made with inducement to be
acted upon (5) acted in reliance thereon and (6) causing injury. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d at 468.
Since UPS never came through on its alleged promise to hire Rickert, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that a verdict in his favor on the fraud count was supportable. Rickert could not
prove that UPS did not intend to hire him individually, but he introduced circumstantial evidence
that UPS did not intend to hire all of the contract carrier pilots. According to the court, this was
"clear and convincing evidence" sufficient to maintain Rickert's fraud action. Rickert
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established detrimental reliance by showing that he forewent any job search during the transition r
period, while he thought he had a guaranteed job at ups. All this "proof," the Supreme Court
believed, when combined, supported a jury verdict in favor ofRickert.
WHERE ARE WE GOING?
The future of the employment at-will doctrine is uncertain. As the Rickert case
demonstrates, the courts are more than willing to carve out exceptions to the rule when it suits
the circumstances of the case. Rickert was not even able to identify the person who allegedly
made the fraudulent promise to him, yet the court allowed him to maintain a fraud claim and
circumvent the at-will employment rule. The court effectively transformed a promise to an
applicant that he would have a job into a guaranteed contract of employment for life.
Presumably, under the at-will employment rule, if Rickert had actually been hired by UPS, the
company could have terminated him the day after hiring him. After all, employers do not owe a
duty of good faith to their employees. Wyant v. SCM, supra. Nevertheless, the Rickert decision
shows just how uneasy the courts are with the at-will employment rule. It remains to be seen
how far the courts will go to undermine the rule.
The courts are also beginning to whittle away at the employment at-will rule by relying
on employee handbooks. More and more often, if an employee is given a handbook or a set of
policies by which he or she must abide, the employee will no longer be considered to be
terminable at-will. Perhaps the most shocking example of this shift in philosophy can be found
in a recent Arizona case, Demasse v. ITT Corporation, 1999 WL 326407 (Az. 1999), where the
Arizona Supreme Court examined an employee handbook containing a policy concerning layoff.
The policy stated that employees would not be laid off ahead of less-senior employees. The
employer thereafter sought to change its policy, under a clause in the handbook reserving the
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right to amend, modify or cancel the handbook policies unilaterally. The employer wished
layoffs to be based on each employee's abilities, rather than seniority. The Arizona Supreme
Court held that this unilateral change was impermissible. According to the court, once an
employee relies upon provisions of the handbook, despite a disclaimer noting that the handbook
was not a guarantee of continued employment, the employee may legitimately expect that the
policies would not be changed during his tenure of employment. The handbook may be changed
for new employees, but those changes may not be applied to current employees. In many states,
continued employment would be sufficient consideration to modify the handbook, but the
Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument. If an employer in Arizona wants to change a
handbook provision for existing employees, it must provide additional consideration beyond
continued employment.
The Court in Demasse also faced an issue of whether an employee must exhaust the
complaint procedure specified in an employee handbook prior to bringing suit for breach of
contract. Although the same court stated that the employer was bound to follow the provisions
of the employee handbook, it held that an employee is not required to exhaust the complaint
procedures found therein. These two separate holdings cannot be reconciled. If the employer is
bound to follow the terms of the employee handbook, since it is construed by the court to be a
contract, then the doctrine of mutuality should require that an employee also be required to
follow the terms of the employee handbook. The fact that the Arizona Supreme Court held that
only the employer was bound to follow the provisions of the employee handbook demonstrates
how far some courts are willing to go to undeJ!lline an employer's right to terminate an employee
at-will.s
As of this date, the Demasse decision has not been followed by any other jurisdiction.
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Many employers sense they can no longer count on judicial support for their business
decisions to discharge at-will employees. To protect themselves, and in light of the U. S.
Supreme Court's recent holding in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001),
which upheld application of the Federal Arbitration Act to employees not directly involved in
interstate commerce, many employers are requiring employees to resolve disputes through
arbitration. These employers reason that, if most employment is no longer at-will, then resolving
employment disputes should at least be done in the cheapest and quickest manner possible.
Regardless of the direction that employment at-will takes in the future, it is clear the
doctrine no longer has the vitality it once enjoyed. Courts have gone along with employees'
efforts to dilute the doctrine over the past several years. Perhaps the law will come full circle,
returning to a statutorily imposed minimum guarantee of employment, similar to the Statute of
Artificers or the Statute of Labourers.
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An employment law practitioner faces ethical issues each day ofhis or her
practice. I have addressed in this paper a number of issues which one may confront in
every day practice. I will supplement this paper with a power point presentation and
copies of the same will be available at the seminar.
Further, no paper can be exhaustive on this issue. One should always consult the
Supreme Court Rules for guidance in this area.
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A. CONTACTING CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF
AN ADVERSE PARTY.
1. Current Employees.
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." SCR
3.130(4.2). With regard to an organization, this Supreme Court Rule
prohibits communication by a lawyer from one party concerning the
matter in question with persons with managerial responsibility on behalf
of the organization, any other person whose act or omission in connection
with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or
criminal liability, or any other person whose statement may constitute an
admission on the part of the organization. SCR 3.130(4.2), emt. 2. In
regard to communications with non-managerial employees of the
organization, the lawyer should disclose his identity and the fact that he is
a lawyer representing a party with a claim against the organization. Id.
See also, SCR 3.130(4.3). If, however, the non-managerial party or agent
is represented in the matter by his own counsel, the lawyer may acquire
that counsel's consent. Id.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that SCR 3.130(4.2)'s
prohibition against contacting represented parties applies prior to the
initiation of fonnal proceedings as well as after the initiation of such
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proceedings, when those contacts concern the matter on which the party is
represented. Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 514, 516 (1994)
citing KBA E-65. In Shoney's, plaintiffs counsel, after being notified that
the defendant was represented by counsel, met with and procured sworn
statements from two employees, a general manager and a relief manager,
without consent from or notice to defendant's counsel. Shoney's, supra,
875 S.W.2d at 514-15. In response, defend~nt's counsel sought
i
disqualification ofplaintiffs counsel as well as suppression of the sworn
statements. Id. at 515. The Court, after reviewing the trial court's record,
found that plaintiffs counsel admitted to taking written statements from
two senior managerial employees without consent or notice. Plaintiffs
counsel also admitted to taking a "stack" ofwritten statements from other
employees, and said that the statements obtained were "very important...
super important" to his case. Id.
The Court held that there was no doubt that the statements
procured were about the subject of the representation as prohibited in SCR
3.130(4.2). Shoney's, supra, 875 S.W.2d at 515. The Court concluded
that the portion of Comment2 to SCR 3.~30(4.2),relating to managerial
employees of the organization, covered the communications between
plaintiffs counsel·and the senior managerial employees of the defendant.
Id. Finally, the Court held that plaintiffs counsel was disqualified, and the
statements obtained were suppressed. Id. at 516-1 7.
2. Former Employees.
"The prohibition ofRule 4.2 with respect to contacts by a lawyer
with employees of an opposing corporate party does not extend to fonner
employees of that party." ABA Formal Ope 91-359. The Kentucky Bar
Association ("KBA"), relying on ABA Formal Opinion 91-359, has
reached the same conclusion. KBA E-381. In the KBA opinion, the
committee noted that a former employee is no longer subject to the control
of the organization nor in a position to speak for the organization, and
therefore cannot make vicarious admissions under state and federal rules
of evidence. Id.
The KBA committee recognized that persuasive arguments can and
have been made to extend the ambit ofModel Rule 4.2 to cover some
former corporate employees. The committee, however, also recognized
that the text ofRule 4.2 does not extend to cover former employees, nor
does the comment give basis for concluding that such coverage was
intended. Id. The committee opined that a lawyer, representing a client in
a matter adverse to a corporate party represented by counsel, may
communicate about the subject of the representation with an unrepresented
former employee of the corporate party without the consent of the
corporation's lawyer, and not violate Rule 4.2. Id. The committee does,
however, caution lawyers not to seek or induce the former employee to
violate the privilege attaching to the attorney-client communications
between the former employee and the former employer's counsel to the
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extent the communications are protected by the privilege, as such an
attempt would violate Rule 4.4. Id. The committee also requires the
lawyer contacting a fonner employee of an opposing corporate party to
infonn the fonner employee of the nature of the lawyer's role in the matter
giving to the contact. Id. The lawyer should also disclose who the
lawyer's client is and the fact that the former employer is an adverse party.
Id. The KBA opinion also states that if the lawyer contacts a·fonner
employee who is personally represented by counsel in the matter in
question, the lawyer must contact the former employee's counsel to seek
consent or provide notice that the fonner employee will be contacted.
KBAE-381.
The Kentucky Supreme Court '8 decision in Humco, Inc. v. Noble
is directly on point. See Humco, Inc. v. Noble, Ky., 31 S. W.3d 916 (2000).
One of the issues addressed in Humco was whether the plaintiffs lawyer
violated Model Rule 4.2 by contacting ten fonner employees of the
defendant without notice to or consent of defendant's counsel. These
former employees included individuals from both management and non-
management level positions. Two of the former employees were involved
in meetings and discussions regarding the discipline and ultimate
termination of the plaintiffs employment. The defendant brought this case
before the Kentucky Supreme Court, challenging the trial court and Court
ofAppeals decisions not to disqualify plaintiffs counsel for
communicating with the fonner employees without notice or consent.
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The Court, citing KBA E-381 and ABA Fonnal Opinion 91-359,
held that Model Rule 4.2 does not apply to fonner employees, including
situations where the fonner employees held managerial positions or their
conduct might have been the basis for imputing liability to the employer or
their statements could be admitted in evidence as an admission by the
employer. The Court further held that the purpose ofRule 4.2 was not to
prevent the flow of infonnation to the parti<fs, but rather to preserve the
adversarial system and prevent interference with the attorney-client
privilege. The Court concluded that fonner employees who no longer
have a present relationship with the organizational party are not parties
under Rule 4.2, and thus not adverse in the litigation sense.
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B. REPRESENTATION ISSUES - CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
1. Representation of Multiple Clients - Defendants.
Supreme Court Rule 3.130(1.7) provides the general rule on conflicts of
interest in representation. The Rule provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not·adversely affect the relationship with the
other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by
the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not be adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation. When
representation ofmultiple clients in a single matter
is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
An employment law practitioner faces this issue often in the
context of the simultaneous representation·ofpotentially adverse clients -
the corporation and the individual supervisor.
There does not appear to be any absolute rule against representing
multiple parties in litigation. Rather, the issue is decided on a case by case
basis. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3.130, clients may consent to such
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representation after a full explanation of the advantages and risks involved
in multiple representation. Comment 6 to this rule provides as follows:
[6] Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing
partisan litigation. Simultaneous representation ofparties whose
interests in litigation may conflict, such as co-plaintiff or co-
defendants, is governed by paragraph (b).An impennissible
conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the
parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an
opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different
possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question...
On the other hand, common representationrfpersons having
similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal
and the requirements ofparagraph (b) are met.
In representing the corporate employer and the individually named
defendant employee, an employment lawyer may be faced with a conflict
of interest too substantial to overcome. In certain cases, the company, to
avoid legal liability, must show that the employee in question was acting
outside the scope of his job. The employee, on the other hand, has an
interest in establishing he acted within the sC.ope of his duties, especially
where' such a finding might entitle him to indemnity from the corporate
employer. If, however, the corporation acknowledges that the employee
was acting within the scope of his duties, no conflict exists and multiple
representation is not inappropriate.
The District of Columbia Bar has actually adopted a test for
detennining the propriety ofjoint representation ofpotentially adverse
parties. The test is based on ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Opinion 1441. It consists of the following:
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(I) The co-parties agree to a single comprehensive
statement of facts describing the occurrence.
(2) The attorney reviews the statement of facts from the
perspective of each of the parties and detennines
that it does not support a claim by one against the
other.
(3) The attorney detennines that no additional facts are
known by each party which might give rise to an
independent basis of liability against the other or
against themselves by the other.
(4) The attorney advises each party as to the possible
theories of recovery or defense which may be
foregoing through this joint representation based on
the disclosed facts. DR 5-1 05(C).
(5) Each party agrees to forego any claim or defense
against the other based on the facts known by each
at the time. DR 5-1 05(C).
(6) Each party agrees that the attorney is free to
disclose to the other party, at the attorney's
discretion, all facts obtained by the attorney.
(7) The attorney outlines potential pitfalls in multiple
representation, and advises each party of the
opportunity to seek the opinion of independent
counsel as to the advisability of the proposed
multiple representation; and, each either consults
separate counselor advises that no separate
consideration is desired.
(8) Each party acknowledges that the facts not
mentioned now but later discovered may reveal
differing interests, which, if they do not
compromise these differences, may require the
attorney to withdraw from the representation of
both without injuring either. DR 2-110; 5-101(B).
(9) Each party agrees that the attorney may represent
both in the litigation. DR 5-105(C).
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2. Representation of Multiple Clients - Plaintiffs.
Defense counsel is not alone in this legal quandary. Plaintiff
counsel must insure that the joint representation ofmultiple plaintiffs does
not violate this Supreme Court Rule. For example, in a discharge context,
one plaintiff could claim that the other alone committed the offense for
which they were both discharged. In addition, pursuant to Comment 6,
counsel must look to the parties' testimony rnd detennine if there is
substantial discrepancy as well as determine whether there are substantial
different possibilities of settlement.
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C. PAYMENT OF LAWYER'S SERVICES.
Defense counsel often run into this issue when they are representing the
supervisory employee and the corporate defendant is paying the attorneys' fee for
the supervisory employee. Comment 9 to Supreme Court Rule 3.130 addresses
this issue. The comment states as follows:
[9] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the
client is infonned of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not
compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f).
For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in
a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is
required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should
assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a
corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in
which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds
for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the
clients consent after consultation and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's
professional independence.
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D. POSITIONAL CONFLICTS.
Although I represent employers 95% of the time, Ido take plaintiff cases.
As such, I am aware of the potential conflict of interest in this area. Conflict can
occur in this area when advocacy of a legal issue on behalf of one client could
adversely affect a client in a second matter through precedential effect.
Although neither the Code nor the Model Rules prohibit most positional
conflicts, both include provisions that could encompass some of the matters. If
any representation would involve misuse of client confidences, it would be
prohibited. In addition, if accepting representation would compromise a lawyer's
"independent professional judgment," or would "adversely affect" the lawyer-
client relationship, it would be prohibited. See Supreme Court Rules 3.130(1.6)
and (1.7).
There are three comments to Supreme Court Rule 3.130(1.7) which
address loyalty. They are as follows:
[1] Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a
client. An impermissible conflict of interest may exist before
representation is undertaken, in which event the representation should be
declined. If such a conflict arises after representation has been
undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule
1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws
because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may
continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See
also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or,
having once been established, is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and
Scope.
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[2] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits
undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that
client's consent. Paragraph (a) expresses that general rule. Thus, a lawyer
ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents
in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand,
simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests
are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does
not require consent of the respective clients. Paragraph (a) applies only
when the representation of one client would be directly adverse to the
other.
[3] Loyalty to a client is also impaired whe~ a lawyer cannot
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate c0urse of action for the
client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The
conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available
to the client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict
does not itselfpreclude the representation. The critical questions are the
likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will
materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment
in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably
should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given
to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved.
See also ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 93-377 (Oct. 16, 1993)
(when a lawyer is asked to advocate a position with respect to a
substantive legal issue that is directly contrary to the position being urged
on behalf of another client in a different and unrelated matter which is
being litigated in the same jurisdiction, the lawyer, in the absence of
infonned consent by both clients, should refuse to accept the second
representation if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's advocacy on
behalfof one client will create a legal precedent which is likely to
materially undercut the legal position being urged on behalf of the other
client).
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E. CONFLICT OF INTEREST - FORMER CLIENT.
Supreme Court Rule 3.130(9) provides as follows:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter.
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially
related matter in which that person's interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation.
(b) Represent a person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was
associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that
person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to
the matter; unless the former client consents after
consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented· a client in a matter
ofwhose present or former firm has formerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(1) Use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6
or Rule 3.3 would peffilit or require with respect to
a client or when the information has become
generally known; or
(2) Reveal infonnation relating to the representation
except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or
require with respect to a client.
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F. INSURANCE ISSUES.
In an increasing number of cases, employers and individual defendants have been
successful in establishing insurance coverage for employment law claims made against
them. In other cases, insurers will provide defense costs (and sometimes actually retain
counsel to represent the insured) under a reservation of rights. In suc~ cases, attorneys
must be aware of the potential conflicts between the inter4ts of the insurer and the
insured. It has been made clear that the rules ofprofessional conduct, and not the
insurance contract, govern the ethical obligations of a lawyer retained by the insurer to
defend its insured.
Formal Opinion 96-403 imposes special requirements on lawyers defending. an
insured under an insurance policy that permits the insurer to control the defense and settle
within policy limits in its sole discretion. The Opinion requires the lawyer to
communicate to the insured the limitations that the policy places on his representation,
"preferably early in the representation." Once the lawyer has so informed the insured, he
need not consult the insured again before settling at the direction of the insured.
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G. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES.
1. Attorney-client Privilege Does Not Cover Preparing Former
Employee for Deposition.
The attorney-client privilege does not shield communications
between a corporation's in-house lawyers and a non-client former
employee about the latter's upcoming deposition testimony, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District ofNew York has held. (New York
City v. Coastal Oil New York, Inc., S.D.N.Y, No. 96 Civ. 8667 (RPP),
2/7/00).
Judge Robert P. Patterson Jr. decided that a corporation's
opponent in litigation would be permitted to inquire about witness
preparation sessions in which inside corporate counsel prepared a former
employee for an impending deposition. The former employee did not
view the lawyers as his attorneys, and they were not investigating
allegations against the corporation, Patterson explained.
At the deposition of a former employee of Coastal Oil, he was
asked about earlier conversations with two in-house lawyers for the
corporate defendants. The employee acknowledged that he had spoken
with the two lawyers in preparation for the deposition. However, he was
directed by his lawyer - the corporate defendants' outside counsel - not to
answer questions about the preparation that he received from the in-house
lawyers. The conversations in question were protected by the attomey-
client privilege, the defendants argued.
L· 17
The Court distinguished Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981), in which a corporate defendant was held entitled to the protection
of the lawyer-client ,privilege with respect to the conversations of in-house
counsel with corporate employees while investigating allegations against
the corporation.
The present case, in contrast, involved a discovery dispute in
which the plaintiffs were seeking to find oUf whether a third party witness
had his memory "refreshed" by in-house counsel. The allegations against
the corporate defendants had long since been investigated and had been
the subject of a criminal trial, he noted, and there was no showing that the
in-house lawyers were acting in an investigatory capacity during the
conversations in question.
More on point, the Court noted, was Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190
F.R.D. 38 (D. Conn. 1999), which allowed limited discovery ofa former
employee's conversations with counsel for the defendant. Patterson also
cited the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Section 123,
Comment e (Proposed Final Draft No 1, 1996), which states that for the
corporate privilege to apply a former employee must have "an agency
relationship to the principal-organization at the time of the
communication."
The Court did limit the questioning to the in-house lawyers'
activities that aided in preparing to be dep.osed, such as information the
employee provided to him during the conversations, actions and
L· 18
statements that "refreshed" his recollection, reminders ofhis prior
testimony or prior statements, references to the testimony of other
witnesses, or any instructions about his testimony that he received from
the in-house lawyers.
2. Lawsuits by Former In-house Attorneys.
There has been a plethora of cases discussing whether or not
former in-house attorneys have standing to bring claims against their
former employers. The ABA Ethics Committee has held that there is
nothing in the Model Rules that precludes a lawyer from suing his or her
former client. In Opinion 01-424, rendered in September 2001, the
Committee okayed such a lawsuit, but also guarded against the disclosure
ofunnecessary information.
3. Secretly Recording Conversations.
On June 24, 2001, the ABA Ethics Committee abandoned its
longstanding view that a lawyer may not ethically record a conversation
with the consent of all parties and advised instead that a lawyer does not
violate the Model Rules by secretly, but lawfully, taping a conversation.
Formal Opinion 01-422.
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4. Candor Toward the Court.
Supreme Court Rule 3.130(3.3) provides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Make false statement ofmaterial fact or law to a
tribunal;
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to the tribunal when
disclosure is necessary to avoid a fraud being
perpetrated upon the tribunal;
(3) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If
a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to
know of its falsi~y, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the
-conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance
requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer
reasonably believes is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which
will enable the tribunal to make an infonned decision,
whether or not the facts are adverse.
(e) The obligation of the advocate under these rules is
subordinate to such constitutional requirements as may be
announced by the courts.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
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5. Fairness.
Supreme Court Rule provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) ,Unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other
material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall
not counselor assist another person, to do any such act;
I
(b) Knowingly or intentionally falsify evidence, counselor
assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to
a witness that is prohibited by law;
(c) Knowingly or intentionally disobey an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an
assertion that no valid obligations exists;
(d) In pretrial procedure, knowingly or intentionally make a
frivolous discovery request or deliberately fail to make.
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request by an opposing party;
(e) In trial, knowingly or intentionally allude to any matter that
the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that
will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert
personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying
as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of
a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a
civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or
(f) Present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
criminal or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an
advantage in any civil or criminal matter.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
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Corporate Counsel
Fonner In-House Lawyer May Pursue Claim
For Wrongful Discharge, ABA Opinion Advises
I
t is not unethical for a former in-house corporate
counsel to pursue a wrongful discharge action
against her ex-client so long as the lawyer does not
reveal more client information than reasonably neces-
sary to establish the claim, the ABA's ethics committee
advised Sept. 22 (ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Ope 01-424,
9/22/01).
The committee grounded its advice on the exception
in Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 that autho-
rizes disclosure of client information when necessary to
establish a "claim" in a dispute between the lawyer and
the client. But a lawyer suing a former client-employer
must take affinnative steps to guard against unneces-
sary disclosure of information learned during the repre-
sentation, the opinion cautions.
The opinion does not address the underlying legal
question of whether a fonner in-house lawyer who is
fired for complying with her ethical obligations has a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge-a_matter on
which courts have reached opposite conclusions. Nor
does it address the subject of wrongful discharge claims
steps to ensure that the foreign lawyer is specially
trained to provide advice on the laws of the foreign ju-
risdiction and to represent clients in its legal system.
Moreover, the committee said, members of the firm
must satisfy themselves that the arrangement complies
with the law of the jurisdictions in which the finn prac-
tices.
For instance, the committee said, qualification as a
foreign lawyer should be accorded to an avocat (court-
room lawyer) or conseil juridique (transactional or
business lawyer) but not to a notario (notary), which is
a Usubstantially different functionary" in most civil law
jurisdictions.
If professionals in a foreign jurisdiction do not
qualify as members of a recognized legal profession in
their home country, the committee said, they should be
considered nonlawyers for purposes of Rule 5.4 and
would not be eligible for partnership.
Differing Standards. u.s. lawyers should remain
aware, the committee advised, that ethics standards in
a number of foreign countries-such as those governing
confidentiality-differ from the standards that apply to
lawyers in the United States, and that responsible law-
yers in the U.S. firms should not only make certain that
clients understand these differences but also ensure
that client information in U.S. offices remains pro-
tected.
Finally, the committee warned that U.S. lawyers
must take care not to help the foreign lawyer engage in
unauthorized practice. Calling upon a foreign lawyer to
provide advice on the law of a foreign jurisdiction to a
client who is located in the United States ordinarily
would not violate Rule 5.5, the committee said, so long
as the foreign lawyer is not regularly in the jurisdiction
where the U.S. office is located and the matter has a re-
lationship to the jurisdiction in which the foreign law-
yer is admitted to practice.
•
•
•
actions may occur."
ABA FORMAL OP. 01-424
ETHICS OPINIONS
The committee decided that a retaliatory discharge
or similar claim by an in-house lawyer against her
fonner employer constitutes a "claim" under the Rule
1.6(b)(2) exception. Although the Model Rules do not
define "claim," the committee found that paragraph
(b)(2) was intended to enlarge the predecessor Model
Code of Professional Responsibility provision beyond
.claims for fees to reach other claims such as recovery
of property from the client.
In addition, the committee relied on Burkhart v.
Semitool Inc., 5 P.3d 1031 (Mont. 2000), which held, the
committee said, that Montana's identical version of
Rule 1.6 permits confidential client infonnation to be re-
vealed by a former in-house lawyer pursuing a retalia-
tory discharge claim against her ex-employer.
Constraints on Disclosure. The opinion warns that in
pursuing a retaliatory discharge claim, "the lawyer
must limit disclosure of confidential client information
to the extent reasonably possible."
The fonner in-house lawyer "must take reasonable
affirmative steps"-which will be unique to each
case-to guard against unnecessary disclosure of confi-
dential client information, the committee said. It sug-
gested that these specific protections be considered:
• in camera review at a pretrial evidentiary hearing;
• sealing the record of the proceedings; and
• not disclosing the parties' names.
In giving this advice, the committee drew on the
comment to Rule 1.6, which states that U[a] lawyer must
make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary dis-
closure of information relating to a representation, to
limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and
to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements
limiting the risk of disclosure."
by law firm associates. Case law on those issues is sum-
marized in extensive footnotes in the opinion, however.
'Claim' Against Ex-Client. "There is nothing in the
~ Model Rules that precludes a lawyer from suing her
former client and, in fact, the Rules contemplate that
such actions may occur," the opinion states.
The committee acknowledged that Rule 1.9 forbids a
lawyer who has formerly represented a client to reveal
information relating to the representation or to use
such information to the former client's disadvantage.
But that rule carves out an exception, the committee
noted, for disclosure permitted by Rule 1.6, and para-
graph (b)(2) of Rule 1.6 allows a lawyer to reveal client
information "to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary ... to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the law-
yer and the client."
"There is nothing in the Model Rules that
precludes a lawyer from suing her former client
and, in fact, the Rules contemplate that such
(Vol. 17, No. 23)660
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS 'AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Formal Opinion 01-424
A Former In-House Lawyer May Pursue a Wrongful Discharge Claim Against Her
Former Employer and Client As Long As Client Information Properly Is Protected
September 22, 2001
The Model Rules do not prohibit a lawyer from suing her former client and
employer for retaliatory discharge. In pursuing such a claim, however, the
lawyer must take care not to disclose client information beyond that information
the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to est~blish her claim.
i
Retaliatory Discharge Claims
In this opinion, we address the constraints that may be imposed on
retaliatory or wrongful discharge claims by in-house lawyers against their
former employers and clients under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. We
note at the outset that the Committee does not address the legal question of
whether the discharge of an in-ho~se lawyer--even one that alleges that the
employer has "retaliated" for the lawyer's proper adherence to her ethical
obligations--gives rise to an enforceable claim. n1 The Committee only addresses
the ethical considerations that arise under the Model Rules when such an action
is permitted under applicable state law. n2
n1 This opinion also does not address a retaliatory discharge claim by a
lawyer against the law firm by which she is employed. A retaliatory discharge
claim by a former in-house lawyer may be distinguished from a wrongful discharge
suit by a lawyer against a law firm. A law firm and lawyer are bound to conduct
their practices in accordance with prevailing ethical obligations. Wieder v.
Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 636, 609 N.E.2d lOS, 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 755 (N.Y.
1992). The employer of an in-house lawyer necessarily is not bound by legal
ethical rules. See Mourad v. Automobile ,Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 400
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991). In Wieder, an associate sued a law firm claiming he was
fired for insisting that the firm comply with governing disciplinary rules and
that it report the misconduct of another associate. 80 N.Y.2d at 631, 609 N.E.
2d at 106, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 753. The New York Court of Appeals held there was an
implied obligation that both the firm and the associate would carry out the
employment contract in compliance with ethical obligations, meaning the firm
could not require an associate to violate ethical obligations in order to keep
his job., 80 N.Y.2d at 636, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
n2 Courts permit retaliatory discharge claims by former employees as an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, which avows that when an employee
does not have a written employment contract and the term of employment is of
indefinite duration, the employer can terminate the employee for "good cause,
bad cause, or no cause at all." See generally Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116
Cal. App. 3d 311, 319-21, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920-22 (1st Dist. 1981); Brian F.
Berger, Note, Defining Public Policy Torts In At-Will Dismissals, 37 STANFORD L.
REV. 153, 153 (1981). The exception provides relief to employees discharged ,for
reasons contrary to public policy, such as for exercising statutory or
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constitutional rights or for whistleblowing when an employee refuses to violate
the law and reports an employer's wrongdoing. E.g., Parker v. M & T Chemicals,
236 N.J.Super. 451, 460, 566 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(court construed state whistleblower act as compelling a retaliating employer to
pay damages to an employee-lawyer who is discharged wrongfully or mistreated for
refusing to join a scheme to cheat a competitor or for any reason that is
violative of law, fraudulent, criminal, or incompatible with a clear mandate of
the state's public policy concerning public health, safety or welfare); Perks v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1365-66 (3d. Cir. 1979)
(Pennsylvania statute forbidding employer from requiring polygraph test as
condition for employment or continuation of employment embodies a recognized
facet of public policy). In addition, certain states have enacted legislation in
this area. For example, in Louisiana, an employment contract in restrain of
membership in labor organizations is contrary to public policy. La. Rev. Stat.
Ann § 823 (West 2001) . I
I
Employers faced with retaliatory discharge suits from former in-house lawyers
assert an absolute right to discharge their lawyer at any time and for any
reason because no client should be forced into representation by a lawyer in
whom that "confidence and trust lying at the heart of a fiduciary relationship
has been lost. II General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1174,
876 P.2d 487, 493, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1994); Parker v. M & T Chemicals,
236 N.J.Super. at 458, 566 A.2d at 219. The absolute right to terminate an
in-house lawyer under any circumstances without consequence has been limited,
however, by a number of courts in recent years that have noted that the in-house
lawyer uniquely is bound to her client. Where outside counsel face dilemma with
clients, the in-house lawyer faces "a virtually complete dependence on the good
will and confidence of a single employer to provide livelihood and career
success." General Dynamics, 7 Cal.4th at 1182, 876 P.2d at 498. 32 Cal.Rptr.2d
at 12. Thus, some courts have permitted the retaliatory discharge claim by the
former in-house lawyer. These courts find there are compelling reasons of public
policy that make it appropriate to impose legal consequences for dismissing an
in-house lawyer. Specifically, they conclude that the public has an interest in
insuring that lawyers abide by their ethical obligations.
Courts also have recognized state-adopted codes of ethics for lawyers as a
reflection of public pOlicy. E.g., Mourad v. Automobile Club, 465 N.W.2d 395 at
400 (court refused to address in-house lawyer's retaliatory discharge claim but
held that lawyer could maintain action for breach of contract based on
retaliatory demotion and constructive discharge resulting from his refusal to
violate code of professional conduct). In addition to Mourad, other courts that
have provided relief to an in-house lawyer dismissed in retaliation for either
insisting on adhering to mandatory ethical norms of the profession or for
refusing to violate them include GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart, 421 Mass. 22,
29, 653 N.E.2d 161, 165 (Mass. 1995) (public interest is better served if
in-house counsel's resolve to comply with ethical and statutorily mandated
duties is strengthened by providing judicial recourse when an employer's demands
are in direct and unequivocal conflict with those duties) and General Dynamics
Corp., 7 Cal.4th at 1186, 876 P.2d at SOl, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d at 15 (in-house
counsel should be permitted to pursue a claim for wrongful discharge if the
claim is "founded on allegations that an in-house attorney was terminated for
refusing to violate a mandatory ethical duty embodied in [the state's code of
professional conduct] II). See also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116, 118
(S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th eire 1988)
e™ LexisNexis™ e™ LexisNexis™ e™ LexisNexis™
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(implying that code of ethics reflected public policy, but holding other
remedies, such as withdrawal from representation, sufficient to avoid violating
public policy); Herbster v. North American Co., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346-48 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 114 Ill.2d 545, 108 Ill. Dec. 417, 508
N.E.2d 728 (1987) (stating that code of ethics reflected public policy despite
disallowing vice-president in charge of legal department's retaliatory discharge
claim). On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a lawyer
retaliatory discharge claim in Balla v. Gambro, 145 Ill.2d 492, 501-02, 584
N.E.2d 104, 108-09, 164 Ill. Dec. 892, 896-97 (Ill. 1991), on the grounds that
public policy adequately is safeguarded without extending the tort of
retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel and that permitting such suits would
have an undesirable effect on the lawyer-client relationship.
The Model Rules and Retaliatory Discharge Claims
There is nothing in the Model Rules that precludes a lawyer from suing her
former client and, in fact, the Rules contemplate that such actions may occur.
n3
n3 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2001). Rule 1.6 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and
except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
The principal obligations of a lawyer to her former client are to continue to
maintain the confidentiality of the client information learned during the course
of the representation and to neither "use information relating to the
representation to the disadvantage of the former client" nor "reveal information
relating to the representation" n4 except, in both cases, as permitted by Rule
1.6 or Rule 3.3. n5 Under Rule 1.6(b) (2), a lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation of the client "to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary . . . to establish a claim or defense on behalf of
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer artd the client .... "
n4 Rule 1.9 states in part:
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter of whose
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
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(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with
respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or
Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.
n5 Rule 3.3 states in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraUdUlert act by the client,
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the
proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
The term "claim" is not defined under/the Model Rules. In the predecessor
Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 4-101 (C) allowed a lawyer to reveal
"confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct." 06 When the Model Rules were adopted in 1983, the Conunents explained:
"with regard to paragraph (b) (2), DR 4-101 (c) (4) provided that a lawyer may
reveal 'confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employers or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct.' Paragraph (b) (2) enlarges the exception to include disclosure of
information relating to claims by the lawyer other than for the lawyer's
fee--for example, recovery of property from the client." n7 Recently, the
Montana Supreme Court concluded that Rule 1.6 of the Montana Rules of
Professional Conduct, which is identical to Model Rule 1.6, contemplates
revealing confidential client information by a former in-house lawyer pursuing a
retaliatory discharge claim against her former employer. n8 We conclude that a
retaliatory discharge or similar claim by an in-house lawyer against her
employer is a "claim" under Rule 1.6(b) (2).
n6 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (4) (1978).
n7 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 68 (4th ed. 1999).
n8 Burkhart v. Semitool, Inc., 300 Mont. 480, 497, 5 P.3d 1031, 1041 (Mont.
2000) .
Only Necessary Information May Be Disclosed
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In pursuing a retaliatory discharge claim, however, the lawyer must limit'
disclosure of confidential client information to the extent reasonably possible.
A comment to Rule 1.6 provides that" [a] lawyer must make every effort
practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a
representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to
obtain protective orders or make other arrangements limiting the risk of
disclosure." n9
n9 Rule 1.6 cmt. [19].
The measures necessary to protect information that may be disclosed will be
unique to each situation. For example, a lawyer should consider the protections
offered by in camera review at a pre-trial evidentiary hearing. To prevent
unnecessary disclosure of confidential information, a lawyer should consider
requesting that a court seal the record of the proceedings n10 and consider in
an appropriate case whether the action should go forward without disclosing even
the names of the parties. n11
n10 See, e.g., Doe v. A. Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1045, n.1, reh'g denied, 717
F.2d 1399 (5th Cir. 1983).
n11 Id.
Conclusion
Retaliatory discharge actions provide relief to employees fired for reasons
contradicting public pOlicy. The Model Rules do not prevent an in-house lawyer
from pursuing a suit for retaliatory discharge when a lawyer was discharged for
complying with her ethical obligations. An in-house lawyer pursuing a wrongful
discharge claim must comply with her duty of confidentiality to her former
client and may reveal information to the extent necessary to establish her claim
against her employer. The lawyer must take reasonable affirmative steps,
however, to avoid unnecessary disclosure and limit the information revealed.
This opinion is based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and, to the
extent indicated, the predecessor Model Code of Professional Responsibility of
the American Bar Association. The laws, court rules, regulations, codes of
professional responsibility, and opinions promulgated in the individual
jurisdictions are controlling.
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Corporate Counsel
Tennessee COUR Says 'In-House Counsel
Can't Bring Suit for Retaliatory Discharge
Hutchins's "investigation" came in response to a
specific assignment from a partner, not from an inde-
pendent suspicion of fraud, the court emphasized.
The court also stressed that Hutchins did not tell the
firm that he was going to report the problem to govern-
ment officials or that he was contemplating his own qui
tam suit. Furthermore, he did not use the terms "ille-
gal" or "fraud" nor did he attempt to discuss the firm's
billing practice with corporate counsel, the court added.
Marianne E. Murphy of Tompkins, McGuire,
Wachenfeld & Barry, Newark, N.J., argued for Wilentz,
Goldman. & Spitzer. Douglas Hallward-Driemeier,
Washington, D.C., argued for the United States.
Hutchins argued on his own behalf.
An in-house lawyer who claims that she was firedfor reporting her supervisor's lack of a Tennesseelaw license cannot pursue a claim for retaliatory
discharge under Tennessee law even if the claim could
be proven without violating' the attorney-client privi-
lege, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held June 18
(Crews v. Bu.ckman Laboratories International Inc.,
Tenn. Ct. App., No. W2000-01834-COA-R3-CV, 6/18/01).
Addressing a question of first impression in the state,
the court expressed concern that allowing in-house
counsel to pursue a retaliatory discharge claim could
chill the relationship between' corporate lawyers and
their employer-clients.
No Tennessee License. Julia Beth Crews alleged that
she was working as an in-house lawyer for Buckman
Laboratories International when she discovered that
her supervisor-the company's general counsel,
Katherine Buckman Davis-was not licensed to practice
law in Tennessee.
Crews alleged that when she expressed concern
about Davis's licensing status to Joe M. Duncan, an at-
torney and a member of Buckman's board of directors,
Duncan submitted an inquiry to the Tennessee Board of
Professional Responsibility, which advised that "a per-
son with a valid license from another state may not be
employed as general counsel in Tennessee, unless that
person also has a valid Tennessee law license."
Crews alleged that Davis then took th~ Tennessee
bar exam but failed to complete other requirements for
a Tennessee law license. 'Crews claimed that she re-
ported the problem to company officials, consulted in-
dependent legal counsel, and inf0"!1ed !he board. of law
examiners, whereupon the work situation detenorated
and Buckman fired her.
Three Views. On appeal .from the tria!- court's dis-
missal of Crews's wrongful discharge action, the court
framed the issue as "whether Ms. Crews has stated a
common law claim for retaliatory discharge in violation
of the public policy of the State of Tennessee."
In his opinion for the court, Judge W. Frank Craw-
ford noted that under a public policy exception to the
at-will employment doctrine in Te!U1essee, an
employee-at-will generally may not. be ~schar:ged for
any reason that violates a clear pubhc polIcy eVIdenced
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No Retaliatory Discharge. Hutchins also alleged that
the law firm fired him for his investigation and report-
ing of fraud, in violation of Section 3730(h), a "whistle-
blower" provision that entitles employees to relief if
they are discharged or otherwise discriminated against
for investigating or prosecuting a civil action for false
claims.
A successful cause of action under this provision, the
court said, requires the plaintiff to show that he en-
gaged in "protected conduct," meaning acts done in
furtherance of a False Claims Act suit, and that his em-
ployer was on notice of the "distinct possibility" of
False Claims Act litigation and retaliated against him
because of his protected conduct.
The court acknowledged that, in many cases, an em-
ployee's internal reporting of fraudulent or illegal activ-
ity to an employer may satisfy these requirements. But
an employee whose job duties involve investigating and
reporting fraud has a heightened burden of proof on
these points, the court declared.
Applying these principles, !he court fou~d that
Hutchins failed to meet the requirements for sUing as a
whistleblower.
Hutchins contended that even if no government
money was expended in connection with the law firm's
inflated legal bills, the submission of these bills for ap-
proval by the bankruptcy court amounted to a "false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval'" in violati9n
of Section 3729(a) (1).
The court did not agree. "Although not linguistically
implausible, we find no. support for this reading from
the jurisprudence interpreting the False Claims Act,"
the court declared.
Case law and the statutory definition of "claim" con-
vinced the court that the False Claims Act seeks to re-
dress only the types of fraudulent activity that cause
economic loss to the federal government. Otherwise,
any plaintiff would be permitted to sue on behalf of the
government when false or misleading statements. are
made to any government agent, the court pointed out.
"For these reasons, we hold that the submission of
false claims to the United States government for ap-
proval which do not cause financial loss to the govern-
ment are not within the pUIView of the False Claims
Act," the court declared.
In dismissing the qui tam claim, the district court
stated that the bankruptcy court was merely acting as
an intermediary without control over government
funds. Although affirming the result, the court of ap-
peals rejected that analysis. The proper inquiry, the
court said,.is not whether an intermediary controls gov-
ernment funds but whether the defendant causes the in-
termediary to make a false claim against the govern-
ment resulting in a financial loss to the treasury.
Hutchins also argued that the firm's submission of
fraud~lent legal bills to the bankruptcy court consti-
tuted a "reverse false claim" in violation of Section
3729(a)(7), which holds liable anyone who knowingly I
makes a false statement "to conceal, avoid, or decrease
an obligation" to pay money to the government. If the
government were a creditor t.o a bankrupt estate, it
would suffer economic loss bv reason of the estate's
paying inflated legal bills, Hutchins contended.
The court expressly refused to address that argu-
ment, however, because Hutchins had not pleaded a
Hreverse false claim" violation.
COURT DECISIONS
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by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regula-
tory provision. The court decided, however, that "the
public policy exception does not apply to the particular
facts of this case."
From a survey of the "dozen or so cases from other
jurisdictions which have addressed the issue" of retal-
iatory discharge claims by in-house counsel, the court
discerned three basis approaches.
First, the court noted, some jurisdictions allow the
cause of action under a breach of contract theory-
which Crews did not pursue here-in cases where an
employer's statement of company policy has given rise
to an implied contract benveen the employer and the in-
house lawyer.
The second approach, the court continued, pennits
in-house counsel to maintain a claim for retaliatory dis-
charge if the claim can be proven without any violation
of the la\\yer's obligation to respect client confidences.
The last approach, the court said, is to deny such re-
taliatory discharge claims. The court cited Balla v.
Gambro Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991), as the leading
case for this view, and it quoted at length from Balla,
which it described as "a very well-reasoned opinion."
Public Policy Concerns. In urging the court to permit
her. retaliatory discharge action, Crews argued that
Tennessee has a strong public policy for the regulation
of lawyers. The court found that policy to be adequately
served, however, by the existing protections of Tennes-
see statutes and the lawyer ethics· code.
"[The] well-established disciplinary requirement
[to report ethics violations] is, in and of itself,
sufficient to protect the public policy.concerns at
issue in this case."
TENNESSEE COURT OF .A.PPEALS
In particular, the court noted that a Tennessee stat-
ute prohibits the practice of la\\: by nonlawyers, and
that DR 3-101 (A) of the Tennessee Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits laWyers from aiding nonlaw-
yers in the unauthorized practice of law. Furthermore,
the court remarked, DR 1-103(A) requires a lawyer with
unprivileged knowledge of a disciplinary rule violation
to report it.
Therefore, the court observed, once Crews had
knowledge that Davis was engaged in unauthorized
practice, she was ethically required to report Davis's
conduct. "V-le believe that this \vell-established disci-
plinary requirement is, in and of itself, sufficient to pro-
tect the public policy concerns at issue in this case,"
Crawford stated.
Crews contended that expanding the public policy
exception to include in-house counsel would promote
lawful conduct by lawyers. The court spurned that argu-
ment as incorrectly implying that an in-house lawyer
has a choice between complying \\;th disciplina'ry rules
and retaining her job. "No such choice exists," Craw-
ford declared.
The court was equally unpersuaded by the argument
that enlarging the public policy exception-to include in-
house lawyers would encourage employers to comply
with the law. "We believe that, rather than encouraging
compliance, such an action could seriously impair the
special relationship of trust between an attorney and his
or her client," the court said.
A client needs to have complete trust in its lawyer,
the court emphasized. It took note of the comment·in
Balla that if lawyers are granted the right to sue their
employers for retaliatory discharge, employers might
be less willing to be candid with their in-house counsel,
especi~lly regarding potentially questionable corporate
conduct.
The same logic applies even if the plaintiff-attorney
could prove his case without violating attorney-client
confidentiality, the court added. "In the unlikely event
that the in-house attorney were able to prove retaliatory
discharge without violating privilege," the court said,
"such a claim might have the effect of chilling the
attorney-client relationship."
Finally, Crews suggest~d that allowing money dam-
ages as a remedy for wrongful discharge would not in-
terfere with the employer-client's right to discharge
counsel for any reason. But that remedy would still
leave the problem of chilling the attorney-client rela-
tionship, the court responded. In addition, allowing
damages wo~ld shift the costs of in~house counsel's
compliance with disciplinary rules from the attorney to
the employer, Crawiord pointed out.
Donald A.Donati and William B. Ryan of Donati Law
Firm in rvlemphis, Tenn., represented Crews. Buckman
was represented. by Frederick J. Lewis, Thomas L.
Hendersol1' and Whitney K. Fogerty of Lewis, Fisher,
Henderson & Claxton, Memphis.
Fees
Fee-Sharing Accord Is Unenforceable
Where Split Wasn't Proportional to Services
Fee-sharing agreements not based either on the law-yers' proportion of services rendered or on theirassumption of joint responsibility for the represen-
tation are void, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, Third Department, made clear in a May 24 rul-
ing (Ford v. Albany lVIedical Center, N.Y. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 3d Dept., No. 88516, 5/24/01).
Justice John A. Lahtinen stressed that the "plain lan-
guage" ofNew York's DR 2-107(i\) (2) calls for the divi-
sion of any fee to be in proportion to the services per-
formed by each la\\yer when the lawyers do notin writ-
ing assume joint responsibility for a client's
representation.
Because the la\\)'ers here did not undertake joint ac-
countability for the representation, Lahtinen said, their
purported contract for a split not based on the actual
share of their sen;ces was unenforceable and the fee
must be apportioned based on quantum meruit.
Undone Deal. Sandra Ford consulted with attorney
Eugene R. Spada in February 1998 about a possible
medical malpractice action on behalf of her 'daughter.
Using documents provided by Ford, Spada obtained an
expert medical opinion suggesting that Ford had a
cause of action for medical malpractice.
On April 8, 1998, attorney Charles R. Harding in-
formed Spada by letter that Ford had retained him to
(
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AFFIRMED.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant sought review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals (Kentucky) deny-
ing a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct a trial
court to disqualify trial counsel for having ex parte con-
tacts with appellants employees.
OVERVIEW: Attorneys for real party in interest, al-
leging appellant's racial discrimination, contacted ap-
pellant's employees. Correspondence from appellant's
employee to the attorneys indicated a copy was· sent to
appellant's counsel. Real party in interest sued appel-
lant, and appellant sought the disqualification of her at-
torneys and suppression of notes of interviews, due to
the ex parte contacts. The trial court denied this mo-
tion. Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus from
the court of appeals was denied. Appellants sought re-
view in the state supreme court. Sending a copy of cor-
respondence to a party's attorney did not establish the
attorney represented the party concerning the correspon-
dence. The record did not establish real party in inter-
est's counsel knew appellant was represented concerning
her allegations when they contacted appellant's employ-
ees. Counsel's contact with appellant's former employ-
ees was not prohibited as those employees' interests were
not at stake in the litigation. An attorney's obligation to
avoid the appearance of impropriety was adopted to en-
force an attorney's duty of loyalty to a former client and
did not extend to persons other than clients.
OUTCOME: Court of appeals' denial of writ of man-
damus was affirmed because record did not establish
real party in interest's counsel knew appellant was rep-
resented concerning real party's allegations when they
contacted appellant's current employees, and the attor-
neys were not prohibited from contacting former em-
ployees, as they were no longer parties to the litigation.
CORE CONCEPTS
Civil Procedure: Counsel
Individuals often copy "their attorney" on letters, but
that fact alone does not establish that the attorney is rep-
resenting the letter-writer.
Civil Procedure: Counsel
The requirement in Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130, Rule 4.2 of
securing permission ofcounsel before speaking to some-
one is limited to those circumstances where the inquiring
lawyer knows that the person with whom he wants to
speak is represented by counsel with respect to the sub-
ject of the communication. Actual knowledge is required
and may be inferred from the circumstances.
Civil Procedure : Counsel
Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130, Rule 4.2, entitled
"Communication with Person Represented by
Counsel," limits an attorney's right to contact the
employees of a represented organization.
Civil Procedure : Counsel
See Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130, Rule 4.2.
Civil Procedure : Counsel
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There are three categories of employees of a represented
organization that are off limits to opposing counsel: 1)
persons having managerial responsibility on behalfof the
organization, 2) any other person whose act or omission
in connection with that matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability,
and 3) any other person whose statement may constitute
an admission on the part of the organization.
Civil Procedure : Counsel
Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130, Rule 4.2, restricting employees
of an organization with whom an employee Inay have
contact does not distinguish between current and former
employees of the organization.
Civil Procedure : Counsel
Ex parte contact with an organization's former elnploy-
ees by an attorney pursuing an action against the orga-
nization is not prohibited.
Civil Procedure : Counsel
Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130, Rule 4.2, restricting an attor-
ney's right to have contact with employees of an orga-
nization against whom he or she is pursuing an action,
does not extend to former employees, even if they are
former managerial employees or those whose conduct
might have been the basis for imputing liability to the
employer or whose statements could be admitted in ev-
idence as an admission by the employer.
Civil Procedure : Counsel
The purpose of Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130, Rule 4.2, re-
stricting an attorney's right to contact employees of an
organization represented by counsel, is not to prevent
the flow of information, even if damaging to a party in
a suit.
Civil Procedure: Appeals: Appellate Jurisdiction:
Extraordinary Writs
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and
should be granted only when the lower court is proceed-
ing or about to proceed without jurisdiction, and there is
no adequate remedy by law, or to establish that the lower
court, although acting with jurisdiction, is about to act
incorrectly and there is no adequate remedy by appeal
and great injustice or irreparable injury would result. In
deciding the propriety of the denial of a writ, the ap-
pellate court must determine whether the lower· tribunal
exercised sound discretion or acted arbitrarily.
COUNSEL:
FOR APPELLANT: Jeffrey 1. Kuebler, KUEBLER
LAW OFFICES, Lexington, KY.
FOR APPELLEE, MARY C. NOBLE: Hon. Mary C.
Noble, Judge, Fayette Circuit Court. Lexington, KY.
FOR APPELLEE, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST,
MARY COLEMAN: Albert F. Grasch, Jr., Theodore
E. Cowen, GRASCH & COWEN, P.S.C., Lexington,
KY.
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE, THE
KENTIJCKY ACADEMY OF TRIAL ATTORNEYS:
John C. Roach, Robert E. Wier, RANSDELL, ROACH
& WIER, PLLC, Lexington, KY.
JUDGES:
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE
LAMBERT. All concur, except Wintersheimer, 1., who
concurs in result only.
OPINIONBY:!
LAMBERT
OPINION:
[*918]
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE
LAMBERT
. AFFIRMING
Pursuant to CR 76.36(7)(a), Humco, Inc., doing
business as Humana Hospital-Lexington ("Humana"),
appeals from an order of the Court of Appeals denying
its petition .for a writ of mandamus. Through the writ,
Humco sought to compel Judge Mary C. Noble of the
Fayette Circuit Court to disqualify opposing [**2] coun-
sel for allegedly making improper ex parte contacts,in
violation of SCR 3.130(4.2), with current and former
Humana employees and to suppress written statements
obtained as a result of these contacts.
The underlying claim involves allegations of racial
discrimination by the real party in interest, Mary
Coleman, against Humana, her former employer for
which she worked as a nurse from 1988 to 1995. In July
1995, prior to suit being filed, Coleman's former coun-
sel, Virginia'M. Angellis, wrote to Becky Adams,hos-
pital administrator for Humana, regarding Coleman's
discrimination claims. Adams responded in a letter, not-
ing on the letter that it was copied to Humana's legal
counsel: "Lois Hess, House Counsel, Jewish Hospital
HealthCare Services. " The letter indicated that Humana
did not tolerate discrimination in its organization and
that it had an internal grievance procedure for dealing
with discrimination claims.
In September 1995, prior to the commencement of
litigation, Angellis contacted five Humana employees
regarding the matter. At least four were current em-
ployees at the time of contact, and the position and em-
8 lM LexisNexis lM 8 lM LexisNexis™ 8 lM LexisNexis™
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ployment status of the fifth is unknown. Of these four,
three [**3] were staff nurses and one was a staffmg co-
ordinator. In her affidavit in this proceeding, Angellis
stated that she did not know that Humana was ·repre-
sented by counsel on this matter at the time she under-
took the witness interviews. She further stated that she
was unaware that Humana was formally represented un-
til March 1996, after suit had been filed and William
Rambicure had entered his appearance as counsel for
Humana.
In March 1996, Coleman filed suit against Humana.
In May 1996, Albert F. Grasch and Theodore E. Cowen
ofGrasch and Cowen, P.S.C., replaced Angellis as coun-
sel for Coleman, and the new attorneys took possession
of the notes prepared by Angellis from her communica-
tions with Humana employees. From September 1996
through the winter of 1998, Coleman's counsel con-
tacted approximately tenformer Humana employees, at
both management and non-management levels, without
notice to or consent of Humana counsel. Two of these
former employees were involved in meetings and dis-
cussions regarding the disciplining of Coleman and the
ultimate termination of her employment with Humana.
On February 5, 1999, Humana filed a motion in the
trial court seeking disqualification of Coleman's [**4]
attorneys based upon allegedly improper ex parte con-
tacts with current and former Humana employees. In
its motion, Humana also requested that the trial court
suppress any further use of statements obtained from
Humana employees through these contacts. The trial
court denied the motion for two reasons. With regard
to the current employees Angellis had contacted, the
trial court held that the contacts were not improper be-
cause the employees were not at a managerial or su-
pervisory level or because the contacts occurred before
Humana was represented by counsel. With regard to the
former employees contacted by Grasch and Cowen, the
trial court held such contact is not prohibited by SCR
3.130(4.2), regardless of whether the employees were
at management level or otherwise.
Humana then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
in the Court of Appeals, seeking to compel the trial
court to disqualify Grasch and Cowen and to suppress
the statements they had obtained. The Court of Appeals
denied the writ, holding with regard to the Angellis con-
tacts that there was no evidence that Humana was [*919]
formally represented by counsel at that time and that the
July 1995 letter to Angellis, copied to Humana's [**5]
in-house counsel, was insufficient to put Angellis on no-
tice that Humana was represented by counsel. In support
of this concl~sion, the Court of Appeals relied upon K-
Mart v. Helton, nl which held that the knowledge that
corporations have in-house counsel is not sufficient to
provide actual notice of representation.
nl Ky., 894 S. W2d 630 (1995).
The Court of Appeals further held that the second
set of contacts, between Coleman's current counsel and
former Humana employees, were not improper bec~use
contact with former employees is not prohibited. In sup-
port of this result, the Court of Appeals adopted Formal
Ethics Opinion, KBA E-381, which states that commu-
nications with unrepresented former employees of an
organizational party do not violate SCR 3.130(4.2).
Humana now contends, relying on Shoney's Inc. v.
Lewis, n2 that Ithe contacts made by Angellis with cur-
rent employee~ were improper as Humana was repre-
sented by counsel at the time. Humana maintains that
the letter sent by Adams [**6] to Angellis and copied to
Humana's in-house counsel makes such representation
clear. In Shoney's, the plaintiff's counsel was explicitly
advised that the defendant corporation was represented
by counsel and was given the name of such counsel. No
such explicit information was conveyed to Angellis in
this case. Adams' letter did not state that Humana was
represented by an attorney nor state that all further con-
tact was to be through Hess. Adams' letter did not state
that Hess was to be consulted in the matter.
n2 Ky., 875 S. ~2d 514 (1994).
Individuals often copy "their attorney" on letters,
but that fact alone does not establish that the attorney is
representing the letter-writer nor does this record reveal
any such representation. n3
n3 See K-Mart v. Helton, supra; Miano \I.
AC&R Advertising. Inc., 148 ER.D. 68, 80
(S.D. N. r 1993)("mere existence of general coun-
sel, without particular involvement in the matter at
issue, is insufficient to render a corporation 'rep-
resented' ").
[**7]
This conclusion is supported by a Formal Opinion of
the American Bar Association, No. 95-396. This opin-
ion states that the requirement in Rule 4.2 of "securing
permission of counsel is limited to those circumstances
where the inquiring lawyer 'knows' that the person with
whom he wants to speak is represented by counsel with
respect to the subject of the communication. " The opin-
ion further states that actual knowledge is required and
may be inferred from the circumstances. n4 Such cir-
cumstances are not present in this case, as there is no
_TM LexisNexis™ _TM LexisNexis™ _TM LexisNexis™
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evidence from the record that Humana was formally
represented by Hess when the communications occurred
or that Angellis knew that Humana was represented by
counsel.
n4 ABA Formal Opinion 95-396 at 12-13.
With regard to former managerial employees,
Humana urges this Court to hold that such contacts
should be prohibited if they concern the subject of repre-
sentation and if the former employee has personal knowl-
edge of the matter that could be imputed to the employer.
With regard [**8] to former non-managerial employ-
ees, Humana argues that contact should be prohibited if
an employee's acts or omissions may be imputed to the
organization or if their statements may constitute admis-
sions by the organization. To resolve the issue ofwhether
confidential information should remain confidential re-
gardless of whether the individual is still employed, it
is necessary to review the rule, its rationale, and inter-
pretations thereof.
SCR 3.130, Rule 4.2, entitled "Communication with
Person Represented by Counsel, If limits an attorney's
right to contact the employees of a represented organi-
zation. Specifically, the rule provides:
[*920] In representing a client, a lawyer shall not com-
municate about the subject of the representation with
a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent
of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
The official commentary to the rule explains that there
are three categories of employees of a represented orga-
nization that are off limits to opposing counsel: 1) per-
sons having managerial responsibility on behalf of the
organization, 2) any other person whose act or omission
[**9] in connection with that matter may be imputed
to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal li-
ability, and 3) any other person whose statement may
constitute an admission on the part of the organization.
n5
n5 8ee8honey's~ Lewis, Ky., 8758. ~2d514,
515 (1994)(citing SCR 3.130, Rule 4.2, comment
2).
The rule does not distinguish between current and
former employees of the organization. As noted by the
Court of Appeals, Formal Ethics Opinion KBA E-381
provides guidance in this area. In holding that ex parte
contact with an organization's former employees is not
prohibited, the ethics opinion reasoned, tl a former em-
ployee is no longer subject to the control of the organiza-
tion nor in a position to speak for the organization, and
cannot make vicarious admissions under the state and
federal evidence rules. tI The opinion refers to a formal
opinion issued in 1991 by the American Bar Association
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
which explicitly states that [**10] Rule 4.2 does not ex-
tend to former employees, even if they are former man-
agerial employees or those whose conduct might have
been the basis for imputing liability to the employer or
whose statements could be admitted in evidence as an
admission by the employer. n6
n6 ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Ope 91-359, at 6 (March
22, 1991).
We believe this to be the sound approach and observe
that it has been adopted by the majority of other jurisdic-
tions. The majority rule is consistent with the purposes
and policies of Rule 4.2. The purpose of Rule 4.2 is
not "to prevent the flow of information, even if dam-
aging to a party in a suit." n7 Rather, it is to preserve
the positions of the parties in an adversarial system and
thereby to maintain the protections obtained by employ-
ing counsel and prevent disruption of the attorney-client
relationship. A former employee with no present rela-
tionship with the organizational party is not a "party It
under the rule, and thus the individual is not [**11] ad-
verse in the sense that his interests are at stake in the
litigation.
n7 Aiken ~ The Business and Industry Health
Group, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (D. Kansas
1995).
Finally, Humana argues that the Court of Appeals
should be reversed and the writ of mandamus granted
becau~e, even if no technical ethical violation occurred,
Coleman's attorneys have created an impermissible ap-
pearance of impropriety. n8 This standard has been
adopted as a basis independent of SCR 1.9 for enforc-
ing an attorney's duty of loyalty and confidentiality to
a former client to avoid compromise by subsequent rep-
resentation of another party. n9 Lovell is clearly lim-
ited to protecting the attorney/client relationship or the
reasonable expectations of parties in that regard and to
promoting public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. We decline the invitation to extend this stan-
dard to situations involving transactions with persons
other than clients under SCR 4.2.
n8 Lovell ~ Winchester, Ky., 941 S. W2d 466
(1997).
[**12]
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n9941 S. ~2d 466 at 468-469.
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and
should be granted only when the lower court "is pro-
ceeding or about to proceed without jurisdiction, and
there is no adequate remedy by law, or to establish that
the lower court, although [*921] acting with jurisdic-
tion, is about to act incorrectly and there is no adequate
remedy by appeal and great injustice or irreparable in-
jury would result." n10 In deciding the propriety of the
denial of a writ, this Court must determine whether the
Court of Appeals exercised sound discretion or acted ar-
bitrarily. nIl Here, we are compelled to conclude that
the Court of Appeals' decision was not arbitrary and that
it acted properly in denying Humana's request for a writ
ordering disqualification of opposing counsel.
n10 Bock ~ Graves, Ky., 804 S. W2d 6, 9
(1991).
nIl Jones lJ. Hogg, Ky., 639 S. W2d 543
(1982).
[**13]
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed.
All concur, except Wintersheilner, 1., who concurs
in result only.
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